Materealism and morality

[HansMustermann]

Let's take the example of the "the sound of a single clapping hand" and "the portable hole" (I loved "Who framed Roger Rabbit"). There are contradictions within those terms. By "conceive" I mean something that also involves logical thinking, which really does think about those terms. Something that actually attaches meaning to the words.

Right. But there were movies about them. Is that suddenly no longer proving dualism?

It is impossible to attach a referent to the term of a "hole without something that it is a hole in". It is a contradiction in terms. It is impossible to be a referent of such a word.

(By the way, in the movie, they don't actually draw a "portable hole". What they draw is a black portable circle that magically becomes a hole, when one puts it on any surface... )

There were plenty of cartoons where one rolls up a hole and moves it somewhere else. Or when one drags a hole a meter to the left with one finger. I don't think the latter transforms into anything else than a hole in the process.

Plus, if you're going to play the "it transforms into something else" card about holes in transit, I'm going to play the same card about minds. How about: Yeah, but when you swap minds, it just becomes data until you put it in another brain.

Did you understand the different terms in the ways we used "conceive"? For example, an "immaterial ghost" is inconceivable. There is a contradiction in the term. "Ghost" implies a certain form, which "immaterial" denies. You can say "well, there are movies about ghosts". But in the movies those ghosts aren't really presented as immaterial...

The whole point is that I'm no longer sure which meaning of conceive you use. You seem to switch between "if there was a movie about it, it must be a different entity" to "yeah, but it's not really conceiving if it's self-contradictory" and back all the time. That's what I'm trying to pin down, because otherwise we're not getting anywhere.

And no, I'm pretty sure there was at least one movie where ghosts are invisible and can't directly interact with matter. (But apparently willpower hocus-pocus works anyway.) Don't underestimate the human capability to imagine the impossible, or to make a movie out of it

Plus, again, how about movies where you hear explosions in space? Do those prove that sound can happen without a medium to you?

For example, I also think that the word "supernatural" is inconceivable, since it cannot have a referent. People certainly believe in supernatural things, and bla bla bla... But what they really believe when they say "supernatural" is more of the nature of "something that I cannot understand, mysterious, wow". It is impossible to conceive of something supernatural, since the term itself is self-contradictory. Nature is by definition "all that exists", and there cannot be anything "outside of all that exists", it is a meaningless expression. When I say "conceive" it includes logical thinking about the meaning of your words.

...except when it comes to mind and body, apparently, since then you no longer seem too bothered about the contradictions.

To re-iterate, my argument is that it is impossible to think of a property without the thing it is a property of. By think, I mean logical thinking, such a thinking that ascribes concrete referents to each of the terms of the wordd. It is impossible for a property of a ball to exist without a ball - and NOT for scientific reasons. But the reason why we know that it is impossible for a disembodied consciousness to exist is BECAUSE of scientific reasons. There is a difference.

Really? It's not that hard to conceive some device or place that sucks the colour out of stuff, and I'm pretty sure there was at least a cartoon about one. Plus it's been used in more than one computer game, since it just involves a simple shader to implement.

Proving, obviously, that colour isn't a property of the material. A copper tube doesn't transform to iron in the process, it just stops being red-ish. A plant's chlorophil doesn't transform into something else, it just stops being green. Rust doesn't stop being iron oxide... you get the idea.

Because if elements transformed into something else, you'd have a bigger problems there.

Does that prove some material-colour dualism just because it's been conceived and represented on the screen?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Let's take the example of the "the sound of a single clapping hand" and "the portable hole" (I loved "Who framed Roger Rabbit"). There are contradictions within those terms. By "conceive" I mean something that also involves logical thinking, which really does think about those terms.

By that standard, then a disembodied mind is not conceivable.

Something that actually attaches meaning to the words.

Now you're back to the lower standard--what Hans called simply a concept (not necessarily logically consistent). As Hans pointed out, we can attach meaning to words without that meaning being logically consistent.

According to the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, it's possible to fly by falling but failing to remember to hit the ground (by being distracted at the precise moment). These words have meaning, but of course, it's all logically impossible.

I can SAY "five is greater than seven", and the words have meaning, but the statement is simply false. (It's meaningful sometimes even to make such a statement as a way to prove that a more complicated statement is false when its truth value is not so readily apparent.)

It is impossible to attach a referent to the term of a "hole without something that it is a hole in". It is a contradiction in terms. It is impossible to be a referent of such a word.

In the same way it is impossible to talk about consciousness (that includes being conscious of the outside world) without sensory inputs--without a body. I've already given you plenty of proof of this sort of contradiction.

Do you know what the "imaginary unit" is? It's the square root of negative 1. It's not logically possible, but it is meaningful to use the term and even do algebra with it.

So don't confuse "having meaning" with "being logically possible".

On top of that, there's still the problem that you're trying to predicate existence.

That's why I've been objecting to your argument that goes:
disembodied mind is conceivable==>mind and body are logically separate entities

You're using the conception of something as the proof that the concept has a logically separate existence. That's not valid argumentation.

To re-iterate, my argument is that it is impossible to think of a property without the thing it is a property of.

That's a false statement. I can think of plenty of properties in the abstract: pretty much any adjective in the English language, plus words like gender, color, flavor, height, width, length, weight, ethnicity, stability, size, conductivity, opacity, translucence, magnitude, position, orientation, age etc. All of these are properties of objects and not objects in themselves.

When you think of mind or consciousness in the abstract (as separate from the body), it's analogous to thinking of these kinds of properties.

By think, I mean logical thinking, such a thinking that ascribes concrete referents to each of the terms of the wordd. It is impossible for a property of a ball to exist without a ball - and NOT for scientific reasons. But the reason why we know that it is impossible for a disembodied consciousness to exist is BECAUSE of scientific reasons. There is a difference.

No--it is also logically impossible, as I've shown. For example, talking about the location of a disembodied mind is as logically impossible as talking about an inventory of holes.

 

[JetLeg]

The whole point is that I'm no longer sure which meaning of conceive you use. You seem to switch between (1) "if there was a movie about it, it must be a different entity" to (2) "yeah, but it's not really conceiving if it's self-contradictory" and back all the time. That's what I'm trying to pin down, because otherwise we're not getting anywhere.

I am not switching "back and forth".

At first I said (1), and then you pointed out "a transportable hole", so I had to refine it to (2) - I didn't notice that possibility before.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

(By the way, in the movie, they don't actually draw a "portable hole". What they draw is a black portable circle that magically becomes a hole, when one puts it on any surface... )

Nonetheless, a paint-on hole shows that it's possible to think of "hole" as a logically separate entity from the object it's on. It's thought of being the same as, for example, a spot on a surface--except that it's a hole or a tunnel.

Being able to think about it doesn't make a concept logically possible. That's your basic argument for dualism.

Some time ago, I pointed out that this is a hopeless flawed argument, so you would do better to see if you could find evidence for dualism (rather than an argument that resembles the mumbo-jumbo of apologetics).

Is there any such evidence?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I am not switching "back and forth".

At first I said (1), and then you pointed out "a transportable hole", so I had to refine it to (2) - I didn't notice that possibility before.

Except that when it comes to the mind you switch back to claiming that it's conceivable because you can think of it (back to number 1). You dismiss the fact that it's logically impossible by saying that all that logic is dependent on science.

(Unlike the logic that tells us you can't move holes around or walk on rainbows???)

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Plus, again, how about movies where you hear explosions in space? Do those prove that sound can happen without a medium to you?

Good one. The only reason it's "logically impossible" to hear sound in space is because of science.

So if Jetlag is going to stay consistent, he'll dismiss the scientific logic, and he must admit that it's logically possible to hear sound in the vacuum of space.

 

[JetLeg]

That's why I've been objecting to your argument that goes:
disembodied mind is conceivable==>mind and body are logically separate entities

Lets try another angle.


Imagine that I would try to establish the possibility of existance of holes-that-exist-without-something-that-they-are-a-hole-in.

(Got any nicer word for it? Perhaps "detached holes" ? )

I would argue that such a hole is conceivable -> the hole and the-stuff-that-it-is-a-hole-in are logically separate.

Wouldn't that be a valid argument?

And again, I am not sure how I would define conceivability, but Hans has a point - the fact that it appears in a movie is not sufficient. I mean the stricter sense, one that also checks the notion for internal coherence.


Of course, it is an unsound argument -> a hole without the-stuff-that-it-is-a-hole-in are not logically separate. One existing without the other is impossible.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

You quoted only three quarters of my post.

Yes, it's customary to quote only that which you're replying to. Do you think I took your statements out of context?

To the last paragraph in your post : If you conceive of a disembodied mind, or of a p-zombie, and understand that this means they separate logical entities this proves my understanding of dualism. This is not begging the question, but proving a point...

I ask you to accept "A", and if you agree that "A" is true, then it proves "B". This is a mechanism of proving a point and not a one of begging the question..

No. You're asking for a concession that even you have agreed is tantamount to the definition of dualism. If I concede that minds and bodies are logically separate, then I have conceded dualism.

 

[drkitten]

Imagine that I would try to establish the possibility of existance of holes-that-exist-without-something-that-they-are-a-hole-in.

(Got any nicer word for it? Perhaps "detached holes" ? )

I would argue that such a hole is conceivable -> the hole and the-stuff-that-it-is-a-hole-in are logically separate.

Wouldn't that be a valid argument?

No. Among other things, this works out to be an argument-from-ignorance; the fact that you are unaware of the connection between a hole and its surroundings (and therefore, you are capable of conceiving it) doesn't mean that no such connection exists.

And again, I am not sure how I would define conceivability, but Hans has a point - the fact that it appears in a movie is not sufficient. I mean the stricter sense, one that also checks the notion for internal coherence.

But if you check an idea for coherence and fail to find a reason to proclaim something incoherent, that doesn't mean that the reason doesn't exist.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Lets try another angle.


Imagine that I would try to establish the possibility of existance of holes-that-exist-without-something-that-they-are-a-hole-in.

(Got any nicer word for it? Perhaps "detached holes" ? )

I would argue that such a hole is conceivable -> the hole and the-stuff-that-it-is-a-hole-in are logically separate.

Wouldn't that be a valid argument?

No, it would not.

Dualistic holes are just as "conceivable" as dualistic minds. (Depending on your definition of "conceivable" either both are or both are not conceivable, yet we know that holes are not separate entities.)

And again, I am not sure how I would define conceivability, but Hans has a point - the fact that it appears in a movie is not sufficient. I mean the stricter sense, one that also checks the notion for internal coherence.

Again, if you want to look into the source of this problem, it is that you are trying to predicate existence. (When you say something is a logically separate object, you're saying it exists.)

ETA: That you can conceive or imagine something cannot possibly be the premise (or at least the sole premise) for a valid argument for its existence.

Of course, it is an unsound argument -> a hole without the-stuff-that-it-is-a-hole-in are not logically separate. One existing without the other is impossible.

That's exactly why Hans presented it as an example. It is just as conceivable as a disembodied mind, and just as logically impossible.

 

[HansMustermann]

Then you're probably just about ready to see why a mind without brain is impossible too.

The brain is by and large what in computer science is called a neural net. (Not surprising. CS copied the idea from the real thing.)

The data in that brain, and the memories of those subjective perceptions aren't just like ones and zeroes in a memory cell. The brain rewires itself all the time. Neurons physically grow new dendrites and form new synapses with other neurons. Each neuron in your cortex is connected to tens of thousands of other neurons.

The "wiring" isn't just how data is processed, it's _state_.

So really this is not very much like my hardware/software example. The mind (as in, the sum of your experiences, personality, memory, way you think, etc) is a property of the actual brain wiring, much like being red is a property of copper. It's that unique wiring in your head that makes you who you are.

So imagining a mind without a brain is like imagining an electronic circuit without wires or components. Conceptually possible, but not that easy to actually produce

Also, swapping "minds" between two people would involve breaking most synapses, destroying existing dendrites, creating new ones, forming new synapses. It would also involve rewriting that person's DNA, since other proteins can influence how you deal with the various mediators.

I'm not sure how that's even possible without killing them in the process.

 

[JetLeg]

Yes, it's customary to quote only that which you're replying to. Do you think I took your statements out of context?

No you didn't, but you missed the question.

You seem to say that is possible that

a certain A,B can be logically separate, but are not.



Can you provide me of a single example of such A,B that can be logically separate, but aren't?

 

[JetLeg]

Then you're probably just about ready to see why a mind without brain is impossible too.

The brain is by and large what in computer science is called a neural net. (Not surprising. CS copied the idea from the real thing.)

The data in that brain, and the memories of those subjective perceptions aren't just like ones and zeroes in a memory cell. The brain rewires itself all the time. Neurons physically grow new dendrites and form new synapses with other neurons. Each neuron in your cortex is connected to tens of thousands of other neurons.

The "wiring" isn't just how data is processed, it's _state_.

So really this is not very much like my hardware/software example. The mind (as in, the sum of your experiences, personality, memory, way you think, etc) is a property of the actual brain wiring, much like being red is a property of copper. It's that unique wiring in your head that makes you who you are.

So imagining a mind without a brain is like imagining an electronic circuit without wires or components. Conceptually possible, but not that easy to actually produce

Also, swapping "minds" between two people would involve breaking most synapses, destroying existing dendrites, creating new ones, forming new synapses. It would also involve rewriting that person's DNA, since other proteins can influence how you deal with the various mediators.

I'm not sure how that's even possible without killing them in the process.

You are begging the question.

The mind is not a neural net. It is caused by a neural net.

(A far-from-perfect analogy: In order to create sound, you need physical objects that rub one against the other\against the air. You can't have it without them. But the sound isn't a property of those objects. It is their cause).

 

[HansMustermann]

You are begging the question.

The mind is not a neural net. It is caused by a neural net.

(A far-from-perfect analogy: In order to create sound, you need physical objects that rub one against the other\against the air. You can't have it without them. But the sound isn't a property of those objects. It is their cause).

I never said that it is the neural net. I said that both the data and the processes in it mirror the wiring of that neural net. I.e., that it's a property of that neural net.

 

[JetLeg]

(When you say something is a logically separate object, you're saying it exists.)

I just miss what you are saying here.

The head of a dodo is a logically separate object from a wing of a dodo, right? But that doesn't imply either exists...


Please explain/provide a link.

 

[L The Detective]

No you didn't, but you missed the question.

You seem to say that is possible that

a certain A,B can be logically separate, but are not.

Can you provide me of a single example of such A,B that can be logically separate, but aren't?

I still don't understand why you think the mind and brain are "logically" separate. It doesn't seem logical that they would be separate entities. If you replace that word "logically" with "possibly," then I could agree with you.

 

[HansMustermann]

I just miss what you are saying here.

The head of a dodo is a logically separate object from a wing of a dodo, right? But that doesn't imply either exists...


Please explain/provide a link.

Are you _sure_ you're not just talking about concepts then?

 

[drkitten]

No you didn't, but you missed the question.

You seem to say that is possible that

a certain A,B can be logically separate, but are not.

I'm not quite sure what this means. You're asking for an A and B that can be separated (logically), but are not separated in the real world?

Sure. The evening star (Hesperus) and the morning star (Bosperus) were separate entities to the ancients, and were only "recently" discovered to be the same entity -- the planet Venus.

Similarly, King George (IV?) is famously supposed to have wondered if "the Author of Waverly" was the same person as Sir Walter Scott. These two concepts are logically separable, but of course, since Sir Walter Scott did write the book, they're not actually separate.

Just because I can conceive of something doesn't mean that it actually holds -- similarly, the fact that I might be able to conceive of a disembodied mind doesn't mean that they exist or that dualism is true. Especially if the reason I am able to make such a conception is through ignorance of the actual state of affairs.

 

[JetLeg]

A logical pathway? Maybe you're right, maybe there isn't one. However, I'm wondering why "B is caused by A" is the default assumption. Maybe the only difference between you and I is one of perspective. Let me see if I can show you what I mean with a counter-example:

They make a change in B (ball), and observe a change in A (roundness). Changing B also causes A to change, for example: the ball may no longer be round. Therefore they conclude that A is a property of B.

They make a change in B (brain), and observe a change in A (mind). Changing B also causes A to change, for example: alcohol makes you feel great! Therefore they conclude that A is a property of B.

So, here's my question to you... why is my way of looking at it wrong, and yours right? For what reason?

Well, your example with the ball seems a really bad one. What you say is :

They make a change in B, and observe a change in A. Therefore they conclude that A is a property of B.

Look at that line of reasoning abstractly - it doesn't work at all!

They make a change in B (oxygen), and observe a change in A (a person dies because of a lack of oxygen). Therefore they conclude that a person is a property of oxygen.

They make a change in B (ammount of money a person has) and observe a change in A (a person's level of happiness). Therefore they conclude that a person's level of happiness is a property (??) of money.


The reason why I think that the mind is caused by the brain is that it conforms to the logical process we carry everywhere else. They make a change in B, and observe a change in A, therefore they conclude that B causes A. That's what any textbook would say, I believe, and I see no reason to treat brain and mind differently.


Your example does raise an interesting question - what is the logical procedure needed to establish that A is a property of B?

A rough, far from perfect suggestion which I had in this thread is to add to your examples an additional statement " 'A' logically cannot exist apart from 'B' ".


Changing B causes a change in A AND A logically cannot exist apart from B.

Seems to me that it would establish a thing-property relationship.

Which is why I consider JoeTheJuggler's attempt to show that disembodied consciousness and p-zombies are inherently self-contradictory as the right way to approach this question (only I think he doesn't manage to show that).

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And generally speaking, I think the burden of proof is on you, not on me. "B causes a change in A, thus B causes A" is the standard way of thinking. The burden is on you to find proof that A is a property of B, and the line of reasoning above is not enough.

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Hmm. I would have to say that while this scenario may be possible, I can't think of any good reason to suggest it. It seems convoluted.

I can't think of any good reason to suggest it, because I can't think of any thing that could stand for C. (Unless you posit some very-very-very-weird notion of a god that is busy observing the brain, and creating the mind according to the changes in it.. ) But would that type of scenario be even _possible_ if A were a property of B? Even if it were possible, somehow it seem to point me in the direction of causality.

 

[JetLeg]

I still don't understand why you think the mind and brain are "logically" separate. It doesn't seem logical that they would be separate entities. If you replace that word "logically" with "possibly," then I could agree with you.

What is the difference for you between "logically" and "possibly" in this context? An example?

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In this context, "logically" and "possibly" carry a very similar meaning to me.


It is possible that Barack Obama can fly using his mental powers, in the sense that there is nothing logically contradictory about it.

It is impossible that Barack Obama can become a married batchelor, in the sense that there is a logical contradiction in it.