Francesca R
Girl
Ha. There is (much) more if you want.An excellent point, and one which I hadn't heard put in precisely those terms before. Thanks.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6107
Adverse Selection in Health Insurance
Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals being allocated to the wrong plans; risk sharing losses since premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers distorting their policies to improve their mix of insureds. [ . . . ]
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2574.html
How adverse selection affects the health insurance market
Adverse selection can be defined as strategic behavior by the more informed partner in a contract against the interest of the less informed partner(s). In the health insurance field, this manifests itself through healthy people choosing managed care and less healthy people choosing more generous plans. [ . . . ] The government can correct spontaneous market dynamics in the health insurance market by directly subsidizing insurance or through regulation [ . . . ]
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/health/pools_sep06.pdf
http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/18/3/657
Government bulk-buying a la NHS is not the only solution to selection bias, and several others have been studied and reported on in some of the above links. But nobody on this thread has mentioned anything approaching any of those, so they are, so far at least, beyond the scope of this (rinse and repeat) discussion.