1, That doesn't follow at all. Just because I am unsure about others' subjective experiences (or lack thereof), does not mean I am unsure about my own subjective experiences. Anyone who has ever stubbed their toe knows what I mean. It is not just that you injured your foot; stubbing your toe hurts, it feels bad, and any theory of consciousness better take that into account.
There is an extensive literature on the pain problem in consciousness; I certainly would not be promoting a theory which does not take it into account. Of course, pain is a very good example of how we are unable to describe a subjective experience without reference to a public one; the words we use to describe pain tend to make metaphorical reference to observable events (is it a stabbing pain, or a burning pain? Doc, it feels like somebody hit me with a hammer...), and doctors still have the unenviable task of figuring out whether this person who stubbed his toe and claims it is a 9 on the 10-scale is really in more pain than this fellow with the compound fracture and partial amputation who calls his pain a 6. "Worst pain imaginable" changes as a function of what injuries you have actually suffered; our reports of pain are very much learned, and even our subjective experience of pain is dependent on individual and cultural learning histories.
2, Who's the radical skeptic around here? Do you really walk around doubting you (and other people) are conscious? It's one thing to doubt physical matter exists, it's something else entirely to deny conscious experience. Do you honestly think it's possible you're a zombie?
Yes, I think it possible I am a p-zombie. (Or m-zombie, from an earlier thread.) But then, I am a veteran of these threads going back to Interesting Ian, and I have had plenty of opportunity to come to this conclusion.
I do not walk around doubting that people are conscious, but then, I have a definition of consciousness that refers to public behavior, so there is no inconsistency. It is only those who claim a primacy of subjective experience as the defining aspect of consciousness who are in an untenable position.
I absolutely do not deny conscious experience; what I do deny is that there is some sort of consciousness that we have that p-zombies do not. They behave indistinguishably from us; there is no way to tell them from us; I certainly do not feel some sort of magic inside of me, so I think it entirely possible that I am--and I cannot but think the same of others--a p-zombie.
I must? To deny my own consciousness is to assert it- I cannot undertsand the denial of consciuosness without being conscious to begin with.
Exactly what a p-zombie would say.
Why does it follow? How do you define consciousness? Define "sad" for me. We all feel sad sometimes, and if someone tells us they are sad we know what they mean. So what does that mean "feel sad"?
Do we know what they mean? Each of us has perhaps a unique learning history with "sadness". There is certainly overlap in our experience, but the more dissimilar our environments, the less this would be the case; I suspect that the descriptions of what we call sadness would vary tremendously across cultures. I know that "love" certainly does; I just have not had the opportunity to do the same analysis with "sadness".
And of course, you have had a lifetime of learning in your culture to hone your definition of sadness. Think of a young child just learning the word. How much variety in experience goes into that word, and how much can the child relate to that, even if she has reason to be sad?
If qualia are irrelevant, you won't mind slamming your fingers in the door, right? It doesn't really hurt. That's an archaic term dependent on qualia. You can redefine things all you want to try to remove subjective experience, but at the end of the day, you're going to take the novacaine shot at the dentist. Not because you have some abstract notion to block mental processes telling you a hole is being drilled in your tooth, but because it feels bad.
Wow. You really don't understand*. The door slam and the hole drilled in the tooth are both environmental stimuli (both, in this case, causing tissue damage!). I react to getting my fingers slammed into the door, not to "the perception of" getting my fingers slammed into the door. Or the qualia of the perception of getting my fingers slammed into the door. Or the sensation of the qualia of the perception of getting my fingers slammed into the door. Or the rest of the turtles. Qualia add nothing at all to the equation; they are offered without evidence, and can be dismissed just as easily.
*I infer this from your public behavior, obviously. It is quite possible that you understand perfectly, but consistently behave as if you do not. For all purposes, this amounts to the same thing; it is just the "understanding" version of the "dude, what if you say something is red, and I say it's red, but really what looks like red to me would look like green to you but you've just always called that red...dude, my hands are soooo big...." Red is defined by a set of publicly observable objects and events, not by qualia. We know this, because we agree that these things are red, and those are not. I infer that Darat understands my points because we react similarly to comments; I infer that you do not because you say such things as "If qualia are irrelevant, you won't mind slamming your fingers in the door, right?"
