Materealism and morality

[Neverfly]

Exactly. It might be possible to find proof of disembodied consciousness -> therefore the concept is conceivable.

All I was arguing. No more.

It also might be possible to discover that our galaxy is encased in a marble hanging on Orion's Belt (a cats collar.)

Claiming that something may be conceivable if the right conditions are met is nothing more than an act of fantasizing.
Until you have evidence that gives the notion merit- it remains a product of speculation and nothing more.

In the case of your arguments here, you cannot support a conclusion based upon a series of speculations.

Additionally, you also can have counter evidence which strongly indicates that a possibility, (Such as the galaxy in a marble.) is far fetched and highly unlikely.

 

[JetLeg]

Detectable by science? What do you mean detectable by science. Are asking if it is empirically observed or if some authority says they observed it? Do you need me to provide a reference to a scientific study to confirm something you confirm yourself every waking moment? You might as well ask me whether apples falling is detectable by "science".



You have volition so clearly its a part of physics. You volition affects affects you nervous system and, by extension, the rest of your body, and by extension the rest of the world around you. Your claim that volition doesn't affect the world outside the brain is rather silly. Computers, power lines, and skyscrapers don't build themselves and cars and planes don't get up and go of their own accord. You're not making much sense right now

You missed my point. I have a volition, it is a fact. I am not asking you for evidence of volition. I am asking you for evidence that it effects the brain.

I understand that it appears that it does. You take that as evidence.

My argument, which you didn't adress was that

1) Our volition isn't material, it is a subjective phenomena.
2) if our volition has effect on our body, then science should detect this effect at the micro-level. There should be some cells/atoms/whatever that are effected directly by volition, and behave differently that cells/atoms that aren't effected by volition.
3) At the micro-level, no such distinctions have been found.

So our volition doesn't have an effect on our body/brain, and the observation that it seems to have, is an illusion.

 

[JetLeg]

It also might be possible to discover that our galaxy is encased in a marble hanging on Orion's Belt (a cats collar.)

Claiming that something may be conceivable if the right conditions are met is nothing more than an act of fantasizing.
Until you have evidence that gives the notion merit- it remains a product of speculation and nothing more.

In the case of your arguments here, you cannot support a conclusion based upon a series of speculations.

Additionally, you also can have counter evidence which strongly indicates that a possibility, (Such as the galaxy in a marble.) is far fetched and highly unlikely.

I was not arguing that it is true. I have argued that it conceivable.

You tell me "If it is conceivable, it still remains a product of speculation". I never said otherwise.

I will have an argument based on the fact that it is conceivable. I wanted to sort out this first, since some people claim that p-zombies and disembodied consciousnesses aren't conceivable. Bear with me.

 

[Neverfly]

I was not arguing that it is true. I have argued that it conceivable.

You tell me "If it is conceivable, it still remains a product of speculation". I never said otherwise.

I will have an argument based on the fact that it is conceivable. I wanted to sort out this first, since some people claim that p-zombies and disembodied consciousnesses aren't conceivable. Bear with me.

I understand your frustration but you must understand too..
I quote myself in bold:

In the case of your arguments here, you cannot support a conclusion based upon a series of speculations.

Giving you the benefit of the doubt- You may be unaware that you are doing that. That's ok- I am making you aware of it.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Listen, it's not fair. I've written quiet a long post arguing for the conceivability of p-zombies and disembodied consciousness. I am going to argue for dualism on the basis of it, but the argument isn't "it's conceivable, so it's true". I want us to agree on the question of the conceivability first.

So present your argument. I guarantee you, I've heard it before.

You don't need to try some silly rhetorical trap by asking me to concede that a p-zombie is conceivable before you make your argument. Just go for it.

Here's what I think is wrong with the argument, and why I won't concede the point:

The question is how to explain the phenomenon of mind. Neuroscience is sufficient to explain the phenomenon of mind. (Even in a lot finer degree than simply "subjective experience"--as fine, for example, as proprioception.) So something else is not even necessary.

The p-zombie thing is begging the question. I have to concede that dualism is right to conceive of p zombies. I'm not willing to do that. At least not unless you can show me how to distinguish a zombie from a person. If I've got one of each, how can I ever know which is which?

It's very much like the analogy I made about a zombie universe that doesn't have gravity. People in that universe get exactly the same results we do in every respect. Objects fall in that universe. The inverse square law holds up, etc. Yet, I'm asking you to concede that in that zombie universe, gravity is doesn't exist. Then I'm going to use that concession that gravity doesn't have to exist for us to get all the measurements we get in our universe to show that in our universe it is, therefore, reasonable (or conceivable) that gravity is magic and not a physical property of matter.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I was not arguing that it is true. I have argued that it conceivable.

Yes, I know. You're trying to lay a rhetorical trap, and that's why you won't just go ahead an present the argument based on your assertion that p-zombies are conceivable.

I know the argument, and I guarantee it will turn out that the asking us to concede that p zombies are conceivable is tantamount to begging the question.

But do go ahead. If you're not playing a silly game of "trap" you shouldn't need a concession to present the argument.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Back to the issue of quantum events and mental activity:

The problem with that approach is that quantum events are properties of sub-atomic or atomic realm. Mental activity is associated with higher levels of organization. If "mind" were somehow the result of quantum events, then why don't rocks or trees have mental activity?

We're really talking about much higher levels of organization. Things like the lateral geniculate nucleus, the amygdala, and so on. Stuff you don't find in trees or rocks.

For more support of this approach, we do see a continuum of mental capacity that correlates very well with more and more complex examples of these higher levels of organization.

 

[JetLeg]

Yes, I know. You're trying to lay a rhetorical trap, and that's why you won't just go ahead an present the argument based on your assertion that p-zombies are conceivable.

I know the argument, and I guarantee it will turn out that the asking us to concede that p zombies are conceivable is tantamount to begging the question.

But do go ahead. If you're not playing a silly game of "trap" you shouldn't need a concession to present the argument.

I'm not playing in a rhetorical game. In the original post I wrote

"I will explain later the role of the conceivability of them in my worldview. "

And perhaps it wasn't enough. The reason why I wanted to establish conceivability priorhand, is that my argument depends on it, and I wanted to reach a conclusion about it first. I think it is fair. Don't you? Do you agree to discuss the conceivability first, since my argument depends on that, or you insist me to go to the argument? (Can you point of another "rhetorical trap" that I've made in the post that causes you to suspect me?)

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

One more try on mind-reading:

Imagine you're in a lab. You've got a p-zombie and a normal person. Your lab is equipped with all the latest tech: MRI, EEG, etc. as well as a bona-fide mind reader (either a machine or a person--makes no difference). When you test the two subjects, you get convincing readings on all the tests. There is no difference.

Your assertion that the mind-reader will definitely give you a result that distinguishes the p-zombie from the normal person is just begging the question. How could you possibly know that it would?

Let's say you did get two different results with the mind-reader. How would you know which is which? Your confidence in the mind reader's ability is presumably based on past trials (as is our confidence in the other machinery). You're asking me to say that what the other machinery has been reading all these years isn't evidence of "mind" but that the mind reader's past trials all have been. Why should I grant that?

You still face the same exact deficit (or assumption) that neuroscience deals with.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

The reason why I wanted to establish conceivability priorhand, is that my argument depends on it, and I wanted to reach a conclusion about it first. I think it is fair. Don't you?

No, I don't. As I said, I've already heard this argument, and I do know exactly where you're going. I've spelled it out pretty well. You pretty much want a concession of the point under discussion before you show your argument. (If you'd present your argument, it will be clear that asking for this concession is tantamount to begging the question.)

Do you agree to discuss the conceivability first, since my argument depends on that, or you insist me to go to the argument?

Discuss, fine. Then answer my last 4 or 5 posts where I've shown exactly the problem with the conceding the conceivability of p zombies. See especially the problem of what a p-zombie is (if it's not a concession of the point of that dualism is valid and materialism is not--especially in regards to the mind-reader problem). See also the analogy of the zombie universe in explaining the phenomenon of gravity.

Or better yet, just present your argument as a whole, and then let's discuss that. There's no need to get my agreement to the conceivability of p zombies first. If your argument is robust, it should stand.

 

[JetLeg]

Ok. I'll present my argument as a whole, but while I am writing that, please respond to these topics - do they prove conceivability? You haven't so far.

1) Disembodied consciousness - If the experiments that test out-of-body experience would succeed, they would _prove_ disembodied consciousess. If you lie on a bed, and you feel that you hover outside your body, and go to a safe, enter this safe, read the number that is written there - and you get it right - it would be proof of disembodied experience, provided that it were done with all the controls. I think Susan Blackmore was performing such tests for a long time.

I am not arguing that these experiments are successful - only that if they are, they establish disembodied consciousness. And therefore disembodied consciousness is conceivable.

3) I can invent a specific scenario for a p-zombie to exist. Remember, all I am arguing for now is the _conceivability_ of p-zombies, and disembodied consciousnesses.

Have you seen The Truman's Show? Imagine a whole civilization instead of being dedicated to watching Truman, dedicated to make a single p-zombie act like a human being. One million people would be responsible for his eye movements, another million, for his mouth movements, a milliard would be responsible for the movements of the cells of his brain... Can't you conceive of such a scenario?

4) After all these are you guys who claim that it is a scientific discovery that the brain causes the mind. If it a scientific discovery, then it must be conceivable that it wouldn't be the case, it must be conceivable that the brain wouldn't cause the mind, and that they would be separate. Otherwise, what type of a scientific discovery it is, the opposite of which is simply inconceivable?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

And I'm not being coy. I really do find the notion of p zombies inconceivable. I keep trying to imagine how you'd tell a p zombie from a normal person, and the only way it can be done is by stipulation for purposes of an argument. That's just begging the question.

 

[Neverfly]

Ok. I'll present my argument as a whole, but while I am writing that, please respond to these topics - do they prove conceivability? You haven't so far.

Conceivability has nothing to do with rationality.

It's conceivable that I am not really me and that I am not really typing on a computer right now. In fact, I am currently locked in a padded room and in a straight jacket and drooling on myself; All of this that I am perceiving as happening is just a figment of my diseased imagination.

Now: Can you prove that's not the case?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Ok. I'll present my argument as a whole, but while I am writing that, please respond to these topics - do they prove conceivability? You haven't so far.

You must've missed my response to these items. Look up. I even quoted them.

 

[JetLeg]

It is important to clarify the type of relationship that exists between the mind and the brain.

The mind and the brain are logically seperate entities. The type of relationship between them is causal.

It is conceivable to think of the mind existing without the brain. And it is conceivable to think of the brain existing without the mind. Therefore they are logically seperate entities.

What we did establish? That changes in the brain influence the mind. Lets go with the strongest interpretation -> that the activity of the brain causes the mind.

Does that negate dualism? Depends on your definition of dualism.

One type of dualists are those that think that the mind can exist without the brain. I do not think so. It is a logical possibility, but I do not see evidence for this.

The other type of dualists are "substance dualists", those that think that the brain and the mind belong to different categories of phenomena. One material, the other one not.

The scientific findings did nothing to negate my variety of dualism. There is no contradiction between the idea that the mind and the matter are different "substances", and that one of them causes the other.

 

[JetLeg]

Conceivability has nothing to do with rationality.

It's conceivable that I am not really me and that I am not really typing on a computer right now. In fact, I am currently locked in a padded room and in a straight jacket and drooling on myself; All of this that I am perceiving as happening is just a figment of my diseased imagination.

Now: Can you prove that's not the case?

For the last time. I never claimed it does.

 

[Neverfly]

It is important to clarify the type of relationship that exists between the mind and the brain.

The mind and the brain are logically seperate entities. The type of relationship between them is causal.

This claim requires evidence. If you are going to make this claim- Support it. Otherwise, your discussion cannot proceed.

If you are not making the claim- Clarify.

It is conceivable to think of the mind existing without the brain.

How so? I would say that is very inconcievable. Especially considering what any victim of brain damage will tell you.
Any doctor will tell you happens to a person when the brain dies.

And it is conceivable to think of the brain existing without the mind. Therefore they are logically seperate entities.

It is most illogical. You are basing conclusions as facts on rather wild and unsupported speculations.

I believe I told you this once and then quoted myself again in bold when you professed to not understand.

ETA:

For the last time. I never claimed it does.

You are not vocally claiming such but as I just answered (now three times) you are supporting conclusions with wild and unsupported speculations.

I have made you very well aware of it several times now.

To remain unaware of it at this point must only be a conscientious choice on your part and is no longer, "Ok."

 

[JetLeg]

Well, you did reply to those points, and even quoted them, but... you didn't reply whether these points prove conceivability, but pointed all the time that conceivability doesn't prove anything.

That something is conceivable isn't the problem. That what it's conceiving is pointless is the issue.

But was it a good point for conceivability?

How absurd. You're saying the lack of evidence for disembodied consciousness is somehow proof that disembodied consciousness exists?

No, I'm saying that the fact that there is a scientific test to test whether disembodied consciousness exist makes it a conceivable option that it does.

You're missing the point. That you can conceive of something doesn't make that something real or useful in any way whatsoever.

No, you're missing the point. I never argued that I can conceive of something makes it real. My point is that because I can conceive of disembodied consciouness, the brain and the mind are logically seperate.

There is no need to make an alternate theory that the mind can exist independently of the brain. If you want to make that hypothesis, go ahead. But it's up to you to provide some evidence to support it, and there is exactly none. (And as mentioned an abundance of evidence showing the mind-brain correlation.)

For the nth time, I am not going to prove this hypothesis, just to argue that it is a conceivable one.


Because they are conceivable to be seperate, they are logically different concepts. The relationship between them is causal. So you cannot say that they are "one thing".

 

[Neverfly]

Because they are conceivable to be seperate, they are logically different concepts. The relationship between them is causal. So you cannot say that they are "one thing".

It's conceivable to claim I am not really experiencing typing this post, but instead, locked in a padded room drooling on myself dreaming that I am experiencing this.
However, that possibility is absurdly unlikely.
It would be irrational to presume it has merit.

One can claim, given the overwhelming mountain of evidence, that I am, in fact, experiencing typing this post in reality.

 

[JetLeg]

This claim requires evidence. If you are going to make this claim- Support it. Otherwise, your discussion cannot proceed.

Haha. In order to prove that A and B are seperate logical entities, you don't provide evidence. You provide a hypothetical scenario in which one exists, and the other doesn't and that's enough.

For example, the left side of an object and the right side of an object are not seperate logical entities since there cannot be a hypothetical scenario in which an object has a left part, but not a right part.

The movement of a ball, and a ball are partially seperate logical entities. There can be a hypothetical situation of a ball that doesn't move. But there cannot be a movement of a ball without a ball.