Materealism and morality

[JoeTheJuggler]

Listen, my argument doesn't stand or fall on the issue of the mind-reader.

That was in response to your comment that you still don't understand how a mind-reader doesn't resolve the issue of our inability to share someone's subjective experience. So now you get it?

You yourself agreed that an omniscient being could distinguish a p-zombie from a human. So there you go, p-zombie is a logical possibility.

A p-zombie is just an example of something without consciousness. Lots of things don't have consciousness. It doesn't prove that consciousness is a logically separate thing. Lots of things also lack roundness or any number of other properties or functions. That doesn't make roundness a logically separate thing.

In short, conceiving of a thing without a certain property (or function) doesn't offer any support whatsoever that that property or function should be taken as a logically separate thing.

However, the problem with p-zombies is that short of being omniscient, there is no way to distinguish one from a human being, so it doesn't help your argument in the least.

Again, these silly games with "It is conceivable that" or p-zombies aside, is there even one tiny shred of evidence to support dualism?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

You claim that disembodied consciousness is impossible, because that would imply a mind that doesn't have any sensory input/language and still functions. In post #425, I gave a specific example that doesn't have any input and still functions.

You're kidding, right?

Here's your post 425:

Yes, I can conceive of a mind being like that.

Imagine the following (horrible) expirement : you take an embryo, and cause it to be born without eyesight, hearing, smell, taste. Also, he would be paralyzed, and without tactile sensation.

I believe it can be done by genetic manipulation / manipulations of embryonic development. If it cannot be done now, I am sure it will be possible in 10,000 years, say.

(And yes, this is really horrible).

I cannot imagine how "would it be like" to be such a baby. I can imagine him having feelings. But I cannot imagine him having thoughts without any content to them.

Yet, I think that such a baby is a possibility. And I see no reason why he wouldn't be conscious.

Absolutely nothing about a disembodied mind. You're talking about an embryo or a baby. This is something that has a body--even a brain. Not a disembodied mind at all.

Also, you ignore vestibular sensory inputs, and the sensory "inputs" that come from within the brain*. (Something a disembodied mind doesn't have.) If you were to make your thought experiment correct (which you can't), at best you'd be describing a body that lacks the ability to have subjective experience (a mind) and not the other way around (a mind without a body), which is what you were claiming to do.

OK--now would you please respond to the following?

I described both of these sorts of experiments earlier:

The one from the PBS show I just mentioned (that you wholly ignored), where scientists can accurately determine which of two wholly subjective experiences a person is having based on a brain scan. This is the one with the vertical and horizontal stripes and the colored lenses that I described earlier.

Similarly, we have for some time been able to predict with great accuracy when a person is having the subjective experience of "dreaming" based on brain scans in a sleep lab.

This is strong evidence of the subjective experience being a function or process of the brain.

Do you have ANY evidence of ANY subjective experience of a mind without a brain?

*From that same PBS show, in the segment on dreaming, the guy's hypothesis is that at times during sleep, the external inputs are basically shut off, and instead the cortex (which seems to be the seat of awareness or consciousness) receives random signals from lower parts of the brain. The cortex then imposes some kind of meaning or content on these inputs, which we experience subjectively as dreaming.

 

[L The Detective]

He doesn't think it's logical that something "private" can be a property of something "measurable." So he prefers the explanation that there is a separate entity, which is private, which has a causal relationship with what is "measurable." I think that is, if you boil down his argument, the core of what he's saying.

In other words, he doesn't think that something "private" can be the result of material substances that we can measure. It has to be the result of a different substance.

Then again, "private" experiences could be caused by the material world all the time, hypothetically. How do we know that a rock doesn't have "private" experiences? We have no way of knowing. Maybe it's completely normal for "private" to be tied to the observable material world, without the need for a separate substance or entity. Since these experiences are "private," it's technically impossible to say for sure, correct? The only thing we can say for sure is that we have them.

Anyway, I think Occam's Razor still applies. Why bother to posit a separate substance from which "private experiences" emerge? Why not just say that they emerge from observable substances? Our explanations are simpler that way, right? Or am I completely looking at this the wrong way? (That's a question to Joe, too.)

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

He doesn't think it's logical that something "private" can be a property of something "measurable."
So he prefers the explanation that there is a separate entity, which is private, which has a causal relationship with what is "measurable." I think that is, if you boil down his argument, the core of what he's saying.

Sounds like what he's been saying, but with different words. ("Private" instead of "subjective" and "measurable" instead of "material".)

My response to this "logical" approach is that even if it's true (and there's no reason to think it is), saying the substance that causes the subjective experience is something else (immaterial), does nothing to resolve the issue of "private" or "subjective" experience. Since there's no way to get at that from the outside (at least not any way superior to what neuroscience has done), all he can do in these thought-experiment type of arguments is to stipulate the situation he wants to be taken as evidence for dualism. As I've pointed out repeatedly, this is tantamount to begging the question.

In other words, he doesn't think that something "private" can be the result of material substances that we can measure. It has to be the result of a different substance.

And I don't believe he's offered any reasoning behind this conclusion (which is basically nothing but the definition of dualism, isn't it?)

Anyway, I think Occam's Razor still applies. Why bother to posit a separate substance from which "private experiences" emerge? Why not just say that they emerge from observable substances? Our explanations are simpler that way, right? Or am I completely looking at this the wrong way? (That's a question to Joe, too.)

I think that's about right.

Not only is there no NEED for another explanation of subjective experience (dualism offers no explanation that is superior to neuroscience), the scientific materialist approach (neuroscience) has a history of useful successes. The body of knowledge of physiological correlations with subjective experience is substantial and all of it creates a problem for more traditional dualism.

I think JL has backed off of traditional dualism and is now making a slippery argument about the mind (which he admits is wholly dependent on the brain, I think--in his words, it is "caused" by the brain) as being a separate thing. Hans has been addressing this for a while now. Of course any concept is a separate concept. The issue is that JL is saying it is a separate entity somehow.

That is, he is saying that the relationship of mind to brain is not analogous to that of running to legs.

Unfortunately, all I've seen him do, in one way or another, is to make that assertion.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Back to JL's sense-deprived baby for a moment. . .

When I used to interpret for the Deaf, my last client was a medical school student (in a Master's OT program). The Neuroscience lecture class was my favorite.

In that class, the professor explained in great detail how the primary visual cortex organized (through differential use of connections, cell migration, etc). The experiments used to prove that the process relied on visual input involved sewing the eyelids of newborn chimpanzees shut.

Someone (L?) wondered whether the mind affects the brain. In fact, it certainly does. This is just one example. Without having the subjective experience of seeing, the visual cortex doesn't organize properly.

The good news is that the brain is at least somewhat plastic. If a sensory input, for example, is lost, the brain structures that would ordinarily be used to process that input is "freed up" and can be used for other processes.

 

[L The Detective]

Sounds like what he's been saying, but with different words. ("Private" instead of "subjective" and "measurable" instead of "material".)

Right. I am taking those words from his most recent post, where he clarified "subjective" as "private" for me, and expressed his objection to "private" things emerging from the measurable world. I like those terms because it makes his point easier for me to grasp.

My response to this "logical" approach is that even if it's true (and there's no reason to think it is), saying the substance that causes the subjective experience is something else (immaterial), does nothing to resolve the issue of "private" or "subjective" experience. Since there's no way to get at that from the outside (at least not any way superior to what neuroscience has done), all he can do in these thought-experiment type of arguments is to stipulate the situation he wants to be taken as evidence for dualism. As I've pointed out repeatedly, this is tantamount to begging the question.

Yes, you're absolutely right. But if there were some reason to think that it is illogical for "private experiences" to emerge from "observable material," I could see his point, it's just that I don't see any logical problem there. I agree that even if there was, and we needed to posit an extra material for mind, it still wouldn't resolve the issue of "why are there private experiences," but it seems like from Jetleg's point of view, he would just feel more comfortable with that type of thing being tied to it's own substance.

And I don't believe he's offered any reasoning behind this conclusion (which is basically nothing but the definition of dualism, isn't it?)

Well, I can tell from reading his posts that he has thought out his point of view very carefully, and he is trying to make reasoned arguments to show why he thinks subjective experience can't arise from the objective world. I think his problem is that he's just making a fundamental error somewhere, and all of his logic that stems from that error is flawed. Perhaps the error is that all of his logic stems from an assumption. I am thinking that this could be the case.

Not only is there no NEED for another explanation of subjective experience (dualism offers no explanation that is superior to neuroscience), the scientific materialist approach (neuroscience) has a history of useful successes. The body of knowledge of physiological correlations with subjective experience is substantial and all of it creates a problem for more traditional dualism.

I think JL has backed off of traditional dualism and is now making a slippery argument about the mind (which he admits is wholly dependent on the brain, I think--in his words, it is "caused" by the brain) as being a separate thing. Hans has been addressing this for a while now. Of course any concept is a separate concept. The issue is that JL is saying it is a separate entity somehow.

That is, he is saying that the relationship of mind to brain is not analogous to that of running to legs.

Unfortunately, all I've seen him do, in one way or another, is to make that assertion.

Yes. I can understand where he's coming from, though... when I was younger, I thought about a lot of this stuff, although without using the fancy terms we are using like "subjective." But I definetly thought about P-Zombies, although I didn't know what they were called, and my reasoning was:

All of my brain functions could be carried out by a P-Zombie. If so, what makes me different from a computer? There must be some extra element that contributes to my actual "consciousness," which a computer or P-Zombie wouldn't have. And this extra element could be seen as a "soul."

Except, that is an assumption. P-Zombies as a concept may actually be logically impossible, and perhaps it is also logically impossible to have a working mind without having "private experience." How can I even know for sure that a computer doesn't have "private experience?" I can't. I think what I realized is that, anything I try to say is based by logic, is really not; it's ultimately based on an assumption on how life and Universe works. So what I decided to do was to just get rid of all assumptions and just stick with what I know... I guess that's why I consider myself a "materialist." That's why I think Occam's Razor is important to this discussion... Jetleg could very easily be right, but my explanation is simpler so I go with that.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Yes. I can understand where he's coming from, though... when I was younger, I thought about a lot of this stuff, although without using the fancy terms we are using like "subjective."

Me too. I remember having the thought when I was about 7 (sitting bored in church during mass) the first time the thought occurred to me that what I see as "orange" might look totally different to someone else and there is no way I can ever determine that. First, orange, defined as a blending of red and yellow would still have that definition for them, just that those colors would look different to them too. Then, the stuff that's associated with those colors (like "hot" or "exciting" with red and "cool" or "calm" with blue) would also be associated with the colors of the same name no matter what the subjective experience. I remember about that time learning about the spectrum of EM radiation, and the idea that different colors were different wavelengths of light, but that too wouldn't be any way to break through that subjectivity barrier.

I'm one of 10 siblings, and the thought used to occur to me, especially when I was very relaxed (like in a hot shower) that "I" always seem to be riding around in my head just behind my eyes. How come this feeling of "me" never rides around behind one of my brother's eyes?

That's why I think Occam's Razor is important to this discussion... Jetleg could very easily be right, but my explanation is simpler so I go with that.

I agree as far as that goes, but I'd go the next step. Logical "possibility" is only part of an argument for something to be so. In the realm of empirical evidence, we've got a mountain to show that neuroscience offers a good explanation of subjective experience and exactly nothing in support of dualism. Not only is dualism not necessary (Occam's Razor), it also has nothing in the real world to support it, and a mountain of evidence it would need to overcome.

I remember an intro to philosophy course I interpreted (it was mostly logic and didn't get into all the "isms"), the professor said that the logical problem with the existence of a soul (or any other soul-substitute--that is a non-material "substance" that comprises the mind or the will) is that you can't have something that is not material interact with something that is. Something with none of the properties of matter (and remember, materialists have no problem with energy as long as the term is used properly) can't interact with the material.

A simple example is the problem of how you get from visual input (light acting on photo-receptors converting that input to action potentials in neurons and sending it to the primary visual cortex, etc.) from the material to the immaterial. How does the soul see, even if it resides within a body much less the disembodied soul?

 

[L The Detective]

I agree as far as that goes, but I'd go the next step. Logical "possibility" is only part of an argument for something to be so. In the realm of empirical evidence, we've got a mountain to show that neuroscience offers a good explanation of subjective experience and exactly nothing in support of dualism. Not only is dualism not necessary (Occam's Razor), it also has nothing in the real world to support it, and a mountain of evidence it would need to overcome.

Yes, you're right. The realm of logical possibility is where Jetleg wants to stay right now, though, so I'm just trying to get in there with him and see his point of view.

A simple example is the problem of how you get from visual input (light acting on photo-receptors converting that input to action potentials in neurons and sending it to the primary visual cortex, etc.) from the material to the immaterial. How does the soul see, even if it resides within a body much less the disembodied soul?

Yes, of course you would have to reason that, supposing the soul existed, it probably couldn't see.

If we posit the existence of an out of body consciousness, and we take away all brain function, it's interesting to think about what would be left. Would there really be any meaningful difference between a disembodied consciousness existing, and not existing? For the disembodied consciousness, if there is no brain function, then wouldn't that be virtually the same as if it just didn't exist? It's hard to imagine what "consciousness" would be like without brain function, but I can't help but think it'd be virtually the same as "death."

ETA: Which, if you look at it that way, then maybe trees are more or less P-zombies. In the sense that, they are alive, but seem to have no brain functions like we do, so they probably have no "subjective experience" whatsoever. But even that is an assumption.

 

[L The Detective]

I also use introspection. Introspection is the _only_ tool we have (and that we will probably ever have) to inspect the subjective mind. So I look at it and I think "wow, it is so different from the brain. I remember a house where I grew up, and I see a form, but this form is not composed of atoms. There is a color. But it is an immaterial color. wow".

Jetleg, I was thinking about introspection, and something else occured to me. I'm a pretty introspective person myself, I think, and I was thinking about the nature of introspection. Basically, I think introspection is a tool you use to examine yourself. I also agree that it is a tool for inspecting the subjective, but that's basically the same thing. What is "subjective" basically all stems from your emotions, I think. So when you use introspection, you are examining yourself.

So my conclusion is that, anything you come up with through introspection, is itself inherently subjective. In simple terms, this means that any conclusions you come up with through introspection are conclusions that feel right for you. This is what I think you mean by "introspection."

If you think that mind is a separate entity because it feels right to you, that's fine. I have no problems with you believing whatever you'd like to believe, as long as it doesn't effect me in a negative way. But I hope you'll understand why I can't share those beliefs.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

If we posit the existence of an out of body consciousness, and we take away all brain function, it's interesting to think about what would be left. Would there really be any meaningful difference between a disembodied consciousness existing, and not existing?

Well said!

ETA: Which, if you look at it that way, then maybe trees are more or less P-zombies. In the sense that, they are alive, but seem to have no brain functions like we do, so they probably have no "subjective experience" whatsoever. But even that is an assumption.

Not the way that the p-zombie argument is ordinarily used (at least in making a case for dualism). They usually posit that the p-zombie is indistinguishable from a normal person. They report that they "feel", they produce EEG and MRI and other such scans that correlate well to their reported subjective experience, but they in fact have no subjective experience. (It's basically like carrying the idea of an automaton that is programmed to say it has subjective experience even though it doesn't to an extreme.)

A reasonable person would say that the p-zombie is a person and has consciousness. (I can't KNOW for sure that anyone else has consciousness or subjective experience. But that way of thinking is called solipsism, and it's not a very useful approach. You end up just like Dwayne Hoover in Vonnegut's Breakfast of Champions.) The dualism argument that starts with the assertion that p-zombies are conceivable is just asking us to stipulate that they lack subjective experience, and the only reason the argument does that is to dissociate all the external evidence we have of subjective experience from subjective experience itself. In other words, it is tantamount to begging the question.

As I mentioned, dualism doesn't solve the problem of solipsism. If you want to doubt that other people have subjective experience, saying that subjective experience is dependent on some non-material substance doesn't help. You'd just doubt that other people had that non-material substance (a soul, in the traditional approach). The only way you can "know" that some people have it and some don't is by stipulating the existence of normal people (those with it) and p-zombies (those without it). There's absolutely no way to distinguish the two.

 

[JetLeg]

You're kidding, right?

Here's your post 425:



Absolutely nothing about a disembodied mind. You're talking about an embryo or a baby. This is something that has a body--even a brain. Not a disembodied mind at all.

Also, you ignore vestibular sensory inputs, and the sensory "inputs" that come from within the brain*. (Something a disembodied mind doesn't have.) If you were to make your thought experiment correct (which you can't), at best you'd be describing a body that lacks the ability to have subjective experience (a mind) and not the other way around (a mind without a body), which is what you were claiming to do.

OK--now would you please respond to the following?

I described both of these sorts of experiments earlier:

The one from the PBS show I just mentioned (that you wholly ignored), where scientists can accurately determine which of two wholly subjective experiences a person is having based on a brain scan. This is the one with the vertical and horizontal stripes and the colored lenses that I described earlier.

Similarly, we have for some time been able to predict with great accuracy when a person is having the subjective experience of "dreaming" based on brain scans in a sleep lab.

This is strong evidence of the subjective experience being a function or process of the brain.

Do you have ANY evidence of ANY subjective experience of a mind without a brain?

*From that same PBS show, in the segment on dreaming, the guy's hypothesis is that at times during sleep, the external inputs are basically shut off, and instead the cortex (which seems to be the seat of awareness or consciousness) receives random signals from lower parts of the brain. The cortex then imposes some kind of meaning or content on these inputs, which we experience subjectively as dreaming.

Please recall your argument against disembodied consciousness -> you claimed that since it has no sensory input, and no language, it is inconceivable.

My example (and lets say the baby doesn't have vestibular impulses as well) shows a body with a consciousness, but the consciousness lacks any sensory input. I know that it is a body with a consciousness. But that is a rebuttal to your argument. A disembodied consciousness could be exactly like the consciousness of such a baby.

As to the experiments, they can simply suggest that the mind is an effect of the brain. I have no problem with that. An effect doesn't mean a property and doesn't mean a process.

 

[JetLeg]

Anyway, I think Occam's Razor still applies. Why bother to posit a separate substance from which "private experiences" emerge? Why not just say that they emerge from observable substances? Our explanations are simpler that way, right? Or am I completely looking at this the wrong way? (That's a question to Joe, too.)

Hm...

I wouldn't say that our private experiences are emerging from a separate substance. (If 'emerge' is synonimous to 'is caused". Is it? ).

I would say that our private experiences _are_ a separate substance, that is caused by observable substances.

Again, it isn't Occam's Razor, it is L The Detective's Razor. Again : Lets say that we _know_ god exists. Is he a separate substance, or an emergent property of the world? This is _not_ a question for the _classic_ Occam's Razor, it simply is a different one.

 

[JetLeg]

So my conclusion is that, anything you come up with through introspection, is itself inherently subjective. In simple terms, this means that any conclusions you come up with through introspection are conclusions that feel right for you. This is what I think you mean by "introspection."

Well, you know by introspection what you feel, and what you think. Does it mean that statements "I feel love", or "I feel pain" can't be true, because they are known to be true by introspection?

If you think that mind is a separate entity because it feels right to you, that's fine. I have no problems with you believing whatever you'd like to believe, as long as it doesn't effect me in a negative way. But I hope you'll understand why I can't share those beliefs.

Well, I don't think so because it feels right to me. It's based on reason. I think that some qualities of the mind are revealed by introspetion (the privacy of the mind, mainly), and reason leads to the conclusion that something private is probably not a property of something non-private.

 

[JetLeg]

L is fine. I guess I don't understand where the contradiction is? You say "how can something private arise from something measurable," and I say "why not?" Why specifically does that bother you?

Well, I have yet to define and clarify why it bothers me that something objective has a private property, but I am sure why it bothers me that something private is a process that results from objective things.

See post #458.

Take a cup. Break it into two parts. When I look at the left part, and at the right part, I can realize that combining them would result in a cup that would be able to hold water, right?

Another example is kynetic gas theory, that provides a logical link between the properties of each atom, and the behaviour of the gas as a whole.


It also holds for proccesses -> we can look at the property of each molecule, and then predict the reaction between them. There is a logical link.

We know that gravity exists between bodies, we know how it functions. And we can predict the existance of a system like the Solar system once we know how do the basic constituents function.

The reason I am a dualist, is because I do not see any logical link between the physical structure of the brain, and the qualities of the mind.

Any good theory that explains a process explains why the constituents of the process _inevitably_ lead to the process itself. Would you agree?

Kinetic gas theory makes it inevitable that, given certain atom qualities, and statistics, the gas will behave _according to them_ in a certain way.

I cannot see a link how would objective (in the sense of non-private) constituents, come together, and produce something private. Where is the predictability? How can you predict something private occuring from atomic forces?

(I don't deny that there is an effect. But this is why I call it an effect of, and not a process of).

ETA: Are you saying that all properties should be measurable? I guess I'm not sure if that is the case. To be honest with you, I'm not 100% sure that the mind truly is 100% "private." Like I said before, I don't think it's impossible that technology won't one day allow us to share experiences with each other. That doesn't mean you're not right, it could be impossible, but I don't think we can rule that out yet.

I thought about it, and it seems that an advanced technology could read your brain, and create a replica of your thoughts for me. But it wouldn't be the same as feeling _your_ thoughts. Consider this : we can already scan your body, and cause the same pain that you are feeling in me. But it doesn't mean that I would feel _your_ pain, only that it would be replicated.

So, for something that is "private," you feel it makes more sense that it is a separate entity. I see. I guess I'm having a hard time understanding why exactly you feel that way. As far as I can tell, your reasoning seems to basically have at it's core: "I just feel like they are separate. I don't feel like it's a property." Now, if that is the way you feel, that's entirely subjective, and there's nothing I can do further to persuade you. (But then again, maybe your answer to the question above will illuminate something for me.)

When you say "mind exists," I guess I have to disagree with you. It seems as though you're using the term "mind" differently than I am, technically I would say "roundness exists," even if it does not exist as a tangible thing, it exists as a concept. So if I say that "mind" exists, please understand I mean it the same way, that it at least exists as a "concept" in the same way that "roundness" exists, and possibly as an entity. That's the whole point of using Occam's Razor here, to see which is more likely, "property," or "entity."

So when you say "we know mind exists," if you mean we already know it exists as a tangible thing, then it's pointless for you to use Occam's Razor because you apparently have already decided on one of the choices. But please understand, for me, I don't see any evidence that the mind is an "entity." That's why I need to use Occam's Razor here. I don't already assume that the mind exists as an entity, like you do. I consider both "property" and "entity" as valid explanations, but I consider "property" to be more logical because it is simpler.

I think what I mean by "entity" is pretty clear... in other words, that mind is a separate substance than brain. I'm pretty sure that's what you're arguing for, correct?

Ok, I understand it better now, thanks. I don't like the wording "I think it to be a separate property because it feels different", since it isn't an emotional whim for me.

I have a question to you : how would you define "mind"????

--------------------------------------

My solution is the following : private ostensive definition. One "looks" at his mind through introspection, and calls what he introspects "mind". Would you agree, or you have a different method of definition?

 

[L The Detective]

Again, it isn't Occam's Razor, it is L The Detective's Razor. Again : Lets say that we _know_ god exists. Is he a separate substance, or an emergent property of the world? This is _not_ a question for the _classic_ Occam's Razor, it simply is a different one.

L The Detective's Razor, really? I'm honestly not following you. What are you saying I should *know* exists? Was it "mind?"

Well, you know by introspection what you feel, and what you think. Does it mean that statements "I feel love", or "I feel pain" can't be true, because they are known to be true by introspection?

No, it means you only know they are true for you, or at least that's all you can learn from the tool "introspection." You said it yourself that introspection is what *you* feel, and *you* think.

Well, I don't think so because it feels right to me. It's based on reason. I think that some qualities of the mind are revealed by introspetion (the privacy of the mind, mainly), and reason leads to the conclusion that something private is probably not a property of something non-private.

Well then, could you please ellaborate on why, logically, something private can't be a property of something non-private? To me, this seems like a complete assumption on your part.

Any good theory that explains a process explains why the constituents of the process _inevitably_ lead to the process itself. Would you agree?

Kinetic gas theory makes it inevitable that, given certain atom qualities, and statistics, the gas will behave _according to them_ in a certain way.

I cannot see a link how would objective (in the sense of non-private) constituents, come together, and produce something private. Where is the predictability? How can you predict something private occuring from atomic forces?

(I don't deny that there is an effect. But this is why I call it an effect of, and not a process of).

Those are good questions. But as you say, we know that there is a causal relationship between our brain and our mind, at the least, so there clearly is a link.

Unfortunetly, the nature of "private", by definition, sort of prevents us from predicting if "private" things occur from atomic forces, correct? That is to say, if a rock has a "private" experience, there's no way we'll ever know, because if we did, it wouldn't be private.

So I think you're exactly right, we can't predict something private occuring from atomic forces, the most we can do with science is see the causal relationship between a physical brain and our private experiences. That's all we have to go on. Based on that fact, I think "property" is a perfectly good explanation, and a simpler explanation than "entity."

So you're saying that you consider it impossible for private experiences to be a property of objective material, because science can't predict why this happens? Don't you think, by nature, it is fundamentally impossible for science to predict this? Also, if mind exists as a separate substance, science can't make any predictions about this substance either. Why are you okay with that?

I thought about it, and it seems that an advanced technology could read your brain, and create a replica of your thoughts for me. But it wouldn't be the same as feeling _your_ thoughts. Consider this : we can already scan your body, and cause the same pain that you are feeling in me. But it doesn't mean that I would feel _your_ pain, only that it would be replicated.

Yes, you're absolutely right. But what if, hypothetically, science could hook your brain up to someone else's in such a way that when pain is caused to their brain, you are able to feel it too?

Ok, I understand it better now, thanks. I don't like the wording "I think it to be a separate property because it feels different", since it isn't an emotional whim for me.

I have a question to you : how would you define "mind"????

Well hey, just because it is an emotional belief doesn't make it a "whim." When you put it that way, that makes it sound trivial. Love is an emotion too, and that's not trivial, right?

Well, one definition I have always heard is "the inner workings of your brain." I guess that word "workings" sort of implies it is a process, and "inner" implies the subjective notion of self, so hey it's kind of a compromise between what we both believe. Not bad, huh?

 

[JetLeg]

Well, one definition I have always heard is "the inner workings of your brain." I guess that word "workings" sort of implies it is a process, and "inner" implies the subjective notion of self, so hey it's kind of a compromise between what we both believe. Not bad, huh?

Uh... I don't like any definition that links between the mind and the brain.

I am looking for a more basic definition. Now we know that water is H2O. But when we didn't know that with 100% certainity, we couldn't define water as "H2O", right? We needed some other definition, for example "That wet thing! ". (ok, a better one).

I am still not sure that we know beyond doubt that the mind is caused only by the brain (though this is my working hypothesis). So I wouldn't define it in such a way.


And even if it is a good definition -> I would still want to know the primary definition of the mind, that definition which comes before the scientific findings. You will see later where I am going with this.

L The Detective's Razor, really? I'm honestly not following you. What are you saying I should *know* exists? Was it "mind?"

Uhm, yes. You _know_ that the mind exists. You attempt to use a razor to shave it to a property instead of an entity. But this is not occam's razor. Occam's razor is used when it is debated _whether_ something exists, not when the debate is whether it exists as an entity, or as a property.

No, it means you only know they are true for you, or at least that's all you can learn from the tool "introspection." You said it yourself that introspection is what *you* feel, and *you* think.

What do you mean by "true for you"? When you feel pain, is the statement "I feel pain" only true for you??? When you are in love, is the statement "I am in love" only true for you??? No, it is _really_ true, though you get this info by private means.

Well then, could you please ellaborate on why, logically, something private can't be a property of something non-private? To me, this seems like a complete assumption on your part.

Like I said, so far I cannot present a formal argument why something private can't be a property of something non-private. It just makes no sense to me. But I'll think of it. The arguments I have presented are arguments why something private can't be a _process_ of something non-private. Because a process has to be explained in terms of its constituents. And also, why it can't be an "emergent" property - because for something to be an emergent property, the explanation of why it emerges has to be found amongst the constituents.

Yes, you're absolutely right. But what if, hypothetically, science could hook your brain up to someone else's in such a way that when pain is caused to their brain, you are able to feel it too?

How is it different from what I said? When they would feel pain, I would also feel pain. It doesn't mean I would feel _their_ pain. Consider a primitive experiment : there are two machines that torture the people that are tied to them. They are identical. They cause identical pain. Doesn't mean that two subjects to identical torture feel the _same_ pain. Just identical.

There might be an interesting point though if science could merge two brains into one... Or split one brain into two different subjective expiriences...

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Please recall your argument against disembodied consciousness -> you claimed that since it has no sensory input, and no language, it is inconceivable.

Yes, that was a fragment of why I said it really is inconceivable. In response to that you talked about a person--with a body--but with some of its sensory inputs disabled.

[quote[My example (and lets say the baby doesn't have vestibular impulses as well) shows a body with a consciousness, but the consciousness lacks any sensory input. I know that it is a body with a consciousness. But that is a rebuttal to your argument. A disembodied consciousness could be exactly like the consciousness of such a baby.[/quote]
You're simply wrong. Sensory input is just one part of it. I also pointed out that without a body, you'd have no language centers (Broca's area and Wernicke's area for example), no hippocampus for processing memory, no gender, no spatial location and so on).

You've partially taken out just one bit of this, and left the rest in place so that you can claim to conceive of a disembodied mind--but in fact, you're not talking about a disembodied mind. If anything, you're talking about a body without a mind. You said you were trying to conceive of a disembodied mind. You've done no such thing.

As to the experiments, they can simply suggest that the mind is an effect of the brain. I have no problem with that. An effect doesn't mean a property and doesn't mean a process.

But they certainly prove that a disembodied mind is utterly impossible! (And so far, that it's "possible" is your only argument for why you say the mind is not a property or function of the body.)

You're just jumping around to avoid facing the glaring problems in your reasoning.

If the mind is an effect of the brain, but still a wholly separate entity, it should be able to exist independently, right? Yet the experiments I've cited show strong--overwhelming--evidence that this isn't so.

So, as Hans has pointed out, it comes down to what you mean by a "separate entity". If you mean a different concept (mental construct) that is wholly and utterly dependent on the body, that can never exist separately from the body, that is continuously caused by the body (as opposed to a cause that lets the effect just go on its own), then I agree. But that's a very silly way to use the language. It would be like saying the little dabs of paint on a canvas "cause" the picture but that the picture is a logically separate entity. You'd ignore the fact that you can't have the picture without the little dabs of paint, and that when you change the little dabs of paint, you change the picture.

And you've yet to show how the relationship between mind and brain is different than that from running to legs. All you've claimed is that the former is conceivable and the latter is not, yet I've shown repeatedly that neither is more conceivable than the other.

Your best attempt at responding is the business about a body with sensory disability. You disregard a great deal of the problems I offered, and you're talking about a body--not a disembodied mind.

In fact, you can no more conceive of a disembodied mind than you can conceive of running without legs.

So for about the tenth time, I ask you, do you have ANY empirical evidence whatsoever to support dualism? I notice you keep ignoring this question.

 

[RandFan]

This is because for morality to happen, one needs to be able to draw a line between people, who should be treated morally, and inanimate objects that shouldn't.

Since materealism is a monistic system, it cannot draw this line.

Loki's wager.

• Where does the neck end and the head begin?
• When exactly does night end and day begin.
• We cannot draw a line therefore there it is not possible to distinguish between neck and head and day and night.

Sorry if this argument has been made before.

JetLeg,

It's really simple.

• I don't like to feel pain or discomfort.
• Due to mirror neurons in my brain (empathy) I don't like it when others feel pain or discomfort.
• I like a sense of well being.
• Due to empathy, I like it when others have a sense of well being.
• The best strategy for me and those around me to reduce the incidence of pain and or discomfort and increase the incidence of well being is through a system of ethics. We evolved a sense of morality

The above can be modeled by game theory and can be seen in the animal world among species who lack the cognitive abilities of humans. See Dawkins Selfish gene.

Monism explains it very, very well.

 

[HansMustermann]

Well, I wouldn't go as far as to say that it's impossible to conceive a mind on its own. But it does throw a sabot into the workings of that _experiment_ proposed earlier. A mind without sensory inputs wouldn't be able to read the card on the shelf. So since a good chunk of the argument, way I understood it, was along the lines of "but I can conceive an experiment around a disembodied mind"... well, I'd think either that point falls or JL will have to imagine a new experiment.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Any good theory that explains a process explains why the constituents of the process _inevitably_ lead to the process itself. Would you agree?

No. Many processes in nature are not linear, and not predictable. Read up on chaos theory.

Kinetic gas theory makes it inevitable that, given certain atom qualities, and statistics, the gas will behave _according to them_ in a certain way.

Again, they will obey the laws, but the results may still be unpredictable. In fact, it was gas and fluid dynamics that were some of the first applications of chaos theory. This is also why, despite all our technology, we really can't predict the weather further than a day or two ahead with much accuracy.

I cannot see a link how would objective (in the sense of non-private) constituents, come together, and produce something private.

That might be due to your own ignorance of neuroscience.

Where is the predictability? How can you predict something private occuring from atomic forces?

There is a very high degree of predictability. I have cited several experiments that show this--an incredibly high degree of predictability (or correlation) between brain measures and subjective experience.

Did you read about the one on the horizontal and vertical stripes? The ONLY change that was going on was a change in awareness--a change in subjective experience. At least look at the video on that one. It's fascinating.

I thought about it, and it seems that an advanced technology could read your brain, and create a replica of your thoughts for me. But it wouldn't be the same as feeling _your_ thoughts.

So what? Dualism offers nothing to allow someone else to feel your thoughts either.

We also can't shrink ourselves down to subatomic size and experience what's going on there, yet modern physics is delving into events at that scale. A doctor doesn't need to feel your symptoms to give you an accurate diagnosis. So what is the significance of the fact that no one can feel what someone else is feeling?

I have a question to you : how would you define "mind"????

I have defined it several times. In neuroscience, it's merely a term used to refer to a collection of many different processes. Pinker talks about "modules"--that's pretty much the current consensus. It is stuff like proprioception, memory (and several sub process--like memory fixing and retrieving, and procedural vs. declarative memory), pattern matching/recognition, semiotics, etc.

The approach you're focusing on is called solipsism.