The Hard Problem of Gravity

[westprog]

Ah. I think you failed to detect the interesting thing. Or you detected a different interesting thing than I did.

Let's have that again:



When exactly does this cease to be true if we change "computers" to "people?" Not in the first sentence. People operate entirely according to the laws of physics, don't they? And what you're trying to do is to say that people have a kind of understanding that is denied to other objects, isn't it?

It's not in the second sentence. That's just a flat denial of the premise described in the first sentence. So if the truth value of that premise hasn't changed, the truth value of the second one can't change either. That's just logic.

So it must in that pesky third sentence. Either people do exchange information in a different sense to other objects or they do understand it at least a little bit. Or both.

But if the first sentence remains true and the third one becomes false, then that means that the third sentence cannot be a logical consequence of the first one, or vice versa. That's the interesting thing I was talking about. The whole "They're just objects -- all they can do is obey the laws of physics" bit is a big old smoke screen.

This is quite an insightful post, and shows up a flaw in my argument. If all the computers are doing is executing according to the laws of physics, then am I claiming that human beings are doing something different? Am I guilty of dualism, or idealism, or some other bad "ism".
Actually, no. I'm guilty of not being precise enough.

What the computers are doing is executing according to known laws of physics, producing output exactly as expected. Everything they do is understood. We have no need of concepts such as "meaning" or "understanding" to deal with computers. Physical information theory is no more relevant for a computer than for a fridge magnet.

If a computer forwards a message from New Guinea saying that there has been an earthquake, does the computer know that there has been an earthquake? How can it? The message doesn't say what an earthquake is, or where New Guinea is. As far as a Cisco router goes, it might carry all the packets, but it doesn't fit them together. The only interpretation of data happens when the human being reads it.

But how can the human being understand, if the computer doesn't? Because we don't know under what physical laws understanding emerges. We don't know what makes human beings aware. An unknown physical principle is a perfectly respectable scientific idea. Indeed, pretence to perfect knowledge is the hallmark of the charlatan.

Did you happen to follow the link I posted earlier that explains how the "No Quack" story was written?

An instructive and amusing story.

 

[westprog]

And the idea that humans are doing something new and different from what goes on elsewhere in the universe isn't?

Accusing humans of being like humans is not anthropomorphism.

 

[westprog]

What westprog was suggesting is. I also don't think he was saying that this was the only way to come up with "every possible joke". But I question its relevance.

And a computer can, very simply, brute force.

westprog:

I could have sworn I mentioned this earlier, but just in case...

We are computers.

My fundamental point remains - it is not inherently proof of anything if a computer prints out one funny joke. It's the capacity to select only funny jokes that would be impressive.

A computer or other mechanism can apply a number of simple rules to get rid of a number of phrases which aren't part of human language. Indeed, you could get an English speaker to apply a similar set of rules to a language he doesn't speak, and he'd be able to generate phrases that he would not understand. Such phrases might be quite comprehensible to the native speaker, but would mean nothing at all to the person who'd assembled them.

We can be computers - but if that's all we are, we don't understand anything either.

 

[westprog]

This is wrong. Here are some things I can say about what it's like for me to see red:

• It's closer to what it's like to see orange than what it's like to see blue.
• It's more like what it's like to see blue than what it's like to hear middle C
• It seems impossible to see red without extent and location

There are things we can say about experience. Just dissect them--break them up, and analyze them, and you'll see that experience is comprised of categorizations with aspects under which they are similar to other categorizations and aspects under which they differ.

In other words, experience is, in itself, a form of reasoning.

Now, I don't propose to have a full theory of experiences--but I think they are worthy targets of study, and that there's a lot of very useful information we can get as a result of such study.

It's certainly true that we can say a lot about experience - indeed, I've said already that we spend a high proportion of our time doing just that. Actually describing in objective terms what experience is is another matter, and may be impossible.

 

[rocketdodger]

Accusing humans of being like humans is not anthropomorphism.

But how do you know when something is a human?

When it satisfies a certain set of properties.

The more properties satisfied, the more "human" a thing is.

All one is doing when they display anthropomorphism is looking at the property of some entity and matching it with an isomorphic property in the set of all properties that belong to humans.

So yes, actually, by any formal definition, accusing humans of being like humans is definitely anthropomorphism.

Just like with everything else you have said in this thread, your argument here is nothing but special pleading.

 

[westprog]

But how do you know when something is a human?

When it satisfies a certain set of properties.

The more properties satisfied, the more "human" a thing is.

All one is doing when they display anthropomorphism is looking at the property of some entity and matching it with an isomorphic property in the set of all properties that belong to humans.

So yes, actually, by any formal definition, accusing humans of being like humans is definitely anthropomorphism.

Just like with everything else you have said in this thread, your argument here is nothing but special pleading.

Anthropomorphism is the attribution of uniquely human characteristics to non-human creatures and beings.

Attribution of human motivation, characteristics, or behavior to inanimate objects, animals, or natural phenomena.

The ascription of human characteristics to things not human.

... and so on down plenty of other definitions.

So, no, you can't be accused of anthropomorphism for ascribing human qualities to humans. It would be odd if you could. The idea is not just wrong by definition - which is a mere technical quirk. Anyone can get a definition wrong. The idea is actually useless because humans are largely well defined (with fuzzy edges, like much in real life). All the participants on this thread are 100% human. The error lies in the assumption that humans can't be special, and that therefore all human qualities must be manifested in some arbitrarily selected other objects.

When Darwin discovered that human beings were, in fact, animals, with animal ancestry, he didn't start with the assumption that human beings couldn't be special - he started with an open mind and accumulated actual evidence.

 

[rocketdodger]

The idea is actually useless because humans are largely well defined (with fuzzy edges, like much in real life). All the participants on this thread are 100% human.

So, for example, saying a severely mentally handicapped individual is "enjoying his/her self" because they are sitting there "smiling" isn't an anthropomorphism? You are confident that such an individual is going through the experience of happiness very similar to your own?

Yet, saying a chimpanzee is "upset" because he is causing a ruckus and attacking his handlers is an anthropomorphism, because there is just no way the chimpanzee is experiencing something similar to a human emotion?

Or what about assuming the behavior of an individual from another culture has a meaning entirely different from its true meaning? Is that just "being wrong" instead of an anthropomorphsim?

Humans are not well defined in any area other than physical appearance. We display a wide variety of behaviors, some much less "human" than others. That you think otherwise is evidence of the state of your knowledge of this issue.

 

[rocketdodger]

What the computers are doing is executing according to known laws of physics, producing output exactly as expected.

But how can the human being understand, if the computer doesn't? Because we don't know under what physical laws understanding emerges. We don't know what makes human beings aware. An unknown physical principle is a perfectly respectable scientific idea.

So it is your contention that between the fully understood behavior of neurons and the incomplete understanding of understanding there is some unknown physical law coming into play?

You don't think it is just an emergent phenomenon resulting from known physical laws?

Do you have any evidence that supports the former? Because as far as I know all the evidence supports the latter. In particular, we have no evidence of any unknown physical laws causing the behavior of systems of neurons. We know exactly how neurons work.

 

[rocketdodger]

When Darwin discovered that human beings were, in fact, animals, with animal ancestry, he didn't start with the assumption that human beings couldn't be special - he started with an open mind and accumulated actual evidence.

Alright. I have an open mind.

Please provide the evidence that human understanding can't be explained in terms of known physical laws.

Oh, right, I forgot -- we can't make a computer who roasts people as well as Jeffry Ross. What a magic bullet you have there!

 

[yy2bggggs]

We can be computers - but if that's all we are, we don't understand anything either.

You're killing your own argument. What you are calling a computer isn't all that a computer is.

And my point remains. We are computers. Everything you say about computers, if you just say "people" instead, is equally applicable. You're trying to show a difference by appealing to your own prejudices that we are in no way obliged to have ourselves.

 

[rocketdodger]

Which is self-contradictory.

Holy ****.

What, on God's green Earth, could "Arise from but be ontologically autonomous of," even mean?

Yes, stupidity like this makes me quasi-religious.

 

[RandFan]

The error lies in the assumption that humans can't be special, and that therefore all human qualities must be manifested in some arbitrarily selected other objects.

When Darwin discovered that human beings were, in fact, animals, with animal ancestry, he didn't start with the assumption that human beings couldn't be special - he started with an open mind and accumulated actual evidence.

But I think you are missing a larger point. You are, it seems to me, asserting that there are properties that are intrinsic only to humans. When in fact we know that not even all humans have these properties.

What basis do you have to presume that humans are special in a way that nothing non-human could ever be? There is nothing in science that holds such a view. In fact, millions $ are being invested right now because science doesn't hold that view.

So, again, what is your basis?

 

[yy2bggggs]

That's news to me, ...

Bottom line, algorythims are not TRNGS.

This is a technical point. An algorithm is nothing more than a series of well defined steps that transform inputs into outputs.

You're begging the question a tad by pointing out that random.org uses truly random processes as inputs. The issue isn't whether or not you use truly random processes (indeed, the examples being claimed to be algorithms are using figurative truly random processes in themselves, are they not?) The issue is whether or not they are algorithms.

They are well defined series of steps that transform inputs into outputs. They are algorithms.

See randomized algorithm^WP.

 

[RandFan]

This is a technical point. An algorithm is nothing more than a series of well defined steps that transform inputs into outputs.

You're begging the question a tad by pointing out that random.org uses truly random processes as inputs. The issue isn't whether or not you use truly random processes (indeed, the examples being claimed to be algorithms are using figurative truly random processes in themselves, are they not?) The issue is whether or not they are algorithms.

They are well defined series of steps that transform inputs into outputs. They are algorithms.

See randomized algorithm^WP.

No. I'm not begging the question. It's simple. A mathmatical algorithim will not in and of itself render a random number. A physical process is required. If you want to now include the physical process as part of the algorythim then fine but I don't think that was the point being discussed and I think you are moving the goal posts but it's a trite point.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Alright. Here's the original claim, RandFan:

Note that rolling a 30^8000 sided die is an algorithm.

So:

A mathmatical algorithim will not in and of itself render a random number. A physical process is required.

...does rolling a figurative die count?

At what point do you think I claimed what you're rebutting?

The big picture is that algorithms work like this:
[INPUTS]->[WELL DEFINED STEPS]->[OUTPUTS]
...with no other restrictions (usually outputs and inputs are related, for example; note that algorithms get to exploit this relationship if it's there--nay, rely on it).

What random.org does is modeled perfectly by the above. What I originally called an algorithm is modeled perfectly by the above. What you're describing as a TRNG is modeled perfectly by the above. The claim is simply that those outputs can be random. Do not ignore the inputs.

What you're describing as a mathematical algorithm works something like this:
[INPUTS]->[WELL DEFINED STEPS]->[OUTPUTS]
...with specific restrictions; speculatively, something like having both INPUTS and OUTPUTS be modeled by a FSM starting from a well known state. (There are even more technical points here, such as the FSM starting in a well known "random" state, still being subject to be PRNG's as well--similar to the cryptographic sin of reusing an OTP).

...and I agree. This can only produce PRNG's. But I never claimed otherwise. The original claim wasn't an example. If I'm moving the goalposts, where am I moving them from?

 

[westprog]

So it is your contention that between the fully understood behavior of neurons and the incomplete understanding of understanding there is some unknown physical law coming into play?

You don't think it is just an emergent phenomenon resulting from known physical laws?

I'm not quite sure what the concept of an "emergent phenomenon" actually means. Physical phenomena can normally be decomposed into smaller scale events. Each event on a smaller scale must have some kind of physical significance. Consciousness has not been convincingly decomposed in such a way. I see no reason to agree that if we get enough switches set up in just the right way, consciousness will happen.

Do you have any evidence that supports the former? Because as far as I know all the evidence supports the latter. In particular, we have no evidence of any unknown physical laws causing the behavior of systems of neurons. We know exactly how neurons work.

But we don't know how consciousness works.

 

[westprog]

So, for example, saying a severely mentally handicapped individual is "enjoying his/her self" because they are sitting there "smiling" isn't an anthropomorphism? You are confident that such an individual is going through the experience of happiness very similar to your own?

Yet, saying a chimpanzee is "upset" because he is causing a ruckus and attacking his handlers is an anthropomorphism, because there is just no way the chimpanzee is experiencing something similar to a human emotion?

Or what about assuming the behavior of an individual from another culture has a meaning entirely different from its true meaning? Is that just "being wrong" instead of an anthropomorphsim?

Humans are not well defined in any area other than physical appearance. We display a wide variety of behaviors, some much less "human" than others. That you think otherwise is evidence of the state of your knowledge of this issue.

If you are going to insist that someone is misusing a phrase, it's a good idea to have the dictionary on your side. No, claiming that somebody with brain damage is happy because involuntary nerve spasms make him smile is not anthropomorphism. The word means something different, and I've given several definitions, which all agree. I suggest you quit digging on this one. The word means something, and what it means is clear.

 

[rocketdodger]

Physical phenomena can normally be decomposed into smaller scale events. Each event on a smaller scale must have some kind of physical significance. Consciousness has not been convincingly decomposed in such a way.

How interesting.

Magic is a valid explanation for something until magic has been ruled out.

What a fantastic approach to science you have.

I see no reason to agree that if we get enough switches set up in just the right way, consciousness will happen.

Do you agree that if we get enough neurons set up in just the right way, consciousness will happen?

But we don't know how consciousness works.

We know human consciousness is entirely dependent upon the living neurons in a human brain.

Apparently you think living neurons can somehow invoke magic -- wait, I mean "unknown laws of physics."

 

[rocketdodger]

If you are going to insist that someone is misusing a phrase, it's a good idea to have the dictionary on your side. No, claiming that somebody with brain damage is happy because involuntary nerve spasms make him smile is not anthropomorphism. The word means something different, and I've given several definitions, which all agree. I suggest you quit digging on this one. The word means something, and what it means is clear.

Oh, Oh, like switch ?

 

[westprog]

But I think you are missing a larger point. You are, it seems to me, asserting that there are properties that are intrinsic only to humans. When in fact we know that not even all humans have these properties.

If we observe a property in exactly one place, then that's what we should assume possesses the property.

What basis do you have to presume that humans are special in a way that nothing non-human could ever be? There is nothing in science that holds such a view. In fact, millions $ are being invested right now because science doesn't hold that view.

So, again, what is your basis?

Why do you assume that just because consciousness has not yet appeared except in humans that it can't be produced? That's one of the two fundamental mistakes one could make. The other is to assume that one can produce consciousness in some way without knowing exactly what it is or how it works.