Can theists be rational?

My point was that anecdotal evidence can be very strong, depending on who's telling you. You seemed to be dismissing it entirely. If you get a phone call from a hospital attendant that a loved one has been hurt in a car accident, it wouldn't even cross your mind not to go.

I'm not dismissing anecdotal evidence. I'm carefully considering what it is evidence for. Being hurt in a car accident is a well-established event. What you are asking me to believe is whether or not someone specific to me (a loved one) has experienced something that is already well-established as occurring regularly to others. In that case, a call from a hospital attendant can serve as evidence that my loved one has experienced this event, but the call wouldn't serve to establish that car accidents occur if there were no such things as cars.

To your second point: suppose someone you trust tells you they had a supernatural experience?

Again, we are not attempting to establish that people have these experiences. What you are attempting to establish is that some vague and inconsistently grouped set of experiences have a different underlying cause or nature than some other set of experiences. It isn't that I don't have these experiences and so don't understand why others consider them supernatural. It's that I recognize that the way in which they are distinguished as 'supernatural' is so unreliable as to be useless, and that Supernaturalism as a methology has never been demonstrated to be useful. You want us to consider it rational to apply an apparently useless methodology without guidelines as to where and when this methodology can be applied. I'm asking, "why would any of us want to do that when we have an exquisitely useful methodology that already applies at our disposal?"

Linda
 
If this discussion wasn't 60 pages long, I might be able to find the issues actually under debate. Any chance someone would like to tackle a summary?

What I had in mind when I started this thread was something along the lines of "do theists need to apologize for their beliefs?"

We have 60 pages of apologists trying to find ways for theists to justify their beliefs. The arguments for rational theism seem to take the form of:

- finding places for God to reside which have not yet been excluded by science
- arguing that Supernaturalism is the preferred methodology when addressing certain questions (fine-tuning, 'supernatural' experiences (the products of mysticism, NDE's, 'spiritual' (as of yet undefined) experiences, etc.)
- treating the idea as separate from the process that led to the idea, thereby giving the idea automatic immunity from inquiry (i.e. discrediting the process doesn't discredit the idea)
- discounting 'useful' as a characteristic of 'rational'

Linda
 
A belief in the certainty of rational explanation needs a bit more faith than I have.
Faith has nothing to do with it a belief in the certainty of rational explanation, making up a magical explanation is Faith based.

Paul

:) :) :)
 
This from a guy with that cool optical illusion in his avatar?
It is not an optical illustion, look up Fouth Dimensional Cube.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_dimension

That is how is would look being projected onto a 2 dimensional surface with it turning. Now project a three dimensional cube on the surface of a table and turn it and see how it would look.

Paul

:) :) :)
 
The scenario we're talking about is that you have had an experience, that you cannot explain other than by positing that you had a random hallucination on a normal day.

The rational thing to believe is that you're either ignorant, or you have had a random hallucination on a normal day.

If it's possible to use rationality to rationally prove that rationality does not universally apply, you would have a rational explanation for the same. Otherwise, to believe in the non-rational is simply irrational.

If I have two oranges in my refrigerator, and I put two more in, I should have four oranges. If I open it up and see three oranges, I assume one was taken, or that I cannot find one, or something. If I find five, I assume someone else put oranges in my refrigerator, or something along those lines. If I rule everything out, before concluding that two plus two is three or five today for no reason, I'm even willing to entertain crazy theories such as that oranges occasionally merge or split.

Maybe I'm just crazy, and maybe it's just faith, but I somehow think there should be a rational explanation for why I find three oranges instead of the four I expect, and I happen to want to call this belief rational, since it is regarding rational explanations.

What is perfectly rational in the world of oranges is not so rational when dealing with electrons. The closer we look at the world the less rational it appears. On what basis should we assume that everything will be rational the deeper we go? The evidence so far is that our view of the world, based as it is on the oranges-in-the-fridge scale, won't hold up all the way down.

I'm not sure that it's rational to keep oranges in the fridge, but that's another matter.
 
What is perfectly rational in the world of oranges is not so rational when dealing with electrons. The closer we look at the world the less rational it appears. On what basis should we assume that everything will be rational the deeper we go? The evidence so far is that our view of the world, based as it is on the oranges-in-the-fridge scale, won't hold up all the way down.
You're dealing with some strange new definition of rational that I don't think applies to a conversation about rational explanations for things.

And to rephrase your notion more precisely, the closer we look at the fundamental physics of the world the less it looks like what we're used to deal with. I might make a parallel observation--the closer we look at the fundamental physics of the world, the less it looks like what something we could have come up with. These things together are all the more reason to look for rational explanations.

In terms of electrons per se, we do the same thing. For example, electric current can be explained in terms of missing electrons, which aren't really missing, but have moved from one place to another--missing oranges, so to speak.

Furthermore, we're dealing with things having rational explanations--for example, mass itself. Fermilab's currently involved in a search for the Higgs boson, and LHC will pick this search up should Fermilab not find anything. The Higgs boson, in this context, is a rational explanation for why particles have mass. Should the LHC be torn down, and Fermilab halted, because of this "insight" that the universe might not even be "rational"?

Edit:

Yeah, Paulhoff's avatar is simply a 3 dimensional representation of a 4 dimensional representation of a 5 dimensional rotating hypercube. (Don't forget the time dimension in all three). Also, strictly speaking, there are multiple optical illusions at work in the avatar.
 
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What I had in mind when I started this thread was something along the lines of "do theists need to apologize for their beliefs?"

We have 60 pages of apologists trying to find ways for theists to justify their beliefs. The arguments for rational theism seem to take the form of:

- finding places for God to reside which have not yet been excluded by science
- arguing that Supernaturalism is the preferred methodology when addressing certain questions (fine-tuning, 'supernatural' experiences (the products of mysticism, NDE's, 'spiritual' (as of yet undefined) experiences, etc.)
- treating the idea as separate from the process that led to the idea, thereby giving the idea automatic immunity from inquiry (i.e. discrediting the process doesn't discredit the idea)
- discounting 'useful' as a characteristic of 'rational'

Who claimed it was the preferred methodology? I recall claims that supernatural explanations were a competing methodology, and rational to believe in.

And do you really think that all rational beliefs are "useful"? It may be rational to believe the Andromeda Galaxy is approx. 2.9 million light years away from us. It doesn't follow that that has to be "useful" in some way. I could merrily go through life believing it was 1.9 million light years away and never have a problem.
 
No, it's not difficult to comprehend. What I don't understand is why you place god with the easter bunny and not language, math, justice, etc.

You mean the fact that I've explained it to you already doesn't cut it ?

Language exists, in the sense that it's a convention, but what it represents doesn't exist. The MYTH of the easter bunny exists, but not what it represents. Religions exist, but not God. Get it ?

Nice to get some agreement from you that it IS evidence. Thanks.

Don't thank me yet. It's evidence of the weakest possible kind, and as fls showed, it can usually be ignored in the absence of corroboration.

Yes, if such testimony were in existance, it would be evidence in the same way that such testimony is evidence for god. But again, this runs up against the FACT that no such testimony actually exists.

Maybe not for the easter bunny, but certainly for OTHER things we KNOW are false. That's why we call them delusions. But you don't KNOW they're delusions when you only have the testimony, because by YOU logic they are positive evidence.

Little green men I dismiss the same way as I do the easter bunny, but likewise, I've not actually heard of a sane responsible credible adult making claims about their existance.

No True Scottsman fallacy. Just because you think they're loony doesn't mean they're excluded magically from your rule that experience is evidence. You're trying to have it both ways.
 
But I would ask you not to let your opinion of me halt your asking serious questions... are you sure that the only reason you don't believe me is that you "don't trust me"? Wouldn't it be even more relevant that I simply cannot possibly know your house is on fire, for example?

It should. But if it did we wouldn't have had the inquisition.
 
As I've said before, the "things are just the way they are, no particular reason" argument has never convinced me.

Whether or not it convinces you is irrelevant. There is NO reason to assume that there are multiple universes, just as there is no reason to assume otherwise. However, in the absence of any form of evidence, even in principle, we have to go with what we know: things are the way they are.

There is a chain of reasons for what happens in the universe.

Not if the universe is in a false vacuum. There would be litterally no reason for that. Your faith in causality is not always justified.

Why should it arbitrarily terminate just at the point of current human knowledge? Wouldn't that be quite a coincidence?

The same could be said about God, westprog.

The uncertainty principle is not simply a matter of noting that whenever you measure something you disturb it in some way.

The wave function represents the possible location of a particle. Once it is known, the function collapses. Now, why do you think that is ?

And you will find, elsewhere in this thread, a discussion as to whether experiences that contradict the laws of physics and common experience should be believed or not. The simulation is self-correcting.

No it isn't. It's only self-correcting in a world where science doesn't exist and we can't actually spot things that are wrong. Your argument only works if, for some reason, the bugs in the system are invisible to science. But then, they become like god: useless; because you can pretend there exists anything that is undetectable.
 
Who claimed it was the preferred methodology? I recall claims that supernatural explanations were a competing methodology, and rational to believe in.

Some people have said that science is unable to address the issue of gods. However, I agree that 'competing' would be a better description, but I don't yet understand why someone would choose the clear loser.

And do you really think that all rational beliefs are "useful"? It may be rational to believe the Andromeda Galaxy is approx. 2.9 million light years away from us. It doesn't follow that that has to be "useful" in some way. I could merrily go through life believing it was 1.9 million light years away and never have a problem.

Regardless of whether or not you find personal ignorance useful, accurate cosmological distances have an impact on our theories about the universes.

Linda
 
Some people have said that science is unable to address the issue of gods. However, I agree that 'competing' would be a better description, but I don't yet understand why someone would choose the clear loser.



Regardless of whether or not you find personal ignorance useful, accurate cosmological distances have an impact on our theories about the universes.

Linda

That's not what you said. You said
'useful' as a characteristic of 'rational'

What exactly do you mean by this? I've given an example of a rational belief that is useless for nearly all people. Do you mean that a rational belief can be useful? That is also true of an irrational belief. The pragmatic defintion of truth is full of minefields.
 
Some people have said that science is unable to address the issue of gods. However, I agree that 'competing' would be a better description, but I don't yet understand why someone would choose the clear loser.

I know, which is why you atheists are so few in number ;) Everyone knows God did it :)
 
You're dealing with some strange new definition of rational that I don't think applies to a conversation about rational explanations for things.

And to rephrase your notion more precisely, the closer we look at the fundamental physics of the world the less it looks like what we're used to deal with. I might make a parallel observation--the closer we look at the fundamental physics of the world, the less it looks like what something we could have come up with. These things together are all the more reason to look for rational explanations.

In terms of electrons per se, we do the same thing. For example, electric current can be explained in terms of missing electrons, which aren't really missing, but have moved from one place to another--missing oranges, so to speak.

Furthermore, we're dealing with things having rational explanations--for example, mass itself. Fermilab's currently involved in a search for the Higgs boson, and LHC will pick this search up should Fermilab not find anything. The Higgs boson, in this context, is a rational explanation for why particles have mass. Should the LHC be torn down, and Fermilab halted, because of this "insight" that the universe might not even be "rational"?

What has happened with physics since at least Galileo is that what is considered "rational" has changed as we learn more. Newton thought it was absurd that forces could act at a distance, but had no alternative but to accept the model. Einstein found the randomness of the quantum world unacceptable, but it remains the most accurate scientific theory ever.

Anyone who held to a nineteenth century view of what was rational was forced to abandon it because it turned out the world didn't actually work that way. Cause and effect weren't universal, as it turned out. Sometimes things just happened. So are we going to bet that the way things seem to be now is the final answer, and we basically know how things work? That seems highly optimistic.
 
Whether or not it convinces you is irrelevant. There is NO reason to assume that there are multiple universes, just as there is no reason to assume otherwise. However, in the absence of any form of evidence, even in principle, we have to go with what we know: things are the way they are.

I'm quite willing to accept that things are the way they are. It's the claim that there's no reason for it that I find hard to swallow.

Not if the universe is in a false vacuum. There would be litterally no reason for that. Your faith in causality is not always justified.

I'm not insisting that there's a cause for the universe. I find it unlikely that the universe is precisely the way it is without any underlying principle.

The same could be said about God, westprog.



The wave function represents the possible location of a particle. Once it is known, the function collapses. Now, why do you think that is ?

It is not a case of finding out where the particle is. The particle doesn't have a specific location until the wave function collapses. That's been shown by the difraction slit experiment.

No it isn't. It's only self-correcting in a world where science doesn't exist and we can't actually spot things that are wrong. Your argument only works if, for some reason, the bugs in the system are invisible to science. But then, they become like god: useless; because you can pretend there exists anything that is undetectable.

You are making multiple assumptions about a possible simulation based on experience with computer systems that doesn't extend as far as living memory. Because you've worked with computers you're convinced that

  • The simulation must be taking place on a computer
  • The program that is running must have bugs
  • These bugs will manifest themselves as inconsistencies in the laws of physics
  • We, the people experiencing the simulation, would be able to spot the inconsistencies and realise that the only explanation is that we are part of a simulation.

None of these are necessarily true. For one thing, even if there is a bug which means that the laws of physics as designed don't operate as planned, how would we know? We'd experience the laws of physics as executed.

For all we know, the inability to reconcile gravity with the other fundamental forces is due to some programming error. But we'd never know.
 

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