Can theists be rational?

With all due respect my friends I see so much misinformation and lies by omission here that I don't know where to start.
At least start somewhere.

The really horrible thing is that it all looks unintentional. People relying on wikipedia quoting as if its credible source! Its not credible at all! Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't. I noticed you quip that according to wikipedia the KCA has 'fatal flaws'. How quaint! How wrong!
I didn't say that according to Wikipedia, the KCA has fatal flaws. I said that Wikipedia has a list of fatal flaws in the KCA.

An incomplete list; a number of other fatal flaws were brought up in this thread.

Anyway your statement above is correct, but you should be impressed! It solves infinite regression neatly! A first cause argument like the KCA states anything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence. So the cause that caused the universe to begin to exist did not have a cause. It existed before time existed (time was created in the big bang). So infinite regression stops with the 'cause' that caused the universe to begin to exist!
Fail.

If time is a property of the Universe, created with it, and causality only exists within time, then the Universe not only needs no cause, but can have no cause.
 
Prophesy is one way we can see god working in our world indirectly. Israel becoming a nation state as prophesied was not made up.

; {>

Exactly. And without a methodology for determining the legitimacy of the content of these other ways of discovery, they cannot serve as a valid way to know about something. For example, can you outline the methodology for determining which prophesies are false?

Linda
 
I'm sorry, but you're just wrong.

The ISS is in a stable orbit (as far as I know), and is not accelerating. A positive acceleration would push it into a higher orbit, and a negative one would drop it into a lower one (or a death spiral destined to crash to the Earth).

ETA: To explain further--the gravity between the EArth and the ISS is a force that would otherwise pull the ISS down to the Earth. It is exactly equalled to the part of the ISS's forward velocity which, in the absence of the Earth's gravitational pull would otherwise send it flying in a straight line (away from the Earth at a tangent to its current orbit). Since these forces equal out, there is no net acceleration to be felt.

As fls said, this is wrong. Acceleration is the rate of change of velocity. Velocity is a vector quantity ie it has direction. Any object in a circular orbit is constantly changing direction of motion and therefore velocity. Hence the ISS is accelerating.
 
Now, people are often confused by how I use "paranormal" and "supernatural", so just to make absolutely clear -- Supernatural phenomena are those which are one of two things

i) are phenomena or entities which exist outside of our space/time, aka this universe
or
ii) are phenomena or entities which do not act naturalistically, that si in accordance with physical law, the laws of nature. So a beasticle which contravened the third law of thermodynamic would be supernatural. Now the problem with this is natural laws are in fact bounded temporally, geographically and contextually, and cosmological uniformity is simply a convenient myth to deal with the problem of induction. So I prefer to use i)

However from definition i), it follows that such an entity could act in nature, being outside nature, in a manner which is arbitrary and contravenes natural law. Imagine a pond, with sticklebacks, and a scientist reaching in and altering the environment by grabbing a stickleback, or introducing tadpoles, or stirring it with a big stick. The pond is time/space, and the supernatural entity the scientist. Now to stickleback scientists if any such existed, the interventions effects would appear mysterious, but entirely naturalistic.

Anyway to get back to your question, yes a supernatural question is outside the scope of science for all time, simply because of the axioms/assumptions which support our science. Such phenomena will never be in accordance with natural law, because they do not have to be. They pond is merely a subset of their potential laws. We are flatlanders, facing a three dimensional intrusion.

The "paranormal" however is just the term I use for the stuff which will be explicable by natural law, is in accordance with natural law, we just don't understand the actual rules yet. We may well do one day.

Multiple universes, if they exist are supernatural. Supernatural is a temporal/geographic non-position, nothing more, nothing less. Things in nature, no matte rhow rare, are natural. So if invisible goblins live on my hat, they are natural, because they occur in nature. If you are asking how can I detect by science the influence fo a supernatural entity on the universe, I can not.

A long time ago I wrote--

" I define Natural as the universe and everything therein, and Supernatural as that existing "outside" or "above" the Universe - the literal meaning of the term.

My first contention is that any Supernatural action within the Universe is by definition therefore Natural, and will manifest in terms of Natural Law. That manifestation may be highly unusual, or extremely rare, but it would not be as in Hume's famous definition of a miracle a violation of Natural Law, as by definition anything that occurs in Nature is Natural.

Therfore, I contend that supernatural causation would be effectively invisible to our naturalistic Science, which by definition is bounded by the natural. While logic and reason (and perhaps mathematics) might be used to explore what lies "beyond" the Universe, experimental and procedural science can not. As a "supernatural event" becomes natural by definition as soon as it occurs in the universe, Science will indeed find no "miracles" - which is not to say that supernatural interventions do not occur. One could only hope to establish if this was the case by logic or reason. Professor Dawkins has suggested that the law of Nature in a Universe created by a deity should look quite different from those in one without - but that we will have to address later.

Let me give a playful example. Let us assume that the Norse Trickster God Loki built the universe. His handiwork is the Laws of Nature, and any examination thereof will reveal nothing but Natural forces acting in accordance with Natural Law. Any arbitrary exception he introduced, such as the Duckbill platypus (I know it's quite explicable really, but you get my point!)would be quite Natural, and entirely explicable by Science. Then imagine a Scientist who looks at the world and says "There is no Loki". Yet equally rational is the Loki-ist theologians, who looks at the same Science and says "we can not see Loki, but we can learn the nature of Loki from his handiwork!" The Loki-ist might remark after JBS Haldane that Loki appears to have "an inordinate fondness for beetles!"

The clear problem therefore is not if there is evidence for Theism - there may be much - but in how one would find and understand that evidence. I would argue that reason and logic should work as well on understanding the Gods as any other thing: the locally prevailing conditions just differ, just as Quantum Mechanics seems counter-intuitive to us whose experience is limited to Classical Physics in a day to day sense, and the local earthly form thereof. I will in a future post discuss how in fact much human knowledge, indeed most academic knowledge, would fail by the criteria used to reject the evidence against Theism, and attempt to develop a case putting forward that evidence."

Any critiques?
cj x


Very good, and I agree for the most part, but how does this answer questions about the rationality/irrationality of theism?

I think I might disagree with the statement that multiple universes are supernatural, since that word is loaded (I know what you mean by it and I agree, since it clearly allows us to violate the law of conservation in "this universe" because "this universe" would not necessarily be a closed system). This would require us to reconceptualize what we mean by "universe" so that we use can continue to use the word "universe" to mean our local affair but without it meaning what it is supposed to mean -- just like atom no longer means what it was supposed to mean but we still believe there might be some uncuttable fundamental existent underneath it all.

I think the issue surrounding reasonable belief in God, given that God is logically possibility but not bound by physical possibility, rests on the strength of evidence (or the other possibility mentioned below). I still contend that we need less (or less strong) evidence to believe in the probability of the logically possible and physically possible than in the logically possible but physically impossible (pixies) or the logically possible and physically unbounded.

Part of the reason I say so is because of the way that we justify our beliefs. We generally justify belief based on physical evidence (requiring some sort of observation, not limited to vision or direct observation since it is usually observation of effects) and the way the physical evidence fits within the model we construct to explain the evidence (for ease of discussion -- think causality). For the physically possible, we may conjecture existence of an unobserved entity based on our understanding of the forces that could result in that entity and circumstantial evidence. So, we believed there was a dark side of the moon before anyone saw it based on these inferences. It was rational to do so. Belief in the likelihood of intelligent life elsewhere in the universe is similar because the chance for such life to exist depends on the same causal forces that resulted in life here and there are so many chances for it to occur; and we have experience with similar low-chance occurrences (drug resistance mutation within a single organism) being "overcome" by the law of large numbers -- enough iterations and the highly unlikely becomes almost inevitable.

Belief in God (God as a person) does not fit into that category, so discussion of the Drake equation does not exactly fit the bill. With God as supernatural, we cannot provide a causal account for how God works, so we miss one of the crutches we generally use to justify belief. Without that crutch -- a causal account to help us justify belief -- it seems to me that we would need better evidence for God's existence to command belief if we are to follow the same sort of rules we use for believing in things that are physically possible. So, for belief in God to be reasonable, using our typical model for belief, we should ask for something astounding. I don't think I've heard any astounding evidence.

The other solution, to which I alluded before, is to chuck the whole enterprise and call it misguided, which is probably what it is. I don't think we could ever call belief in a personal God rational (as I've tried to argue above in several posts), but why is that a problem? Just as I believe it is a category error to discuss God as physically possible or physically impossible, could it also be a category error to discuss belief in God as rational or irrational? If we want to discuss God as a person, God must be supernatural as you say. Can we even apply the idea of rationality to belief in the transcendent? Since the realm of causality is removed from discussion I'm not sure the word applies.

So, to discuss God in a reasonable way, I think we probably need to jettison most of the approach used in this thread. Arguments from design (let's face it, but the fine tuner bit with Bayes' theorem was just a design argument with math thrown in to confuse the unwary) and cosmological arguments don't get us far. The design argument has obvious faults that we needn't discuss again here. The cosmological argument as often presented rests on a false dichotomy -- when we get to the final cause we are given a choice between a person and a natural cause. Why those two choices? What about a supernatural impersonal cause? There seems to be an uncaused cause somewhere; we needn't call it God. It needn't be a person.

So, where does that leave us? Perhaps some variation on an ontological argument? Discussion of the nature of substance? Appeal to God as the Ground of all Being? Is there a person in there? Or is it possible that the whole idea of God as a person is a necessary limitation on God and wrong-headed from the start? If God is everything, and a person is defined not only by what it is but by what it is not, then isn't any conception of God as a person a limitation that does not describe God?

The other option is "yeah belief in God is not rational and so what?". Tertullian liked that approach. So have many others.
 
We've gone over this. You're using a different meaning of "rational" than most of us--and clearly a different meaning than the one in the question in the OP. You're arguing that logical possibility is sufficient for belief in something to be rational. The rest of us say that logical possibility is necessary but not sufficient.

I agree. I think that most of the responses have been directed at this consideration of rational:

"...if by reasonable one means both empirically grounded and logically coherent." (from the article I linked to earlier)

I think most agree that one could confine 'rational' to 'logically coherent', but it has been made fairly clear (if only because it has been repeated with such regularity :)) that most of us are not.

Please read the thread title. It clearly is asking if the person (theist) defined as someone holding a particular belief or conclusion (theism) can be rational. There's no way that question can be construed to mean that the person can be rational but still maintain that "rationality has to be a property of an argument not a conclusion".

There are logically coherent arguments for theism. The fine-tuning argument is one of them (if a fine-tuner is that which makes fine-tuning more likely in its presence than in its absence, then fine-tuning makes the presence of a fine-tuner more likely). But as you have pointed out, logically coherent arguments can be formed for anything - even that which we know to be silly or untrue.

So the question becomes whether or not the argument is empirically grounded. I suspect that the reference to attempts to measure fine-tuning is meant to suggest that the fine-tuning argument is empirically grounded. But it's not. The validity of the logical argument does not depend upon whether we can empirically observe fine-tuning, but upon whether we can empirically observe universes where the fine-tuner is absent. That is, the argument is empirically grounded when we can exclude at least some of those cases where 'a fine-tuner is absent'. (Yy2bggggs explained this in this post.) And it is pretty obvious that we cannot unless we assume that a fine-tuner is absent from this universe, which is hardly what cj is going for.

So what we have instead is a thought experiment where assumptions are made about what universes without a fine-tuner would look like and how many would be excluded as not-fine-tuned. But it still works out to be a series of coin tosses instead of a direct observation.

If there were any empirically grounded arguments for theism, then we wouldn't be having this discussion. So what I am really asking is, given that from an explanatory perspective there are no logically coherent and empirically grounded arguments for theism (i.e. properties of the arguments), what does it mean when someone still chooses to believe? Can one have a rational approach to explanation and hold a non-rational approach to the provision of other benefits (such as social benefits)? Or is it that the benefits of belief in belief can be empirically grounded? This is similar to what you were attempting to discuss many pages back and didn't get much in the way of takers. :) Regardless, this mostly reflects personal properties, rather than the properties of the arguments (as you pointed out already). We seem to mostly be discussing the properties of the arguments, which is interesting in its own way.

Linda
 
If I was born the night before last,
Were you born the night before last?
and my experience is limited to the sun rising yesterday,
Is your experience limited thusly?


With all due respect my friends I see so much misinformation and lies by omission here that I don't know where to start.
With all due respect, you managed to make an entire post without saying anything of value at all.
... People relying on wikipedia quoting as if its credible source!
No. People relying on wikipedia as an encyclopedia. If it's wrong, fix it. But don't just whine here about how severely wrong it is. If you have something of value to say about it, say it. Nobody's going to fall for your false appeal to authority act.

Furthermore, you are being insanely presumptuous by suggesting that we have only just heard of the KCA by quickly looking it up on wikipedia. What do you think the people on this forum do? (And yeah, I'm relatively new here, but as alt.atheism atheist #272, I can assure you I'm not a spring chicken).
Anyway your statement above is correct, but you should be impressed! It solves infinite regression neatly! A first cause argument like the KCA states anything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence.
And this claim has flaws. First, it merely begs the question. There is absolutely no basis to even state this in the first place. None of our observations apply to things coming into being ex nihilo.

And in fact, our only knowledge about things that come into being kind of has said things come into being uncaused.
So the cause that caused the universe to begin to exist did not have a cause.
...if and only if said cause did not "begin to exist", and even then, it doesn't actually follow; it's simply immune to the carefully phrased assertion that anything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence. With all of that sophistry, effectively, you've done nothing but address the question "why is there anything at all" by saying "because of God". It's not even a real answer--it's the same exact question to ask why God is there.

All it is, is Godidit.
It existed before time existed (time was created in the big bang).
As you approach a black hole, besides all of the fun tidal effects that happen to you, the passage of time will slow. You won't notice this by staring at your hands, but an observer who isn't approaching the black hole would notice that your watch starts to tick slower. As you continue to approach the black hole, this guy will notice your watch ticking slower and slower--asymptotically slow. By the time you pass the event horizon, an infinite amount of time will pass to this outside observer. And here, we haven't even touched the singularity.

The reversal of this is a rough model of the big bang, only there, you have touched the singularity (and the tidal effects aren't manifest).

The point being--it's not even clear there was a before to the big bang--our current physics give no meaning to the concept (as Hawking says, it's like asking what's south of the south pole). There's no current a posteriori sense in which to speak of this in the first place. So you have a way to go to build the case that you can even speak of a before to the BB.

An MA in comparative religion doesn't help you here.
So infinite regression stops with the 'cause' that caused the universe to begin to exist!
And could just as well stop one step earlier. In fact, by going that one step, you have added nothing--you solved no problem. And in fact, all you've done was to add something else which needs to be explained.

KCA solves one and only one issue--it puts God there for people who want God there. (And it doesn't even do that).
 
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Reading over your reply reminded me of another question for the Rev: What does it mean to say that something "existed before time existed"? Before is a referent to time. You can't have before without time.
 
As fls said, this is wrong. Acceleration is the rate of change of velocity. Velocity is a vector quantity ie it has direction. Any object in a circular orbit is constantly changing direction of motion and therefore velocity. Hence the ISS is accelerating.
This is a problem about words and common usage, as in the use of the word "theory".

Maybe saying, Mathematical-Acceleration or Scientific-theory would be much better.

Paul

:) :) :)
 
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And how is a so-called god not causal, because it says so.

Paul

:) :) :)
 
And yet physcists are speculating about what happened before the big bang:http://www.universetoday.com/2008/06/13/thinking-about-time-before-the-big-bang/
But PixyMisa was talking about what it means to speak of before time, not big bang. I, on the other hand, am talking more about time before the BB. So in all fairness, the objection should go to me, not PixyMisa.

That having been said, from your link:
What happened before the Big Bang? The conventional answer to that question is usually, "There is no such thing as 'before the Big Bang.'" ... But the right answer, says physicist Sean Carroll, is, "We just don't know."
...which is in line with what I've claimed.
Carroll, as well as many other physicists and cosmologists have begun to consider the possibility of time before the Big Bang, as well as alternative theories of how our universe came to be. Carroll discussed this type of "speculative research" during a talk at the American Astronomical Society Meeting last week in St. Louis, Missouri
...which is also in line with what I've claimed.

The major difference is that the physicists know they are speculating--that nobody really knows. RevDisturba, on the other hand, is putting the cart before the horse.
 
But PixyMisa was talking about what it means to speak of before time, not big bang. I, on the other hand, am talking more about time before the BB. So in all fairness, the objection should go to me, not PixyMisa.

That having been said, from your link:

...which is in line with what I've claimed.

...which is also in line with what I've claimed.

The major difference is that the physicists know they are speculating--that nobody really knows. RevDisturba, on the other hand, is putting the cart before the horse.

Speculative, but not incoherent, in the way Hawking claims ("What is North of the North Pole?"). And you're right about PixyMisa. I thought he was referring to time starting with the Big Bang (which I'm guessing he does believe, but that would be speculation on my part).
 
Speculative, but not incoherent,
Agreed. Caroll has the same burden RevDisturba has--he has to show that it makes sense to even speak of a before to the BB. That doesn't mean the burden can't be met, but it's not a given that there's a before to the BB either.

"South of the south pole" is a good way of describing how the concept of time--as it relates to space-time--breaks down at T=0, given our currently known laws of physics.
 
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If there were any empirically grounded arguments for theism, then we wouldn't be having this discussion. So what I am really asking is, given that from an explanatory perspective there are no logically coherent and empirically grounded arguments for theism (i.e. properties of the arguments), what does it mean when someone still chooses to believe? Can one have a rational approach to explanation and hold a non-rational approach to the provision of other benefits (such as social benefits)? Or is it that the benefits of belief in belief can be empirically grounded? This is similar to what you were attempting to discuss many pages back and didn't get much in the way of takers. :) Regardless, this mostly reflects personal properties, rather than the properties of the arguments (as you pointed out already). We seem to mostly be discussing the properties of the arguments, which is interesting in its own way.
Yup--this is definitely the discussion I would rather have than these tired old logical proofs for the existence of God.

At any rate, cj et al., can you see that from the person who asked the question to start this thread, to be rational, "logically possible" is not sufficient?

Based on the usage of "rational" as Linda has spelled it out in this post (and I didn't quote all of it here), do you still consider the Forster & Marsten argument to be a rational argument for the existence of God? When you first posted, cj, you said it was rational but meaningless. With Linda's definition of rational (the one most of us are using, and the one that corresponds to that given in all the dictionaries I've looked at), would you agree that it is not rational?

And then we can take on your meaning of rational by looking at the contradiction it requires.
 
Back to the directly sensing gravity and acceleration, from the Wiki article on otolith:

An otolith, (οτο-, oto-, ear + λιθος, lithos, a stone), also called statoconium[1] or otoconium is a structure in the saccule or utricle of the inner ear, specifically in the vestibular labyrinth. The saccule and utricle, in turn, together make the otolith organs. They are sensitive to gravity and linear acceleration. Because of their orientation in the head, the utricle is sensitive to a change in horizontal movement, and the saccule gives information about vertical acceleration (such as when in an elevator).

Tubbythin, you're right though. I should have specified "linear acceleration".
 
Reading over your reply reminded me of another question for the Rev: What does it mean to say that something "existed before time existed"? Before is a referent to time. You can't have before without time.

Statements like these are fairly incriminating, I think. One one hand God is transcendent which is taken to mean something like outside of time and space. On the other hand, that doesn't really pass muster wrt to statements that have God doing stuff, creating, causing etc. pp. And what is more, there is absolutely no reason that somehow God is trancendent while the universe (as a whole) is not. With the universe not being subject to some sort of temporal progression, any "begins to exist" becomes terribly moot.


To be fair though, language tends to be terribly slanted towards theologians. Prepositions just do have a tendency to reflect temporal and/or spatial relations such as "before", "over", "towards" etc. Although, it probably is just more revealing than anything else, and may just mean that language doesn't even allow for the formulation a successful argument for God.
 

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