Can theists be rational?

[JoeTheJuggler]

Premise: One of the following two postulates must be right.
Postulate 1: the probability of God existing is 1 in 1 million
Postulate 2: the probability of God not existing is .999.

And this is exactly the same as saying that one or the other of the postulates is a premise. Since both give a non-zero probability for the existence of God, we have the same problem.

And then of course, we haven't gotten into the second assumption--the one about the probability of God creating the universe. That one obviously assumes the existence of God. It obviously begs the question.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I have already pointed out (in each post which includes the formula I think at least) that these numbers are arbitrary and subject to GIGO.

And isn't this because it is circular?

 

[Malerin]

Joe, I already gave you an exmaple of how you can posit the possibility of something without making a claim about it's actual existence (leprechauns). I don't know how else to explain it to you, other than to tell you to get a copy of Choice and Chance.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Now that's just silly. We talk about all sorts of things that are made up without assuming that once the name is spoken someone is suggesting that the thing exists. If God does not exist, then it means that the subject of the religion does not exist.

Which means that the definition of God as the subject of the religion is not a definition.

It's sort of like pointing at something--there has to be something there to point at. IF I ask what do you mean by a "grfllzfup" and you say, "It's that" and point your finger at nothing, you have failed to define the term.

For "the subject of a religion" to be a definition that thing must exist.

Still, I think there's something useful in what you say. How about, "what the members of the religion say is the subject of their religion"?

That's where I'd whip out the Baltimore Catechism and prove the contradictions of the definition given.

No. I am making no assumptions about the subject other than that the idea exists. We are quite capable of recognizing that an idea can exist without the subject of the idea existing.

But what is the idea "the subject of a religion"? I think it's just pointing. If it points at nothing, then you've got no definition.

It's quite easy to recognize that there are two different questions there. "Is there a first cause?" and "Is that first cause God?" It may be initially framed in a way that begs the question, but it's easy to uncouple the two parts.

I agree it could, but usually in proponents of this definition of god usually don't separate them.
The Aquinas argument (which is the one I've run into in modern day deists) is that whatever is the first cause--that's what they mean by the term "God". They also argue that a first cause is necessary.

I have really tried to see if that their definition of God allows something like "a singularity" or "the initial conditions that led to the Big Bang", and they just insist that there must be another cause before that. (I'm sure they WANT that cause to be supernatural, but they refuse to say so.)

But finding examples of irrational gods doesn't necessarily tell you whether all gods are irrational. That is why I prefer a definition that is necessary and (hopefully) sufficient instead of one that simply lists a set of properties that are neither necessary nor sufficient. As we have seen, if you show one set of properties is internally inconsistent, the set is simply changed to something else, leaving the idea of God intact.

In my approach, I can disprove God definitions as they're offered (or professed in real life by the vast majority of believers in all other contexts except for logical debate), popping them off one by one. In your case, the definition they offer will always retreat into the gaps. I understand you can prove that God isn't necessary, but then the believers see it as a choice that is equally valid between saying "Goddidit" and "we don't know yet". If they've got the added baggage of the other characteristics of God, you can show that it's unreasonable to choose "Goddidit" over "we don't know yet". If you don't have that fleshed-out (so to speak!) definition, is there really any difference between "Goddidit" and "we don't know yet"? It's just an empty word that refers to nothing.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Agree absolutely. I am gradually working my way through and was thinking, now, when I get to the bottom of this page, I'll do a Quick Reply to JtheJ to say how I admire his posts.

In fact I have just e-mailed Simon (older son) to give him the link to this topic and mentioned particularly Jo the Juggler's posts to look out for, especially as he has decided to do an OU Philosophy course.

Aw shucks!

I'm a pretty smart and well read guy, but I have no background in philosophy at all.

Do you know of Jon Lanman? He's working on a thesis at Oxford on disbelief. He's here in St. Louis just now, but your son should probably meet him when he's back there.

Check out the sticky thread at the top of the Religion subforum. That's Jon. He's got a jref account (and it's somewhere in that thread), so you can contact him. Elsewise, PM me and I can pass along his e-mail address or give him Simon's.

He is REALLY knowledgeable on all this stuff!

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Joe, I already gave you an exmaple of how you can posit the possibility of something without making a claim about it's actual existence (leprechauns). I don't know how else to explain it to you, other than to tell you to get a copy of Choice and Chance.

And Malerin, I have already responded to you pointing out that saying something is possible is not the same as saying it must have a specific probability that you can do math with.

You could substitute Leprechauns into the argument cj posted everyplace you see the word "God" and the argument works the same. So if it is a rational argument that God exists it is also a rational argument that Leprechauns exist.

That's what is meant by a "validating argument".

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

@ Linda:

Catholics say that the subject of their religion is God as described here:

2. Who is God?

God is the Supreme Being, infinitely perfect, who made all things and keeps them in existence.

In him we live and move and have our being. (Ac 17,28)

<snip>

8. What do we mean when we say that God is the Supreme Being?

When we say that God is the Supreme Being we mean that He is above all creatures, the self-existing and infinitely perfect Spirit.

I am the First, and I am the Last, and besides me there is no God. (Is 44,6)

<snip>

10. What do we mean when we say that God is self-existing?

When we say that God is self-existing we mean that He does not owe His existence to any other being.

I am who am. (Ex 3,14)

11. What do we mean when we say that God is infinitely perfect?

When we say that God is infinitely perfect we mean that He has all perfections without limit.

Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised; and of his greatness there is no end. (Ps 144,3)

12. What are some of the perfections of God?

Some of the perfections of God are: God is eternal, all-good, all-knowing, all-present, and almighty.

I think that their religion is based instead on stories, myths and legends (i.e. nothing).

So when you say that the definition of God (for purposes of discussing whether God exists) is the subject of a religion, do we use my meaning or their meaning?

If we use their meaning, does that mean we're assuming that supreme being is the actual subject of their religion and that therefore God exists? If we use my meaning, it's obvious that that definition of God isn't what people mean when they use the term.

At any rate, using their definition--what they say is the subject of their religion is sort of what I've been saying I prefer.

 

[ponderingturtle]

Exactly, and they don't get the 6 in the 1:6 probability by rolling it 6 times.

At any rate, it's irrelevant to the point.

No the idea that probabilities need to be distributed evenly between all possible outcomes is a common mistake in understanding probability

 

[fls]

But what is the idea "the subject of a religion"? I think it's just pointing. If it points at nothing, then you've got no definition.

Is there a religion with a god that does nothing?

I agree it could, but usually in proponents of this definition of god usually don't separate them.
The Aquinas argument (which is the one I've run into in modern day deists) is that whatever is the first cause--that's what they mean by the term "God". They also argue that a first cause is necessary.

I have really tried to see if that their definition of God allows something like "a singularity" or "the initial conditions that led to the Big Bang", and they just insist that there must be another cause before that. (I'm sure they WANT that cause to be supernatural, but they refuse to say so.)

Right, they don't want your cause because it would be lawful.

In my approach, I can disprove God definitions as they're offered (or professed in real life by the vast majority of believers in all other contexts except for logical debate), popping them off one by one.

And if that works, then that's a good idea. Mine is meant to be more of an end run (you can tell what I'm watching today ).

In your case, the definition they offer will always retreat into the gaps. I understand you can prove that God isn't necessary, but then the believers see it as a choice that is equally valid between saying "Goddidit" and "we don't know yet". If they've got the added baggage of the other characteristics of God, you can show that it's unreasonable to choose "Goddidit" over "we don't know yet". If you don't have that fleshed-out (so to speak!) definition, is there really any difference between "Goddidit" and "we don't know yet"? It's just an empty word that refers to nothing.

I suspect that any way you play it, a retreat can be made if that is what is desired.

Linda

 

[fls]

At any rate, using their definition--what they say is the subject of their religion is sort of what I've been saying I prefer.

That works for me since it's what I meant.

Linda

 

[Bri]

The existence of "desertclouds" assumes the existence of rainclouds.

That's not true. The existence of desertclouds does not assume the existence of rainclouds. How silly. Desertclouds are raincloud-like but are NOT rainclouds.

If your analogy is not about the existence of rainclouds, it's not a legitimate analogy. If you state a probability of rainclouds occuring in the desert, you are assuming the existence of rainclouds and any conclusion you make about the existence of rainclouds would be circular.

No, I'm talking about a never-before-seen atmospheric phenomenon whereby it rains in that particular desert. It's not a raincloud, it's a desertcloud. It's raincloud-like only in the fact that it produces rain, but unlike a raincloud it exists in a particular desert in which it has never rained.

The thing about the problem of the existence of God is it's simply a matter of existence, not God occurring in some place or another.

Exactly, as with desertclouds -- it's simply a matter of existence. Desertclouds have never existed before ever, but because of the affects of global warming, there is a 0.0001% probability that they will exist in the next decade. Does my statement assume that desertclouds exist?

-Bri

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

That's not true. The existence of desertclouds does not assume the existence of rainclouds. How silly. Desertclouds are raincloud-like but are NOT rainclouds.

No, I'm talking about a never-before-seen atmospheric phenomenon whereby it rains in that particular desert. It's not a raincloud, it's a desertcloud. It's raincloud-like only in the fact that it produces rain, but unlike a raincloud it exists in a particular desert in which it has never rained.

The definition of the neologism "desertcloud" from the Gospel According to Bri:

-- it's about rainclouds in that particular desert. Let's call them "desertclouds."

"Desertclouds" are here defined as "rainclouds in that particular desert".

Yes, giving a 1:1,000,000 probability of desertclouds assumes that rainclouds exist. If the argument is not about the existence of rainclouds (see below) it is not analogous to the argument for God's existence.

Desertclouds have never existed before ever, but because of the affects of global warming, there is a 0.0001% probability that they will exist in the next decade. Does my statement assume that desertclouds exist?

To make this analogy work, you'd have to be talking about an argument for the future existence of God and not for the existence of God.

FWIW, most definitions of "God" include the property "eternal", so if there is no God now there will be no God in the future. It's pretty much the same as talking about the probability of God in a particular place--you just shifted to a particular (i.e. limited) time.

The thing is, the question is about whether God exists.

ETA: To make this argument analogous:

I concede that God does not exist now. God has never existed before ever, but for some reason I dreamed up, there is a 0.0001% probability that God will exist in the next decade. Does my statement assume that God exists?

No. This fragment of an argument(?) concedes right off that God does not exist. There's no way you can possibly start from the premise that God does not exist and get to a conclusion that God exists, since it is a flat out contradiction.

I don't know what to make of the statement about there being some probability that God may exist in the next decade. To me it just sounds inconsistent with God as an eternal being.

 

[Bri]

I changed my example for you, so desertclouds are raincloud-like but they're not rainclouds. Now answer the question, please. Am I assuming that desertclouds exist?

If you don't like that example, how about this one. I have examined the genetics of two types of birds, the Red Curlew and the Blue Hearin and I believe that they can breed. Even though it's never been tried before, I have reason to believe that there is a 25% chance that this will produce a new type of bird which I am going to call the Purple Puffing. Am I assuming that a Purple Puffing exists?

To make this analogy work, you'd have to be talking about an argument for the future existence of God and not for the existence of God.

FWIW, most definitions of "God" include the property "eternal", so if there is no God now there will be no God in the future. It's pretty much the same as talking about the probability of God in a particular place--you just shifted to a particular (i.e. limited) time.

A god need not be eternal, nor does the original argument posed by cj depend on gods being eternal. The only thing necessary about the god in the original argument was that the existence of the god increases the chances of an inhabitable universe.

You also said in a previous post that if you replace "leprechauns" in the argument it would also assume the existence of leprechauns. Are you now saying that leprechauns must be eternal as well?

ETA: How about this example: There are two types of birds in Malaysia known as the Red Curlew and the Blue Hearin which I believe may be able to inter-breed. Therefore, there is a 5% probability that a third type of bird (the offspring of the other two) exists in Malaysia, which I shall call the Purple Puffing. Does that statement assume that the Purple Puffing actually exists, or just that it might exist?

-Bri

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

@ Linda:

What do you make of this sort of "definition":

That's not true. The existence of desertclouds does not assume the existen It's not a raincloud, it's a desertcloud. It's raincloud-like only in the fact that it produces rain, but unlike a raincloud it exists in a particular desert in which it has never rained.

So a "desertcloud" --even though it fits all the necessary and sufficient characteristics of the class "raincloud"--is not a raincloud.

If a raincloud appears in this particular desert, we deny that it is a raincloud (for no particular reason) but claim it belongs to another class which has the identical characteristics as raincloud and the added charcteristic of "in this location".

(Interesting thought--what if a raincloud formed outside the desert, then blew into the desert? Does it start out as a raincloud then instantaneously cease existing just as a desertcloud instantaneously reappears in its place?)

Just like the consecrated host is no longer bread, but it retains all the accidents of bread.

This sort of thing is merely an abuse of language, IMHO.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I changed my example for you, so desertclouds are raincloud-like but they're not rainclouds. Now answer the question, please. Am I assuming that desertclouds exist?

Well, except that they are rainclouds, and you are assuming rainclouds exist. See my replies above.

If you don't like that example, how about this one. I have examined the genetics of two types of birds, the Red Curlew and the Blue Hearin and I believe that they can breed. Even though it's never been tried before, I have reason to believe that there is a 25% chance that this will produce a new type of bird which I am going to call the Purple Puffing. Am I assuming that a Purple Puffing exists?

I imagine you're just pulling the 25% figure out of thin air. If not, where did it come from? What does it mean?

A god need not be eternal, nor does the original argument posed by cj depend on gods being eternal. The only thing necessary about the god in the original argument was that the existence of the god increases the chances of an inhabitable universe.

OK--if a god is not eternal, let's examine the beginning of your argument.

You concede that god does not now exist and never has in the past. Again, I have no idea what it means then to say that there is a 1 in 1 million probability that god will exist in the next decade. (Can you tell me what it means? What do the numbers correspond to?) At any rate, it doesn't matter, because any way that you start from the premise that god does not exist and get to the conclusion that god exists has to be illogical.

You also said in a previous post that if you replace "leprechauns" in the argument it would also assume the existence of leprechauns. Are you now saying that leprechauns must be eternal as well?

Nope. Why do you ask?

I'm pointing out that it's a validating argument. You can plug in anything where "God" is and get the same result for the existence of that thing. The fact that you resist defining the term God makes this more of an issue. Why believe in God and not leprechauns? Why worship God and not invisible pink unicorns? This argument does nothing to distinguish among these undefined concepts.

 

[Bri]

So a "desertcloud" --even though it fits all the necessary and sufficient characteristics of the class "raincloud"--is not a raincloud.

No, the desertcloud isn't a raincloud and doesn't fit the necessary and sufficient characteristics of a raincloud (which don't exist in this particular desert). The desertcloud takes on a completely different shape than a raincloud (it's shaped more like an inverted funnel cloud) and is formed completely differently than a raincloud. Really the only similarity between the desertcloud and the common raincloud is that they both produce precipitation.

ETA: I added this to my post above, in case you may have missed it. This example deals with the prior existence of something (which seems to be the problem you have with god being eternal):

There are two types of birds in Malaysia known as the Red Curlew and the Blue Hearin which I believe may be able to inter-breed. Therefore, there is a 5% probability that a third type of bird (the offspring of the other two) exists in Malaysia, which I shall call the Purple Puffing. Does that statement assume that the Purple Puffing actually exists, or just that it might exist?

-Bri

 

[articulett]

You are talking about things that we can hypothesize about because they are known to exist--birds and hybrids...

not invisible undetectable forms of consciousness! It's like saying I might be able to roll 3 sixes in a row. God is like claiming you might be able to roll a zero... it's the same as saying "invisible pink unicorns" have a probability of existing!

Your semantics to prove your gods always goes into these bizarre realms. Consciousness without a brain is like sound in a vacuum-- nothing BUT conjecture. There is NOTHING measurable to base it on. We have no basis for even speculating on probabilities of such because they are impossibilities... like rolling a zero. Sure you can play semantic games about how some dices have zero or a part of the 6 could rub off so it looks like zero... but come on!

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

No, the desertcloud isn't a raincloud and doesn't fit the necessary and sufficient characteristics of a raincloud (which don't exist in this particular desert). The desertcloud takes on a completely different shape than a raincloud (it's shaped more like an inverted funnel cloud) and is formed completely differently than a raincloud. Really the only similarity between the desertcloud and the common raincloud is that they both produce precipitation.

And they're made out of water, and they're an atmospheric phenomenon, etc. In fact, they're the same thing. (What about a raincloud that forms outside of the desert and blows into it? You know many clouds do exactly that.)

What you're trying to do here is like saying I will define my5 as a number that is like 5 in all other ways except that my5 only occurs on my laptop and nowhere else. It's really just 5.

There are two types of birds in Malaysia known as the Red Curlew and the Blue Hearin which I believe may be able to inter-breed. Therefore, there is a 5% probability that a third type of bird (the offspring of the other two) exists in Malaysia, which I shall call the Purple Puffing. Does that statement assume that the Purple Puffing actually exists, or just that it might exist?

The part I highlighted simply doesn't follow. You used "therefore" as if it follows from the previous statements, yet it doesn't.

I have no idea what you're assuming if you can't tell me where you got the 5%.

There's no logical connection between "I believe x" and "there is a 5% probability that x is true".

Ever watch Texas Hold 'em on TV? Do you see those percentages they give for each player's chance of winning? Do you know how those are figured?

For each hand, you figure out what cards yet to come would give you the winning hand (these are your "outs"). Then you figure out how many outs there are in the deck and how many total cards are left in the deck. The reason you can do this is because you know what cards exist in the deck. You simply take the number of successful outcome (outs) as a ratio to the total number of possible outcomes (remaining cards in the deck).

If your only out is the King of Clubs, and you're playing with a 51 card deck that has no King of Clubs, you can't win. If you have no idea if you're playing with a deck that has a King of Clubs or not, you cannot say what that hand's probability of winning is, because you don't know if the out (the successful outcome) even exists. If you assume a probability, you are assuming the existence of that card.

If the question is, "does the King of Clubs exist?" it's not legit to start by assuming this hand has some numerical probability of winning, and then infer that the King of Clubs exists. The logic is sound enough:

Question: Does the King of Clubs exist (that is, in this deck)? (this is not known--maybe because your kids were building card houses with the deck, and some cards may have ended up missing and you didn't count the cards before you started playing)
Premise: I have a hand that will win if the King of Clubs is dealt from this deck
Premise: I have a 1 in 42 chance of winning this hand
Conclusion: the King of Clubs must exist (be in the deck).


But you're assuming the conclusion, so it is circular. The assumption may be hidden--it's not stated as "I assume the King of Clubs exists in this deck", but it's there in the second premise.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

No the idea that probabilities need to be distributed evenly between all possible outcomes is a common mistake in understanding probability

I agree, but it hasn't entered as a problem in the argument we're discussing.

Again, when we say the probability of getting a 3 on a normal, fair die is 1:6, the six does not come from rolling the die 6 times and getting a 3 once. It comes from there being 6 equally likely possible outcomes and one possible successful outcome.

The fact that we assume a fair die really isn't the problem.

The 1:6 probability may be used predictively to say we expect one 3 in 6 rolls, but if we don't get that outcome, we don't change the probability. It's 1:6 because there is one possible successful outcome and 6 total (equally likely) possible outcomes.

Again, switch this over to using 6 cards and choosing one of them at random. The fact that someone can cheat and make that choice not random is already covered by assuming that is not the case. The 1:6 possibility of choosing a target card comes from there being 1 target card and 6 total cards that you are randomly choosing from. It does not come from choosing cards randomly 6 times and seeing how many times you get the target card.

The only time the problem you're talking about popped up in this thread (that I recall) is when someone (Malerin, I think) said that 1 in 1 million is generous since he thinks the real probability of God's existence is 1 in 2. For criticism of the argument cj posted, it doesn't matter to me if you put 1 in 2 or 1 in 5 trillion. It's still making an assumption of the conclusion.

 

[Bri]

The part I highlighted simply doesn't follow. You used "therefore" as if it follows from the previous statements, yet it doesn't.

Remove the word "therefore" if you like.

I have no idea what you're assuming if you can't tell me where you got the 5%.

The fact that I didn't specify how I calculated the 5% probability is irrelevant. You are free to reject the premise if you like, but that's not the point.

There's no logical connection between "I believe x" and "there is a 5% probability that x is true".

Again, irrelevant. The premise is that there is a 5% probability. Let's say it was calculated by examining the genes of the birds, and that there is a 5% probability that the two types of birds can inter-breed. Remove the "I believe" if you like, you're still just objecting to the premise. The question is whether the statement assumes the existence of the Purple Puffing. Does it?

-Bri