Materealism and morality

[Belz...]

Materealism cannot provide a logical foundation for morality.

That statement is at odds with reality.

I suggest that reality isn't to blame.

 

[Belz...]

Yes it can and does. Try reading about evolution. Very interesting stuff. Apes have empathy and a sort of morality just as we do. A mouse that is given a button to press that dispenses food, but also electrocutes a mouse in another cage will stop pressing the button, even if it means starving it's self. Do these creatures have souls and gods?

That's very interesting. Source ?

 

[Belz...]

I think it was Carl Sagan that proposed the interpretation of the Garden of Eden story as the story of becoming human. It's only when we've got the higher functions (language and so on) that we ate from the tree of knowledge of good and evil--and were condemned to painful childbirth (because of our bigger brains), awareness of our own mortality, and so on. No more blissful ignorance for us once we ate the forbidden fruit.

Aye, the original sin was knowledge. Not surprising, considering the godling involved.

 

[AkuManiMani]

That statement is at odds with reality.

I suggest that reality isn't to blame.

'Sup, Belz! Haven't run into you here inna while. Good too 'see' ya again

 

[L The Detective]

Seems that you do, thanks for taking the effort to understand.

Thanks. So to re-iterate, what you're trying to establish is that it is possible for the brain and mind to be two separate entities; there's no logical contradiction.

Well, I'm not sure if I agree with you, though it's hard for me to say that something like that is impossible. You may be right. I think what many people are trying to say here is not so much that it is impossible, but that it is unnecessary. It's simpler just to say that the mind is a property of the brain, and fits with what we know scientifically about the brain. So since it's simpler, it's more logical to go with that. I think that's where I'm coming from, too.

Now that I know where you're coming from, let me point something out and get your thoughts. Isn't it possible that there is a logical contradiction, and you're just not aware of it? Perhaps the reason you are not aware is because we don't fully understand yet how the mind is a property of the brain... there is definitely evidence that it is, but we don't know all the details yet. If we knew all the details, isn't is possible that we would say that the mind is a property of a brain in exactly the same way that round is a property of an orange?

In other words, when you say "we can conceive of a mind without a brain," is it possible that the way you want to conceive it is itself fundamentally flawed?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Aye, the original sin was knowledge. Not surprising, considering the godling involved.

Not just knowledge--it was the knowledge of good and evil.

Even though I believe morality exists in a continuum in animals (as does language), in a more general way--comparing humans to cats, dogs, horses, pigs and so on, morality is one of those mental capacities that separates us from them.

And in the Garden of Eden myth, this mental capacity is connected with painful childbirth (because our heads are so big).

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Thanks. So to re-iterate, what you're trying to establish is that it is possible for the brain and mind to be two separate entities; there's no logical contradiction.

His statements have been stronger than that. He's saying because he can conceive of a disembodied mind (or so he claims), that proves (he used "therefore") that the two ARE logically separate entities. In other words, he's not going from "conceivable" to "possible"--he's attempting to use "conveivable" to prove "is".

But I agree with your other points. Dualism suffers from two main problems: there's no empirical evidence for it, and with modern neuroscience, it's very definitely not necessary.


But, I'm still not willing to cede that a disembodied mind is even conceivable. I've shown that trying to do so leads quickly to all sorts of contradictions. For example, a disembodied mind cannot exist in a location (location is a property of matter)--yet when people conceive of it, that's exactly what they do (e.g. floating above the body in a OBE or NDE). A disembodied mind has no sense organs, yet when people attempt to conceive of such a thing, they imagine it has the ability to see and hear.

I think it's only conceivable if you don't really think about it very much.

When people talk about these things, they usually talk about a sort of non-material body (which is, of course, a contradiction in itself). There was a time when the spiritualists thought of it as a material thing (ectoplasm) that was just different than normal matter.

 

[L The Detective]

His statements have been stronger than that. He's saying because he can conceive of a disembodied mind (or so he claims), that proves (he used "therefore") that the two ARE logically separate entities. In other words, he's not going from "conceivable" to "possible"--he's attempting to use "conveivable" to prove "is".

You're probably right. But I'm more interested in what he means than what he says. A language problem is a separate problem.

But I agree with your other points. Dualism suffers from two main problems: there's no empirical evidence for it, and with modern neuroscience, it's very definitely not necessary.

But, I'm still not willing to cede that a disembodied mind is even conceivable. I've shown that trying to do so leads quickly to all sorts of contradictions. For example, a disembodied mind cannot exist in a location (location is a property of matter)--yet when people conceive of it, that's exactly what they do (e.g. floating above the body in a OBE or NDE). A disembodied mind has no sense organs, yet when people attempt to conceive of such a thing, they imagine it has the ability to see and hear.

I think it's only conceivable if you don't really think about it very much.

I think you're absolutely right. But, technically I suppose that means you can concieve it. Well, technically, isn't it possible to conceive of roundness being a separate entity from an orange? Who knows, I might just be crazy enough to do it! So even if there's an obvious contradiction, that doesn't mean it's not possible to conceive it, right? So, what we're basically talking about here is the difference between obvious contradictions and non-obvious contradictions, perhaps?

 

[Skeptic Ginger]

That's very interesting. Source ?

I know there is supporting evidence on the non-human primate morality, but I also am skeptical of the mouse reference.

A Google search of "mouse morality" gets you deciphers of messages in Mickey cartoons. And looking for "mice reluctant to hurt other mice" turned up no such studies. I think this one was a mistaken animal study memory.

 

[AkuManiMani]

His statements have been stronger than that. He's saying because he can conceive of a disembodied mind (or so he claims), that proves (he used "therefore") that the two ARE logically separate entities. In other words, he's not going from "conceivable" to "possible"--he's attempting to use "conveivable" to prove "is".

But I agree with your other points. Dualism suffers from two main problems: there's no empirical evidence for it, and with modern neuroscience, it's very definitely not necessary.


But, I'm still not willing to cede that a disembodied mind is even conceivable. I've shown that trying to do so leads quickly to all sorts of contradictions. For example, a disembodied mind cannot exist in a location (location is a property of matter)--yet when people conceive of it, that's exactly what they do (e.g. floating above the body in a OBE or NDE). A disembodied mind has no sense organs, yet when people attempt to conceive of such a thing, they imagine it has the ability to see and hear.

I think it's only conceivable if you don't really think about it very much.

When people talk about these things, they usually talk about a sort of non-material body (which is, of course, a contradiction in itself). There was a time when the spiritualists thought of it as a material thing (ectoplasm) that was just different than normal matter.

Well as far as disembodied minds go, the whole nonlocality isn't an issue. Its pretty much established to be a part of nature.

I think the real problem with disembodied minds would be how they actually manage to perceive anything without a body or sense organs. The whole OBE/NDE, if ever conclusively verified, would really complicate things.

On the one hand, disembodiment doesn't make any sense to me for the reasons mentioned above -- if it were a real phenomenon it would be quite confusing. We'd be kinda forced back to the philosophical and scientific drawing board to make sense of it all.

On the other hand, it would be extremely fascinating if they turned out to be actual vertical experiences. I'm trying to throw together a contingency theory on the off chance such a discovery were actually confirmed

 

[pchams]

Materealism cannot provide a logical foundation for morality.

...<snip>

Yes it can.
"Materialism" has provided morality.
Without humanity cooperating to survive, we probably wouldn't be here.
Tribes share resources. Without respecting the needs for others, sometimes yours may not be met.
So it seems to follow, that by respecting others needs and rights (morality),
we can survive to procreate.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Well as far as disembodied minds go, the whole nonlocality isn't an issue. Its pretty much established to be a part of nature.

I don't follow.

When they say, for example, that their disembodied consciousness is floating up near the ceiling (and looking down at their own body without eyes and listening to the surgeons without eyes or ears!!), what exactly is near the ceiling?

I don't see how something that is not matter can be "near" something else.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

You're probably right. But I'm more interested in what he means than what he says. A language problem is a separate problem.

Yes, but I'm pretty sure that's what he means as well. (In fact, I'm nearly certain of it, because this is the same p zombie argument for dualism I've run into before.)

I think he means to say (and did say) that if one can conceive of a disembodied mind (or a p-zombie--a "disem-minded" body so to speak), it proves that the two are logically separate entities. (Not that that it's merely possible for them to be logically separate, but that they are. In other words, this is the extent of the argument for dualism.)

He's saying that it's impossible to conceive of roundness separate from the ball, but that it is possible to conceive of a mind without a body.

I agree with your take--depending on how you define "conceivable" you either can conceive of both or neither. I don't think he's thought the disembodied mind or p-zombie idea through enough to see the contradictions at all. (Recall the stuff about a mind-reader, and his insistence that that would somehow resolve the problem that we can't share someone else's subjective experience--as a way to distinguish p-zombies from regular people.)

I'm pretty sure he thinks that the relationship between mind and body is fundamentally different than the relationship between roundness and ball. Not by a matter of degree, but of kind.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

One the one hand, disembodiment doesn't make any sense to me for the reasons mentioned above -- if it were a real phenomenon it would be quite confusing.

I really can't imagine it. I can't imagine having consciousness that is consciousness of nothing--because of no afferent information-- except, presumably, my own internal, non-lingual, thoughts that don't rely on memory or any of the other mental processes that we know for certain are dependent on specific brain structures.

Even a deaf-blind person has a whole host of sensory inputs (and structures for processing memory, language, etc.) That I can imagine.

I can't imagine my "self" as a mind that has no gender (something fundamentally associated with my body). No name (because of no language), etc.

It's as meaningless as thinking of roundness as a separate entity rather than a property of the ball.

 

[pchams]

Opinion:
Evolution selects for morality or altruism selectively, in homo sapiens.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I don't follow.

When they say, for example, that their disembodied consciousness is floating up near the ceiling (and looking down at their own body without eyes and listening to the surgeons without eyes or ears!!), what exactly is near the ceiling?

I've read/heard some accounts of OBEs where people report experiencing seeing in every direction at once, or experiencing past present and future all at once or any number of strange sensory perspectives. Brain phenomenon or not, what ever OBE/NDEs are they don't seem to be limited to conventional first person perspectives. What ever the nature of OBEs it seems that there is extreme flexibility in how an individual may perceive them, with the conventional first person perspective just being one of many ways.

I don't see how something that is not matter can be "near" something else.

I really can't imagine it. I can't imagine having consciousness that is consciousness of nothing--because of no afferent information-- except, presumably, my own internal, non-lingual, thoughts that don't rely on memory or any of the other mental processes that we know for certain are dependent on specific brain structures.

Even a deaf-blind person has a whole host of sensory inputs (and structures for processing memory, language, etc.) That I can imagine.

I can't imagine my "self" as a mind that has no gender (something fundamentally associated with my body). No name (because of no language), etc.

I don't think anyone fully grasps how a particle can be in two places at once, but they still manage to be in multiple locations simultaneously. What is matter really? What ever it's nature, a lot of its properties defy conventional intuition [which is part of the reason why I prefer to use a really qualified definition of 'matter'].

There's a lot of things I don't know but one thing I do know is that the universe is eff'n weird, so in instances like this I prefer to suspend judgment until I can conceptually get my bearings

 

[Skeptic Ginger]

Opinion:
Evolution selects for morality or altruism selectively, in homo sapiens.

Are you being sarcastic? I'd hate to spam you with mountains of research on non-human primate moral behavior research if you were just kidding.

 

[JetLeg]

His statements have been stronger than that. He's saying because he can conceive of a disembodied mind (or so he claims), that proves (he used "therefore") that the two ARE logically separate entities. In other words, he's not going from "conceivable" to "possible"--he's attempting to use "conveivable" to prove "is".

What exactly do you mean by "logically separate"? It doesn't seem the same thing that I mean by it.

(I owe lots of replies to different people. Will folllow up)

 

[Neverfly]

What exactly do you mean by "logically separate"? It doesn't seem the same thing that I mean by it.

(I owe lots of replies to different people. Will folllow up)

Whatever you mean by it is not Real.

 

[JetLeg]

Yes, but I'm pretty sure that's what he means as well. (In fact, I'm nearly certain of it, because this is the same p zombie argument for dualism I've run into before.)

think he means to say (and did say) that if one can conceive of a disembodied mind (or a p-zombie--a "disem-minded" body so to speak), it proves that the two are logically separate entities. (Not that that it's merely possible for them to be logically separate, but that they are. In other words, this is the extent of the argument for dualism.)

He's saying that it's impossible to conceive of roundness separate from the ball, but that it is possible to conceive of a mind without a body.

I agree with your take--depending on how you define "conceivable" you either can conceive of both or neither. I don't think he's thought the disembodied mind or p-zombie idea through enough to see the contradictions at all. (Recall the stuff about a mind-reader, and his insistence that that would somehow resolve the problem that we can't share someone else's subjective experience--as a way to distinguish p-zombies from regular people.)

I'm pretty sure he thinks that the relationship between mind and body is fundamentally different than the relationship between roundness and ball. Not by a matter of degree, but of kind.

__