The Hard Problem of Gravity

[PixyMisa]

Since my main criticism of the computational theory of consciousness is that it's not a physical theory, I should probably discuss what a physical theory is, and why computation doesn't fit with it.

Or give up and accept that you are wrong.

When I refer to a physical theory, I mean a theory in Physics.

What do you mean, "a theory in Physics"? Chemistry is applied physics. Biology is applied chemistry. Medicine is applied biology.

It isn't enough that it relates to the physical world - it has to be based on scientific principles. Most importantly, it has to be objective and universal.

You don't mean "a theory in physics", you mean a scientific theory. What you're looking for is information theory.

The existence of a mathematical model does not necessarily imply a physical theory. Some mathematical models don't have universal applicability.

So?

Computation, for example, is a rigorously defined mathematical process, which is then implemented in the real world in the form of computers.

So?

This is a matter of engineering.

So?

We can get devices to implement a model, but we should not fool ourselves into thinking that this is all that is going on.

Argument from ignorance.

Specifically, when we use a computer to direct certain information into our own consciousness, we should not assume that there is anything special about this information transfer.

We don't.

If we accept that information has a real meaning, then we have to accept that it is being transferred from everything in the universe to everything else.

What is that supposed to mean?

And yes, it is the case that the heap of random computer components thrown on the floor is transferring information just as much as the working computer.

If you take a couple of million transistors, diodes, resistors and capacitors, and a few hundred miles of wire, and just dump them all on the floor, do you get a working computer?

The only place where there is a difference - a fundamental difference - is in the human mind interpreting the data.

What difference might that be?

There are ways to measure, or at least estimate, how much information is being transferred around a physical system, but they have nothing to do with the computational model, and they have very little relationship to it.

That's because you keep switching between definitions of "information".

And this is precisely what needs to be addressed by the computational model. Why should one particular information transfer produce consciousness, and another not?

If you take a couple of million transistors, diodes, resistors and capacitors, and a few hundred miles of wire, and just dump them all on the floor, do you get a working computer?

The concept of the "switch" doesn't really help. In nature, there are a vast number of processes which are "switched" on and off. In order for this to happen, there must be natural switches, whether it's a moon casting a shadow on a planet

That's not a switch.

or an atom absorbing energy and changing the state of an electron.

Nor, by itself, is that.

If they don't produce consciousness - why not?

If you take a couple of million transistors, diodes, resistors and capacitors, and a few hundred miles of wire, and just dump them all on the floor, do you get a working computer?

This is not a rhetorical question. It's at the heart of understanding why the mind produces subjective experience.

If you take a couple of million transistors, diodes, resistors and capacitors, and a few hundred miles of wire, and just dump them all on the floor, do you get a working computer?

 

[westprog]

"Why should certain types of information movement give rise to certain phenomena?"

"Why should one particular set of particles produce an atom of gold, and another not? "

Is there a Hard Problem of Gold or not or do you simply consider gold to be a phenomena you can trace from start to finish?

If so then substantiate the claim, "with consciousness we cannot," as in you'll have to explain why your argument isn't one massive smokescreen for "from ignorance doth I gain knowledge!"

Why is it so difficult to recognise that subjective experience is something different - entirely different - from energy transfer? We know that energy can produce motion. We know how it does it. We do not know how energy transfer produces consciousness. We also don't know why one kind of energy transfer produces consciousness, while other kinds don't.

The strange thing is that the hard AI proponents of the computational model don't even realise that they don't have a physical definition of computation, never mind consciousness.

 

[rocketdodger]

But please, stop dismissing the question with a pat answer just because it's one that people with paranormal agendas ask.

You aren't talking about the same question these other people are talking about.

"What is the mathematical nature of consciousness?" is not the "hard problem of consciousness."

That is the real problem, to be sure, but it isn't what people like westprog are after. His statements on this thread are pretty clear about this.

I'd really love to see the mathematics of consciouness.
The details you know.
The how to.

Well, there has been lots of useful information about this stuff in this thread.

Try googling AI topics like neural networks, bayesian networks, or reasoning systems.

There was also this link in the thread already -- you should be able to find links to a whole bunch of other cool stuff from that site:

http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/

Now, granted, there is no exact mathematical model of the human mind yet. There isn't even one for a mouse and probably won't be for some time (even though one is being worked on, it will be years after that before we can actually understand what is going on in the model).

But it isn't that hard -- assuming one has a background in computing -- to imagine how the components we do understand might fit together to produce something like the consciousness we exhibit.

Yes. In theory. In principle, the experience of consciouness ariises from all that brain activity (Though I think it envolves somewhat of the rest of the body as well.) But what's the mathematical twist that makes of it a subjective awareness?

Smart people are still asking that question and seeking pragmatic answers.

Yes, but that has nothing to do with the question people like westprog are asking.

They are asking "given something that exhibits the behavior of consciousness, what extra step occurs to produce consciousness?"

If you ask that about any other phenomenon in the universe, the answer is pretty simple -- there is no extra step, the behavior is the end result.

The only pragmatic answer is that consciousness is just like all these other phenomenon. Especially in light of the fact that we have no evidence to the contrary.

 

[rocketdodger]

Why is it so difficult to recognise that subjective experience is something different - entirely different - from energy transfer?

What scientific evidence do you have that it is different?

 

[westprog]

You don't mean "a theory in physics", you mean a scientific theory. What you're looking for is information theory.

Which is, of course, not a Physics theory.

It's the failure to realise this that compromises the whole concept.

 

[PixyMisa]

Why is it so difficult to recognise that subjective experience is something different - entirely different - from energy transfer?

Different in what way?

We know that energy can produce motion. We know how it does it.

Yes.

We do not know how energy transfer produces consciousness.

Yes we do.

We also don't know why one kind of energy transfer produces consciousness, while other kinds don't.

Yes we do.

The strange thing is that the hard AI proponents of the computational model don't even realise that they don't have a physical definition of computation, never mind consciousness.

Completely wrong in every possible way - as has already been pointed out to you dozens of times.

 

[PixyMisa]

Which is, of course, not a Physics theory.

Wrong!

It's the failure to realise this that compromises the whole concept.

There's a failure somewhere, you got that right.

 

[rocketdodger]

Westprog, is it your position that numbers exist independent of some type of instantiation?

Because to people like Pixy and I, all of mathematics is automatically physical since it doesn't exist without physical instantiation.

If there was nothing to add, then addition would not exist.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Which is, of course, not a Physics theory.

It's the failure to realise this that compromises the whole concept.

Westprog, I think each party has said all they can about this subject. Best to just let the thread die -- no need to try and get the last word

 

[Apathia]

Yes, but that has nothing to do with the question people like westprog are asking.

They are asking "given something that exhibits the behavior of consciousness, what extra step occurs to produce consciousness?"

If you ask that about any other phenomenon in the universe, the answer is pretty simple -- there is no extra step, the behavior is the end result.

The only pragmatic answer is that consciousness is just like all these other phenomenon. Especially in light of the fact that we have no evidence to the contrary.

So they're fishing for the psychological equivilant of Vitalism, is it?
Some Chi or Ki of consciouness that must be added to the mix to get the subjective experience of awareness?

Yeah. That's not what I was asking for.
I'm hoping for mathematics, not hocus pocus.

Thanks for the link.

 

[westprog]

What scientific evidence do you have that it is different?

Science doesn't work that way. If you want to claim, for example, that the electromagnetic and the weak forces are the same, you have to demonstrate it. If consciousness is a matter of energy exchange - and not, for some reason, only associated with electrochemical phenomena - then you have to show it to be so. You also have to show what kinds of energy exchange give rise to consciousness, and which don't. And labelling certain kinds of energy exchange as "computation" and others not certainly doesn't cut it.

 

[rocketdodger]

Science doesn't work that way. If you want to claim, for example, that the electromagnetic and the weak forces are the same, you have to demonstrate it. If consciousness is a matter of energy exchange - and not, for some reason, only associated with electrochemical phenomena - then you have to show it to be so.

Then this really is a matter of education.

Because an educated person would, for example, deduce that an apple rolls down a hill due to the mathematical properties of it's shape rather than the chemical makeup of it's tissue.

Similarly, those educated in this subject have deduced that groups of neurons behave in certain ways due to their mathematical properties rather than their chemical makeup.

Furthermore, those educated in this subject understand that such mathematical properties can also be exhibited by sets of electronic components.

Finally, those educated in this subject understand that if two entities have equivalent mathematical properties then any given combination of one type is equivalent to some combination of the other type.

So it could only be a lack of education that would lead someone to think that only terran animals can be conscious because only terran animals use biological neurons.

You also have to show what kinds of energy exchange give rise to consciousness, and which don't. And labelling certain kinds of energy exchange as "computation" and others not certainly doesn't cut it.

No, I don't -- mathematical induction takes care of that for me. All I need to show is that the behavior of a neuron isn't limited to actual neurons. And that has been shown.

 

[cyborg]

Why is it so difficult to recognise that subjective experience is something different - entirely different - from energy transfer?

Because - as I have explained before - if you don't know what it is you can't know how it is different. Claiming that you know that it is "entirely different" from a position of ignorance does not create knowledge.

 

[westprog]

Because - as I have explained before - if you don't know what it is you can't know how it is different. Claiming that you know that it is "entirely different" from a position of ignorance does not create knowledge.

Assuming knowledge you don't have creates ignorance.

 

[rocketdodger]

Assuming knowledge you don't have creates ignorance.

Assuming someone else doesn't have knowledge because you are incapable of understanding that knowledge is the essence of ignorance.

 

[westprog]

Then this really is a matter of education.

Because an educated person would, for example, deduce that an apple rolls down a hill due to the mathematical properties of it's shape rather than the chemical makeup of it's tissue.

And again the category error. The apple doesn't have mathematical properties. It has physical properties which can be mathematically and scientifically modelled. These include its chemical composition and its shape.

Similarly, those educated in this subject have deduced that groups of neurons behave in certain ways due to their mathematical properties rather than their chemical makeup.

Physical objects always behave in certain ways due to their physical properties. They don't have mathematical properties. We use mathematics to approximately model behaviour. Objects in the real world are not doing mathematics.

This is a critical point, because if you think that physical objects are doing mathematics, then you can fall into the trap of believing that a mathematical simulation is the same as the thing being simulated. In the end, you can stop believing in reality altogether.

Furthermore, those educated in this subject understand that such mathematical properties can also be exhibited by sets of electronic components.

It's always possible to abstract some behaviour of any system. However, it's important to recognise that this always involves discarding information.

In the case of the generation of consciousness, it's possible to conjecture that the essential element is the digital network. Certainly the brain can be abstracted as a digital network. But we don't know whether this is leaving out an essential element.

If there is neurological research indicating without ambiguity that issues of timing and of biochemical processes have no role in creating consciousness, then that would be interesting. How one would perform such experiments, I don't know, given that brains are fairly sensitive and tend to stop working altogether if subjected to too much interference. But such research would be far more convincing than the traditional AI assertion technique.

Finally, those educated in this subject understand that if two entities have equivalent mathematical properties then any given combination of one type is equivalent to some combination of the other type.

It is obvious that a human brain and a digital electronic computer share certain properties which can be mathematically modelled in the same way. It's also obvious that there are other properties which they do not share. To assume that two systems which share any property are thereby entirely equivalent in function is plain silly.

So it could only be a lack of education that would lead someone to think that only terran animals can be conscious because only terran animals use biological neurons.

I find this "I know all about this and you don't" attitude annoying and a little desperate. There are a lot of people thinking about this subject who are smarter than anyone posting on this thread. They manage to disagree on almost every point. There might be a consensus among people researching AI, but it does not extend to everyone else who has relevant knowledge.

If your arguments are good enough (which they clearly aren't) then you won't feel the need to constantly proclaim how smart you are.

No, I don't -- mathematical induction takes care of that for me. All I need to show is that the behavior of a neuron isn't limited to actual neurons. And that has been shown.

In fact, if you think about it at all, you'll realise that the behaviour of a neuron is limited to neurons. A tiny part of the behaviour of a neuron is equivalent to the behaviour of a computer. Most of it isn't. This isn't a trivial point, and I'm continually amazed that no matter how often these things are pointed out, it still keeps getting missed.

Something that biologists have been finding out in the area of genetic research is that genes have multiple functions. While the newspapers are happy to point to the finding of the gay gene, or the evil gene, geneticists realise that in reality, genes interact in complex ways. A reductionist approach to biology is no longer appropriate. The way organs behave cannot be dismissed as unimportant.

If you want to establish that the creation of consciousness (as well as other functions of the brain) is a matter of only one neurological behaviour out of many, then you will need to demonstrate that. Of course, you could fall back to the default procedure of saying "all the people educated in this subject agree". It's not true, but it's at least quick and gives a nice warm glow.

 

[PixyMisa]

This is a critical point, because if you think that physical objects are doing mathematics, then you can fall into the trap of believing that a mathematical simulation is the same as the thing being simulated. In the end, you can stop believing in reality altogether.

No-one falls into any such trap.

And as far as information is concerned, there is no such trap. Simulated information is information.

In the case of the generation of consciousness, it's possible to conjecture that the essential element is the digital network. Certainly the brain can be abstracted as a digital network. But we don't know whether this is leaving out an essential element.

Yes we do.

If there were some other element essential to consciousness, there would be evidence for it. Situations where an otherwise normal brain did not produce consciousness.

There is no such evidence.

Changes in mental states are invariably accompanied by changes in brain states. There is nothing else to it, and nothing else is required.

Your position is just the assertion that baking bread requires dough, heat, and invisible elves.

If there is neurological research indicating without ambiguity that issues of timing and of biochemical processes have no role in creating consciousness, then that would be interesting.

What are you talking about? Of course issues of timing and biochemical processes are involved. The brain is a biochemical process. This in no way supports your position or contradicts ours.

How one would perform such experiments, I don't know, given that brains are fairly sensitive and tend to stop working altogether if subjected to too much interference. But such research would be far more convincing than the traditional AI assertion technique.

This is being actively researched and has been for decades, and all the results support what we are saying.

It is obvious that a human brain and a digital electronic computer share certain properties which can be mathematically modelled in the same way. It's also obvious that there are other properties which they do not share.

When it comes to processing information, no, there are not.

To assume that two systems which share any property are thereby entirely equivalent in function is plain silly.

Church-Turing thesis. You're wrong.

I find this "I know all about this and you don't" attitude annoying and a little desperate.

Westprog, it's not a question of us knowing all about this. It's a question of us knowing something about this, and every statement you have made being factually false.

There are a lot of people thinking about this subject who are smarter than anyone posting on this thread.

Not Chalmers or Searle or Jackson, though.

They manage to disagree on almost every point.

Nope.

There are the smart ones, who are right, and who largely agree.

Then there are the idiots, who are wrong, and mostly work at ANU.

There might be a consensus among people researching AI, but it does not extend to everyone else who has relevant knowledge.

Yes it does.

If your arguments are good enough (which they clearly aren't)

Then why don't you address them?

In fact, if you think about it at all, you'll realise that the behaviour of a neuron is limited to neurons.

Wrong.

A tiny part of the behaviour of a neuron is equivalent to the behaviour of a computer.

Wrong.

Most of it isn't.

Wrong.

This isn't a trivial point, and I'm continually amazed that no matter how often these things are pointed out, it still keeps getting missed.

It's not getting missed. It's wrong.

Something that biologists have been finding out in the area of genetic research is that genes have multiple functions.

Irrelevant.

While the newspapers are happy to point to the finding of the gay gene, or the evil gene, geneticists realise that in reality, genes interact in complex ways.

Irrelevant.

A reductionist approach to biology is no longer appropriate.

Non-sequitur.

The way organs behave cannot be dismissed as unimportant.

Non-sequitur.

If you want to establish that the creation of consciousness (as well as other functions of the brain) is a matter of only one neurological behaviour out of many, then you will need to demonstrate that.

Westprog, please study how the brain actually works. You're talking utter nonsense.

Of course, you could fall back to the default procedure of saying "all the people educated in this subject agree".

All the people who understand the subject do agree.

Then there's the philosophers...

 

[Nick227]

Reminds me of the quips my parents used to throw at me when I asked them questions.

Why/how should a lot of biochemical processes result in self-awareness?

"To make fools like you ask questions."



"There are some questions that smart people don't ask."

"Because you're a moron."

"Yup, there are dumb questions."


But that's not what's going on here.
Here we have a forbidden question.

If it's a question only "woos" are suffered and derided to ask,
then there will only be woo-woo answers.

I don't see the comparison as particularly valid. (eta: not clear if this is your point)

The question "Why should one particular set of particles produce an atom of gold, and another not?" I would consider rightly answered by "Because that's what it is." One might consider perhaps specific qualities of gold and how they might arise from the atomic configuration, but this aside I see this as basically a fair answer.

However, the question "Why should this arrangement of switches produce consciousness?" is not to me similarly idiotic because consciousness is more a quality than a substance, and because there does exist a considerable body of research to suggest that things are actually not as simple as this.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

The question is not forbidden. On the contrary, it is invited. It just has an extremely simple answer. And therein lies the problem -- the answer is so simple that most people refuse to accept it.

"Most people" apparently including a large number cognitive neuroscientists.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Why is it so difficult to recognise that subjective experience is something different - entirely different - from energy transfer?

Because of narrative selfhood. The brain and body construct a purely notional "idea of self" and then ascribe to this notion physical qualities. It is in reality so insubstantial that it will always be vulnerable to self-examination. Thus the brain and body learn not to investigate this "idea of self" too deeply and to simply proceed through life as though it has substance. The computational theory of consciousness attacks this "idea of self" and so the brain attempts to refute it, to avoid giving it validity.

This aside, if you ask me, Strong AI still has core problems when we consider actual neurons, something one of its leading proponents, Dan Dennett, admits he doesn't do.

Nick