The scientific theory regarding consciousness

[Wowbagger]

Consciousness is a possible emergent property of complex adaptive systems, when they take themselves into account when modeling their enviornment.

....or something like that.

 

[Perpetual Student]

Thanks, as I'm not a native english speaker, I'm having a hard time with the terminology.

OK, then try this:

Ein Zustand des Seins, das vom Selbst gekennzeichnet wird, erzeugte kontinuierlichen Erwerb und Zurückhalten der Strom- und Vergangenheitsinformationen über sich und seine Umlagerungen und die Interaktionen davon.

 

[reason1]

I have a strong feeling that this theory is related to the law of conservation of energy.

 

[PixyMisa]

Self-referential information processing.

Read Douglas Hofstadter's Godel, Escher, Bach. It explores this concept in great detail, and it's very informative and entertaining.

 

[Cuddles]

Hi, yes, it's easier to apply my definition to entities that we know for sure that they're are conscious , but I think it can be also applied to any entity that is even virtual.

That isn't even vaguely related to anything I said. My point was that your definition applies to many things that are not conscious. Therefore it is either a useless definition, since it is not discriminating enough, or it defines something that is not consciousness.

Well, maybe I am, maybe my theory will evolve and become the theory of everything, you never know .

I have a strong feeling that this theory is related to the law of conservation of energy.

You do not have a theory. A theory involves rigorous scientific predictions, is falsifiable and will be almost always be expressable mathematically. What you have is a vague idea of a definition which does not appear to have any relation with reality. You can have all the strong feelings you like, but your idea has nothing to do with science.

 

[PixyMisa]

I disagree. I think he's very close to an operational definition of the what it is that we are referring to when we distinguish conscious processes from unconscious ones.

As I said, Hofstadter covers this in great detail in Godel, Escher, Bach, a fascinating read, and again in I Am A Strange Loop (which I haven't yet read).

 

[thought_fugitive]

With regards to the philosophical zombies, how can you know it's not actually feeling pain? You're going to have trouble with this theory if you dismiss counter-arguments by believing they don't exist.

Also, make sure to keep the world informed with your progress at

latest news:
-I'm a little busy trying to refute the quantum mechanics nonsense.

 

[Tranca]

With regards to the philosophical zombies, how can you know it's not actually feeling pain? You're going to have trouble with this theory if you dismiss counter-arguments by believing they don't exist.

Also, make sure to keep the world informed with your progress at

People get this Zombies Stories to seriously. They don't feel pain by definition. That's why we call them Zombies. The idea of Zombies came because it's conceivable the non existence of consciousness. So, why is there such a thing? It's just a tool to think about the hard problem.

 

[Tranca]

Consciousness is a possible emergent property of complex adaptive systems, when they take themselves into account when modeling their enviornment.

....or something like that.

That doesn't help. And Ice is an emergent property of many water molecules. But you can't guess, by this alone, that ice can float...

 

[Perpetual Student]

I disagree. I think he's very close to an operational definition of the what it is that we are referring to when we distinguish conscious processes from unconscious ones.

Not even close! "Consciousness ... the state ... an entity. is recalling" is nothing more than a tautological statement like "consciousness is awareness." It is useless!

 

[thought_fugitive]

People get this Zombies Stories to seriously. They don't feel pain by definition. That's why we call them Zombies. The idea of Zombies came because it's conceivable the non existence of consciousness. So, why is there such a thing? It's just a tool to think about the hard problem.

I honestly have no idea what I meant in my initial reply but the point I wanted to make is that one can't know the zombie isn't feeling pain. However, that also makes it unfalsifiable and irrelevant to reason1's conditions for consciousness.

To reason1, what aspects of your theory can be tested and how?

 

[Tranca]

I honestly have no idea what I meant in my initial reply but the point I wanted to make is that one can't know the zombie isn't feeling pain. However, that also makes it unfalsifiable and irrelevant to reason1's conditions for consciousness.

To reason1, what aspects of your theory can be tested and how?

Zombies don't exist

A Zombie is something that doesn't have subjective experience (it's a definition). Pain is a subjective experience. Therefore a Zombie doesn't feel pain. This is obvious because without subjectivity there's no subject to experiment. Believe me, I'm no philosopher... but this is just one of those "Duh" things.
This idea is just a tool to think about other stuff. Not to be taken too serious. It's relevant to the question of How subjective experience arises in humans and animals, and why. The reason? There must have been a period of time in our development where we can be said to be Zombies (so, in a way, there are Zombies and you and me were once Zombies. Besides, most of human behaviour is not even part of consciousness. We are not aware of most of the stuff the brain does. There are zombie bots all over our brain. We can imagine that these Zombie bots could go all the way... and ocupy the entire brain. We can imagine this. But this doesn't happen... and we have subjective experience.)
But, in general, the Zombie idea is not something to be tested, because they are not looking for Zombies (i'm talking abou a full Zombie, because it's a fact that there as Zombie programs running in my brain). They are trying to explain consciousness.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

"recalling and memorizing happen unconsciously" is a meaningless statement.

I'd like an explanation of this, too.

~~ Paul

 

[Wowbagger]

That doesn't help. And Ice is an emergent property of many water molecules. But you can't guess, by this alone, that ice can float...

I am not sure how that analogy is supposed to fit, yet. What is the equivalent of "ice floating" to consciousness? What, specifically, can we not "guess" about consciousness from my definition?

(Which I consider only a working definition, btw. I hope to refine it eventually, and perhaps you can help.)

 

[Dymanic]

I've always liked Dennett's analogy: "center of narrative gravity".

 

[Wowbagger]

I've always liked Dennett's analogy: "center of narrative gravity".

Ah, that'll work, too.

Of course, it helps to understand how the mind, itself, is an emergent property of the evolutionary heritage of the brain, in order to understand how "narrative" can have a "center" of anything. And, how that center could shift, in the selection process of multiple mental "drafts". But, as a general summary, it's good.

 

[Perpetual Student]

Consciousness is a possible emergent property of complex adaptive systems, when they take themselves into account when modeling their enviornment.

....or something like that.

Not bad!

 

[reason1]

I disagree. I think he's very close to an operational definition of the what it is that we are referring to when we distinguish conscious processes from unconscious ones.

As I said, Hofstadter covers this in great detail in Godel, Escher, Bach, a fascinating read, and again in I Am A Strange Loop (which I haven't yet read).

Thanks, I'll check the books, maybe it will help with the terminology.
The problem is, I must use our conscious language to define consciousness. Maybe when it becomes an equation, it will be less ambiguous.