Idealists: What does 'physical' mean to you?

[Nick227]

We said it wasn't counter-intuitive for us. I dunno about pixy, but I am an A.I. programmer. I come up with algorithms to perform human cognitive tasks for a living. So of course a computational model of consciousness isn't that farfetched for me.

Then how do you get around the issue of selfhood, of subjectivity, of the fact that life appears to be happening to someone? How do you recreate this in your computational modelling?

Dennett says that if your theory isn't counter-intuitive it's wrong, and I think he's spot on correct with this.

Even if you are right about that ... so what? Isn't a reformed opinion an implicit admission of prior error?

I don't find it so straight. I mean, it's a drag for my pride to have to admit it when I'm wrong, but I like to do it when I find I learn more through honesty. I find your position hazy, which is ok but then you don't say this. Even in this thread it's like one minute you agree the models must be counter-intuitive and then you don't. For me you don't get to the real issue and if you feel like I'm pushing you there then I become a trouble-maker and you hide behind some judgement or something. This is how it seems to me.

OK Nick, lets play this game again.

You ask for consistent definition of "I" or "self."

I respond with "the entity typing this sentence."

Refresh my memory -- what was your response to that definition? I remember it being some nonsense along the lines of me not fully understanding what "entity" and "typing" and "sentence" were, because "they are all just processes." Am I incorrect? I mean, is 'the entity typing this sentence' incorrect?

I don't recall the exact exchange, but it doesn't sound like something I'd write. Sounds more like Pixy to be honest. He's the one wanting to make personal pronouns into gerunds.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

You are the annoying soul who is trying to blur everything into uselessness.

You have made utterly useless arguments, such as an assertion that it is impossible to distinguish between material processes.

Have I? Are you sure? Doesn't sound like the sort of thing I'd say.

You have, among other things, asserted that there is no "self" despite the fact (which we have pointed out to you) that the entire field of computer science relies upon the notion of "self."

Well, I've said that the narrative or psychological self, to use Dennett's term, has no material referent. It's analogous to a centre of gravity.

It seems to me your true goal is the complete obfuscation of computer and cognitive science via the denial of agreed upon definitions.

What is the agreed upon definition of self in these disciplines then? Does it match what we know about the human notion of self?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Intuition is learned as much as it is genetic.

Unless you are telling me that my intuition about, say, algorithm optimisations is encoded in the 17th chromosome?

I'm saying that the notion of self the overwhelming majority of humans have is created by their brain and that it is inevitably inconsistent with a materialist reality. How it seems cannot be how it is. This to me is Dennett's point.

Severe mental illness aside, you will believe that you are an individual experiencing a world of objects, thoughts and feelings.

No.

So you don't believe yourself to be an individual experiencing a world? Fair enough. I stand corrected.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

You haven't bothered to read a single post by anyone, ever, have you?

Because if you had, you would know that the entirety of human history is evidence for this.

The entirety of human history is evidence that there is no aspect of thinking which is not material? How so?

I find your statements get more and more extreme as you are backed into a corner.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

You have evidence of thinking that does not require a thinker? I'd love to hear about it.

To me thinking should not of necessity require a coherent entity in order for it to exist. This is what I meant.

I'm afraid I don't understand. You haven't seen much evidence that if you stimulate nervous tissue in a particular way, you see a particular type of mental activity? Nor the fact that when the brain is shut off that thinking stops?

I meant an explanation for how thinking comes to be experienced in the manner that it is, usually that of an inner voice telling a narrative. This I do not understand in material terms.

As to how thinking translates into physicality, I think you'd better be a little more specific. What precisely do you mean? How thinking can result in physical action? How detailed an explanation do you want?

Well, I'd be happy to hear any materialist explanation. Maybe I can or maybe I can't understand it. How does neuronal activity translate into physical action and does this imply thinking is epiphenomenal or is it purely material and causative?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Look at it this way. A thinking entity needs the following:

Input - sensory data of some sort
Memory - the ability to memorise past input and output, and hence to learn
Logic - the ability to make decisions based on a mixture of input and memory
Output - some way of interacting with the world

I call this simple creature (which can be simulated with about 50 transistors) aware, but not self-aware. Dennett describes a thermostat as conscious, but I describ it as merely aware.

To be conscious, one must also be aware of oneself. That is, you need feedback from the logic circuits to themselves. Now we're looking at maybe 100 transistors.

This creature (or circuit) can think and feel and act and learn, and it can reflect on the process by which it does this. Not very much, mind you; it only has about 8 bits of memory, total. But it can do it.

We have a whole bunch more RAM and logic circuits, but self-reference is what makes us different from, say, a clock.

OK, how do you make it see? And then how do you create in it the experience that it is seeing?

Nick

 

[HypnoPsi]

You just contradicted yourself.

How so? That phenomenal objects (or neumena, if you prefer) continue to exist unobserved does not mean there exists any type of substance. Why would it?

~
HypnoPsi

 

[HypnoPsi]

No he didn´t. Objects do not equal substance.

Correct. And thank you.

~
HypnoPsi

 

[HypnoPsi]

Consciousness comes from living brains similar to the way music comes from instruments.

Do you agree with Daniel Dennett that thermostats have beliefs about "too hot", "too cold" and "just right"?

If yes - why?

If no - why?

~
HypnoPsi

 

[HypnoPsi]

Is music "substance"? Why do you think consciousness demands a more "metaphysical" explanation than music?

For myself, it's because I accept the evidence (e.g. from the Ganzfeld and starting experiments, etc.,) that a low level of psi ability exists in humans.

I've never seen even the slightest hint of evidence that cellular activity generates consciousness.

It's about evidence and nothing more.

~
HypnoPsi

 

[HypnoPsi]

I am an A.I. programmer. I come up with algorithms to perform human cognitive tasks for a living. So of course a computational model of consciousness isn't that farfetched for me.

But how do you know you're modelling consciousness?

Would your program be conscious if you printed it out on a piece of paper? Why so? Why not so?

Do you think that having it on a hard disk and having an electric current pass though the computer matters somehow? If so, why?

Do you agree with Daniel Dennett about thermostats having beliefs about too hot, too cold and just right?

What if it's a mechanical thermostat rather than an electric thermostat?

~
HypnoPsi

 

[Nick227]

For myself, it's because I accept the evidence (e.g. from the Ganzfeld and starting experiments, etc.,) that a low level of psi ability exists in humans.

I've never seen even the slightest hint of evidence that cellular activity generates consciousness.

It's about evidence and nothing more.

~
HypnoPsi

Come on now, HP! That's a bit extreme. I mean if we interfere with cellular activity then consciousness is qualitatively affected. This is well accepted. I think you have to be careful not to "mythologise" consciousness into something which will "just never be understood."

Nick

 

[plumjam]

Sounds like you are describing ego loss. You can get that with 250 micrograms of LSD, transcranial magnetic stimulation of the temporal lobe, fasting, oxygen starvation, the list goes on.

That ego loss can happen (and yes, I have experienced it) is one thing, merging with a so-called Universal Consciousness is another. Is there any evidence beyond self-reported experiences (usually regarding states where you are not capable of critically analyzing your mental state with any degree of rationality) for a Universal Consciousness that goes beyond simple ego loss?

Ego loss is not the same as ego transcendence. The ego exists as an organisational nexus within a certain level of the development of individualised mind. It is there to bring experience together in order to allow for intelligent analysis, reflection, planning, creativity and the like.
Mental asylums are full of people who have, for one reason or another, suffered ego loss. They no longer have the ability to intelligently organise, analyse, reflect, or plan upon their variegated experiences. In short, they have somewhat regressed to an animal experience of the world.
In contrast ego transcendence allows for the ´individual´ to merge into Universal Consciousness, yet when they ´return´ their prior ego is still intact in an operational sense. So for example they will still retain their previous tastes in food, music, their same habits of gesture, language, temperament etc. If you read the teachings of someone like Ramana Maharshi it´s clear that his ´centre´ remains in The Self (the Divine), while his ego/body centre goes on operating, as it were, automatically.

Well, how does the (non-individual) Universal Consciousness work? Please keep your explanation consistent with what we already know about the reality we inhabit, please.

With your second sentence you are, perhaps unwittingly, rendering the question unanswerable. It´s like asking an ant to explain how a mainframe computer works, while keeping your explanation consistent with what we already know about the reality we inhabit, please.
You are also making the mechanistic assumption that everything in existence has to bow to the rationale of ¨well, how does it work?¨. This makes the assumption that there have to be interrelated parts, cogs, wheels etc..
If Universal Consciousness is the fundamental nature of reality, questions as to how it works would not be valid. Just as if ´matter´was the fundamental nature of reality it would be pointless to ask how matter worked. Matter would just BE.

Bull. Losing your narrative center of gravity is an interesting experience, but there is no reason to think it is not explainable from a materialist (or any equivalent monisim) perspective, or that it involves group consciousness. .

You are making another assumption, which is that tripping on drugs, or the like, is the same thing as true ego transcendence. That is not the case, and is illustrated by the fact that so many trippers have ended up in asylums, regressed somewhat to animalistic consciousness.

You lose your I for awhile, but it always comes back unless you die

You were lucky enough that up till now your ego came back. So it always came back for you, so far. That´s all you can say. And do you have recollection of dying before in order to substantiate your last claim?

 

[rocketdodger]

And the findings, ultimately, are only known via subjective perception. Which is what makes the whole proposition self-undermining.

No.

They are known ultimately via objective perception. There is quite a difference.

It is much harder to be wrong about objective perceptions. For instance, if you see a rock in front of you, it is possible to confirm that sight perception by going up and feeling the rock with your hands. Then if you still aren't convinced you can weigh the rock, or break it apart, or perform any number of analytical tests to make sure this perception of a rock was correct.

You can't do that with subjective perceptions I.E. perceptions of the self. If you feel hungry, you might be hungry. But you might also have some kind of disorder that makes you feel hungry when your body doesn't need food at all. You might be taking a medication that causes such a side effect. There are any number of ways you could be tricked because there is no easy way to confirm your subjective perception.

But you know what plumjam, lets just assume you are right. You are wrong, clearly, but lets pretend otherwise. What now? If the results of such studies are "self-undermining," as you claim, then what? Are we to stick our head in the sand and pretend we didn't see what happened?

 

[HypnoPsi]

My point was that there are known examples of decisions that an individual would insist were conscious yet are provably not.

Heck, if that's all you're looking for then I can point you to decades of research in advertising and chuck in a few points from schema theory for good measure.

When you go to see a movie, if the foyer is plastered with adverts for Coke or Pepsi on any given day that will probably be the drink that more people on average choose to buy.

What you seem to be missing is that the choice to actually buy a drink (or move a hand) is still the subject's even if they are being influenced into choosing Coke or Pepsi (or to move one hand in particular).

None of this surprises me or really says very much about free will that most people wouldn't already suspect.

99% of the time people are simply working on autopilot allocating more mental effort to decisions that are more important.

If someone has just been paid and walks into a store and sees lots of great clothes and stuff all neatly displayed with cool poster adverts all over the place they'll quite possibly come out with a few things. If it's the end of the month and they've only got enough cash in their pocket for the bus fare home then they'll probably not treat themselves.

And this fact leads to the conclusion one cannot fully trust whatever faculty leads a human to claim a decision was consciously made -- because we have instances where that faculty is wrong.

Of course, but so what? The fact that we rarely choose to excercise a great deal of free will with mundane tasks can hardly be said to demonstrate that free will is an illusion.

~
HypnoPsi

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

How so? That phenomenal objects (or neumena, if you prefer) continue to exist unobserved does not mean there exists any type of substance. Why would it?

It depends entirely on your definition of substance. The important point is that you have to explain how these substantive objects continue to exist, which requires something over and above personal consciousness, the only thing for which you have direct evidence.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Of course, but so what? The fact that we rarely choose to excercise a great deal of free will with mundane tasks can hardly be said to demonstrate that free will is an illusion.

I agree. Libertarian free will is an incoherent concept from the get-go.

~~ Paul

 

[rocketdodger]

Then how do you get around the issue of selfhood, of subjectivity, of the fact that life appears to be happening to someone? How do you recreate this in your computational modelling?

Dennett says that if your theory isn't counter-intuitive it's wrong, and I think he's spot on correct with this.

Man... we have been over this ... over and over... in other threads.

Once more: subjectivity is simply identity. Subjectivity is what it is like to be.

Why is human experience like human experience, and not dog experience? Well, that is more along the lines of what Dennet speaks about, and maybe what you are interested in. And I don't disagree with any of Dennet's conjectures on this matter -- they just don't interest me as much as other stuff right now.

I don't recall the exact exchange, but it doesn't sound like something I'd write. Sounds more like Pixy to be honest. He's the one wanting to make personal pronouns into gerunds.

Well, that is how the exchange went. We can start it all over if you would like.

I define "I" as "the entity typing this sentence."

Do you find that acceptable or unacceptable as a definition of "I?"

 

[rocketdodger]

Have I? Are you sure? Doesn't sound like the sort of thing I'd say.

Yes, I am sure. It was in the context of "self" vs. "non-self." You constantly ask 'who defines self vs. non-self?' We give you logically coherent answers, such as pixy saying 'physics -- if you stub your toe, it is you and not your neighbor who cries out in pain.'

And your responses are similar to what I stated -- that without a "self" somewhere to perceive a difference between you and your neighbor, both of you are simply a process. A response like that implies that there is no way to differentiate between you and your neighbor if there is no "self" to do it. Which is nonsense and doesn't in any way refute pixy's answer to your riddle.

Well, I've said that the narrative or psychological self, to use Dennett's term, has no material referent. It's analogous to a centre of gravity.

Yes, and I responded with "I" is "the entity typing this sentence."

Your counter is that this isn't what people normally mean when they use "I." How do you know what people normally mean? What else could they mean?

What is the agreed upon definition of self in these disciplines then? Does it match what we know about the human notion of self?

Yes. Self is a reference to entity X used by entity X. Like humans, no matter how lost an entity becomes in the sea of information, it can always fall back on self.

Your argument is that there in fact is no self for humans. That is nonsense. It just happens to be very complicated -- but it still exists. If it didn't exist, we wouldn't be able to use it.

 

[Nick227]

Man... we have been over this ... over and over... in other threads.

Once more: subjectivity is simply identity. Subjectivity is what it is like to be.

Why is human experience like human experience, and not dog experience? Well, that is more along the lines of what Dennet speaks about, and maybe what you are interested in. And I don't disagree with any of Dennet's conjectures on this matter -- they just don't interest me as much as other stuff right now.

I am not asking what is it that differentiates experiences, rather what is it that creates the whole notion of experience? What makes it appear that I am experiencing this room around me, as opposed to their being simply a room and a body?

We can make some inroads into answering questions of this nature, but inevitably it gets counter-intuitive, and that is what I have been saying.

Well, that is how the exchange went. We can start it all over if you would like.

I define "I" as "the entity typing this sentence."

Do you find that acceptable or unacceptable as a definition of "I?"

Well, I don't feel especially drawn into the subject, but since you bring it up...I would ask you how you would reduce the statement "I define I as..." to a more coherent proposition. What is it that is defining this "I?" Simply stating "I am" does not appear to me to be very useful.

Nick