Can theists be rational?

Again, the question must be is it rational to use ANY EQUATION under conditions where it cannot give valid results. Why the special pleading here?

...snip...

Here's a hint for you: Can theists be rational? That is known as "the topic of the thread".
 
Even if you want to pretend that the natural universe is defined by the laws of physics and not the other way around, a being that can adjust the constants of the universe controls the laws of physics and is not governed by them.

Such a being is not inconsistent with the known laws of physics, which relate only to the natural universe.

-Bri

Calling it the "natural universe" rather than just "the universe" is rather flippant. It presumes that there is at least some marginally rational reason to believe in the simply yet to be discovered supernatural part, including the yet to be discovered "being". Is there any reason to believe in this supernatural part, other than the fact that some humans have conceived of a theoretical concept that, by its very nature, can never be disproven?
 
Here's a hint for you: Can theists be rational? That is known as "the topic of the thread".

The only objective use of the term "irrational" in common usage that I've heard mentioned is "incoherent." Unless you have some other method of objectively determining whether or not a particular belief can be considered "irrational" (presumably one that doesn't involve special pleading) you'll generally have to compare a belief in theism with other beliefs that are more subjectively considered "rational" or "irrational" and see if you can come up with a consistent criteria by which they differ.

So unless you want to post an objective method for determining whether something is rational, you're going to have to discuss beliefs other than theism in order to determine whether theism can be rational. Sorry that bothers you so much, but you're free to ignore the thread if you like.

-Bri
 
Calling it the "natural universe" rather than just "the universe" is rather flippant.

No, it's just accurate. That we don't have compelling evidence of anything supernatural outside of the natural universe doesn't make it theoretically impossible.

It presumes that there is at least some marginally rational reason to believe in the simply yet to be discovered supernatural part, including the yet to be discovered "being".

No, it just doesn't presume that the supernatural is impossible.

Is there any reason to believe in this supernatural part, other than the fact that some humans have conceived of a theoretical concept that, by its very nature, can never be disproven?

The existence of aliens can't be disproven either, but that doesn't necessarily mean they are impossible or that we shouldn't consider the possibility of their existence.

-Bri
 
No, it's just accurate. That we don't have compelling evidence of anything supernatural outside of the natural universe doesn't make it theoretically impossible.



No, it just doesn't presume that the supernatural is impossible.



The existence of aliens can't be disproven either, but that doesn't necessarily mean they are impossible or that we shouldn't consider the possibility of their existence.

-Bri


Why are you discounting the non-supernatural, non-natural universes?
 
All well and good but has nothing to do with what I posted which was answering your question (albeit that you had misused the term "special pleading").

I don't think you answered my question, which was a fair question directed at Linda. I asked why she would consider the use of a mathematical equation in a logical argument different from every other logical argument that similarly uses a mathematical equation.

And, yes, objecting to the use of a specific equation in a specific argument without consideration of every other argument that uses mathematical equations in the same way would be special pleading.

Why are you discounting the non-supernatural, non-natural universes?

I wasn't discounting anything.

-Bri
 
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Again, the question must be is it rational to use ANY EQUATION under conditions where it cannot give valid results. Why the special pleading here?

Well, I realize that we are now on page 34, so you may have forgotten what this thread is about, but the title is "Can theists be rational?" and in response to that question, cj.23 presented what he called a rational argument for theism which involved the use of Bayes' theorem under conditions where it was not possible to form valid premises. I don't consider it a case of special pleading to directly address an argument that was directed toward the thread topic.

Does that mean that you agree that the use of Bayes' theorem was not rational - that is, the fine-tuning argument does not constitute a rational argument for theism?

That depends what you consider "valid."

I told you earlier that I was referring mostly to external validity - i.e. the extent to which a finding can be applied to settings other than those which are the direct subject of the argument, the extent to which the premises are based on measurable properties (subjective or objective, doesn't matter), the extent to which the premises reflect a real setting.

These are all examples where the validity of the premises is subjective. Any time the premises of an argument are subjective but reasonable, the results will be "controversial" -- meaning that reasonable people can disagree. This occurs when there is a lack of conclusive evidence upon which to base the premise. It's not unreasonable to conclude that Joe was speeding, but that doesn't mean that someone would necessarily be irrational if they concluded otherwise.

-Bri

These examples all refer to situations where it is possible to form valid premises (even if you have tried to avoid doing so :)). Does that mean that no examples are available (other than the fine-tuning argument) of situations where Bayes' theorem is used when it is not possible to form valid premises?

Linda
 
I don't think you answered my question, which was a fair question directed at Linda. I asked why she would consider the use of a mathematical equation in a logical argument different from every other logical argument that similarly uses a mathematical equation.

And, yes, objecting to the use of a specific equation in a specific argument without consideration of every other argument that uses mathematical equations in the same way would be special pleading.


...snip...

Good job she never did that then wasn't it.
 
No, it's just accurate. That we don't have compelling evidence of anything supernatural outside of the natural universe doesn't make it theoretically impossible.

No, it just doesn't presume that the supernatural is impossible.

The existence of aliens can't be disproven either, but that doesn't necessarily mean they are impossible or that we shouldn't consider the possibility of their existence.

-Bri

I only read the first 2 and then the last few pages of this thread, so perhaps I am missing and/or misinterpreting something. Are you acknowledging that theism is not the rational choice?
 
If your point is that we don't know of the existence of anything beyond the natural and therefore the supernatural can't be used to explain anything, I agree. The same can be true of aliens or teapots orbiting Jupiter though. I don't mind defining any belief for which there is no conclusive evidence irrational as long as you're consistent.

-Bri
I said nothing about any teapots.

There is proof of life on a planet, this planet also has no special place, and no special laws of physics. Also on this planet life has shown that it can live under all types of conditions, and more are being learned all the time. So why the hell is it so hard to understand that this is not the only planet where life can be?

Paul

:) :) :)

And I'm still waiting for what a so-called god answers.
 
Well, I realize that we are now on page 34, so you may have forgotten what this thread is about, but the title is "Can theists be rational?" and in response to that question, cj.23 presented what he called a rational argument for theism which involved the use of Bayes' theorem under conditions where it was not possible to form valid premises. I don't consider it a case of special pleading to directly address an argument that was directed toward the thread topic.

See my response to Darat. I might not have been clear with what I meant since both of you apparently misunderstood, but my question was why you would consider the use of a mathematical equation in a logical argument different from every other logical argument that similarly uses a mathematical equation.

Does that mean that you agree that the use of Bayes' theorem was not rational - that is, the fine-tuning argument does not constitute a rational argument for theism?

I don't know how you're using the term "irrational." If you agree that every argument for which there isn't conclusive evidence is irrational, then I will agree that at least you're being consistent. If that's what you're proposing, let's discuss whether such an argument can be considered necessarily irrational or not.

If you're singling out the fine-tuning argument as irrational for some reason other than because the premises are not supported by conclusive evidence, then I'll need more information about why you consider it irrational that differentiates it from other similar arguments that you don't consider irrational.

I told you earlier that I was referring mostly to external validity - i.e. the extent to which a finding can be applied to settings other than those which are the direct subject of the argument, the extent to which the premises are based on measurable properties (subjective or objective, doesn't matter), the extent to which the premises reflect a real setting.

External validity to me means whether or not an argument is consistent with what we know about the universe, but you seem to be using it differently here. For example, what do you mean by "the extent to which the premises reflect a real setting?" It sounds like what your getting at is whether the premises are supported by evidence, but if you mean something different then please clarify.

These examples all refer to situations where it is possible to form valid premises (even if you have tried to avoid doing so :)).

Again, if you mean that the premises are supported by evidence, sure. Of course, if you have no idea whether Joe was 1 or 3 miles away, then the premises aren't supported by evidence and it is not possible to form a valid conclusion from them.

Does that mean that no examples are available (other than the fine-tuning argument) of situations where Bayes' theorem is used when it is not possible to form valid premises?

No, I gave you examples (including the one about whether or not Joe was speeding) and pointed out that the validity of the premises is often subjective rather than objective. If Joe is in court being tried for speeding, and the eye witness thinks that Joe was 3 miles away but isn't sure, you'd have to guess as to how reliable that witness is. "Reasonable doubt" isn't an objective cut-and-dry term, otherwise jury deliberations would be much easier than they often are.

-Bri
 
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I said nothing about any teapots.

I never said you did. It's an analogy.

There is proof of life on a planet, this planet also has no special place, and no special laws of physics. Also on this planet life has shown that it can live under all types of conditions, and more are being learned all the time. So why the hell is it so hard to understand that this is not the only planet where life can be?

Substitute "teapot" for "life" and "exist" for "live" in that argument and you'll see why I made the analogy.

And I'm still waiting for what a so-called god answers.

What's it supposed to answer?

-Bri
 
See my response to Darat. I might not have been clear with what I meant since both of you apparently misunderstood, but my question was why you would consider the use of a mathematical equation in a logical argument different from every other logical argument that similarly uses a mathematical equation.

I wouldn't.

I don't know how you're using the term "irrational." If you agree that every argument for which there isn't conclusive evidence is irrational, then I will agree that at least you're being consistent. If that's what you're proposing, let's discuss whether such an argument can be considered necessarily irrational or not.

I'm using the term 'rational' as described by Blobru:

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=4322700#post4322700

If you're saying that only the fine-tuning argument is irrational, then I'll need more information about why you consider it irrational if not because the premises are not supported by conclusive evidence.

I consider it not rational because the premises don't make reference to something that is the result of systematic observation or hypothesis testing.

External validity to me means whether or not an argument is consistent with what we know about the universe, but you seem to be using it differently here. For example, what do you mean by "the extent to which the premises reflect a real setting?" It sounds like what your getting at is whether the premises are supported by evidence, but if you mean something different then please clarify.

That fits as well - whether or not the premises depend upon what we have or can observe about the universe.

Again, if you mean that the premises are supported by evidence, sure. Of course, if you have no idea whether Joe was 1 or 3 miles away, then the premises aren't supported by evidence and it is not possible to form a valid conclusion from them.

The idea that Joe was some distance away and that it took him a certain amount of time to cover that distance isn't a particularly difficult thing to understand.

No, I gave you examples (including the one about whether or not Joe was speeding) and pointed out that the validity of the premises is often subjective rather than objective. If Joe is in court being tried for speeding, and the eye witness thinks that Joe was 3 miles away but isn't sure, you'd have to guess as to how reliable that witness is. "Reasonable doubt" isn't an objective cut-and-dry term, otherwise jury deliberations would be much easier than they often are.

-Bri

I'm telling you nicely that this example has nothing whatsoever to do with what I'm talking about, so it really doesn't help for you to continue to mention to it. Your example is fairly straightforward, whereas cj.23 is wondering whether Joe travelled to your house on the IPU.

Linda
 
I never said you did. It's an analogy.



Substitute "teapot" for "life" and "exist" for "live" in that argument and you'll see why I made the analogy.



What's it supposed to answer?

-Bri
No substitute needed, that is a straw-man.

Yes, if it answers nothing then why bring it up, unless you are showing that theists can't be rational.

Paul

:) :) :)
 
...

Funny when you put the two together, huh? It wasn't hard to connect though--you didn't separate them far enough apart.

Not sure what you mean. These are subjective probabilities. For me, God has always been a plausible hypothesis. It receives confirmation from the FT argument. But even if you low-ball the probability of God existing, as CJ did, you still get a lot of confirmation, because the odds against life are so long. This is assuming one believes in only one universe, which is completely rational to do. We have no evidence of other universes.

More special pleading. I'm not assuming God has to be created through evolution--that's just the only thing being put on the table.

Huh? The hypothesis "Something create the universe" means the only thing being put on the table is some lifeform that evolved? "Something" can apply to anything capable of creating a universe and fine-tuning it, including God.

But God damned well has to exist, doesn't he? If he's going to start creating life and such?

You're confusing ontological with epistemological. God either does or doesn't exist. The FT argument is a way to show that our belief in God is justified viz-a-viz God being a good explanation for the long odds against life existing.



Remember... you are trying to show your belief is rational.

Right. If the FT argument comes down to either something created the universe or there is a vast multiverse, the theist is on more stable ground. It is perfectly reasonable to reject the many-universes hypothesis as there is zero evidence for it. You're then left with either chance or a universe-creator. The theist has to do a bit more arguing to go from "universe creator" to God, but once you establish the rationality of believing the universe was created by something powerful enough to create universes and fine-tune them, it's a short leap to go from there to some type of God.

I agree, Malerin. It's an even worse problem. It appears that even if we should discover life is inevitable, even then, you'll try to put God into it, by asking, "but why is it such a way that it's inevitable?" I think this betrays a sort of absolute bias.

Not bias. The impossibilty of a life-less universe is better explained by a life-symapthetic universe creator, than by chance. Imagine you're looking over a sea of trillions of actual universes. You are then told that every single one is full of life- not a lifeless one out of trillions and trillions. I certainly would be surprised. Now add to that you ALSO found out they all have life because the values of the physical constants are set in just the right life-permitting way- protons just happen to have the right mass, the fine-structure constant just happens to be set at the right value. That kind of evidence would make anything but a universe creator irrational to believe in.

Can you imagine a scenario where you wouldn't put God into it, and please tell me what it looks like?

The physical constants are random and we have evidence for either an oscillating universe or a vast multiverse. God would not be required to explain anything if that is the way the universe is.

And all I'm demanding is that you add this into your set of possible universes, in your Bayesian equation. Why? Because you haven't ruled it out.

What I just said can be factored in. It's rational for someone to believe that. It's also rational to believe this is the only universe and that we did not just get lucky.

But if you want to exclude it, fine. You get to exclude one possibility you hold to be extremely remote from the equation, and I'll pick another extremely remote possibility to remove. Fair trade, right? Guess what I'm picking.

I'm not excluding anything. What are you trying to argue, that life in a universe with no stars is plausible? If your only way to defeat the FT argument is making up faith-based stories, you have no leg to stand on accusing a theist of irrationality.

Do you really suppose they have actual probabilities? They don't even have a full standard model yet, much less an idea of how universes get created. You're focused on what the parameters are again... this part is about arguing what the chances are that the parameters are that way.

According to the physicists I've sourced, the odds are infinistesimally small. I don't know why you won't post rebuttal sources. This is a cosmological argument. You're going to have reference something other than your musings.

Well, yeah. But that's what the actual case is. We don't know. Are you supposing those physicists do know how the universe got those parameters? Then cite me quote mines about their model (and a supporting word or two about their discovery).

I'm supposing their opinon on a highly technical matter counts for more than what you are I could say. They are actually paid to write and think about this stuff. When the doctor shows you an X-ray, do you physically take apart the X-Ray machine to verify it gave the correct result?

Do you just not understand the question or it's relevance?

Again, feel free to source other cosmologists/physicists who disagree about the precise values needed for life and we'll go from there. Till then, I have my quotes from experts and you haven't shown anything to refute them.

What's even more strange that the atheist, who is saying "we don't know for sure, do we?", applies it to everything that we actually don't know for sure, where the theist is surgically applying it only to the existence of God, and absolutely refuses to apply it to convenient factoids.

What "convenient factoids" am I not applying?

Everything else, that slants his way... we're certain of, even though he doesn't even have so much as the model any of these quote mined scientists are using.

Why would I have their "model"? I assume it would be meaningless to someone without an advanced degree in physics or math. Do you really think Hawking is full of ****** Again, who's the radical skepticist around here anyway?

Isn't that strange? And right after you ask me if they are picking these out from a vacuum... it appears Linde and Hawking, who you're trying to beat me over the head with, are not jumping onto the God hypothesis.

I never said they were. Linde believes in a macroverse and Hawking has his own top-down theory of cosmology. Linde and Hawking can rationally believe that, but it's nothing more than speculation at this point. A theist can rationally reject what they're saying until some evidence that either one is right emerges.

Boy... that's convenient.

Then why is it not relevant what they think of the fine tuning argument for God?

"Thus, Francis Crick toys with terms like ‘miracle’, Frederick Hoyle refers to a superintellect ‘monkeying’ with physics, and Andrei Linde raises the possibility of our cosmos itself being a product of design—by some supertechnological alien culture. The character of such proposals is itself testimony to the prima facie plausibility of fine-tuning cases."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/#4.1

I don't know what Hawking thinks of the FT argument. Feel free to look it up. I referenced these guys to support my formulation of the evidence, which was being attacked by several people.

A very easy model, very quickly. Science progresses through observations. We don't have much about how universes are created. So we are, legitimately, ignorant of the matter. The parameters of the universe seem to be such that we ourselves could be here. We don't know why, because we have no viable working scientific theory of how universes come into being.

An appeal to ignorance to get around a theistic argument supported by physics and biology. Do you not see the irony here?
 
Huh? The hypothesis "Something create the universe" means the only thing being put on the table is some lifeform that evolved? "Something" can apply to anything capable of creating a universe and fine-tuning it, including God.
Why does something have to creat the universe, and if so what created the creator, it just around and around and nothing comes of it.

And why does the universe has to be fine-tuned, the universe started without life, and it could end without life, the universe does not care.

Paul

:) :) :)
 

Blobru's definition, which I agree with for the most part, isn't very succinct and is also subjective. Essentially it boils down to "it's rational unless the reasons to believe it are irrational." Blobru also concluded the opposite that you concluded about whether it is necessarily irrational to believe in a god. In this case, the argument in question isn't necessarily any less rational than other similar arguments for which there isn't conclusive evidence for one or more of the premises. I'm willing to discuss whether all such arguments can be considered irrational if you want to go there.

I consider it not rational because the premises don't make reference to something that is the result of systematic observation or hypothesis testing.

Can you clarify what you mean by "systematic observation or hypothesis testing" other than "supported by evidence?"

That fits as well - whether or not the premises depend upon what we have or can observe about the universe.

OK, I can agree with that, except that it excludes lots of beliefs that are often considered "rational" for which there is little or no conclusive evidence to support the premises.

The idea that Joe was some distance away and that it took him a certain amount of time to cover that distance isn't a particularly difficult thing to understand.

I chose the example specifically because it was easy to understand. The point is that whether or not the conclusion is valid isn't exactly cut-and-dry unless the premises are supported by conclusive evidence. In the case of "I think he was 3 miles away" it's not clear. Still, I wouldn't say that it would necessarily be irrational to be of the opinion that Joe was probably speeding, even without conclusive evidence.

I'm telling you nicely that this example has nothing whatsoever to do with what I'm talking about, so it really doesn't help for you to continue to mention to it. Your example is fairly straightforward, whereas cj.23 is wondering whether Joe travelled to your house on the IPU.

I'm telling you nicely that I don't understand the difference you're drawing at all. They both involve equations in which some of the premise is not supported by conclusive evidence. That one of the equations is a little "simpler to understand" doesn't seem to be a valid reason for labeling only one as "irrational." Specifically, blobru's definition -- if that's the one you're going with -- has nothing whatsoever to do with the simplicity of the equation upon which an argument is based on.

-Bri
 
In other words, the notion of a supernatural being violates the laws of physics.

So? The universality of the laws of physics is a working assumption of science. If it's a belief, it's a non-scientific belief.

There is no scientific theory which asserts that the laws of physics have universal applicability. It's assumed because it's necessary to make science work. It's not a metaphysical assertion.

That is why it doesn't mean very much to say that God is "theoretically impossible". According to what theory? Science doesn't claim to provide universal truth. The belief that the laws of physics are immutable and universal is not scientific - it's a belief.
 

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