The Hard Problem of Gravity

rocketdodger said:
If you consider all of physics computation, then the term "computation" ceases to be useful.

What, then, should we call the difference between what was previously labeled computation and what was not?

[...]

What, then, is the difference between a calculator and a puddle?

You and westprog just don't "get it." All there is are particles. Period. The only differences are in how the particles behave. We label only certain behaviors as computation. All computation is a behavior, but not all behavior is computation.
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I suppose the difference is that technologies like abacuses, calculators, computers, thermostats, GPS systems, etc. are artificial arrangements of matter created by intelligent agents [e.g. humans] to further augment their abilities to manipulate their environment. Its one thing for matter to compute, but quite another to make it compute in a way that is useful for the goals of an intelligent agent.
 
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AkuManiMani said:
I suppose the difference is that technologies like abacuses, calculators, computers, thermostats, GPS systems, etc. are artificial arrangements of matter created by intelligent agents [e.g. humans] to further augment their abilities to manipulate their environment. Its one thing for matter to compute, but quite another to make it compute in a way that is useful for the goals of an intelligent agent.
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Nope.

The difference is the way the behavior of one system is statistically ordered compared to the other. We call such order in behavior "computation," among other things.

Although I should have asked about a puddle and a bacterium, because that is more to the point.
 
Ichneumonwasp said:
Your attempted definition refers only, as far as I can tell, to the actors -- one 'real' and one not -- while making no clear distinction in the action itself.
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I'm not quite sure what you mean by actor, but if I had to guess, I would say that my views are a bit more nuanced than this. I see relations in the "things"--for example, this solid penny sitting here on my desk. It is a penny by a referential social convention--it's a single object partially by that convention, and partially due to its molecular cohesiveness--in particular, it's cohesive to the degree that we are able to physically translate it through space in a pragmatic manner as a separable unit. Its solidity in itself is a result of Pauli Exclusion of fermions. Even its identity per se is merely a pragmatic approximation--technically, the penny is constantly leaking itself into the world (as easily demonstrated by handling it for a while, then noticing your hands smell of copper). So aside from pragmatic linguistics, there's not a significant difference between a penny being tossed and a penny being what a penny is--a countable solid object falling into a conventionally defined equivalence class.

So, regarding this:
The reason this is is because verbs are not real 'things'.
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I would tend to say that real 'things' are actually part 'verb' (more precisely, potential, verb, and "referrant"). In other words, true, the penny is an object, but the object qua object includes a lot of relations in itself. So I'm not quite sure I see a major difference between actor and action.

As such, this:
Referential issues concern the actors, not the action.
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...becomes a bit hard to map into my nuanced view of things--especially when you consider that part of what I refer to as "things" involves particular "kinds" of relations within frames.

But maybe I just make things too complicated.

Edit: This sort of has a point... I'm trying to figure out if I agree with your assessment that the actions in a simulation would constitute the same thing. I'm tending towards disagreement, merely because if I can find a distinction, I can exclude something based on it--and, as such, its possible to conceive of it as a separate "kind of thing" (equivalence class), which means we can say it's not the same, which is my best guess of the negation of what you're claiming.
 
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Ichneumonwasp said:
It isn't really about running, but about consciousness. Westprog's argument is that something will necessarily be left out of the picture with any simulation, while the rest of us are arguing that verbs are defined relationally, so a perfect simulation of running is running. The "thing" running isn't a part of the real world, but so what?

The same is true of consciousness. Any simulation of it that is accurate in all respects solves the problem of consciousness; if we can do it with a computer then we would have explained it.
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But consciousness is not a verb. We can't make coal in a simulation. So we don't know if we can make consciousness. Whether we can make something that tells us something we didn't know about consciousness remains to be seen.
 
And a topical story: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8012496.stm

...snip...

A detailed simulation of a small region of a brain built molecule by molecule has been constructed and has recreated experimental results from real brains.

...snip...

the Blue Brain project was conceived to reverse-engineer mammal brains from real laboratory data and to build up a computer model down to the level of the molecules that make them up.

The first phase of the project is now complete; researchers have modeled the neocortical column - a unit of the mammalian brain known as the neocortex which is responsible for higher brain functions and thought.

...snip...
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Third Eye Open said:
Except that according to you, running is only real if the running is being done by an agent that is able to observe.

CIRCLES ARE FUN!
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Real running is a physical action. That's a different thing to a simulation.

Typically, we'll describe something as running if we think it is a real person running, or dog, or even robot. That doesn't mean or imply that if we don't observe it it isn't running. It can be running without any conscious agent being involved.

We'll also describe something as running if it appears like running. Or dancing, say.

Julian Opie - dancing girl, Prague

That's just a few lights switching on and off. There's no relationships there. But we perceive it as dancing.

However, we could do a huge program to analyse running, and have all the possible relationships incorporated, and if it doesn't have a visual (or other sensory) component, nobody will describe it as running. We call it running if it looks like (at a pinch, sounds like) running.
 
westprog said:
But consciousness is not a verb.
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Like hell it isn't. Stop its movement and where is it? What is it?

Stop a horse and you can still point to the horse. Stop running and there is no running. Stop consciousness and there is no consciousness.

The whole weirdness -- why Descartes said the soul had no dimension -- is simply because consciousness is not a thing. It is a verb.

We can't make coal in a simulation. So we don't know if we can make consciousness. Whether we can make something that tells us something we didn't know about consciousness remains to be seen.
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We've been through this. We don't cross frames of reference. We can only make simulated coal in a simulation -- because coal is a 'thing', an object. But if we properly simulate the actions of making coal, then we do the "coal making thing" in the simulation. The same is true of consciousness.

If you see consciousness as a 'thing', then you've bought into the dualistic language and have no hope of solving the 'problem'.
 
yy2bggggs said:
I'm not quite sure what you mean by actor, but if I had to guess, I would say that my views are a bit more nuanced than this. I see relations in the "things"--for example, this solid penny sitting here on my desk. It is a penny by a referential social convention--it's a single object partially by that convention, and partially due to its molecular cohesiveness--in particular, it's cohesive to the degree that we are able to physically translate it through space in a pragmatic manner as a separable unit. Its solidity in itself is a result of Pauli Exclusion of fermions. Even its identity per se is merely a pragmatic approximation--technically, the penny is constantly leaking itself into the world (as easily demonstrated by handling it for a while, then noticing your hands smell of copper). So aside from pragmatic linguistics, there's not a significant difference between a penny being tossed and a penny being what a penny is--a countable solid object falling into a conventionally defined equivalence class.

So, regarding this:

I would tend to say that real 'things' are actually part 'verb' (more precisely, potential, verb, and "referrant"). In other words, true, the penny is an object, but the object qua object includes a lot of relations in itself. So I'm not quite sure I see a major difference between actor and action.

As such, this:

...becomes a bit hard to map into my nuanced view of things--especially when you consider that part of what I refer to as "things" involves particular "kinds" of relations within frames.

But maybe I just make things too complicated.

Edit: This sort of has a point... I'm trying to figure out if I agree with your assessment that the actions in a simulation would constitute the same thing. I'm tending towards disagreement, merely because if I can find a distinction, I can exclude something based on it--and, as such, its possible to conceive of it as a separate "kind of thing" (equivalence class), which means we can say it's not the same, which is my best guess of the negation of what you're claiming.
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And perhaps I am making too fine a distinction.

What I'm after is a separation between the "thing" and the "action" itself. Sure, a penny can be in all sorts of different relations; so can anything.

But what is an action? How do we define verbs? I'm not sure that we do so very well.

I can certainly see clear distinctions between the types of "things" involved in a simulation and the types of "things" in the "real world". What I am really asking is -- just because there is a difference in the objects, when it comes to the actual actions, how can we see a difference? Does the difference only lie in the way the "things" are instantiated, or is there a more fundamental difference in terms of the action itself?

Of course, actions only occur in "things" or in relations between "things"; but if we try to piece out exactly what the action *is*, does it not consist in particular relations between "things" or within a "thing". Those things may differ from one area to the next.

A cat can run. The relation of its parts to the whole cat and relation of the cat to the world changes as it runs. An antelope runs -- same scenario.

How do we define what "running" is? Is it specifically tied to the animal doing it, so that there is no generalizable "running"; or is it our generalized notion of what happens when we see soemthing moving through space moving its legs?

I don't particularly see how moving from a "real" animal to a simulated one changes the way we use the word 'running' to refer to those relationships and translational motion.

My ultimate point is that if you simulate consciousness well enough in a computer, then you will have created something that is conscious. I do not claim that it is human or that this is a human consciousness -- because it would not be instantiated as human consciousness (so, sure there are differences, and I do not claim that this would be exactly the same in all particulars since one is a simulation after all, but it is the action that would be the same); but if the same action is carried out, on what grounds would it not constitute consciousness?

We have a big linguistic problem because the word 'consciousness' is a noun, so it is viewed as a 'thing'. But it isn't a thing. It should be a verb. It emerges through the action of cells with semi-permeable membranes repeatedly firing in particular patterns. Stop neurons from firing and consciousness ceases to exist; stimulate certain groups of neurons and consciousness changes; drink a large bottle of whiskey and it changes more.
 
AkuManiMani said:
Well, whether or not one wishes to call them 'private behaviors' they are definitely real in the sense of being actual phenomena. Our private behaviors have physical consequences such affecting external behavior responses [like motion and speaking] or our general physiology [such as stress responses and immunity]. How we perceive the world has a direct effect on how we interact with it. I think it would be wise to consider mental phenomena to be just as real as any other biological process.
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Fine. It's just that when the term "qualia" is used it seems to mean more than just "private behavior" and often seems to fall into the realm of woo.

You speak English so well I never would have thought that you weren't a native speaker :)
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Thank you. You can thank Captain Picard for most of it!

Even tho we are not directly aware of the unconscious processes that generate our qualia we can be aware of the qualia themselves because they are, by definition, what we consciously perceive. I'm not sure how I could clarify it anymore than that :-/
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My comment about turtles was basically boiling down to this: if we can have qualia about qualia, can we have qualia about qualia about qualia about qualia ad infinitum ? And what constitudes those ?

My point is that we have no convincing evidence that current artificial computers are aware.
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Indeed. But that comes back to my comment about "special" minds. We all seemed to agree that the only way we can spot consciousness is through behaviour. I have no evidence that anyone but me is "really" aware, but I accept that they are because I have evidence that their behaviour is the same. So, really, what Dodger and Pixy are saying, I think, is that if you can say the same thing about a computer, then that computer is aware by definition, because you have nothing else to go on. Otherwise we're just positing "something else" as being awareness.

That position doesn't really make much sense to me. It seems to imply that we're not really 'conscious' until we're taught to be.
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Ever since Mercutio mentioned it, I've come to notice a number of things about myself and my childhood and children I see here and there and it makes a lot of sense, actually.
 
AkuManiMani said:
I even have memories of my childhood from before I even acquired fully developed language. I experiences emotions, sensations, and thoughts even before I acquired words to describe them.
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But you don't have memories before you osberved same behaviour in others. You developped language and communication around, what, 12 months (6 for me, actually!) ? I'm sure you don't remember that far back. The earliest memories you have are probably, like mine, of a time well after you developped those concepts in reference to other people.
 
westprog said:
That's what consciousness is for. I know that my consciousness is real. The rest is open to debate.
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Ok, so let me get all these ducks in a row.

You assert that your consciousness is "real," even if we are living in a simulation, because you experience it as being "real."

You also assert that if there was an entity in a simulation that experienced its consciousness it would in fact not be "really" conscious because it is inhabiting a simulation.

Now, you don't find any inconsistencies between those two assertions?
 
westprog said:
However, we could do a huge program to analyse running, and have all the possible relationships incorporated, and if it doesn't have a visual (or other sensory) component, nobody will describe it as running. We call it running if it looks like (at a pinch, sounds like) running.
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Speak for yourself.

People who understand that the simulation is a different frame understand that running is taking place even when they are not monitoring it.

And, once again, the fact that we could be in a simulation right now sort of flushes your argument down the toilet.

I know, I know -- it sucks when mathematics goes against your arguments. I hate when that happens!
 
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