The Hard Problem of Gravity

[westprog]

No-one falls into any such trap.

And as far as information is concerned, there is no such trap. Simulated information is information.


Yes we do.

If there were some other element essential to consciousness, there would be evidence for it. Situations where an otherwise normal brain did not produce consciousness.

There is no such evidence.

Changes in mental states are invariably accompanied by changes in brain states. There is nothing else to it, and nothing else is required.

Your position is just the assertion that baking bread requires dough, heat, and invisible elves.


What are you talking about? Of course issues of timing and biochemical processes are involved. The brain is a biochemical process. This in no way supports your position or contradicts ours.


This is being actively researched and has been for decades, and all the results support what we are saying.


When it comes to processing information, no, there are not.


Church-Turing thesis. You're wrong.


Westprog, it's not a question of us knowing all about this. It's a question of us knowing something about this, and every statement you have made being factually false.


Not Chalmers or Searle or Jackson, though.


Nope.

There are the smart ones, who are right, and who largely agree.

Then there are the idiots, who are wrong, and mostly work at ANU.


Yes it does.


Then why don't you address them?


Wrong.


Wrong.


Wrong.


It's not getting missed. It's wrong.


Irrelevant.


Irrelevant.


Non-sequitur.


Non-sequitur.


Westprog, please study how the brain actually works. You're talking utter nonsense.


All the people who understand the subject do agree.

Then there's the philosophers...

This is why I don't bother replying to Pixy any more. I have yet to see him make any kind of an argument on this subject. In an argument about consciousness, I'd at least expect someone to exhibit consciousness. A simple script would be able to run through my posts and put "wrong" "stupid" "irrelevant" "non-sequitor" at the paragraph marks.

 

[PixyMisa]

This is why I don't bother replying to Pixy any more. I have yet to see him make any kind of an argument on this subject. In an argument about consciousness, I'd at least expect someone to exhibit consciousness. A simple script would be able to run through my posts and put "wrong" "stupid" "irrelevant" "non-sequitor" at the paragraph marks.

If you want to get a more interesting response, you just need to post something that hasn't already been shown to be wrong, irrelevant, and a non-sequitur.

I didn't use the word "stupid". I did use the word "idiot", specifically to describe Chalmers, Searle, and Jackson, because they are professional philosophers and really should know better.

 

[PixyMisa]

However, the question "Why should this arrangement of switches produce consciousness?" is not to me similarly idiotic because consciousness is more a quality than a substance, and because there does exist a considerable body of research to suggest that things are actually not as simple as this.

That's not an unreasonable question as far as it goes, in large part because you are assuming in your question the answer that Westprog has been studiously avoiding throughout the tread.

But consciousness is not a quality, it is a process. And all processes are physical. And there is no such body of research.

 

[PixyMisa]

This is why I don't bother replying to Pixy any more. I have yet to see him make any kind of an argument on this subject.

I'll also point out that if you haven't seen me make an argument, you haven't read any of my posts, including the one that you just quoted in its entirety.

Do you know what the Church-Turing thesis is? Do you understand why it is relevant, and how it proves that all your objections are irrelevant?

Because it's been mentioned at least a dozen times already, and you seem to have taken no notice.

 

[Dancing David]

"Most people" apparently including a large number cognitive neuroscientists.

Nick

A large number you don't reference, who , where and when?

 

[Apathia]

I don't see the comparison as particularly valid. (eta: not clear if this is your point)

The question "Why should one particular set of particles produce an atom of gold, and another not?" I would consider rightly answered by "Because that's what it is." One might consider perhaps specific qualities of gold and how they might arise from the atomic configuration, but this aside I see this as basically a fair answer.

However, the question "Why should this arrangement of switches produce consciousness?" is not to me similarly idiotic because consciousness is more a quality than a substance, and because there does exist a considerable body of research to suggest that things are actually not as simple as this.

Nick

As I said in a subsequent post, I was being reactive because of situations in my own past where I was given dismissive answers to my questions.

"Why should this arrangement of switches produce consciousness?" isn't a moronic question. Rocketdoger and Pixy may argue that it is based on misunderstanding, but just that our thoughts are in a position that we ask such a thing makes it worthy of examination.

Even silly questions deserve a little respect.
"Why does a man with hair on his head have more hair than a man with hairs?
A funny question, but it has linguistic and even philosophical depth.

It's interesting how some members of this discussion can so forcefully disagree about consciousness and yet have this agreement that it is some kind of substance: a field, a material, an additive, dancing neurons, or ghosts in the machine.

I agree with you that it's a quality and a result of process.

The more productive question isn't
What is consciouness made of?
But
How does it work?

 

[Nick227]

That's not an unreasonable question as far as it goes, in large part because you are assuming in your question the answer that Westprog has been studiously avoiding throughout the tread.

But consciousness is not a quality, it is a process. And all processes are physical. And there is no such body of research.

There's not a body of research specifically trying to prove or disprove the HPC, fair point. However, if we look at GWT, then the question still remains...what materially distinguishes conscious and unconscious processing? Blackmore asks Baars this question. He agrees that it's an explanatory gap. And, AFAICT, this is the current state of scientific research. Note that we are talking actual neurology here, not Strong AI theorising and pontificating. There's a gap. We don't know yet. And that's how it is.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

There's not a body of research specifically trying to prove or disprove the HPC, fair point. However, if we look at GWT, then the question still remains...what materially distinguishes conscious and unconscious processing?

Self-reference.

Blackmore asks Baars this question. He agrees that it's an explanatory gap. And, AFAICT, this is the current state of scientific research. Note that we are talking actual neurology here, not Strong AI theorising and pontificating. There's a gap. We don't know yet. And that's how it is.

No.

If you were talking about how the brain processes language, or vision, or other complex things, you'd be correct. But consciousness itself? No.

 

[Nick227]

A large number you don't reference, who , where and when?

Why not read Blackmore's series of interviews Conversations on Consciousness, and see how many of the interviewees consider that we've actually overcome the HPC at a material level. I believe the answer is none.

In terms of theoretical modelling, sure Dennett does, no doubt O'Regan too. The book isn't just discussing the HPC, but most of the rest admit or infer we don't really know yet.

As soon as there is concurrent conscious and unconscious processing, as humans have, Strong AI needs to explain it, and ideally do so in neuronal terms.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

"Why should this arrangement of switches produce consciousness?" isn't a moronic question. Rocketdoger and Pixy may argue that it is based on misunderstanding, but just that our thoughts are in a position that we ask such a thing makes it worthy of examination.

I think it's a valid and worthwhile question, though I'd phrase it as a "how" rather than a "why".

But it is precisely this question that Westprog and AkuManiMani have desperately been avoiding, because the question itself destroys their argument.

I agree with you that it's a quality and a result of process.

Why do you say it's the result of a process, rather than a process in its own right? I'm curious. I think we're probably just approaching it from a slightly different semantic angle here, and likely more in agreement than disagreement.

The more productive question isn't
What is consciouness made of?
But
How does it work?

Absolutely.

 

[PixyMisa]

As soon as there is concurrent conscious and unconscious processing, as humans have, Strong AI needs to explain it, and ideally do so in neuronal terms.

We have.

Processing without self-reference is unconscious.

Processing with self-reference is conscious.

In neuronal terms, self-reference is a feedback loop.

Hofstadter covers all of this in great depth, by the way.

 

[Nick227]

Self-reference.

My problem with this is that if we look at Dehaene et al's paper, linked earlier in this thread by Lupus, and which attemts to deal with this specific issue, we don't find much mention of self-reference.

They discuss what we know of the specific neuronal attributes that are associated with consciousness. They talk about "ignition states" which lead to "global access." They talk about specific frequencies. They don't talk about self-reference.

You can try, as you did, to associate these specific phenomena to self-reference. But then you need also to explain why they apply for this bunch of neurons over here, and not for this bunch carrying out unconscious processing over here.

Some day in the future maybe it's proven that self-reference is significant here, but AFAICT that day hasn't come yet.

No.

If you were talking about how the brain processes language, or vision, or other complex things, you'd be correct. But consciousness itself? No.

That's a position you're taking there, Pixy. Not a proven fact.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

We have.

Processing without self-reference is unconscious.

Processing with self-reference is conscious.

In neuronal terms, self-reference is a feedback loop.

Hofstadter covers all of this in great depth, by the way.

Yes. But Hofstadter wasn't looking at neurons. He wasn't dealing with the realities of what we now know about the human brain.

The predominant neuronal theory of consciousness currently is the neo-Freudian model, GWT. It is accepted that there is both conscious and unconscious processing. Conscious processing is associated with a so-called "global access" state where a large number of neurons "broadcast" specific informations around the brain. Why this should be consciousness (given that there is also unconscious processing) is not yet known. But we do know that there are certain neuronal conditions which facilitate this consciousness, and I haven't seen any evidence that self-reference is one of them.

Nick

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

My problem with this is that if we look at Dehaene et al's paper, linked earlier in this thread by Lupus, and which attemts to deal with this specific issue, we don't find much mention of self-reference.

They discuss what we know of the specific neuronal attributes that are associated with consciousness. They talk about "ignition states" which lead to "global access." They talk about specific frequencies. They don't talk about self-reference.

No problem there. The 40 Hz event related potentials consist of feedback loops. What do you think the 40 Hz cycling consists in? The same is true of most all EEG activity that we see at the scalp. Much of it -- in the typical alpha and beta ranges -- consists in feedback loops from the thalamus to cortex and back again. Some of it -- particularly the beta-range activity -- seems to consist of local cortical feedback loops.

Feedback loops are one of the primary ways that the human nervous system is constructed in the first place.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

We have.

Processing without self-reference is unconscious.

Processing with self-reference is conscious.

In neuronal terms, self-reference is a feedback loop.

Hofstadter covers all of this in great depth, by the way.

But the cerebellum is one huge feedback loop, and cerebellar function is not conscious. Feedback loops are clearly necessary, but they are not sufficient for what we call consciousness.

 

[PixyMisa]

But the cerebellum is one huge feedback loop, and cerebellar function is not conscious.

We are not (directly) conscious of cerebellar function. That does not mean that it's not conscious itself, just that we don't have access.

Feedback loops are clearly necessary, but they are not sufficient for what we call consciousness.

It does depend on how the feedback loop operates - it needs to be self-referential, not merely referential.

 

[PixyMisa]

My problem with this is that if we look at Dehaene et al's paper, linked earlier in this thread by Lupus, and which attemts to deal with this specific issue, we don't find much mention of self-reference.

Yes we do.

They discuss what we know of the specific neuronal attributes that are associated with consciousness. They talk about "ignition states" which lead to "global access." They talk about specific frequencies. They don't talk about self-reference.

Yes they do.

You can try, as you did, to associate these specific phenomena to self-reference. But then you need also to explain why they apply for this bunch of neurons over here, and not for this bunch carrying out unconscious processing over here.

That "specific frequency" is the operating speed of the self-referential loop. It's nothing more, and no-one in the field suggests that it is anything more.

Global access does not happen at the neuronal level. It's an outcome of the switching network. Introspection of the "global" state is by self-reference.

Some day in the future maybe it's proven that self-reference is significant here, but AFAICT that day hasn't come yet.

Sorry, you're talking nonsense. It's not just that consciousness works by self-reference, we define it as self-reference. We've always defined it as self-reference.

Take a look at Descarte's cogito. He's talking about self-referential information processing.

That's a position you're taking there, Pixy. Not a proven fact.

Wrong. It's not only a proven fact, it's true by definition.

Read Hofstadter.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes. But Hofstadter wasn't looking at neurons.

You haven't read the book, have you?

 

[Apathia]

Why do you say it's the result of a process, rather than a process in its own right? I'm curious. I think we're probably just approaching it from a slightly different semantic angle here, and likely more in agreement than disagreement.

Correct. "result" is some unnecessary verbal baggage there.

 

[Nick227]

No problem there. The 40 Hz event related potentials consist of feedback loops. What do you think the 40 Hz cycling consists in? The same is true of most all EEG activity that we see at the scalp. Much of it -- in the typical alpha and beta ranges -- consists in feedback loops from the thalamus to cortex and back again. Some of it -- particularly the beta-range activity -- seems to consist of local cortical feedback loops.

Feedback loops are one of the primary ways that the human nervous system is constructed in the first place.

So...you're saying that it's the presence of feedbacks loops that makes one set of signals conscious and another not?

Nick