Why Malerin is Wrong About Bayes Theorem

OK, fine, we cut to the chase. The problem with the fine tuner argument that uses Bayes' theorem is the same as with all fine tuner arguments.

The fine tuner is a more complex solution to the origin of the universe than quantum fluxuation or "unknown natural process" (there is an unknown at the center of both explanations but one is simpler). The fine tuner requires either that dualism is the case, and this is necessarily more complex (in addition to requiring magic), so less probable, than monism; or the fine tuner is alive in order to fine tune, so the argument is answered from the outset in your definitions.

There is also the issue of multiple universes. And the other issues already mentioned.

We already covered these issues three threads and many pages ago.
 
You cannot name a situation where there are more false propositions than true ones.
With negation and propositional logic that is true. I agree.

P|~P
T| F
F| T

But that's just a tautalogy, a slight of hand and a technical refutation of my statement.
 
I do, yes. It completely fails. There's a good response here.

His first point is that the physical constants may be set at their precise values (they couldn't be other than what they are. Here's my response:

"Besides being entirely speculative, the problem with postulating such a law is that it simply moves the improbability of the fine-tuning up one level, to that of the postulated physical law itself. As astrophysicists Bernard Carr and Martin Rees note "even if all apparently anthropic coincidences could be explained [in terms of some grand unified theory], it would still be remarkable that the relationships dictated by physical theory happened also to be those propitious for life" (1979, p. 612).

A similar sort of response can be given to the claim that the fine-tuning is not improbable because it might be logically necessary for the constants of physics to have life-permitting values. That is, according to this claim, the constants of physics must have life-permitting values in the same way 2 + 2 must equal 4, or the interior angles of a triangle must add up to 180 degrees in Euclidian geometry. Like the "more fundamental law" proposal above, however, this postulate simply transfers the improbability up one level: of all the laws and constants of physics that conceivably could have been logically necessary, it seems highly improbable that it would be those that are life-permitting."


http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/finetune/anth.htm.htm

It would be astonishing to learn that the physical constants are set in stone (as it were) at just the right levels to support life- that there is some cosmological principle that every possible universe that can emerge is life-permitting. The impossibility of life-less universes would be a far-stronger argument than the current FT argument.

I agree with his next point that we are constrained somewhat by not having any universes to compare this one to, but that does not mean we can't look at the values of the constants and speculate what would happen if they were off even the tiniest bit. Even Victor Stenger admits this point:

"But if the gravitational attraction between protons in stars had not been many orders of magnitude weaker than the electric repulsion, as represented by the very large value of N1, stars would have collapsed and burned out long before nuclear processes could build up the periodic table from the original hydrogen and deuterium.”

“The element-synthesizing processes in stars depend sensitively on
the properties and abundances of deuterium and helium produced in the early universe. Deuterium would not exist if the difference between the masses of a neutron and a proton were just slightly displaced from its actual value. The relative abundances of hydrogen and helium also depend strongly on this parameter. They, too, require a delicate balance of the relative strengths of gravity and the weak force, the force responsible for nuclear beta decay. A slightly stronger weak force, and the universe would be 100 percent hydrogen; all the neutrons in the early universe would have decayed, leaving none around to be saved in deuterium nuclei for later use in the synthesizing elements in stars. A slightly weaker weak force, and few neutrons would have decayed, leaving about the same numbers of protons and neutrons; then, all the protons and neutrons would have been bound up in helium nuclei, with two protons and two neutrons in each. This would have led to a universe that was 100 percent helium, with no hydrogen to fuel the fusion processes in stars
"

Stenger then goes on to wonder about whether non-molecular life could exist. Anyway, Stanford's article comes across as a little more scholarly than Hurben's (had trouble fiding Hurben's field of study), and what we're doing is pretty much throwing papers at each other.

His next point (that one constant may compensate for the change in value of another constant), is actually contradicted by Stenger's Monkey God experiment. http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/v...mo/monkey.html
Play around with it a bit. I was never able to generate a random universe that was even close to an earthlike planet with a star like our sun and atomic nuclei that weren't centimeters wide.

This is interesting: "However, since alternate universes can imaginably posses different laws and even different particles (or something else entirely), we have no way of judging the improbability of life in those cases. And if this line of argument seems far-fetched, remember it is merely an example of giving the AD proponents a taste of their own medicine. After all, if one can argue by making statements of the form "we can imagine so many possible universes where life could not exist" then it is fair play to propose exotic universes where life is abundant."

But here the theist is on stronger evidentiary ground because they can whip out every biological text book ever written as evidence that non-carbon-based life is improbable- we certainly haven't seen any. Granted, our sample size is very small, but the evidence, however scant it is, is still on the theist's side: non-carbon based life is pure speculation and all life observed so far has been carbon-based. If the FT opponent goes further and claims (like Stenger) that non-molecular life is possible, the theist is on even firmer biological ground.

"But let us also suppose that the firing squad has the overwhelming task of executing a trillion and one prisoners, one after the other. In that case, no one would be surprised if one prisoner was not killed. (One could also modify this by considering N different firing squads firing at N different prisoners.)"

This is a reubttal to the firing squad analogy only if there are a gazillion actual universes. If there was only 1 firing squad, and you were it's sole victim, the fact that you survived would naturally lead you to wonder how you survived. I agree that the multiverse hypothesis is deadly to the FT argument.

"All of the calculations, probabilities, and "fine-tuning" aside, I contend that the biggest flaw in the modern AD is the one which was there from the beginning, the one that David Hume pointed out so long ago.[13] To argue for design is make an inductive argument, an argument by analogy, about the universe as a whole (of which there is only one, which we know of at least), and about its origin in particular, about which we know very little. One should be hesitant to draw many conclusions from a comparison of such dissimilar entities."

This cuts both ways: if so little is known about the universe, why study it at all? Any study of the universe is going to rely on induction. And if we know so little about the universe's origin, why should we be so quick to assume it was a purely physical process?

The easiest and simplest response is just to note that we have no evidence for a directed firing squad. We were taken out to a field and heard a lot of gunshots. Until and unless you can prove that there was actually a firing squad or that any of the riflemen were aiming at you, then there's nothing to explain in the fact that you weren't hit.

This goes back to the point that the constants could have had different values that compensated for each other, or life could have a lot more variety than the uniform carbon-based life we've observed so far. Basically, we can't even make a guess as to how rare life-permitting universes are. There are two objections to this:
1. The many cosmologists who have argued how precise the values need to be for anything resembling a life-permitting universe to come about
2. Even if the odds were only 1-100, the FT argument receives significant confirmation (if the multiverse is not part of the background knowledge. If the Multiverse IS part of the background knowledge, it really doesn't matter what the odds of a life-permitting universe are- given enough universes, all possibilities are actualized). Hurben seems to be arguing for almost complete ignorance about the universe and biology, which I'm not sure a lot of physicists or biologists would agree with.

Suppose that, as a news reporter, I decide that I will interview the "expected" survivor afterwards. Should I be surprised that I have someone to interview? And while he is probably shocked and elated, I find it rather ho-hum.

You would find it ho-hum that a firing squad of 100 marksmen missed a stationary target just a few feet away? :confused: Are you still in Hurben's cosmic ignorance mode?

Is it a miracle that I have interview footage to show? Of course not. And while the fact that any one prisoner survived is unusual, the fact that someone would survive is predictable

Are you now assuming multiple firing squads? That is the only way it would be predictable that an entire firing squad should miss the target.
 
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Or maybe it works by way of a species called the Tuner fish, which absorbs the randomly fluctuating universal variables in order to nourish itself, and excretes a set of perfectly balanced constants that make all life possible. After all, you can tune a piano, but you can't, you know...


“Now it is such a bizarrely improbable coincidence that anything so mindboggingly useful [as the Tuner fish] could have evolved purely by chance that some thinkers have chosen to see it as the final and clinching proof of the non-existence of God.

“The argument goes something like this: ‘I refuse to prove that I exist,’ says God, ‘for proof denies faith, and without faith I am nothing.’

“‘But,’ says Man, ‘The Tuner fish is a dead giveaway, isn’t it? It could not have evolved by chance. It proves you exist, and so therefore, by your own arguments, you don’t. QED.’

“‘Oh dear,’ says God, ‘I hadn’t thought of that,’ and promptly vanished in a puff of logic.
 
"But let us also suppose that the firing squad has the overwhelming task of executing a trillion and one prisoners, one after the other. In that case, no one would be surprised if one prisoner was not killed. (One could also modify this by considering N different firing squads firing at N different prisoners.)"

This is a reubttal to the firing squad analogy only if there are a gazillion actual universes.

Wrong. It's a rebuttal only if there are a gazillion potential universes.

Which you seem to agree there are.

You would find it ho-hum that a firing squad of 100 marksmen missed a stationary target just a few feet away?

If that was one target out of a gazillion.... yes.

Are you now assuming multiple firing squads?

No. Multiple potential targets.

That is the only way it would be predictable that an entire firing squad should miss the target.

Not at all.

So, once again, your argument (the firing squad) not only fails epically, but the refutation has already been published --- and you are forced to misreading in order to defend your argument.

How,... unsurprising, really.
 
Seems like there's a lot of double standards at work in the fine-tuning argument.

We're supposed to assume that every physical property of Existence was free to vary, except one: the number of universes (N).

We're told that the hypothesis that N>1 is against the evidence, because we've only observed one universe. But the fact that we've only observed one set of physical laws and constants is no obstacle to assuming that those laws and constants "could have" been different.

We're told that the possibility of a different form of life existing in a possible universe that could not support our kind of life is to be scoffed at, because we have no evidence of any other kind of life. But a complex intelligent being that is not only completely unlike the kinds of life we have observed, but in fact can exist outside of (or "prior to" or however you want to describe something that can exist independent of the universe) is a reasonable hypothesis.
 
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So my question, then, is really "what kind of a probability distribution can you produce from a single sample?"

It depends.

What probability distribution did you have before you saw any samples?

Then, just use Bayes's theorem.

(But this question, of the correct prior distribution when we 'have no information', is a difficult one, I think. If we 'have no information about X', don't we also 'have no information about X2'? But it's hard to give both the same prior. Which one should get the 'uninformative' prior?)

I disagree with Ivor the Engineer that a distribution with zero variance is at all reasonable after seeing one sample (or after seeing any finite number of samples, for that matter). (1) If we flip a coin once and get heads, are we then absolutely certain that every subsequent flip will also result in heads? Of course not. But that's what his position implies. (2) The only way to get that distribution after seeing a single flip is to be certain, before seeing any flips, that the coin is either two-headed or two-tailed. Perhaps it's hard to say exactly what an uninformative prior does look like, but it seems safe to say that it doesn't look like that. Before seeing any flips, surely we want at least to allow for the possibility that the coin sometimes lands heads and sometimes lands tails.
 
Seems like there's a lot of double standards at work in the fine-tuning argument.

We're supposed to assume that every physical property of Existence was free to vary, except one: the number of universes (N).

We're told that the hypothesis that N>1 is against the evidence, because we've only observed one universe. But the fact that we've only observed one set of physical laws and constants is no obstacle to assuming that those laws and constants "could have" been different.

We're told that the possibility of a different form of life existing in a possible universe that could not support our kind of life is to be scoffed at, because we have no evidence of any other kind of life. But a complex intelligent being that is not only completely unlike the kinds of life we have observed, but in fact can exist outside of (or "prior to" or however you want to describe something that can exist independent of the universe) is a reasonable hypothesis.
Malerin's entire line of argument, ranging from his Dualistic/Solipsistic "evidence is subjective" argument that was shreaded to this argument of fine tuning via fraudulent Bayesian statistics is the epitome of double standard.

His "god claim" is exempt from all the criticism he flings at all other hypotheses because his "god-claim" is so vague and so easily movable.
 
"A similar sort of response can be given to the claim that the fine-tuning is not improbable because it might be logically necessary for the constants of physics to have life-permitting values. That is, according to this claim, the constants of physics must have life-permitting values in the same way 2 + 2 must equal 4, or the interior angles of a triangle must add up to 180 degrees in Euclidian geometry. Like the "more fundamental law" proposal above, however, this postulate simply transfers the improbability up one level: of all the laws and constants of physics that conceivably could have been logically necessary, it seems highly improbable that it would be those that are life-permitting."

I don't know what it means to say that something which is not logically necessary could conceivably have been logically necessary, or vice versa.

Would you say that, although it is logically necessary that 2 + 2 = 4, it is conceivable that this fact might not have been logically necessary?

(But I do find it very hard to believe that it could be logically necessary for the laws of physics to permit life. "Nothing exists, and nothing ever did or will" certainly seems logically possible as the sole law of physics, and it doesn't permit life.)
 
It depends on how adapabtle life is. If life needs a fairly narrow range to get a foothold (the existence of stars, water, planets, heavy elements, etc.), then any universes that are lacking those features would have to be considered lifeless. Everything we know of biology tells us that life requires what I just mentioned (plus a lot more specific things).

From what we've been learning in the last 20 years, life is much more adaptive and robust than we once thought. In fact, the FT argument, as you've been stating it, fails to take into account much of what we've learned about organisms such as extremophiles and the like. If you'd asked an FT-proponent 20 years ago to define life as we know it (or knew it), he'd have been completely ignorant of extremophile lifeforms and he'd have argued in that vein. But as we discover that life is more and more robust, lives in areas we never thought possible before, and as our traditional views of life are broadened, those gaps in our knowledge start to shrink up. And when the gaps shrink, it leaves less and less room for the FT argument because the ambiguities in the argument are filled in with actual evidence.

And, I think you'll find, our entire notion of life could be changing again, very soon. There are many reasons to think that soon we'll create synthetic life, either in a lab beaker or in a computer network. But that is a topic for another thread.

So, you'll have to pardon me if I get a little tired of the life as we know it line of argumentation in favor of the FT argument. It is little more than an argument from ignorance.
 
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Malerin's entire line of argument, ranging from his Dualistic/Solipsistic "evidence is subjective" argument that was shreaded to this argument of fine tuning via fraudulent Bayesian statistics is the epitome of double standard.

I've learned that when people like Malerin make the "evidence is subjective" argument they usually mean "I'm right, because I say so."

His "god claim" is exempt from all the criticism he flings at all other hypotheses because his "god-claim" is so vague and so easily movable.

It's easy to win the game when you get to move the goalposts wherever you wish :rolleyes:
 
Wrong. It's a rebuttal only if there are a gazillion potential universes.

Which you seem to agree there are.



If that was one target out of a gazillion.... yes.



No. Multiple potential targets.



Not at all.

So, once again, your argument (the firing squad) not only fails epically, but the refutation has already been published --- and you are forced to misreading in order to defend your argument.

How,... unsurprising, really.

Actually, we're not that far in disagreement. Your claim is that there don't need to be other actual firing squads- just the belief in the possibility of other firing squads. I agree with you. If I thought it fairly possible that there were trillions of other prisoners like myself (but didn't know for sure), then I would not be so surprised to have survived. Maybe there were a bunch of other people being executed, and if that's case, someone's gonna surivive, given enough people being shot at.

This is why I say we're not in much disagreement: If PR(E/~H) is written
Pr(E/~H)k , and k = our background knowledge that the existence of the multiverse is NOT Pr(<<.5), then Pr(E/~H)k will lose it's "confirmation power". The FT argument will go nowhere.

Don't assume I'm wedded to this argument, and will twist things around just to make a point. I don't agree with most of the objections given so far (most have been attacking conditional probability, like RD), but I have admitted more than once that it will have almost no influence on a person who believes the existence of a multiverse is somewhat plausible. I've also admitted that any evidence for a multiverse (or cyclical universe) will kill the argument. I also see now the author's point that knowledge of actual firing squads is not required to make the firing squad analogy not work- the belief in other shootees would seem to be enough to make you not so surprised; the more you believe other executions are going on, the less surprised I think you would be to have survived your own.
 
It would be astonishing to learn that the physical constants are set in stone (as it were) at just the right levels to support life- that there is some cosmological principle that every possible universe that can emerge is life-permitting. The impossibility of life-less universes would be a far-stronger argument than the current FT argument.
So even if it wasn't improbable, then it would still be evidence for God?
I agree that the multiverse hypothesis is deadly to the FT argument.
I doubt it. The Discovery Institute are already publishing papers about how a multiverse would be fine tuned for life
 
Ah yes, I see that you have already cited the paper that has the multiverse fine-tuned for life:

One major theistic response to the many-universe generator scenario, whether of the inflationary variety or some other type, is that the "many_universes generator" itself seems to need to be "well_designed" in order to produce life-sustaining universes.
http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/finetune/anth.htm.htm

So it seems to me that Theists are claiming that it is evidence for God if there is a single Universe when there might have been many, and also if there is a single Universe when there could not have been many, and also if there is a Multiverse.

Basically then, every possible circumstance that can lead to human life will be claimed equally as evidence for God.

If so, then fine-tuning cannot be regarded as altering the probability of God existing.
 
<snip>

I disagree with Ivor the Engineer

What!? How dare you!:)

that a distribution with zero variance is at all reasonable after seeing one sample (or after seeing any finite number of samples, for that matter).

If you have only seen one sample how is it reasonable to assume the process which generated it has a variance greater than zero?

(1) If we flip a coin once and get heads, are we then absolutely certain that every subsequent flip will also result in heads? Of course not. But that's what his position implies.

In flipping a coin we are aware the process, at least in theory, allows for more than one outcome. I.e. 'flip' implies we already know there is more than one state in the underlying process which generates the samples. Note that more than one state in the underlying process does not imply more than one output value, since more than a single state could produce an output with the same value. But it does allow us to hypothesize that the other state(s) may produce an output which is different to the one we have observed.

(2) The only way to get that distribution after seeing a single flip is to be certain, before seeing any flips, that the coin is either two-headed or two-tailed. Perhaps it's hard to say exactly what an uninformative prior does look like, but it seems safe to say that it doesn't look like that. Before seeing any flips, surely we want at least to allow for the possibility that the coin sometimes lands heads and sometimes lands tails.

How many states does a universe generator have based on our current knowledge of universes?
 
My problem with the fine tuning argument is that it focuses on life in particular. Why?

Why not ask, "why is it that we live in a universe in which it's possible for iron-oxide to exist?", or comets? or black holes? or any of a million other things? Why do we just decide that god likes life, and then go from there?

It's as though I entered a room and said, "wow, why is it that that particular book is in that particular place on that particular shelf? The chances of that are xxx! Clearly there is a god and it loves that book!".
 
Basically then, every possible circumstance that can lead to human life will be claimed equally as evidence for God.

Yup, the ultimate in moving the goalposts. Translation: "We win the argument, no matter what." :rolleyes:

If so, then fine-tuning cannot be regarded as altering the probability of God existing.

Good point. Which would essentially make all of Malerin's arguments trivial.

My problem with the fine tuning argument is that it focuses on life in particular. Why?

An excellent point. Using this logic, I think one could reasonably argue that the universe was fine-tuned specifically for vacuum, since the vast majority of space is essentially empty, even down to and beyond the atomic level. Or perhaps the universe was fine-tuned for dark energy, which apparently makes up about 74% of our universe.

Why not ask, "why is it that we live in a universe in which it's possible for iron-oxide to exist?", or comets? or black holes? or any of a million other things? Why do we just decide that god likes life, and then go from there?

It's as though I entered a room and said, "wow, why is it that that particular book is in that particular place on that particular shelf? The chances of that are xxx! Clearly there is a god and it loves that book!".

If you want to stick to the whole life as we know it argument, you could say that the universe was fine-tuned for bacteria since bacteria outnumber us by many orders of magnitude. Of course, many theists who propose the FT argument say "life" but they are really implying "human life".

Observing how the FT argument is presented is an excellent way of noting the biases of those arguing in favor of it.
 
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Ah yes, I see that you have already cited the paper that has the multiverse fine-tuned for life:

http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/finetune/anth.htm.htm

So it seems to me that Theists are claiming that it is evidence for God if there is a single Universe when there might have been many, and also if there is a single Universe when there could not have been many, and also if there is a Multiverse.

Here's my favorite part of the Collins paper. In this paragraph (in the "Theistic Responses to Many-Universe Generator Scenario" section), Collins is making the argument that if there are multiple universes, then a mechanism for a "multiple-universe generator" must exist, presumably run by God...

... In sum, even if an inflationary/superstring many-universe generator exists, it along with the background laws and principles could be said to be an irreducibly complex system, to borrow a phrase from biochemist Michael Behe (1996), with just the right combination of laws and fields for the production of life_permitting universes: if one of the components were missing or different, such as Einstein's equation or the Pauli_exclusion principle, it is unlikely that any life_permitting universes could be produced. In the absence of alternative explanations, the existence of such an a system suggests design since it seems very unlikely that such a system would have just the right components by chance. Thus, it does not seem that one can escape the conclusion of design merely by hypothesizing some sort of many-universe generator. ...

So, in order to hand wave this argument, Collins is essentially referencing Behe's already defunct IC argument. Amazingly, Collins seems to be implying that the irreducible-complexity argument can be applied to everything - from the smallest cellular structures all the way up to the largest multiverse structure which we can possibly conceive!

And if everything is irreducibly complex, then by that logic we cannot dissect anything to learn more about it using naturalistic methods, right?

Epic fail.
 
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