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Resolution of Transporter Problem

rocketdodger

Philosopher
rocketdodger
Joined
Jun 22, 2005
Messages
6,946
Assume that consciousness is information processing.

Let D1 be the information which is being processed in consciousness C.

Then we can fully encode C using another set of information D2 which is a superset of D1. That is, D2 contains not only all the information in D1 but also all the information about how C is processing D1.

D2 does not include information that would not affect C. For example, if C is me standing in the shower, D2 does not include information about the shower, only information about my perception of the shower. D2 does not include absolute coordinates of neurons, only relative ones.

Let D3 be the set of all information used to objectively describe C, such as current location of the substrate of C. Information about the shower I am standing in that is not available to my consciousness would be part of D3. Also note that D3 is a superset of D2.


My contention is that D2 fully defines C as far as C is concerned. Thus, any transporter needs to relay D2 from the source to the destination in order for C to function properly at the destination.

But further, my contention is also that D2 is C as far as C is concerned. Mathematically, if one wanted to, they could take an instance of D2 and run it in any sort of simulation they wanted and as long as the constraints were correct C would continue to exist as C.

This implies that, in the transporter experiment, it is impossible to discontinue C because D2 is purely information. Any instance of D2 is still D2. And since D3 is not important to C, C exists wherever there is D2 -- even in the "airwaves," so to speak. The substrate of the information is irrelevant.

Now for the big questions What happens if a copy of D2 is made and the original set D3 is destroyed? Is C dead? No, because by definition C is sufficiently defined (fully defined, as far as C is concerned) by D2. So the copy is the original. So is the original. Information that is the same as other information.

What about if both the copy and original continue existing? Well, immediately after transport, C is not the same as C'. That is, D2 has nondeterministically split into D2a and D2b, and there are simply two instances of the same person walking around.
 
rocketdodger said:
Assume that consciousness is information processing.

Let D1 be the information which is being processed in consciousness C.

Then we can fully encode C using another set of information D2 which is a superset of D1. That is, D2 contains not only all the information in D1 but also all the information about how C is processing D1.

D2 does not include information that would not affect C. For example, if C is me standing in the shower, D2 does not include information about the shower, only information about my perception of the shower. D2 does not include absolute coordinates of neurons, only relative ones.

Let D3 be the set of all information used to objectively describe C, such as current location of the substrate of C. Information about the shower I am standing in that is not available to my consciousness would be part of D3. Also note that D3 is a superset of D2.


My contention is that D2 fully defines C as far as C is concerned. Thus, any transporter needs to relay D2 from the source to the destination in order for C to function properly at the destination.

But further, my contention is also that D2 is C as far as C is concerned. Mathematically, if one wanted to, they could take an instance of D2 and run it in any sort of simulation they wanted and as long as the constraints were correct C would continue to exist as C.

This implies that, in the transporter experiment, it is impossible to discontinue C because D2 is purely information. Any instance of D2 is still D2. And since D3 is not important to C, C exists wherever there is D2 -- even in the "airwaves," so to speak. The substrate of the information is irrelevant.

Now for the big questions What happens if a copy of D2 is made and the original set D3 is destroyed? Is C dead? No, because by definition C is sufficiently defined (fully defined, as far as C is concerned) by D2. So the copy is the original. So is the original. Information that is the same as other information.

What about if both the copy and original continue existing? Well, immediately after transport, C is not the same as C'. That is, D2 has nondeterministically split into D2a and D2b, and there are simply two instances of the same person walking around.
Click to expand...

The assumption being that C* and D* are simply algorithmic information processing. If that is the case, then we were happy enough being transported anyway.
 
westprog said:
The assumption being that C* and D* are simply algorithmic information processing. If that is the case, then we were happy enough being transported anyway.
Click to expand...

I agree, but I think many people feel that somehow once the medium is changed the information is also changed. My goal here is to show that D2 can exist anywhere (and in an arbitrary number of instances) -- it is still C regardless.
 
I'm sorry - can you explain what the "Transporter Problem" is that you're trying to resolve? I'm familiar with the thought experiments involving transporters and what would happen to a soul, but to my way of thinking it was already pretty well answered for all the cases.
 
rocketdodger said:
Now for the big questions What happens if a copy of D2 is made and the original set D3 is destroyed? Is C dead? No, because by definition C is sufficiently defined (fully defined, as far as C is concerned) by D2. So the copy is the original. So is the original. Information that is the same as other information.

What about if both the copy and original continue existing? Well, immediately after transport, C is not the same as C'. That is, D2 has nondeterministically split into D2a and D2b, and there are simply two instances of the same person walking around.
Click to expand...

So, are you ready to get in the Teletransporter now? Has the above sufficiently convinced you that you won't die and that self is anyway process?

Nick
 
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rocketdodger said:
What about if both the copy and original continue existing? Well, immediately after transport, C is not the same as C'. That is, D2 has nondeterministically split into D2a and D2b, and there are simply two instances of the same person walking around.
Click to expand...

Quick question. If person D2a and person D2b got into a homosexual relationship, would that technically be the same as masturbation?
 
I think the transporter problem referred to is that of identity; If two versions of the same person are created by a transporter accident, which is real?

The trick is, there are two types of identity; Numerical identity which refers to a specific entity, and qualitative identity, which refers to an entity with a particular set of characteristics.

The transporter illuminates the fact that numerical identity is not strictly definable, and that only qualitative identity is unambiguous.

So, as both versions of the person have the same characteristics, they are equally real.
 
Doesn't solve the problem to me.

OK, you just got in the teleporter and pressed the button to teleport you to Mars. A green light signifies that you the operation was successful and 'you' have appeared in the transporter on the other end in perfect shape.

One little problem - a red light now comes on and a message appears on a screen indicating that the 'Acme destructor module' has failed that was to destroy the original copy simultaneously during transport.

A technician enters with a 'blaster' pointed at you and apologizes for the slight delay in completing the teleportation, but that he will now complete it manually and all will be well.

Do you close your eyes and thank him for the quick service, knowing that, as you stated, the copy IS you?

There is an episode of The Outer Limits entitled Think Like a Dinosaur that has this very same scenario.
 
Boogie said:
Do you close your eyes and thank him for the quick service, knowing that, as you stated, the copy IS you?
Click to expand...
I think we would have to legislate the answers to questions like these.

~~ Paul
 
BoogieWoogieWookie said:
A technician enters with a 'blaster' pointed at you and apologizes for the slight delay in completing the teleportation, but that he will now complete it manually and all will be well.

Do you close your eyes and thank him for the quick service, knowing that, as you stated, the copy IS you?
Click to expand...
Um, no? rocketdodger covered this at the end.
rocketdodger said:
What about if both the copy and original continue existing? Well, immediately after transport, C is not the same as C'. That is, D2 has nondeterministically split into D2a and D2b, and there are simply two instances of the same person walking around.
Click to expand...
Immediately after transport, C is not the same as C'. There's one you of two minutes ago, two yous of a minute ago, and a you and a you' now. No reason for you' to accept dying because you exists.
 
GreedyAlgorithm said:
Um, no? rocketdodger covered this at the end.

Immediately after transport, C is not the same as C'. There's one you of two minutes ago, two yous of a minute ago, and a you and a you' now. No reason for you' to accept dying because you exists.
Click to expand...

He might have covered it, but it does not solve the problem. Unless he means that the problem cannot be solved satisfactorily and therefore transporters can never be practical because of this.

But he seems to imply, unless I misunderstand him, that the 'duplicate' is the same being as the original unless the original survives.
 
I have the "teleportation argument" often with one of my more intellectual friends.

It is my opinion that C would continue to exist seemlessly to all the universe, except one person. The original.

From the perspective of that self aware being that stepped onto the pad to be teleported, its lights out.
 
Let us assume our conclusions.

Now, examine our conclusions. See how they match our assumptions?

Wonderful!

4) Profit...
 
Gate2501 said:
I have the "teleportation argument" often with one of my more intellectual friends.

It is my opinion that C would continue to exist seemlessly to all the universe, except one person. The original.

From the perspective of that self aware being that stepped onto the pad to be teleported, its lights out.
Click to expand...

Yes, it's an illusion. It's an illusion to the copy and to anyone who sees the copy.

But what if we frame the question another way. Instead of teleporting the original, we excise an organ each day, (the heart, a kidney,) transport it and replace it. We would say the person is the same uncontroversially if we had replaced all the organs except the brain.

But when we get to the brain, we replace only a cubic centimeter each day, via a perfect non-invasive procedure. It's hard to say it's not the same person when it's all done.

Someone else mentioned earlier that it's a problem of identity. The problem with death (for the self) is the expectation that one can no longer influence and interact with the world.

But if teleportation guaranteed continuity without any technical difficulties, death would no longer mean what it currently means. It would still be death (discontinuity of physical, dynamic whole), but the consequences would not be equivalent to those of death (psychological continuity).

I think the closest meaning of death in terms of teleportation, would be like undergoing anesthesia. You could die from it, but most likely your sense of self-reference will be put on hold until the procedure is over, so, assuming there are safeguards against accidental cloning (temporal concurrency), teletransportation should be uncontroversial.

Put another way, if you are expecting to go to sleep in LA, and wake up 2 minutes later in NY, and it *always* happens, what remaining ethical concerns can there be?

Incidentally, it is said that all the atoms in the human body are replaced within a lifetime.

I think my post generally agrees with the OP, but I have to admit that subjecting myself to teleportation would scare me in the same way that some old-fashioned people are scared to touch computers, fly in a plane, undergo heart surgery, or take mood medications. (By a factor of 10 or 100 !)
 
It's fairly easy to imagine a world in which original-destroying teleporters are in common use. But is it a world in which people have come to a subtler understanding of personal identity and continuity? Or is it one in which people have become indifferent to their own deaths, disdaining continued life and preferring a sort of serial reincarnation?
 
I still don't see anything that I would consider a "problem" as in an unanswered question. Immediately after transporting, there would be another person, and if you killed one of them you'd be killing a person.

So it's not really a problem to solve, it's just a thought experiment that highlights the shortcomings of our traditional way of referring to individuals. It seems like only semantics to me - who is "you" is what it boils down to, and that's just semantics.
 
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