Materealism and morality

[JoeTheJuggler]

P1 is a unsupported assumption, and therefore the entire argument fails.

I don't think that's the problem. (The subjective experience of pain is indeed something no one else can experience from the outside.)

The problem with this latest "argument" is that it only proves that subjective experience (in this case "pain") is not equal to matter (the brain). It's a strawman argument since it is a mischaracterization of contemporary materialism to say that mind is equal to brain. It's one of the first approaches JL took in this thread.

Materialists do not think mind (or the subjective experience of pain, in this case) is equal to the matter of the brain (or the matter at any other level of organization: atoms, molecules, cells or tissue). No more than we think "running" is equal to "legs". The one is a function or process of the other. (We've been using the term "property", but I take that to be a pretty loose thing, meaning property or function, as mentioned before.)

JL is arguing that since the two are not equivalent, they must both be objects (in the philosophical sense), or in his own words "logically separate entities".

Again, is "running" a logically separate entity from "legs"?

 

[JetLeg]

But that's only because you've got preset notions about what running is. Just because you don't have legs, doesn't necessarily mean that you can't run. I've got my test for it and everything.

If you disqualify my test for running by definition (you can't have running without legs), then I can disqualify your test for mind by definition (you can't have a mind without a brain).

I used running since Joe brought this example up. He used "running" to clarify his position of the mind, that mind is a property of the brain, like running is some type of property/process of legs.

It is using this understanding that running without legs carries no sense. IF running is a property of legs, then you can't run without legs. Otherwise it wouldn't be a property.

You also have a more broad definition of running that would be "moving quickly from one place to another", but this one is useless to clarify the relationship between mind and brain, it doesn't clarify the relationship between them.

 

[JetLeg]

Joe, please respond to post #385

 

[JetLeg]

Even if you claimed ignorance of science (especially neuroscience), your logic is flawed, Jetleg. You can't get from "I can conceive of X" to saying anything meaningful about X. It's the same flaw as the Ontological Argument.

(BTW, I was chatting with my Jesuit friend, and I mentioned Jetleg's argument, and the more conventional, "I can conceive of a p-zombie" argument, and he actually interrupted me saying that it's the same problem as in the Ontological Argument.)

The only think you can conclude from "I can conceive" (or "Cogito") is "I am" ("sum").

You constantly say this without explaining where am I predicating existence. I think that I understand the Ontological argument, where it predicates existence, and why its fallacious. I don't do it.


Think of the following : The conclusion of the Ontological argument is "God exists". The conclusion of my argument is not "disembodied consciousness exists". Why do you keep saying that we commit the same fallacy? The arguments are not even similar.

The OA says :
God is conceivable
The concept of a perfect god includes being existent
____
God exists.

It includes existence as a predicate, as being part of the concept. Where do I do it???

 

[JetLeg]

I agree with most of what you say here. I just don't understand why you don't apply the same thinking to minds and brains. A disembodied mind is just as illogical as running without legs.

You claim you can conceive of a disembodied mind, but I insist you really can't. You can think of some sort of ghost body, as I mentioned before, but it really is meaningless to talk of a disembodied mind.

What would that mind be like? It would have no language, no sensory inputs, no name, no gender, no memory, no ability to learn (all of these things we can prove with 100% certainty are dependent on the proper functioning of certain brain structures--even minds still in bodies can lose these mental processes when those parts of the brain are damaged). You could not possibly be in a location (or at least not in one location as opposed to any other).

Can you actually conceive of being a mind like that?

ETA: And I've already shown that you really can't devise a test to prove that a disembodied mind is possible. You'll never get past that same problem of subjectivity. How do you know that what the subject is reporting is true? The fact that they got the right answer could be due to any number of explanations that are no more or less "proven" than the disembodied mind theory (ESP for example, if the tester knows the answers; or precognition, assuming the answers are revealed to the subject after the test).

Yes, I can conceive of a mind being like that.

Imagine the following (horrible) expirement : you take an embryo, and cause it to be born without eyesight, hearing, smell, taste. Also, he would be paralyzed, and without tactile sensation.

I believe it can be done by genetic manipulation / manipulations of embryonic development. If it cannot be done now, I am sure it will be possible in 10,000 years, say.

(And yes, this is really horrible).

I cannot imagine how "would it be like" to be such a baby. I can imagine him having feelings. But I cannot imagine him having thoughts without any content to them.

Yet, I think that such a baby is a possibility. And I see no reason why he wouldn't be conscious.

 

[Neverfly]

Well, please give it an alternative explanation to that of a disembodied consciousness. What you said was not an explanation.

By the way, even if you have an alternative explanation, every explanation must admit that there was here the phenomenon of receiving sensory information about the world, without using one's physical senses. One of the reasons you claimed a disembodied consciousness is inconceivable, was because receiving sensory information about the world, without using one's physical senses is logically contradictory.


Since there is a possible scientific expirement that if true, would establish it (and such expirements were even conducted) - if honest - you have to agree that this specific reason why a disembodied consciousness is inconceivable was wrong.

I'm not JoeTheJuggler but...

I can conceive a test to determine if the Earth is supported on the back of a giant turtle- as the ancient Chinese myth suggests.

Just because I can conceive the experiment, does not validate the premise.

Experiments to the effect that you suggest have been conducted for a very long time.

In modern days- the Randi million continues not only unclaimed- But is hardly ever even challenged.
Many paranormal proponents avoid it like plague and Sylvia Browne tried hiding from it, lied like a dog to worm out of it repeatedly and returned Randi's letters unopened when he even made extra concessions against the rules of the contest in her favor.

 

[JetLeg]

I have a question to all of you. I think that the mind is a logically separate, (though causally dependant) entity from the brain, and not a property of it.

You claim the opposite. So far I have argued for my views. But do you have any argument for yours?

(Assuming that we agree that scientific evidence can justify both your position and mind, not giving one advantage over the other)

 

[Neverfly]

Yes, I can conceive of a mind being like that.

Imagine the following (horrible) expirement : you take an embryo, and cause it to be born without eyesight, hearing, smell, taste. Also, he would be paralyzed, and without tactile sensation.

I believe it can be done by genetic manipulation / manipulations of embryonic development. If it cannot be done now, I am sure it will be possible in 10,000 years, say.

(And yes, this is really horrible).

I cannot imagine how "would it be like" to be such a baby. I can imagine him having feelings. But I cannot imagine him having thoughts without any content to them.

Yet, I think that such a baby is a possibility. And I see no reason why he wouldn't be conscious.

The baby would be conscious- because you did not say anything about removing the BRAIN.

In the meantime, for a lesser degree- Try reading about Helen Kellers childhood sometime.

 

[Neverfly]

I have a question to all of you. I think that the mind is a logically separate, (though causally dependant) entity from the brain, and not a property of it.

You claim the opposite. So far I have argued for my views. But do you have any argument for yours?

Try reading about neurology.

In the meantime, You are the claimant.
It is up to you to demonstrate that the chemical and electrical processes of the brain and the physical aspect of it are separate from the performance of the brain.

Good luck with that...

 

[JetLeg]

I'm not JoeTheJuggler but...

I can conceive a test to determine if the Earth is supported on the back of a giant turtle- as the ancient Chinese myth suggests.

Just because I can conceive the experiment, does not validate the premise.

Experiments to the effect that you suggest have been conducted for a very long time.

In modern days- the Randi million continues not only unclaimed- But is hardly ever even challenged.
Many paranormal proponents avoid it like plague and Sylvia Browne tried hiding from it, lied like a dog to worm out of it repeatedly and returned Randi's letters unopened when he even made extra concessions against the rules of the contest in her favor.

In what way does that answer my post?

 

[Neverfly]

In what way does that answer my post?

Because your continued claim was that just because you can conceive it- it must be possible.

 

[JetLeg]

Try reading about neurology.

In the meantime, You are the claimant.
It is up to you to demonstrate that the chemical and electrical processes of the brain and the physical aspect of it are separate from the performance of the brain.

Good luck with that...

I was the claimant so far. But I wanted to know if you guys have a case. Nothing wrong with that.

 

[HansMustermann]

I have a question to all of you. I think that the mind is a logically separate, (though causally dependant) entity from the brain, and not a property of it.

You claim the opposite. So far I have argued for my views. But do you have any argument for yours?

(Assuming that we agree that scientific evidence can justify both your position and mind, not giving one advantage over the other)

Mate, no offense, but I see no point in continuing this waste of time until you clarify WTH _is_ your position already. The whole thing is akin to "I'm thinking about something about the mind, I'm not saying exactly what, but you must argue whether I'm right or wrong."

You argue that it's sorta like a concept, but not really like a concept, and none of us can tell why or exactly in which way. And it's sorta conceivable as an entity, but you're not arguing that it's an actual entity, and also apparently unlike anything else we've proposed that can also be conceived as an entity... but haven't yet offered much explanation why, in what way, or to which end is that distinction important. You introduced a thought experiment, but still haven't said exactly _what_ does it prove. You reject any other thought experiments proposed so far, but again it's not clear at all why they're unlike what you had in mind.

Basically: please take a deep breath, formulate a clear hypothesis, and then we can take it from there. What _are_ you claiming? Clear claims, please, no more vague word plays and riddles.

 

[drkitten]

I admit, I don't know how the mechanism of running would work in my test. Maybe mystical running forces will propel the unfortunately depeditated athlete along the track, with new legs of pure invisible energy. I admit, this would go against much of what we know of physics.

But we've seen how such things can happen.

For example, when the Road Runner is chased by the Coyote, he's definitely running (by definition), and it's clear from the individual stills that he doesn't have legs, just kind of a strange multicolored smear.

Obviously, running without legs is at least conceptually possible and involves no logical contradictions.

 

[JetLeg]

Basically: please take a deep breath, formulate a clear hypothesis, and then we can take it from there. What _are_ you claiming? Clear claims, please, no more vague word plays and riddles.

Well, I more or less said it on the post.

I defend the position of epiphenomenalism. It means that the mind and the brain are logically separate entities (can be concieved to exist one without the other), though the mind causually depends on the brain to exist. I also defend that the mind has no causual effect on the brain, but the brain does have causual effect on the mind. Also, the mind is immaterial (not composed of atoms).

 

[JetLeg]

But we've seen how such things can happen.

For example, when the Road Runner is chased by the Coyote, he's definitely running (by definition), and it's clear from the individual stills that he doesn't have legs, just kind of a strange multicolored smear.


Obviously, running without legs is at least conceptually possible and involves no logical contradictions.

Well, we should ask Joe for clarification. He said that "mind is to brain as running is to legs".


Joe, in your definition of "running" above, is it logical possible that it occurs without legs?

 

[JetLeg]

Joe, one more question to you.

You claimed that the mind is a property of the brain.

It was I that suggested the critera of being conceivable (logically) separate as a litmus-test whether something is a property or not. And you went on.

But do _you_ have a useful definition of what it means for A to be a property of B?

 

[quixotecoyote]

But we've seen how such things can happen.

For example, when the Road Runner is chased by the Coyote, he's definitely running (by definition), and it's clear from the individual stills that he doesn't have legs, just kind of a strange multicolored smear.

[qimg]http://www.artmix.us/rrrback.jpg[/qimg]

Obviously, running without legs is at least conceptually possible and involves no logical contradictions.

Is joke, yes?

 

[Neverfly]

Well, I more or less said it on the post.

I defend the position of epiphenomenalism. It means that the mind and the brain are logically separate entities (can be concieved to exist one without the other), though the mind causually depends on the brain to exist. I also defend that the mind has no causual effect on the brain, but the brain does have causual effect on the mind. Also, the mind is immaterial (not composed of atoms).

If I bang two rocks together, I am banging.
The rocks exist physically, my hands exist physically- does banging exist?
Is Banging a separate entity from the rocks and my hands?
Can I claim it is without logical contradiction?

No. I can't. Banging is just a word to describe the action. It does not really "exist" it's an invented description.

My mind is what my brain is doing.

 

[JetLeg]

If I bang two rocks together, I am banging.
The rocks exist physically, my hands exist physically- does banging exist?
Is Banging a separate entity from the rocks and my hands?
Can I claim it is without logical contradiction?

No. I can't. Banging is just a word to describe the action. It does not really "exist" it's an invented description.

My mind is what my brain is doing.

Good! You finally seem to get to understand my argument!

My argument was that it is logical possible that a disembodied mind exists.
Therefore the analogy doesn't hold, and mind to brain isn't what baning is to rocks.

Perhaps now you will understand that I did not argue that "a disembodied mind can logically exists, thus it exists "- but that "it can logically exist, thus it isn't a property. ".


By the way, banging IS a separate entity from the rocks. It is possible that after I did the bang, I destroyed the rocks very quickly, and created a situation when the banging exists, but the rocks exist no more. So it is a separate entity. It is simply an effect, and rocks are a cause.

An example I brought is that roundness cannot logically exist separate from a ball. Can you destroy a ball, yet leave the roundness? Logically, you cannot.