Skeptic Ginger
Nasty Woman
- Joined
- Feb 14, 2005
- Messages
- 96,955
Or another hypothesis might be that with more providers you don't have patients squeezed into 5 minute appointments to see them all, giving you time to do more for each one.
Or another hypothesis might be that with more providers you don't have patients squeezed into 5 minute appointments to see them all, giving you time to do more for each one.
That's called the hidden tax paying for the uninsured. Cost shifting is one reason the US needs national health insurance. People often have no clue the people who can pay their bills pay for the unreimbursed care given to the people who do not pay their bills.More evidence that medical professionals (as a group) are excellent at gaming the system to maintain or increase their remuneration:
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1069862
Actually, I think the reason I generally provoke so much hostility when I bring up the issue of supplier induced demand with respect to provision of healthcare is that it threatens what most people would like to be true, but probably is not. i.e. people want to believe ....

One of my favorite jokes (multiple sources) :I do wish I was worshiped as a god but the nurses keep me in line.
The Ranks of a Hospital
Surgeon:
Leaps tall buildings in a single bound
Is more productive than a train
Is faster than a speeding bullet
Walks on water
Talks with God
Internist:
Leaps short buildings in a single bound
Is more powerful than a switch engine
Is faster than a speeding BB
Walks on water if the sea is calm
Talks with God if special request is approved
General Practitioner:
Leaps short buildings with a running start and favorable winds
Is almost as powerful as a switch engine
Nurse Practitioners
Can fire a speeding bullet
Walks on water in an indoor swimming pool
Is occasionally addressed by God
Resident:
Barely clears a picket fence
Loses tug-of-war with a train
Can sometimes handle a gun without inflicting self-injury
Swims well
Talks with animals
Intern:
Makes high skid marks on a wall when trying to leap buildings
Is run over by a train
Is not issued ammunition
Dog paddles
Talks to walls
Medical Student:
Runs into buildings
Recognizes a train 2 out of 3 times
Wets himself with a water pistol
Cannot stay afloat without a life preserver
Mumbles to himself
Nurse:
Lifts buildings and walks under them
Kicks trains off the track
Catches speeding bullets with her teeth and eats them
Freezes water with a single glance
The Nurse IS God!!!!
As with most things in life it's not what you know, but who you know, that counts.
That's called the hidden tax paying for the uninsured. Cost shifting is one reason the US needs national health insurance. People often have no clue the people who can pay their bills pay for the unreimbursed care given to the people who do not pay their bills.
There's no gaming going on there. If the government mandates a hospital cannot turn a patient who cannot pay away from the ED, while that same mandate is unfunded, the cost accrues as an expense of doing business. I'm not quite sure what you think is going on here.
Who ever wrote this nonsense editorial has not a clue!A 2006 study of schizophrenia drugs found that old-line antipsychotics were as effective as pricey new ones.
Nothing like a little snippet to mislead people:
Who ever wrote this nonsense editorial has not a clue!
They have not seen the side effects of Prolixon or Hladol (US names) or even worse the old line Navane and Thorazine.
First off, the symptom mangement oprofiles are different for the old line drugs, the level of side effects for effective treatment is abyssmal.
Second the side effects are horrific
-EPS: extra pyramidal side effects, also called 'neo-parkinsons', shaking, hand flapping, unintended spasms.
-Tardive dyskinesia: a permanent and life threatening motion disorder, pill rolling, tounge thrusts and eventually disrupts breathing.
-akesthesia: feeling of intense disconfort and need to move and pace, very uncomfortable
-dopaminergic effects: dry mouth (to the point where teeth rot), constipation, drooling in some people, shuffling gait, suppression of many systems.
So the editor who wrote that piece is full of crap.
I'm not sure what cost sharing you are talking about, nor how it was supposed to "contain costs". Your version makes no sense.You will note that the idea of the cost-sharing scheme was to attempt to contain costs, yet all that happened was the physicians made up for the loss of income from fewer visits by the cost-sharing insured group by charging their other insured patients with no cost-sharing for such things as longer stays in hospital.
If that's not gaming the system I don't know what is.
I'm not sure what cost sharing you are talking about, nor how it was supposed to "contain costs". Your version makes no sense.
Mineworkers, steelworkers, and their families constituted over 80 percent of the patients seen by the RMG physicians. Steelworkers were privately insured by Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Metropolitan Life. Their benefits remained constant over the study period, 1976-1979. Following the introduction of cost sharing to the UMWA beneficiaries, average monthly visits to the group practice decreased by 13.5 percent. The major share of the decline was due to reduced utilization by UMWA-represented patients, whose visits decreased by 25.3 percent.
This setting has several advantages in a study examining how economic incentives influence physician behavior. First, the change in cost-sharing rates was an exogenous one, that is, it was beyond the influence of physicians. Second, the change that occurred was a large one, from no cost sharing to $7.50 per patient per visit. Third, physician membership in the RMG remained constant throughout our study period. And finally, miner and steelworker patients were fairly evenly distributed across physicians in the practice both before and after UMWA cost sharing. Thus, as a natural experiment, the experience of the RMG following the introduction of cost sharing to the UMWA offers a unique opportunity to study ways in which a substantial drop in utilization by one group of patients can affect physician
treatment patterns for all patients in the practice.
Yes but that is discussing first and second generation, I think that Clozaril, Olanzapine, Zyprexa would be thrid generation, I can't read the full article or see if they even discuss side effect profiles.I assume he is referring to this:
http://archpsyc.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/short/63/10/1069
Some interesting letters and related articles linked to there too.
ETA: or possibly this:
http://pt.wkhealth.com/pt/re/ajhp/a...Mfnd41SyjpYvKM9lR!751744069!181195628!8091!-1
It's described in the article:
So the idea was that by making people pay a fee from their own money to see a physician, it would reduce the number of 'frivolous' visits and hence claims on their insurance policy, reducing overall costs.
Yes but that is discussing first and second generation, I think that Clozaril, Olanzapine, Zyprexa would be thrid generation, I can't read the full article or see if they even discuss side effect profiles.
Just to be clear - I wasn't linking to those articles to say she had a point, I was just providing what I thought might be the source for her assertions.
I totally agree that side effect profiles are a major issue in prescribing any psychotropic medication.
Any larger or more recent studies?
No?
Figures.
3 Supplier Induced Demand: Evidence
3.1 Overseas Evidence
Like many theories in the physical sciences Supplier Induced Demand was first suggested to explain observations which were not convincingly explained within the orthodox framework. The theory is commonly attributed to Evans (1974) who observed that across the province of British Columbia there was little variation in doctor incomes despite very significant variation in their supply. As doctors could not charge fees above the benefit (rebate) this implied service use in proportion to the doctor supply. This is, of course, consistent with orthodox economics if supply had adjusted to demand or if there had been a permanent excess demand. It is at this point of the argument—both with respect to Evans’ data and the observations in many subsequent studies—that a difference of interpretation arises. Critics of SID have generally argued that as the observations are consistent with theory, then SID is ‘unproven’. Evans and others appeal to judgement. Is it likely that variation in service use of 200 - 400 percent could be attributed to other causal factors? The effects of age, sex, income and medical status are independently known and cannot explain the discrepancy. Anecdotal evidence did not indicate significant queuing. SID was therefore proposed as an alternative explanation.
A more rigorous statistical analysis had, in fact, been published in 1972 by Fuchs and Kramer. In this, and in subsequent, similar, studies doctor supply is endogenised and explained, in large part, by doctors’ propensity to work in congenial residential areas. Inserted in the demand equation the endogenised doctor supply has had significant explanatory power.
This latter approach has been criticised statistically as discussed briefly below and various other sources of evidence have been used to support SID. For example a number of studies report an otherwise inexplicable increase in services per person following the freezing of the fee schedule. Perhaps the most notable evidence is the result of a random control trial which ‘converted’ Charles Phelps, one of the most trenchant critics of SID (see Phelps 1997 p254). In this, doctors at a university hospital clinic were randomised to receive income by salary or a fee for service. Patients attending the clinic were randomly assigned to doctors. The result was that fee-forservice doctors scheduled almost 30 percent more return visits than those on salary. Most of the discrepancy was attributable to a 50 percent greater scheduling of (medically doubtful) well care visits (Phelps 1997).
So the idea was that by making people pay a fee from their own money to see a physician, it would reduce the number of 'frivolous' visits and hence claims on their insurance policy, reducing overall costs.
I didn't read the whole 45 pages, but I guess you did...
...so perhaps you'll point out where they said it reduced the number of frivolous visits.
Or is that just your take?
In fact, no, I don't need you to provide this evidence, and, no, I don't trust you, sorryDo you need me to provide evidence for these assertions, or do you trust me?
Yes, there is more than one reason for the results as I have been trying to point out to you all along. First of all, if it is a fact that having to pay a certain amount of the consult fee reduces the number of visits, that is a patient determined change, not a doctor determined change. And yes, they may not be frivilous visits being avoided but necessary visits being discouraged. And If you read all of those studies with these sorts of alternatives in mind, you will find that the conclusions of the authors are not the only ones supported by the evidence they obtained.it's the idea behind making people pay some of their own money to access a service; it focuses the mind as to whether or not the service is really wanted and mitigates against moral hazard...Unfortunately, in the case of medical services, it can also discourage people from seeking necessary care, particularly those on low incomes.