The Hard Problem of Gravity

[Gate2501]

Read the links to my other responses. I've already spent a lot of time articulating my thoughts and typing them out. Its there for you to read. [And FYI, no I am not a dualist.]

Ahhh, I didn't see the bit from the other thread.

So you don't consider yourself a dualist or a materialist? Interesting. I didn't really expect that.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Ahhh, I didn't see the bit from the other thread.

So you are neither a dualist or a materialist? Interesting. I didn't really expect that.

Yea. It gets a little frustrating when people assume they know my position and I end up having to type pages of qualification

For the record, I'd have to say that the school of thought that most closely resembles my own is Dialectical Monism. I've a few nuanced views of my own but, on the whole, I think DM makes the most sense of all the ontological positions I've come across.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Aku-Zombies have the problem of acting dumb enough to pass as human. They will need to flub lots of questions, or they'll be found out.
As long as they aren't 'outed' they should have no problem achieving normal human-rights...as they have done for centuries.



(The bastards)

Crap...they're on to us...

>_>

<_<

 

[PixyMisa]

No, consciousness is a thing IAOI which can have maps drawn within/upon it.

Consciousness is a thing? What kind of thing? What is it, other than a map?

No. The HPC is explicitly a statement that the issue of consciousness is a difficult problem; the fact that it seems to invoke dualism its just one of the many difficulties that come up in trying to seriously address it.

No, wrong. It is deliberately and explicitly dualist.

Wow dude, you're reminding me of a crazed alchemist that goes to his grave believing hes found the elixir of immortality. Or Columbus going to his grave insisting that he found the westward route to Asia. I'm sure you've contributed a lot to the field of AI but you're really overstating yourself

I haven't contributed anything to the field of AI. Consciousness is a solved problem. It's useful, but not at all complicated.

Most computers these days are conscious. And I'm not talking big, complex computers like mobile phones and video games, I'm talking things like microwave ovens and washing machines and car engines.

Read Hofstadter. Or Dennett. Or Hofstadter and Dennett. Or Papert, or Minsky, or Winograd, or, well, a bunch of people.

 

[Gate2501]

Yea. It gets a little frustrating when people assume they know my position and I end up having to type pages of qualification

For the record, I'd have to say that the school of thought that most closely resembles my own is Dialectical Monism. I've a few nuanced views of my own but, on the whole, I think DM makes the most sense of all the ontological positions I've come across.

I will read that link later, all of this p/aku-zombie stuff is making it impossible to stay away from Resident Evil 5.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Consciousness is a thing? What kind of thing? What is it, other than a map?

Well, to be more accurate, it is a phenomenon of a particular type; experience.

Questions like why there is any experience at all, and how would one determine a specific qualitative experience are just a couple of the conundrums is presents. In a way, the questions of "what is consciousness?" and "why is there consciousness?" are on the same level of difficulty as "what is existence?"/"why is there existence?".

No, wrong. [The HPC] is deliberately and explicitly dualist.

Pixy, I don't intent to play the assertion/counter-assertion game. The HPC is not an "ist" or an "ism". It is a group of related, and unanswered questions. The questions do not assert dualism nor are the possible answers necessarily dualistic.

Why you're insisting on such is beyond me.

I haven't contributed anything to the field of AI.

Dude, I have to say thats rather harsh. What have you been doing with your life then?

Consciousness is a solved problem. It's useful, but not at all complicated.

Yea, and I already won a Nobel prize for explaining the origins of the Big Bang and another for discovering ToE. They weren't that complicated to figure out. That's all I had to do is redefine the problems as something they weren't and pretend to solve them.

See, I can do it to

Most computers these days are conscious. And I'm not talking big, complex computers like mobile phones and video games, I'm talking things like microwave ovens and washing machines and car engines.

Read Hofstadter. Or Dennett. Or Hofstadter and Dennett. Or Papert, or Minsky, or Winograd, or, well, a bunch of people.

*blink*

So you simply KNOW microwave ovens and toasters are conscious because some guys say so? Really??

Sometimes, Pixy, when I read your posts, I think there's some guy at you keyboard typing this stuff and laughing his @$$ off. You must be pulling my leg.

What makes Dennett's position on consciousness any different from idealism? If one is going to extend the definition of consciousness to thermostats, or any other random gizmos, then you might as well just come out and say that every rock, atom, or what have you is conscious as well.

Hell, why not just go crazy and proclaim the whole dang universe conscious? Its makes about as much sense, as Dennett's, et al. assertion.

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, to be more accurate, it is a phenomenon of a particular type; experience.

What does that mean?

Questions like why there is any experience at all, and how would one determine a specific qualitative experience are just a couple of the conundrums is presents.

How can there not be experience? Experience is simply the result of processing and storing information. If you have a brain, experience is unavoidable.

In a way, the questions of "what is consciousness?" and "why is there consciousness?" are on the same level of difficulty as "what is existence?"/"why is there existence?".

Right. Trivial.

I don't intent to play the assertion/counter-assertion game. The HPC is not an "ist" or an "ism". It is a group of related, and unanswered questions. The questions do not assert dualism nor are the possible answers necessarily dualistic.

Sorry. You are wrong.

Why you're insisting on such is beyond me.

Because it is what it is.

Dude, I have to say thats rather harsh. What have you been doing with your life then?

I'm not the AI researcher - that's rocketdodger. I'm just an everyday programmer, albeit a good one with a lot of experience.

Yea, and I already won a Nobel prize for explaining the origins of the Big Bang and another for discovering ToE. They weren't that complicated to figure out. That's all I had to do is redefine the problems as something they weren't and pretend to solve them.

Except that you haven't done that. And I didn't explain what consciousness is, or create the first artificial consciousness. Nevertheless, I have implemented quite a few conscious computer programs.

So you simply KNOW microwave ovens and toasters are conscious because some guys say so? Really??

No. Because they are, because you can tell that they are from studying their function or the code involved. (Not toasters, generally, but microwaves and washing machines, yes.) They are built that way because it's by far the easiest way to make them work reliably, and the more complex the function the device performs, the more valuable it is for the device to be conscious.

It's for exactly that reason that consciousness first evolved. (Though exactly when it first evolved is another question; certainly it far predates our species.)

Sometimes, Pixy, when I read your posts, I think there's some guy at you keyboard typing this stuff and laughing his @$$ off. You must be pulling my leg.

Nope. I'm 100% serious with all of this.

What makes Dennett's position on consciousness any different from idealism?

How is Dennett's position similar to idealism in any way whatsoever?

If one is going to extend the definition of consciousness to thermostats

He doesn't, actually; that's a misconception. When I first heard that raised, I thought I disagreed with Dennett on this, because thermostats are too simple to be conscious (unlike a microwave oven, which is vastly more complex).

In fact, Dennett uses the thermostat as an example of a system that is aware, that has an internal model of the outside world, that can be said to have and act upon desires, bit that is not conscious.

or any other random gizmos, then you might as well just come out and say that every rock, atom, or what have you is conscious as well.

How can you possibly come to that conclusion?

Seriously. I cannot for the life of me see how you could connect those two positions.

Hell, why not just go crazy and proclaim the whole dang universe conscious?

Simple: Because it ain't.

Its makes about as much sense, as Dennett's, et al. assertion.

What do you think is actually incorrect in Dennett's position? Random expostulations of incredulity don't actually confer any useful information, so try to be specific.

 

[quixotecoyote]

Pixy, I don't intent to play the assertion/counter-assertion game. The HPC is not an "ist" or an "ism". It is a group of related, and unanswered questions. The questions do not assert dualism nor are the possible answers necessarily dualistic.

Why you're insisting on such is beyond me.

We're reliving the thread all over again.

HPC is a term that means something in philosophy. Specifically it means a kind of dualist theory.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/

It's fine if that's not your position and you want to argue something different, but trying to hijack accepted terms doesn't help.

(Now I just know it's going to be the aku-problem of consciousness. Someone get me a zombie.)

 

[NobbyNobbs]

What annoys me to no end is that, out of sheer intellectual cowardice, intelligent people like rocketdodger go thru their entire careers completely ignoring the the problem they are supposed to be working towards solving: How does one create a conscious entity?

Well, you see, when a man and a woman love each other very much....

 

[dv82matt]

Most computers these days are conscious. And I'm not talking big, complex computers like mobile phones and video games, I'm talking things like microwave ovens and washing machines and car engines.

Just saying microwave ovens are conscious kind of glosses over the whole problem. They are certainly not conscious in the same way or at the same level as a human is conscious. Kind of makes me wonder what your definition of consciousness leaves out.

 

[PixyMisa]

Just saying microwave ovens are conscious kind of glosses over the whole problem. They are certainly not conscious in the same way or at the same level as a human is conscious.

They are conscious in exactly the same way that humans are conscious. There is after all only one way to be conscious.

They are, however, very much simpler computational devices than humans.

Kind of makes me wonder what your definition of consciousness leaves out.

Irrelevancies.

 

[dv82matt]

They are conscious in exactly the same way that humans are conscious. There is after all only one way to be conscious.

Do tell.

They are, however, very much simpler computational devices than humans.

In fact they are so much simpler that I suspect they are not really comparable at all in terms of consciousness as I understand the term.

On the other hand if you define consciousness as merely input/output and data processing then I suppose you're right but then we're not talking about the same thing.

Irrelevancies.

Like what? and how do you know they are irrelevant?

 

[PixyMisa]

Do tell.

Self-reference.

Like what? and how do you know they are irrelevant?

Well, tell me what you think I've excluded, and I'll tell you why it's irrelevant.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

But -- I do know that there is atleast one being in the universe who is conscious: me.

...snip...

No you don't - that is every much just an assumption as the assumption that there are any conscious beings in the world is.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

No. The HPC is explicitly a statement that the issue of consciousness is a difficult problem; the fact that it seems to invoke dualism its just one of the many difficulties that come up in trying to seriously address it.

...snip...

No that is your re-definition of the HPC. You can of course decide to define the HPC to be whatever you want but if you don't use the same definition as the rest of us you'll not be able to contribute in a meaningful way to the discussion. It's like how earlier you redefined what a p-zombie is, the HPC starts with the premise that consciousness is dualistic.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Questions like why there is any experience at all, and how would one determine a specific qualitative experience are just a couple of the conundrums is presents. In a way, the questions of "what is consciousness?" and "why is there consciousness?" are on the same level of difficulty as "what is existence?"/"why is there existence?".

Well, that's right, but that is also exactly why (irony ) it has to be translated into a more operative set of questioning; i.e., why-questions must be translated into how questions, which makes them scientifically answerable. The same goes for 'what is'; it must be translated into a process description. If we remain on the what/why level, we aren't going to make progress at all. We don't even have to invoke consciousness or existence here, we can settle for a banana, asking "what is a banana?" and "why is there bananas?" Regardless of the answer given, the door has been left open for asking "yeah, but, what/why is that/there..." ad infinitum.

Hence, what/why questions are signals of departure for investigations, the answers may come in different forms however. Expecting the answers to rebound back to the departure level is mainly based on unfounded expectations. Perhaps we could even call them invalid expectations.

In a way it's like asking for money in exchange of a service, but then refusing any attempt for payment by saying: "no no no, I want money, not some pieces of metal or paper!"

 

[dv82matt]

Self-reference.

That's not a sufficient explanation unless you think a self-referential sentence is conscious. Now I realize a sentence can't be self-referential in the sense that you probably mean but your excessive briefness doesn't give much of a clue about what you might actually mean.

Well, tell me what you think I've excluded, and I'll tell you why it's irrelevant.

You want me to try to guess what you've excluded? How about some details. Simply asserting that microwaves are conscious because they self-reference doesn't explain anything. How were you able to assertain that the ability to self-reference is sufficient to cause consciousness? Did you simply define them as synonomous?

How about an analogy. Your reasoning seems analogous to: All life forms consist of matter, therefore since we understand much about matter we have a satisfactory understanding of life. DNA is irrelevant, protiens are irrelevant, cells are irrelevant, biology itself is entirely irrelevant as all life forms are matter and that's the end of the story. Do you see what this explanation of life leaves out and how the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise?

 

[PixyMisa]

That's not a sufficient explanation unless you think a self-referential sentence is conscious. Now I realize a sentence can't be self-referential in the sense that you probably mean but your excessive briefness doesn't give much of a clue about what you might actually mean.

Hofstadter. Read.

Shorter Hofstadter: Self-reference is not consciousness, but consciousness is self-referential. Self-referential information processing systems are conscious.

In much the same way our theories are merely conceptual models of reality, and not reality itself, so aku-zombies would be models of consciousness and not necessarily be absolute exemplars of it.

Processes that model consciousness are conscious. There is no distinction. There can be no distinction.

You want me to try to guess what you've excluded? How about some details.

What details?

Simply asserting that microwaves are conscious because they self-reference doesn't explain anything.

Sure it does. It explains both what consciousness is and how we can identify it.

How were you able to assertain that the ability to self-reference is sufficient to cause consciousness?

I'm asking you again: What else is required?

Did you simply define them as synonomous?

No. In the context of information processing, they are synonymous. Viz. Descartes' cogito: I think, therefore I am is just another way of saying I am self-referential, therefore I am conscious.

How about an analogy. Your reasoning seems analogous to: All life forms consist of matter, therefore since we understand much about matter we have a satisfactory understanding of life.

Analogy fail.

The correct analogy is that we understand much about matter, therefore we understand much about matter.

Which does follow, I assure you.

All I am saying is: This is what consciousnss is. Microwaves have it, therefore they are conscious.

If you think there is something more to consciousness, then you have to tell me what it is.

 

[dv82matt]

Shorter Hofstadter: Self-reference is not consciousness, but consciousness is self-referential. Self-referential information processing systems are conscious.

By definition? I sense a tautalogy.

What details?

The details that support your assertion. Maybe you can explain how self-referential information processing systems account for human behaviours associated with consciousness.

Sure it does. It explains both what consciousness is and how we can identify it.

A definition does not an explanation make.

I'm asking you again: What else is required?

I never meant to give the impression that I know what is required. My proposition is that you also don't know.

No. In the context of information processing, they are synonymous. Viz. Descartes' cogito: I think, therefore I am is just another way of saying I am self-referential, therefore I am conscious.

No it's not. It is self-referential but it is not saying "I am self-referential, therefore I am conscious." How do you get that?

Analogy fail.

Why?

The correct analogy is that we understand much about matter, therefore we understand much about matter.

I knew I sensed a tautalogy.

Which does follow, I assure you.

It is also trivial. Rain is rain therefore I am right.

All I am saying is: This is what consciousnss is. Microwaves have it, therefore they are conscious.

No, consciousness is sand. Beaches have it, therefore they are conscious. Words can mean anything. Why is your definition a good definition of consciousness? It doesn't seem to track all that well with things/beings that most people would agree are conscious.

If you think there is something more to consciousness, then you have to tell me what it is.

I don't know that there is more to consciousness. I suspect that there is more to it than just self-referential information processing since microwaves don't seem conscious to me.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Well, you see, when a man and a woman love each other very much....

Oh...Oh, I see wotchu did der...