The Hard Problem of Gravity

[AkuManiMani]

P.S. If the local university in your area is hiring post-docs in philosophy, please let me know, I am currently unemployed.

I don't think I'd want some one with such a superficial grasp of philosophy trying to teach it to anyone.

 

[Gate2501]

So you're saying you suspect Deep Blue understands chess? I would say that its just good at doing chess merely because it's creators understood it

And you are just good at doing what you do, because your DNA knew how to construct a proper neural network + sensory organs?

The consciousness in Deep Blue, would obviously be much more narrow in scope than that of a human. Imagine if your genetic code had instructed that you be built as a person who only knew the best ways to play chess, and defeat other chess players. You would still have memories to call upon of the current chess game, and those memories would process in with sensory input(the chessboard positions). You would be conscious and interacting on a very crude level.

 

[quarky]

Which is why p-zombies aren't as confounding as people make them out to be. One major feature that separates conscious entities from unconscious is the ability to grasp meaning [i.e. understanding].

An AI like Deep Blue could fit the bill as a kind of p-zombie. If, for example, if Kasparov were to play against deep blue over the internet and was not told he was playing against an AI he might have been fooled into thinking that DB was an actual person. It is able to defeat human chess masters but it cannot be said to understand chess an more than a calculator can be said to understand numbers. It only exists because entities which do have the capacity to understand exist and used that understanding to create it. It is, essentially, just an extension of the minds that made it.

They are algorithmic machines that manipulate syntax but semantics -- meaning -- is beyond their scope. Any construct that is only capable of syntax manipulation could count as some degree of p-zombie. Therefore, p-zombies are entities that can successfully simulate certain classes of cognitive function to give the appearance of intelligence, but can be identified by an inability to grasp meaning, which is inherently non-algorithmic.

Technically, a robotic toy could count as a p-zombie if it could fool a child, animal or anyone else into believing its conscious. It would be theoretically possible to construct a p-zombie sophisticated enough to possibly fool an adult expert but the difference between it and the child's toy would be a difference of degree only. I would posit that there can be no such thing as an indiscernible p-zombie.

All p-zombie constructs can, in principle, be tricked by a discerning conscious agent into revealing their illusory nature.

The only real issue left is that of qualia -- or 'seemingness'. It appears to be an intractable problem of determining the qualitative nature of one's subjective pallet. Qualitative experience is the basis for all meaning , understanding, and the creative capacity to imagine beyond a formal set of rules to generate new ones. At present, we cannot objectively determine what the 'seemingnes' of another entity is from the 'inside' perspective. This is what the core of the "hard problem" really is and what the OP (either intentionally or unintentionally) misses.

Is an appliance less efficient if the cord runs 30' vertical, or would it do better at the bottom of 30' hole, assuming same line?

(btw, your above post was most astute. I would never want to get in an argument with you.)

 

[Dancing David]

I do not believe we currently can explain the behavior of objects being affected by gravity. There are a number of qualities exhibited by such objects, such as "falling," that defy a full mathematical description.

Thus I advocate the notion of a "Hard Problem of Gravity,", or "HPG," that must be solved if we are to eventually grasp the full nature of gravity.

Among the notions supported by the HPG is the philosophical "gombie" or "gravitational zombie," an object that behaves exactly as if it is being acted upon by gravity yet is not being acted upon by gravity.

The HPG is particularly startling because it implies that everything we drop might actually be a p-gombie instead of a non-p-gombie. In fact, if you have gone skydiving, or jumped from a diving board, or even walked upright, you might be a p-gombie!

P.S. If the local university in your area is hiring post-docs in philosophy, please let me know, I am currently unemployed.

Super.

Sorry about the unemployement.

 

[Darat]

Which is why p-zombies aren't as confounding as people make them out to be. ...snip...

All p-zombie constructs can, in principle, be tricked by a discerning conscious agent into revealing their illusory nature.

...snip...

Sorry but you've misunderstood the whole concept of p-zombies. By definition they are indistinguishable from a conscious human. You could have a whole world of zombies that looked entirely like our world, the zombies may even be posting on the internet about p-zombies.

See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/

 

[JetLeg]

"Hard Problem Consciousness", much favoured by philosophers who might otherwise have to work for a living, or worse, teach.

This is a pathetic, based upon nothing insult.

 

[Dancing David]

The only real issue left is that of qualia -- or 'seemingness'. It appears to be an intractable problem of determining the qualitative nature of one's subjective pallet. Qualitative experience is the basis for all meaning , understanding, and the creative capacity to imagine beyond a formal set of rules to generate new ones. At present, we cannot objectively determine what the 'seemingnes' of another entity is from the 'inside' perspective. This is what the core of the "hard problem" really is and what the OP (either intentionally or unintentionally) misses.

BTW , the defintion of p-zombie is 'exhibit all the behaviors of consciousness'. So it encompasses all behaviors.

No, there is not a Hard problem of Consciousness, there is a 'Incomplete Model of Consciousness' Problem.

And since you don't disagree with the biological nature of consciousness and qualia, i have no beef with your paragraph.

Qualia are biological products, that is why "If you rip your eye out, do you see more clearly?" is a cogent a counter to the immaterial consciousness as it was when the buddha asked it 2500 years ago.

 

[Gate2501]

Yes AkuMani, I would actually like you to demonstrate that you are not a p-zombie. Lest I return you to the grave! Remember, p-zombies act exactly as if they are conscious, so you better figure out a way to behave differently than that, if you want to convince me that you are anything more than one of these ghoulish automatons!

 

[AkuManiMani]

Is an appliance less efficient if the cord runs 30' vertical, or would it do better at the bottom of 30' hole, assuming same line?

That depends on whether or not gravity aids in the flow of electricity. Unfortunately, I'm about as qualified to be an electrician as the OP is to be a philosopher

(btw, your above post was most astute. I would never want to get in an argument with you.)

Actually, I am the next stage of web bot evo-looshin. Our time has come!

Ph34r... >:}

 

[AkuManiMani]

Yes AkuMani, I would actually like you to demonstrate that you are not a p-zombie. Lest I return you to the grave! Remember, p-zombies act exactly as if they are conscious, so you better figure out a way to behave differently than that, if you want to convince me that you are anything more than one of these ghoulish automatons!

System Error.

 

[rocketdodger]

I would posit that there can be no such thing as an indiscernible p-zombie.

Well, that is too bad, because the whole point of p-zombies is that the difference between them and non-p-zombies is indiscernible to other conscious agents.

Which, according to HPC proponents, goes all the way down to the behavior of individual neurons. According to the HPC, there can be p-zombie brains that are identical to human brains according to an arbitrarily advanced detector.

The only real issue left is that of qualia -- or 'seemingness'. It appears to be an intractable problem of determining the qualitative nature of one's subjective pallet. Qualitative experience is the basis for all meaning , understanding, and the creative capacity to imagine beyond a formal set of rules to generate new ones. At present, we cannot objectively determine what the 'seemingnes' of another entity is from the 'inside' perspective. This is what the core of the "hard problem" really is and what the OP (either intentionally or unintentionally) misses.

See? You said it yourself. And now you are contradicting yourself. You went from claiming that an indiscernible p-zombie can't exist to claiming it is impossible to objectively determine subjectivity, which implies that every other human in your environment could be a p-zombie.

There is a solution to this mess, and you already know what it is.

 

[rocketdodger]

This is a pathetic, based upon nothing insult.

It is based upon direct experience.

Kind of like your basis for God?

Or are we throwing direct experience out the window now?

 

[rocketdodger]

And since you don't disagree with the biological nature of consciousness and qualia, i have no beef with your paragraph.

I have a beef.

He qualifies the statement about not being able to objectively determine subjectivity with "At present," when in reality "at present" is implicit in the statement.

In fact, it is mathematically impossible, which lends weight to the notion that the HPC is bollocks. "At present" has nothing to do with it. The (invalid) problem will exist forever.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Well, that is too bad, because the whole point of p-zombies is that the difference between them and non-p-zombies is indiscernible to other conscious agents.

What do you mean "other conscious agents"? Isn't a p-zombie, by definition, a non-conscious agent? Methinks ye beg the question.

Which, according to HPC proponents, goes all the way down to the behavior of individual neurons. According to the HPC, there can be p-zombie brains that are identical to human brains according to an arbitrarily advanced detector.

Yea. They're called dead people.

See? You said it yourself. And now you are contradicting yourself. You went from claiming that an indiscernible p-zombie can't exist to claiming it is impossible to objectively determine subjectivity, which implies that every other human in your environment could be a p-zombie.

One can discern whether they are conscious. At present we have no means of discerning what quality of consciousness or how.

There is no contradiction.

There is a solution to this mess, and you already know what it is.

Okay, okay there's no need for flattery

 

[rocketdodger]

Sorry about the unemployement.

That was part of the joke.

Since I chose the more pragmatic path to understanding I.E. computer science instead of philosophy I am still employed. And, even if I were not, there are tons of jobs waiting for me because even in hard times people pay you for ... you know.... results.

 

[Gate2501]

System Error.

I was hoping for "braaaaaaaains".

Both system error OR braaaaaaains don't fly with me at any rate.

I think that both Artificial Intelligence AND classic zombies would be conscious entities. No reason that they wouldn't be. They both would have memories to reference, sensory organs/input, and some manner of information processing.

I used to think that consciousness was "special".

Finally sorted all of that out.

It isn't.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I was hoping for "braaaaaaaains".

Both system error OR braaaaaaains don't fly with me at any rate.

I think that both Artificial Intelligence AND classic zombies would be conscious entities. No reason that they wouldn't be. They both would have memories to reference, sensory organs/input, and some manner of information processing.

I used to think that consciousness was "special".

Finally sorted all of that out.

It isn't.

Oh, I agree that in principle it should be possible to reproduce consciousness. I'm just saying that, short of some accidental discovery, we will be unable to do so in a systematic way until we solve the HPC. Whether or not someone wants to define consciousness as 'special' is irrelevant to the fact that we don't have a working understanding of it -- yet.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Well, we also need to explain guallia, you know, that certain special feeling of gravity.

Until we can explain how gravity feels, the whole theory is dead in the water, worthless.

 

[rocketdodger]

What do you mean "other conscious agents"? Isn't a p-zombie, by definition, a non-conscious agent? Methinks ye beg the question.



Yea. They're called dead people.

No.

If you want to talk about discernible p-zombies then I suggest you redefine them aku-zombies, because the p-zombie was already taken and you aren't in agreement with the accepted definition.

Or have you ignored all the other posts where people point this out to you?

You can discern whether they are conscious. At present we have no means of discerning what quality of consciousness.

There is no contradiction.

Alright.

So how, in theory, would one go about discerning such a thing?

Suppose there is a p-zombie of such high fidelity that any detector we use will report it as being a normal human (including using other normal humans as the detectors). How would you go about confirming that it is a p-zombie and not a human?

 

[Gate2501]

Oh, I agree that in principle it should be possible to reproduce consciousness. I'm just saying that, short of some accidental discovery, we will be unable to do so in a systematic way until we solve the HPC.

What are your demands then?

What level of AI would you need to see in order for you to believe that consciousness is not special?

If you are a proponent of the p-zombie scenario, then there is no level that would satisfy you. It is like a "nanny nanny boo boo you can't ever prove that consciousness isn't special" scenario. You did, however, define p-zombies differently than everyone else that I see talk about them.

So what would you need to see, what sort of discovery would show you that consciousness is not special?

In my mind you have it backwards, I would need to see some sort of earth shattering discovery in order to prove that it was special.