Materealism and morality

[JetLeg]

If the mind is an effect of the brain, but still a wholly separate entity, it should be able to exist independently, right? Yet the experiments I've cited show strong--overwhelming--evidence that this isn't so.

Well, not in my understanding of the word "entity".

So, as Hans has pointed out, it comes down to what you mean by a "separate entity". If you mean a different concept (mental construct) that is wholly and utterly dependent on the body, that can never exist separately from the body, that is continuously caused by the body (as opposed to a cause that lets the effect just go on its own), then I agree.

What do you mean by "mental construct"? I have a mental construct of a unicorn. Doesn't mean it exists. But the mind does.

But that's a very silly way to use the language. It would be like saying the little dabs of paint on a canvas "cause" the picture but that the picture is a logically separate entity. You'd ignore the fact that you can't have the picture without the little dabs of paint, and that when you change the little dabs of paint, you change the picture.

Good example. Thanks. And it shows that the relationship between the picture and the dabs of paint is logical, thus its a property, while the relationship between the mind and the brain is experimental, thus it's not.


It's logically impossible for the dabs to change while the picture wouldn't be changed. It's logically impossible to change the picture and not to change the dabs. But with mind-brain its different, otherwise neuroscience wouldn't be such an innnovator in the field of mind-body relationship.

And you've yet to show how the relationship between mind and brain is different than that from running to legs. All you've claimed is that the former is conceivable and the latter is not, yet I've shown repeatedly that neither is more conceivable than the other.

I don't think you did, lets draw.

Your best attempt at responding is the business about a body with sensory disability. You disregard a great deal of the problems I offered, and you're talking about a body--not a disembodied mind.

The mind of such a body, not having any sensory input, would be like a disembodied mind.

So for about the tenth time, I ask you, do you have ANY empirical evidence whatsoever to support dualism? I notice you keep ignoring this question.

If I do, that is because I do not think my dualism rests on empirical evidence, but on concept analysis. I do not have any empirical evidence whatsoever to support dualism, and if that is the criteria for you, then there is no sense in further discussion.

 

[JetLeg]

Well, I wouldn't go as far as to say that it's impossible to conceive a mind on its own. But it does throw a sabot into the workings of that _experiment_ proposed earlier. A mind without sensory inputs wouldn't be able to read the card on the shelf. So since a good chunk of the argument, way I understood it, was along the lines of "but I can conceive an experiment around a disembodied mind"... well, I'd think either that point falls or JL will have to imagine a new experiment.

Perhaps it would be able to read the card on the shelf, using clairvoyance???

It is possible that a person can read a card on a shelf without using _sensory_ input after all...

 

[JetLeg]

The approach you're focusing on is called solipsism.

Huh? Why?

 

[RandFan]

What do you mean by "mental construct"? I have a mental construct of a unicorn. Doesn't mean it exists. But the mind does.

I have a mental construct of flight. Doesn't mean that it exists as a concrete material thing.

 

[JetLeg]

Loki's wager.

• Where does the neck end and the head begin?
• When exactly does night end and day begin.
• We cannot draw a line therefore there it is not possible to distinguish between neck and head and day and night.

Sorry if this argument has been made before.

No, you missed the point of the argument. If monism is true, then one cannot make __any__ distinctions between the core of living and the core non-living beings, since the core is exactly the same.

In Loki's wager, there is black, white and grey. The argument says that since you can't draw a line, you can't distinguish between white and black.

But in monism, there is no black, white and grey. There is just one reality at the core.

 

[RandFan]

No, you missed the point of the argument.

No.

If monism is true, then one cannot make __any__ distinctions between the core of living and the core non-living beings, since the core is exactly the same.

It's not the "core" that is at issue.

In Loki's wager, there is black, white and grey. The argument says that since you can't draw a line, you can't distinguish between white and black.

Which is the same mistake that you are making.

But in monism, there is no black, white and grey. There is just one reality at the core.

I reject your first premise and it does not follow from your second.

Facts:

• Regardless of the truth value of monism I can feel pain.
• Regardless of the truth value of monism I can feel wellbeing.
• Regardless of the truth value of monism I can feel empathy.
• Regardless of the truth value of monism I can create a strategy with others to increase wellbeing and decrease pain and discomfort.

The "core", whatever that means, doesn't figure into it.

 

[JetLeg]

No.

Which is the same mistake that you are making.

I disagree.

I reject your first premise and it does not follow from your second.

Why and why?

[*]Regardless of the truth value of monism I can feel pain.

Ehm... I agree. So what?

 

[HansMustermann]

Perhaps it would be able to read the card on the shelf, using clairvoyance???

Well, I suggested just that myself a couple of pages back. But then the experiment doesn't distinguish between

A) a disembodied mind reading the card by clairvoyance, and

B) the mind still in the guy's brain on the sofa, reading the card by clairvoyance.

I think that as soon as you draw the line between mind and sensory organs, well, I don't think any relevant experiment is even possible any more. Anywhere you could send your mind without any sensory inputs, it won't bring anything back. So any such experiment would pretty much be indistinguishable from a blackout.

 

[RandFan]

I disagree.

Reasonable people can disagree but I don't think you can reasonably disagree in this instance.

Why and why?

The first premise is simply asserted as though it is axiomatic when there is nothing axiomatic about it. Just because you believe it and just because you assert it doesn't make it true. I don't know what you mean by "at its core" but even if we accept the premise that doesn't mean that there is no emergent properties of reality that are nuanced and in conflict with monism. Again, you are simply asserting something as though it is true without establishing the truth value.

Ehm... I agree. So what?

"So what?" So it proves my point. It's possible for there to be both monism and the ability to feel pain. That there is that possibility is proof in and of itself that morality can exist in a monistic reality (given the truth value of my other premises and you've not disputed them).

 

[JetLeg]

Well, I suggested just that myself a couple of pages back. But then the experiment doesn't distinguish between

A) a disembodied mind reading the card by clairvoyance, and

B) the mind still in the guy's brain on the sofa, reading the card by clairvoyance.

I think that as soon as you draw the line between mind and sensory organs, well, I don't think any relevant experiment is even possible any more. Anywhere you could send your mind without any sensory inputs, it won't bring anything back. So any such experiment would pretty much be indistinguishable from a blackout.

Yes, you're right.

I think reincarnation might suggest some form of a disembodied mind. If reincarnation is true, and the amount of people/living beings that are born is not identical to the amount of people that die, the mind has to stay disembodied for some time in a disembodied waiting room in which would wait until something that it can reincarnate in is born.

 

[L The Detective]

I am still not sure that we know beyond doubt that the mind is caused only by the brain (though this is my working hypothesis). So I wouldn't define it in such a way.

Hey, I'm not sure either! In fact, I'll go as far as to say "The only thing that causes "mind" is "brain," as far as I know. There may be some other element, but if there is, I have no knowledge of it yet." Do you feel better about that?

Uhm, yes. You _know_ that the mind exists. You attempt to use a razor to shave it to a property instead of an entity. But this is not occam's razor. Occam's razor is used when it is debated _whether_ something exists, not when the debate is whether it exists as an entity, or as a property.

But "roundness" exists too. How do I know the mind doesn't exist in the same way "roundness" exists? Sure, "roundness" has no meaning without ball, and perhaps "mind" has no meaning without "brain." Or perhaps it does. The difference between you and me is that you are assuming it does, and I am not. Take away that assumption, and it makes sense for me to use Occam's razor here.

What do you mean by "true for you"? When you feel pain, is the statement "I feel pain" only true for you??? When you are in love, is the statement "I am in love" only true for you??? No, it is _really_ true, though you get this info by private means.

Same thing. It is really true, and true only for you. If you feel pain, that doesn't truly tell you anything about whether others feel pain, don't you agree?

Like I said, so far I cannot present a formal argument why something private can't be a property of something non-private. It just makes no sense to me. But I'll think of it. The arguments I have presented are arguments why something private can't be a _process_ of something non-private. Because a process has to be explained in terms of its constituents. And also, why it can't be an "emergent" property - because for something to be an emergent property, the explanation of why it emerges has to be found amongst the constituents.

Really, you think so? Is this a scientific law, that a property must always be explained by it's constituents? How does this apply to the roundness of a ball, for example?

It would probably be a big help if you could present a formal argument as to why a property of something can't be "private."

 

[JetLeg]

Hey, I'm not sure either! In fact, I'll go as far as to say "The only thing that causes "mind" is "brain," as far as I know. There may be some other element, but if there is, I have no knowledge of it yet." Do you feel better about that?

But where is your definition?

But "roundness" exists too. How do I know the mind doesn't exist in the same way "roundness" exists? Sure, "roundness" has no meaning without ball, and perhaps "mind" has no meaning without "brain." Or perhaps it does. The difference between you and me is that you are assuming it does, and I am not. Take away that assumption, and it makes sense for me to use Occam's razor here.

Again, this isn't Occam's razor, just isn't. Occam's razor isn't a tool to decide if something is a property or an entity, it's a tool to decide if something exists.

Same thing. It is really true, and true only for you. If you feel pain, that doesn't truly tell you anything about whether others feel pain, don't you agree?

Uh... Does it tell you a fact about reality that you feel pain?

Really, you think so? Is this a scientific law, that a property must always be explained by it's constituents? How does this apply to the roundness of a ball, for example?

It would probably be a big help if you could present a formal argument as to why a property of something can't be "private."

I said :


Like I said, so far I cannot present a formal argument why something private can't be a property of something non-private. It just makes no sense to me. But I'll think of it. The arguments I have presented are arguments why something private can't be a _process_ of something non-private. Because a process has to be explained in terms of its constituents. And also, why it can't be an "emergent" property - because for something to be an emergent property, the explanation of why it emerges has to be found amongst the constituents.

 

[HansMustermann]

No, you missed the point of the argument. If monism is true, then one cannot make __any__ distinctions between the core of living and the core non-living beings, since the core is exactly the same.

Depends on what you mean by that "core." Does it mean that a non-living thing could have a mind too? Well, half the AI research is into giving a non-living machine a mind. Plus, sentient robots are a stapple of SF and almost nobody has a problem with that.

Plus, there's an (IIRC) IBM project in simulating neurons. Now they're _far_ from having enough of them for a brain simulation. Several orders of magnitude too far. But at least theoretically once they have a big enough computer to simulate a human brain, it should pretty much get a mind too.

And, in the end, why does it really matter?

At the core of it, we're just a lot of chemistry. We're just a bunch of DNA and proteins which happen to make more of themselves. Before even cells existed, much the same reactions happened in the primordial ocean at large.

Or are viruses alive? They're just a couple of RNA strips that tell a cell how to make a copy of that virus. The simplest imaginable virus would contain exactly two genes:

1) the recipe for the capsid protein and

2) the recipe for RNA replicase (ok, ok, "RNA-dependent RNA polymerase") which makes copies of other RNA strips, including these two in the virus

Some viruses are more complex than that, e.g., first get transcribed to DNA. But others don't. The polio virus IIRC is an example which comes with the RNA replicase gene.

Is that life? Is that a grey area between life and non-life? Or does it just mean that, at the core, there is no fundamental difference between life and non-life?

I mean, sure, we draw the line at where it can replicate, but that's a relatively arbitrary line. It's still the same reactions on both sides of the line. The _core_ of it is the same chemistry. On one side it just got complex enough to self-replicate, but that's about the only fundamental difference.

 

[RandFan]

I mean, sure, we draw the line at where it can replicate, but that's a relatively arbitrary line. It's still the same reactions on both sides of the line. The _core_ of it is the same chemistry. On one side it just got complex enough to self-replicate, but that's about the only fundamental difference.

Excellent post.

What is flight? Is it the wing, the air pressure, something else or an emergent property of all of these things. Is our inability to draw a concrete line between the constituent properties of flight and flight proof that flight is transcendental or supernatural?

If JetLeg doesn't believe that flight is transcendental but that morality or the mind is then he has some explaining to do.

 

[HansMustermann]

Like I said, so far I cannot present a formal argument why something private can't be a property of something non-private. It just makes no sense to me. But I'll think of it. The arguments I have presented are arguments why something private can't be a _process_ of something non-private. Because a process has to be explained in terms of its constituents. And also, why it can't be an "emergent" property - because for something to be an emergent property, the explanation of why it emerges has to be found amongst the constituents.

You're doing the old philosophy postulate that something with property X can't come from something without property X. A spectacular case of that is what got us the purity of Mary at the Council Of Nicaea, because something they thought something pure like Jesus couldn't come from any old sinner woman.

Unfortunately it failed miserably for every X tried so far.

But to address your concern about X=privacy:

- my diary on my PDA is private, although all the components in the PDA are very much public. If it's based on an ARM CPU, all the schematics and all are well known by many companies, and there are hundreds of thousands of identical PDAs out there.

- my private encryption key is private, although the algorithm that produces it is public and millions of other people run the exact same program. In fact, ask anyone who knows about cryptography, and they'll tell you the following seemingly paradoxical thing: the algorithm's being public, actually makes it a better choice for your privacy. Go figure.

- the binary tree of that trivial learning program I described a few pages ago, is private. Each instance of that program will classify the world differently from all the others. Although the program's source is public and it runs on identical machines.

Basically you can just generally drop the idea that "X can't come from something which is non-X". Life comes out of non-life. Matter comes from non-matter. (All matter condensed from energy in the first moments of the big bang.) And private or subjective things can be jolly well produced by processes which are neither.

 

[JetLeg]

You're doing the old philosophy postulate that something with property X can't come from something without property X. A spectacular case of that is what got us the purity of Mary at the Council Of Nicaea, because something they thought something pure like Jesus couldn't come from any old sinner woman.

Unfortunately it failed miserably for every X tried so far.

But to address your concern about X=privacy:

- my diary on my PDA is private, although all the components in the PDA are very much public. If it's based on an ARM CPU, all the schematics and all are well known by many companies, and there are hundreds of thousands of identical PDAs out there.

- my private encryption key is private, although the algorithm that produces it is public and millions of other people run the exact same program. In fact, ask anyone who knows about cryptography, and they'll tell you the following seemingly paradoxical thing: the algorithm's being public, actually makes it a better choice for your privacy. Go figure.

- the binary tree of that trivial learning program I described a few pages ago, is private. Each instance of that program will classify the world differently from all the others. Although the program's source is public and it runs on identical machines.

Basically you can just generally drop the idea that "X can't come from something which is non-X". Life comes out of non-life. Matter comes from non-matter. (All matter condensed from energy in the first moments of the big bang.) And private or subjective things can be jolly well produced by processes which are neither.

Can you give some examples from other areas than computer science?

 

[HansMustermann]

Hmm, well, that's a bit harder because that's really the best analogy. The brain is really one big computer. More specifically, it's one huge FPGA.

So any analogies with something else, will necessarily be worse analogies.

 

[JetLeg]

Hmm, well, that's a bit harder because that's really the best analogy. The brain is really one big computer. More specifically, it's one huge FPGA.

So any analogies with something else, will necessarily be worse analogies.

Are you a programmer?

Because the analogies are for something with property X that arises from something without property X, it doesn't have to be an analogy to mind-brain.

 

[HansMustermann]

Yes, I'm a programmer.

Well, I suppose you could take RandFan's example with the wing and flight.

But, really, I think that computers are the best analogy for something which is a huge biological computer. It's not just that you can get X from something which is non-X, it's that you can get very very close equivalents of the very concepts we've been going back and forth about.

 

[L The Detective]

But where is your definition?

Is this an essay question or multiple choice? Sorry, I'm not good at definitions... so you want me to define it without using the word "brain"? How about "the process of your thoughts, feelings, and identity?" Is that good?

Again, this isn't Occam's razor, just isn't. Occam's razor isn't a tool to decide if something is a property or an entity, it's a tool to decide if something exists.

Sorry, I think you're actually wrong on that. Occam's razor is *not* a tool used to decide if something exists. In fact I am pretty sure what it is exactly is the idea that, when presented with 2 explanations, the simplest is usually correct. This idea is most commonly used to explain why God is not a good explanation, not necessarily that God does not exist per se.

I'm pretty sure that's right, someone else wanna help me out with that?

Uh... Does it tell you a fact about reality that you feel pain?

Yes, that I have feelings. That's the only fact I can think of... I think anything else would be an assumption. For example, I could say that from my perspective pain hurts. But this is not a "fact," this is only true for me. Perhaps for you, pain doesn't "hurt" in the way it hurts for me, right? In fact, perhaps pain doesn't even "hurt" for me, maybe that's just the way I look at it. Maybe if I change my perspective, suddenly it doesn't hurt as much as I thought.

I said :

Like I said, so far I cannot present a formal argument why something private can't be a property of something non-private. It just makes no sense to me. But I'll think of it. The arguments I have presented are arguments why something private can't be a _process_ of something non-private. Because a process has to be explained in terms of its constituents. And also, why it can't be an "emergent" property - because for something to be an emergent property, the explanation of why it emerges has to be found amongst the constituents.

Okay. But part of the process of "mind" is explained by it's constituents, "brain," isn't that right? It's just the "privateness" of this process that you don't think is explained, correct?