The bankers have got off astonishingly lightly in gumboot's rant. I think it needs more work.
From what I understand - and keep in mind that my last exposure to economics was waaaaay back in
high school - your statement is really the heart of things. From having read a few sites (only one of which I'm able to remember: MaxedOutMama's "
How did we get here?" post), so many of the problems were based on a deterioration of capital reserves as well as a degredation of appraisal standards leading to a higher degree of risk than what was immediately apparent to anyone but underwriters. So anyway, I have a layman's take on what the problems are, and I've noticed that you're considerably more versed in economics than I am, so I'm running these impressions by you to see if they're accurate:
- The problem of course originates with mortgage defaults. However, the problem is exacerbated because the risks were magnified by practicies in ways not immediately apparent to investors.
- Part of the problem is that the banks above the immediate lending institutions did not have the capital margin to absorb losses, and the reason for this is agitation on the part of politicians (both Democrats and Republicans, so don't anyone else reading this think I'm singling out only one party) loosening the standards and allowing less reserves.
- Another part of the problem is that bad appraisal practices led to overvaluation of many properties, and allowed the bubble to propogate.
- And yet another part of the problem is that all of above problems were snowballing - defaults were rising, reserve capital was being eaten in to, yet appraisals were rising and loans were still flowing out - and they just came to a head last year.
- And above everything else, the reason that the problem turned global is because, ironically, the risks were spread out among many different institutions who had bought the "tranches". So while distribution of risk is normally a good thing, it backfired this one time specifically because it was so spread out and affected so many different investment institutions.
So sure, defaulting loan customers is the base of the problem, but it's sort of like a snowballing effect: The problem starting the issue is actually not uncontainable, but circumstances happened to amplify (magnify, multiple, whatever term you want to apply) the problem, and instead of having a few mortgages fail and depress some individual areas of hyperfast real estate growth, the problem went all the way up to the base of lending, and those big institutions guaranteeing loans (AIG, Lehman Bros., etc.) got shakey, which forced other banks to dry up credit to other lenders (I'm talking way at the top here, about banks lending to other banks) to protect their own resources. And this ended up affecting everybody.
Have I got that right? Again, layman here, so I don't know how close I am to understanding this, presuming I'm close at all.