First, it seems that you misunderstand my version of dualism.
I do not claim that the mind can exist seperately[sic] from the brain.
No, but you attempted to use as an argument that the mind and brain are separate "entities" by saying that it is "conceivable" that there could exist disembodied minds.
I'm saying it is not conceivable, any more than it is conceivable than the existence of "roundness" or "bouncing" independent of the ball (both property and function of the ball).
What I do claim is that the mind and the brain are radically different "substances", "entities". One of them (the brain), perhaps, causes the other, but they are still fundamentally different in nature.
Again, a property of the object is fundamentally different in nature from the object, but that doesn't mean they're separate entities or substances.
The nature of the mind is subjective. Nobody but you can experience your thoughts and feelings. Even if with neurobiology we will be able to know perfectly what one man thinks and feels, this won't be the same as experiencing his thoughts and feelings, which is impossible.
So? Dualism offers no way around that problem. (Care to revisit the issue of the mind-reader?) In fact, taking the mind as a collection of properties and/or functions of the brain, it's not a problem for neuroscience. It is a problem for dualism (which asserts that there is something separate yet inaccessible from the outside).
And yet, it might be that the brain causes the mind. I have no problem with that. One substance, which is radically differ from the other one, causes it.
I think you're just abusing the language so much that you're basically trying to argue that dualism is another form of materialism. I don't buy that.
There are not two substances. There are not two separate objects. There is an object and its properties. One "causes" the other the same way a ball "causes" roundness. (We don't usually speak of the relationship between objects and their properties or functions as "causal".)
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My argument from conceivability doesn't try to establish that the mind can exist seperately from the body, like you seem to think. I do not argue "a disembodied consciousness is conceivable, therefore it is plausible", though both you and Neverfly constantly accuse me of it.
That's not what I've been saying at all. I'm saying that asking for the concession that p-zombies or disembodied minds is conceivable is tantamount to begging the question.
It attempts to separate the object and the properties (like separating "roundness" from the ball) so that you can then argue that they are two separate objects and not a property and an object. If you get me to concede that it's conceivable that "roundness" can exist independently of "the ball", or that there is a zombie ball (one that looks round, but lacks "roundness"), then I have conceded dualism with respect to "roundness" and "the ball".
Do you understand why I'm saying that asking for this concession is tantamount to begging the question?
If not, re-read what I've written more carefully. You have mischaracterized my objection to making the concession.
What it does try to prove is that they are logically seperate[sic], and therefore they cannot be the same thing.
Exactly. And that is the definition of dualism, is it not? And you're asking me to concede the point as a premise to an argument that you will then make to support dualism. That's called "begging the question".
I say abandon this approach and simply make the case for dualism.
(Though one can cause the other). I argue two things : 1) Things that can be logically seperated [sic] cannot be the same thing. 2) If two things can be logically seperated [sic], one cannot be a property of the other.
And I use the argument from conceivability to prove that they can be logically seperated [sic].
The last point first: that something is conceivable doesn't say anything about whether it is logical.
As for the rest, it's the same question begging. You're asking me to concede that the mind and the brain are two separate entities as a premise for a case for dualism. But in fact, that premise IS dualism. You're asking me to concede dualism so that you can make an argument FOR dualism.
Since you've demanded my reply to specific things you've posted, I ask you to read carefully my analogy to the zombie universe (the one with no galaxy) as the first step in the argument that in our universe gravity is dualistic (caused by magic) and not a property of mass.
I do not think the mind is a property of the brain, but a different substance. The mind is not a property of the brain -> it is caused by the brain.
These are radically different. The type of relationship that exists between a thing and its property is not a causal one.
Yes, I know that. But asserting your belief and making a case for it isn't the same thing.
I've shown the abundance of evidence from biology (neuroscience in particular) that support the idea that the mind (a term used for a number of mental processes taken collectively) is a property or function of the brain.
I hope that my position is more clear now. I certainly feel that you are doing an injustice to my arguments.
Your position has been clear to me all along. As I said, I've run into this approach to dualism many time before. In the absence of any case for dualism, you're simply asking me to concede the premise of dualism.
If it's otherwise, you're trying to predicate existence of an entity (whose existence is the question)--that is, "the mind" (as a separate object). In this approach, you're argument suffers from the same problem as the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. (I said this before, but as with most of what I've said, you ignored it and merely repeated your case.)
