The Hard Problem of Gravity

[PixyMisa]

Actually, from what I've read, Chalmers doesn't always take such a position. He frequently says "may be something left to be explained." From a debating point of view of course this is boring and fence-sitting but just to be fair.

He does sometimes make it a question rather than a statement. Either way, though, it's complete nonsense.

 

[westprog]

HPC

How mental states arise from brain activity is a hard problem. I's not insoluble.

This discussion seems to be about whether it's been solved.

 

[PixyMisa]

This discussion seems to be about whether it's been solved.

We know how certain classes of mental states arise from certain classes of brain activity. There's a lot of detail left to be filled in.

But Chalmers says that certain classes of mental states cannot arise from brain activity, because - apparently - he says so.

 

[Nick227]

Wait. What do you mean by "neuronal process" here? Processes within a neuron, or processes involving neurons?

Processes involving neurons. Visual representation in this case.

As I see it, the HPC as it applies in GWT is twofold...

1) it's accepted that there are two classes of neuronal represention - conscious and unconscious. What creates the difference?

2) why does so-called "global access" equate to phenomenality?

I don't see how the notion of self-reference answers these questions.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

HPC

How mental states arise from brain activity is a hard problem. I's not insoluble.

Sorry. I was asking what specific additions to the HPC did Blackmore make over Chalmers' version. You alluded to this earlier.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

As I said, it's a trap.


As you said, it's a trap.

Well, it's a trap if you regard unanswered questions as a trap.

I do feel that at some point you have to concede that many well-regarded cognitive neuroscientists are working with GWT on precisely these issues and it's clear from what they write that they don't yet understand enough to give meaningful answers. It's not as simple as saying it's self-reference. If it was they would say so.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

We know how certain classes of mental states arise from certain classes of brain activity. There's a lot of detail left to be filled in.

But Chalmers says that certain classes of mental states cannot arise from brain activity, because - apparently - he says so.

Chalmers says that even when all the classes of mental states have been tracked back to brain activity, actual phenomenality itself may still be an issue.

Nick

 

[Belz...]

"Why" isn't that the case for other metaphysics, too? How would they answer why questions?

Because there are intelligent agents at the source of the universe in both other cases (god for dualists, the mind for idealists), so there's a "reason" for everything.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

So...you're saying that what separates one neuronal process from another, and makes it conscious and its neighbour not, is that it self-references whereas its neighbour does not? It seems to me that this is unlikely to be true. Remember that we are discussing specifically GWT here.

Nick

In the model itself, what constitutes an unconscious process is that it simply works on basic info. According to the model, what makes something conscious is that it meets at least the three criteria proposed -- those three criteria include self-reference. When the authors refer to involvement (which possibly happens to occur with a 40 Hz loop) of frontal and parietal structures, they refer to directed attention, which is invariably tied to a body map. Directed attention has no meaning without a ground from which to direct attention -- the self (body self). Self reference is built into the very structure of consciousness -- and it is explicit in this model.

Yes, there is a higher order type of self-reference -- the self referring to its self (and self here means the higher order "story self").

Pixy has been speaking of the lower order direct processing with reference to body self as far as I can tell all along (if I'm wrong he can correct me). You can't even speak of consciousness as we experience it without this type of self reference.

 

[westprog]

We know how certain classes of mental states arise from certain classes of brain activity. There's a lot of detail left to be filled in.

Then I suppose the the disagreement is between those who say that it's a matter of filling in detail, and those who say we don't have any real understanding of what's going on at all.

But Chalmers says that certain classes of mental states cannot arise from brain activity, because - apparently - he says so.

 

[Nick227]

In the model itself, what constitutes an unconscious process is that it simply works on basic info. According to the model, what makes something conscious is that it meets at least the three criteria proposed -- those three criteria include self-reference. When the authors refer to involvement (which possibly happens to occur with a 40 Hz loop) of frontal and parietal structures, they refer to directed attention, which is invariably tied to a body map. Directed attention has no meaning without a ground from which to direct attention -- the self (body self). Self reference is built into the very structure of consciousness -- and it is explicit in this model.

Yes. So it doesn't apply here when we're looking for something which separates conscious and unconscious neuronal processing...and can be ignored...which I have been doing.

Yes, there is a higher order type of self-reference -- the self referring to its self (and self here means the higher order "story self").

Pixy has been speaking of the lower order direct processing with reference to body self as far as I can tell all along (if I'm wrong he can correct me). You can't even speak of consciousness as we experience it without this type of self reference.

When I asked Pixy what distinguished unconscious processes from conscious ones in GWT he informed me that the presence of self-referencing did this. See link here to the thread we participated on before this. This is your higher order self-referencing and, as I hope we both agree, it is not this that does the separation.

This key issue in GWT is not, AFAICT, resolved by self-referencing. It seems to me that an unconscious mid-brain process evaluates representations and somehow elevates to global access and thus phenomenality that which fulfils certain self-related criteria.

Nick

 

[RandFan]

Sorry. I was asking what specific additions to the HPC did Blackmore make over Chalmers' version. You alluded to this earlier.

No additions other than the problem isn't insoluble.

 

[PixyMisa]

Processes involving neurons. Visual representation in this case.

Okay, sure.

As I see it, the HPC as it applies in GWT is twofold...

No, wrong. Any time you think the HPC applies to anything, you are automatically wrong, because the HPC is logically self-contradictory.

1) it's accepted that there are two classes of neuronal represention - conscious and unconscious. What creates the difference?

No, wrong.

2) why does so-called "global access" equate to phenomenality?

Wrong.

I don't see how the notion of self-reference answers these questions.

That's because the questions themselves are wrong.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

This is your higher order self-referencing Nick

No, it's not.

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, it's a trap if you regard unanswered questions as a trap.

It's not an unanswered question, it's an unstated premise. In other words, a trap.

I do feel that at some point you have to concede that many well-regarded cognitive neuroscientists are working with GWT on precisely these issues and it's clear from what they write that they don't yet understand enough to give meaningful answers.

No.

It's not as simple as saying it's self-reference. If it was they would say so.

Consciousness is self-referential information processing. That hardly explains every aspect of the human mind.

 

[PixyMisa]

Chalmers says that even when all the classes of mental states have been tracked back to brain activity, actual phenomenality itself may still be an issue.

Right. That's what he says. It's logically incoherent.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

This key issue in GWT is not, AFAICT, resolved by self-referencing. It seems to me that an unconscious mid-brain process evaluates representations and somehow elevates to global access and thus phenomenality that which fulfils certain self-related criteria.

Nick

But reference to self is integral to the model, so I don't even know what it means to say that self-referencing doesn't resolve the process. Without it the model makes no sense.

So, midbrain processes are responsible? If I were to leave your mid brain intact and knock out your cingulate gyrus bilaterally, you'd be conscious?

 

[PixyMisa]

Pixy has been speaking of the lower order direct processing with reference to body self as far as I can tell all along (if I'm wrong he can correct me). You can't even speak of consciousness as we experience it without this type of self reference.

I've been speaking very broadly, as much in terms of definitions as processes. What do we mean when we speak of consciousness? Take it back to Descarte's cogito: I think, therefore I am. It's a statement of self-referential information processing.

To exist as a conscious entity - Nagel's be-able thing of What is it Like to Be a Bat? - is to think, at some level, about one's own thoughts.

Self-reference.

Since that's how we define consciousness, it's little surprise that when we look at conscious processes, we do indeed find self-referential processing.

Hofstadter of course covers this with great thoroughness in GEB, which is why I keep exhorting Nick to read it.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I've been speaking very broadly, as much in terms of definitions as processes. What do we mean when we speak of consciousness? Take it back to Descarte's cogito: I think, therefore I am. It's a statement of self-referential information processing.

To exist as a conscious entity - Nagel's be-able thing of What is it Like to Be a Bat? - is to think, at some level, about one's own thoughts.

Self-reference.

Since that's how we define consciousness, it's little surprise that when we look at conscious processes, we do indeed find self-referential processing.

Hofstadter of course covers this with great thoroughness in GEB, which is why I keep exhorting Nick to read it.

Right, I'm just trying to get him to realize that there are different levels of the same thing -- and you (through Hofstadter) are speaking of all those levels not just the top one. Most of your examples use lower level self-referencing. Hofstadter used many examples from the simple to complex.

Self reference is the key issue even in the model Nick is pushing. All that model does is meld the discovery of 40 Hz event related potentials to one of the generally accepted washes over the whole idea of consciousness.

 

[Nick227]

But reference to self is integral to the model, so I don't even know what it means to say that self-referencing doesn't resolve the process. Without it the model makes no sense.

So, midbrain processes are responsible? If I were to leave your mid brain intact and knock out your cingulate gyrus bilaterally, you'd be conscious?

I was not speaking of what actually creates phenomenality. This is the whole thing here. What I'm saying is that in GWT consciousness/phenomenality/global access appears to be switched by mid-brain, attentional, self-evaluatory processes. They select representations to elevate to consciousness.

We don't know how phenomenality actually takes place and if there is an HPC or not. But it seems increasingly clear that it is associated with so-called "global access." Indeed, this is the core of GWT. And it also seems to me clear that it is simply not the presence of self-reference in the neuronal representation that creates the difference between conscious and unconscious processing.

Nick