Malerin, what difference? Immaterialism is Moot

[athon]

But they're not the same thing. One can be turned into the other, but that is like saying ice and steam are the same thing, or a lump of coal is the same thing as a diamond. If they were the same thing, we wouldn't have bothered labelling them with different words.

Energy is like the currency of the universe - it is a way of describing the amount of work being observed within a system. Matter, on the other hand, is a more precise unit of that work. So, to form an analogy, if matter is a given unit of currency, energy would be the value of that currency. They can be seen as the same thing (I have a five dollar note, worth five dollars), while the different terms allow a comparison of contexts (I have a five dollar note, which can be exchanged for a two dollar coin in another country's currency).

I always find it odd that people happily speak of 'the mind' in a metaphysical way, but rarely translate the same features to a computer.

I can watch a program, such as a computer game, run on my screen. Yet that pattern of moving pixels doesn't really exist anywhere, except as a code mediated by logic gates. The pattern which drives what I observe isn't thought to exist on some other plane, as it's a simple pattern of electrons moving about that creates the images, movement, intelligence etc. of my computer game. Why must the mind be any different in principle?

Athon

 

[AkuManiMani]

Another way to look at it is that the sum includes the relationships of the parts to one another, and not the parts themselves.

If you refuse to recognize this, then you're not addressing reductionism, you're attacking a strawman.

[...]

Holism is nonsense.

[...]

[Reductionism and Holism are] Complementary in the way that "true" and "false" are complementary.

Like I said, they aren't so much contradictory views as perspectives of reality. I'll present formal definitions of both.

Holism (from ὅλος holos, a Greek word meaning all, entire, total) is the idea that all the properties of a given system (biological, chemical, social, economic, mental, linguistic, etc.) cannot be determined or explained by its component parts alone. Instead, the system as a whole determines in an important way how the parts behave.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holism

Reductionism can either mean (a) an approach to understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to the interactions of their parts, or to simpler or more fundamental things or (b) a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituents.[1] This can be said of objects, phenomena, explanations, theories, and meanings.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductionism

In reductionism, the focus is on parts, holism is focusing on the whole. I suppose a more clear analogy is that one looks 'downward' in levels of organization and the other looks 'upward'.

Earlier today I stumbled across a wiki article discussing the concept of holons that pretty much describes exactly what I've been trying to say for a while, but worded a bit differently.

[I didn't realize the concepts I've been considering have already been explored and formalized. Ah well, I guess there really isn't anything new under the sun.]

Anywho:

A holon is a system (or phenomenon) that is a whole in itself as well as a part of a larger system. It can be conceived as systems nested within each other. Every system can be considered a holon, from a subatomic particle to the universe as a whole. On a non-physical level, words, ideas, sounds, emotions—everything that can be identified—is simultaneously part of something, and can be viewed as having parts of its own, similar to sign in regard of semiotics.

Since a holon is embedded in larger wholes, it is influenced by and influences these larger wholes. And since a holon also contains subsystems, or parts, it is similarly influenced by and influences these parts. Information flows bidirectionally between smaller and larger systems as well as rhizomatic contagion. When this bidirectionality of information flow and understanding of role is compromised, for whatever reason, the system begins to break down: wholes no longer recognize their dependence on their subsidiary parts, and parts no longer recognize the organizing authority of the wholes. Cancer may be understood as such a breakdown in the biological realm.

A hierarchy of holons is called a holarchy. The holarchic model can be seen as an attempt to modify and modernise perceptions of natural hierarchy.

Ken Wilber comments that the test of holon hierarchy (e.g. holarchy) is that if a type of holon is removed from existence, then all other holons of which it formed a part must necessarily cease to exist too. Thus an atom is of a lower standing in the hierarchy than a molecule, because if you removed all molecules, atoms could still exist, whereas if you removed all atoms, molecules, in a strict sense would cease to exist. Wilber's concept is known as the doctrine of the fundamental and the significant. A hydrogen atom is more fundamental than an ant, but an ant is more significant.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holons

So, in this framework, reductionism is focusing downward in a system to study it's "fundamentals" while holism is looking upward in a system and seeing it in terms of its "signigicants"

Except that then you'll miss about 95% of the Universe. Not to mention all the other problems.

Not really. I've just recategorized things based upon a slightly different set of criteria. Revising the phylogenetic tree didn't devastate biology or change the essential facts of it. It merely helps to conceptually organize things in a more accessible way.

Okay, I guess the best way to visualize how I'm thinking is that I've mentally organized these categories into directories. The basic ontology is still monist, but I'm viewing it taxonomically.

Why?

Because I don't like the hodgepodge of definitions and categories currently used to label things in physics right now. There isn't a fully consistent consensus of what to categorize a lot of these things [for instance, theres no consensus definition of what should be called matter] so I figured I might as well just make up my own system of categorization. It doesn't revise any laws of physics and I don't have to tolerate inconsistencies when thinking about the subject. Inconsistencies annoy me to no end -- they're just ugly.

Energy and matter are not subsets of space-time, if that's what you mean. And matter is not a subset of energy; they're the same thing. And information is physical.

So your categorization is all wrong.

You wanna know what I see when I read that statement..?

"Stuff and stuff are not subsets of stuff, if that's what you mean. And stuff is not a subset of stuff; they're the same thing. And stuff is stuff-like.

So your categorization is all wrong."

*cringe*

The thing is, its not that my categorization is wrong; its that I'm actually employing one while you're content to just say all the "stuff" in the universe is identical. Thats just...*gag*...stop disturbing my circles man... O_<

edit:Oh, btw. When I was referring to a basic unit of space as being a planck unit I misspoke. I meant planck area -- my bad. Also, from what I've been reading about bleeding edge theoretical physics, there is a lot of heavy implication that spactime is not fundamental.

Anyways, its late here. I'm out.

 

[Malerin]

Energy is like the currency of the universe - it is a way of describing the amount of work being observed within a system. Matter, on the other hand, is a more precise unit of that work. So, to form an analogy, if matter is a given unit of currency, energy would be the value of that currency. They can be seen as the same thing (I have a five dollar note, worth five dollars), while the different terms allow a comparison of contexts (I have a five dollar note, which can be exchanged for a two dollar coin in another country's currency).

It's not just contexts. Dollar coins and pound notes, even if they are worth the same amount, are two different things. I'll give you an example similar to what materialists sometimes throw around:

Suppose you were told that 8 pounds of water was going to be dropped on you from fifty feet up. Since liquid water and ice are fundamentally the same thing, you shouldn't care whether you're going to be hit with an eight pound block of ice or splashed with a gallon of water.

 

[Z]

It's not just contexts. Dollar coins and pound notes, even if they are worth the same amount, are two different things. I'll give you an example similar to what materialists sometimes throw around:

Suppose you were told that 8 pounds of water was going to be dropped on you from fifty feet up. Since liquid water and ice are fundamentally the same thing, you shouldn't care whether you're going to be hit with an eight pound block of ice or splashed with a gallon of water.

Ah, but liquid states and solid states have fundamentally different properties. Liquid water and ice are not at all fundamentally the same thing, any more than ice and water vapor are fundamentally the same thing. A molecular compound in crystalline formation is no more 'fundamentally the same thing' as the same molecular compound in a scattered formation - coal dust versus diamonds. Sure, at the core it's all carbon, but the list of fundamental properties would necessarily have to include factors such as atomic alignment, molecular vibration, environmental influences, etc.

But all this is nothing more than the patterns of the spacetime itself. Like LEGO blocks making up everything in the universe - only every block is utterly identical and fundamental.

 

[athon]

It's not just contexts. Dollar coins and pound notes, even if they are worth the same amount, are two different things. I'll give you an example similar to what materialists sometimes throw around:

Suppose you were told that 8 pounds of water was going to be dropped on you from fifty feet up. Since liquid water and ice are fundamentally the same thing, you shouldn't care whether you're going to be hit with an eight pound block of ice or splashed with a gallon of water.

As Z just said, the analogy again doesn't fit. If you'd said 'water and ice are the same thing', the analogy would be suitable. They are, in the same way that mass is the same as energy. Yet you had to highlight you were discussing 'liquid water and solid water (ice)'. Of course they aren't the same, as now we're discussing the properties.

It helps to keep the analogies as close as possible if you're going to use them.

The point is, materialists view the universe only as a system of rules that seem to govern relationships between what we observe.

Athon

 

[Nick227]

Yes, you're right, I could have phrased that better. A number of mental illnesses are due to (relatively) straightforward biochemical issues, and as long as you keep taking the pills, the mental problems go away.

IMO this is an over-simplification. Depression for example may have biochemical aspects to its manifestation, and treating at this level can alleviate symptomology, but IMO the issue is not as straightforward as mere biochemistry. It's systemic and its complex.

The broader point, that psychology is fundamentally a materialist discipline, remains.

Well, Freud was a neurologist who dropped materialism as it didn't match what he observed in patients. Bernard Baars is a materialist who created Global Workspace Theory (likely the predominant neurological model for conscoiusness) around Freud's model. So you might say the materialists are getting there.

Nick

 

[athon]

IMO this is an over-simplification. Depression for example may have biochemical aspects to its manifestation, and treating at this level can alleviate symptomology, but IMO the issue is not as straightforward as mere biochemistry. It's systemic and its complex.

What else is involved if not biochemistry? Sure, the biochemistry is complex, and interacts with the environment, but the very fact that we can diminish the symptoms with something as blunt as a generic, orally ingested pill indicates it certainly is a chemical imbalance.

I'm not suggesting depression can be 'cured' with a pill, for a number of reasons. But all those reasons are certainly chemical in origin.

If you wish to say aspects of the mind aren't dependent on biochemistry, you'd need to say where the rules governing their operation lie, and for what reasons you think those rules can't be physical ones (i.e., rely on the rules governing energy exchange, forces, particle interactions etc.).

Athon

 

[Nick227]

What else is involved if not biochemistry? Sure, the biochemistry is complex, and interacts with the environment, but the very fact that we can diminish the symptoms with something as blunt as a generic, orally ingested pill indicates it certainly is a chemical imbalance.

What it actually is....is the complex bit. Depression is a self-reported mood reduction. Whether it is caused by neurochemistry or whether altered neurochemistry is simply another symptom of depression is debatable.

Some cases of depression appear to have a psychological root, others not. That's why I'm saying it's complex.

I'm not suggesting depression can be 'cured' with a pill, for a number of reasons. But all those reasons are certainly chemical in origin.

I would say that theoretically depression can be cured with a pill. No more depression to me = cure. In reality we develop side-effects and tolerance levels change. It gets complex again.

If you wish to say aspects of the mind aren't dependent on biochemistry, you'd need to say where the rules governing their operation lie, and for what reasons you think those rules can't be physical ones (i.e., rely on the rules governing energy exchange, forces, particle interactions etc.).

Athon

I'm not saying that. I'm saying that in trying to attribute causation things can get complex. Systems frequently act as though such and such a thing exists. The human brain behaves as though there is an unconscious mind. So is there an unconsious? It's complex.

Nick

 

[Dancing David]

But they're not the same thing. One can be turned into the other, but that is like saying ice and steam are the same thing, or a lump of coal is the same thing as a diamond. If they were the same thing, we wouldn't have bothered labelling them with different words.

Okay, so radio waves, x-rays and red light are all different and not photons?

So black, yellow and white people aren't all people?

okay.

The repulsive force electrons give things their 'push' and knock' factor which we label as 'hard and soft', but the same little critter acts as though it is energy a lot of the time.

Hmmm.

Labels are labels and only useful in making predictions?

 

[Z]

What it actually is....is the complex bit. Depression is a self-reported mood reduction. Whether it is caused by neurochemistry or whether altered neurochemistry is simply another symptom of depression is debatable.

Only if one side of that debate is holding a position that assumes immaterialism to some degree. Materialism holds that depression simply is altered neurochemistry.

I would say that theoretically depression can be cured with a pill. No more depression to me = cure. In reality we develop side-effects and tolerance levels change. It gets complex again.

I would say that theoretically depression can be cured through a physical process - but that includes the use of medicines and other procedures, changes to environment, etc. All physical/material, yet all part of a curative process. The depression victim isn't going to be cured by taking a pill if a major part of their depression is an abusive parent or spouse; yet removing the parent or spouse (or, perhaps, altering their biochemistry) might help the cure. Still all quite physical/material, though.

I'm not saying that. I'm saying that in trying to attribute causation things can get complex. Systems frequently act as though such and such a thing exists. The human brain behaves as though there is an unconscious mind. So is there an unconsious? It's complex.

The human brain can also behave as if there is a Sherlock Holmes or a God. Yet in doing so, it's merely running through a series of biochemical reactions, nothing more. This is the only way in which we can truly claim that God (or Santa Claus, or any meta-mind) exists - because the brain reacts as if it does exist, and therefore causes environmental changes that are based on that reaction.

As for the question, is there an unconscious / subconscious? It's really not that complex. We know that the brain processes many thoughts/feelings/reactions, etc. on a non-conscious level. Recent research even shows that our 'conscious' decision making feelings are more after-the-fact sensations of a decision already made subconsciously. We know, for example, that sensory input passes through several parts of the non-conscious brain before ever entering those parts responsible for awareness - hence, permitting fear/threat reactions without having to process sensory information consciously.

So, certainly there's a 'subconscious' or 'unconscious' laying under our awareness. We certainly don't consciously maintain our entire catalogue of memories, do we? Things pop up, often unbidden, into our awareness that we may have 'thought we've forgotten' all the time.

In the end, though, conscious or not, all mental activity boils down to biochemical reactions - usually stimulated by environmental factors, but often not.

 

[AkuManiMani]

All this controversy over what should be called what really highlights why I think coherent methods of categorization are indispensable when trying to understand the world or communicate about it.

Sure, fundamentally, everything can be said to have some basic equivalence. The problem comes when we take that to mean that things are identical. There absolutely has to be some criteria for distinction of entities -- some coherent language to divide, subdivide, and relate. Without such a system, trying to meaningfully discuss ontology is futile.

Going back to ice/liquid/vapor discussion:

It's not just contexts. Dollar coins and pound notes, even if they are worth the same amount, are two different things. I'll give you an example similar to what materialists sometimes throw around:

Suppose you were told that 8 pounds of water was going to be dropped on you from fifty feet up. Since liquid water and ice are fundamentally the same thing, you shouldn't care whether you're going to be hit with an eight pound block of ice or splashed with a gallon of water.

Z replies....

Ah, but liquid states and solid states have fundamentally different properties. Liquid water and ice are not at all fundamentally the same thing, any more than ice and water vapor are fundamentally the same thing. A molecular compound in crystalline formation is no more 'fundamentally the same thing' as the same molecular compound in a scattered formation - coal dust versus diamonds. Sure, at the core it's all carbon, but the list of fundamental properties would necessarily have to include factors such as atomic alignment, molecular vibration, environmental influences, etc.

In the case of H2O, all off its varying states (solid/liquid/gas) are all fundamentally the same. The fundament they share is that they are comprised of the dihydrogen monoxide compound. Their differences are significant; they show distinct collective properties under certain conditions.

So they are fundamentally the same but significantly different. Its these significant variations in states that we give names and categorize.

 

[Frozenwolf150]

It's not just contexts. Dollar coins and pound notes, even if they are worth the same amount, are two different things. I'll give you an example similar to what materialists sometimes throw around:

Suppose you were told that 8 pounds of water was going to be dropped on you from fifty feet up. Since liquid water and ice are fundamentally the same thing, you shouldn't care whether you're going to be hit with an eight pound block of ice or splashed with a gallon of water.

"Same" as in the same chemical substance. The effect of dropping something depends on its physical properties, as others have pointed out, and this is not analogous to the difference between existing in various models of reality. Besides, your analogy still doesn't work. Suppose you were told that you were going to be dropped from a moderate height into a body of water. Even if the water were liquid, the fall could be injurious or even fatal if not done correctly. Falls from a sufficient height into liquid water will be fatal regardless of how they're done.

I can watch a program, such as a computer game, run on my screen. Yet that pattern of moving pixels doesn't really exist anywhere, except as a code mediated by logic gates. The pattern which drives what I observe isn't thought to exist on some other plane, as it's a simple pattern of electrons moving about that creates the images, movement, intelligence etc. of my computer game. Why must the mind be any different in principle?

Athon

No, no, obviously God did it.

 

[Nick227]

Only if one side of that debate is holding a position that assumes immaterialism to some degree. Materialism holds that depression simply is altered neurochemistry.

I agree. Though attributing causation can still be tricky, because there can be personal or environmental factors which can be understood as creating the depression. Psychotherapy sometimes works.

I would say that theoretically depression can be cured through a physical process - but that includes the use of medicines and other procedures, changes to environment, etc. All physical/material, yet all part of a curative process. The depression victim isn't going to be cured by taking a pill if a major part of their depression is an abusive parent or spouse; yet removing the parent or spouse (or, perhaps, altering their biochemistry) might help the cure. Still all quite physical/material, though.

Well, from a more psychotherapeutic angle, I would say that the cause of the depression is not likely to be an ongoing abusive relationship but more likely to be the continuing behaviour created by an earlier relationship. If someone has learned, for example, to ignore or reject positive feedback then this would likely contribute to depression. Like I said, it's complex. Many negative behaviours have their root in early childhood, even womb stimuli.

Personally, I wouldn't use this angle to try and reinforce the materialist argument. I'd go back to the gene and the notion of pre-existing response patterns to certain stimuli.

The human brain can also behave as if there is a Sherlock Holmes or a God.

...or a self!

Yet in doing so, it's merely running through a series of biochemical reactions, nothing more. This is the only way in which we can truly claim that God (or Santa Claus, or any meta-mind) exists - because the brain reacts as if it does exist, and therefore causes environmental changes that are based on that reaction.

As for the question, is there an unconscious / subconscious? It's really not that complex. We know that the brain processes many thoughts/feelings/reactions, etc. on a non-conscious level. Recent research even shows that our 'conscious' decision making feelings are more after-the-fact sensations of a decision already made subconsciously. We know, for example, that sensory input passes through several parts of the non-conscious brain before ever entering those parts responsible for awareness - hence, permitting fear/threat reactions without having to process sensory information consciously.

It's not complex if you agree to leave the phenomenon of subjectivity out of the equation, as you appear to be doing above.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

All this controversy over what should be called what really highlights why I think coherent methods of categorization are indispensable when trying to understand the world or communicate about it.

Sure, fundamentally, everything can be said to have some basic equivalence. The problem comes when we take that to mean that things are identical. There absolutely has to be some criteria for distinction of entities -- some coherent language to divide, subdivide, and relate. Without such a system, trying to meaningfully discuss ontology is futile.

As I see it, the problem is how meaningfully to do this. Monism does mean it's all the same stuff. Finally this means there is no actual separation, merely that some mathematical principle has somewhere created it so that this experience of separation can happen. How do you divide and categorise in the light of monism? And how do you know when it actually means anything or not?

Nick

 

[AkuManiMani]

As I see it, the problem is how meaningfully to do this. Monism does mean it's all the same stuff. Finally this means there is no actual separation, merely that some mathematical principle has somewhere created it so that this experience of separation can happen. How do you divide and categorise in the light of monism? And how do you know when it actually means anything or not?

Nick

A good analogy I can think of is taxonomy. Biologists started out with a basic system of categorization and over time its been revised and improved to logically and consistently account for nuances.

There aren't any real formal divisions in nature; nothing with predefined labels. The best we can really do is evolve coherent systems to organize reality conceptually; the only real meaning is what we give it. /shrug

 

[Nick227]

There aren't any real formal divisions in nature; nothing with predefined labels. The best we can really do is evolve coherent systems to organize reality conceptually; the only real meaning is what we give it. /shrug

Yes, our addiction to debate fuels the need to create division!

Nick

 

[Dancing David]

I'm not denying the physical substrates of the process. My point is that the mind is a process most likely generated by the brain that can also, in turn, shape behavior and properties of the brain. I consider it a process that could be considered an entity in and of itself. I've gone into much lengthier detail on this before on another thread a while back but it seems I'm going to have to explain my reasoning behind this again.

And I still disagree with that reasoning. I understand the use of 'mind' in common parlace, but as a principle for discussion on a sceptic's bulletin board, no. It is an illusion to my thinking.

If I say that the body as a whole is something and that i call that 'essensce', what have I really done. I have relabeled the body, as it is as something different.

the same is tue of the word, mind. It is another label and I am not sure what reason there would be for using it. I can say 'the body' or I can say 'essence". On has meaning in the definitive debate which occurs on this forum.

Same with the mind I assume that as web of relations is what 'reductionism' will show in the realm of the human experience as exemplified by the processes which we already label ( i refer to the buddha's system here for convenience) body, sensation/perception, thought, emotion and memory. You can then provided further division if you wish, but it is a net or a conglomerate, even in reductionism. You can not move one without it effecting the other. Especially in psychology, there is already an understanding that you are working with a system of systems.

further, where does the mind end?

People who are not in psychology often forget that the CNS (central nervous system) and the PNS (peripheral nervous system) are intertwined, while the sensations and action that are relayed from the PNS by the CNS and processed in the CNS starting with the brain stem, the thing is a whole system. And it is sub systems and connected to other systems, all of them intertwined.

So reductionism is pluralistic and multivariate in psychology. Some people aren't aware of this.

So where does the mind extend then, it would have to include the PNS, yes? So again, it is not always explicit if someone referes to brain processes that one is including the PNS. Then there is the whole other set of systems which impact the CNS and PNS, the respiration, transportation, digestions, etc... All impact the PNS and CNS.

So again I am not sure of the utility of the term mind.

I was referring to Dancing David's previous comments to the effect that "there is no such thing as mind". Though you may not personally share an identical stance to his, I've encountered other forum members whose positions quite similar to that of Dave's. So yes, there are those who 'write off' the mind.

I call it as I see it, I have been challenged if i have free will as well and have had to concede that it is possibly an illusion, although I don't think so. the buddha teaches that the 'self' is an illusion, which after careful consideration, I agree with. then there is the bugaboo of consciousness, which is also an illusion (I think) and lastly mind, which is most likely illusion.

I have many deeply held spiritual and mystical beliefs, i have a wide variety of spiritual experiences, yet here, I discuss the rational science POV, and try to understand them that way.

Utility and clarity in communication are tantamount in science, the practice of creating approximate models to predict reality.

And in that sense, free ill, self, consciousness, mind are very hard to define to the extent that they have utility.

If i was talking to members of a coven or shamanic journey group, i would different terminology with an understanding that allegory is the means of transmission.

I'll start with a statement I made to Dave back on post #78:

"What I'm saying is that this method of treatment is based on flawed assumptions of reductionist philosophy. The approach of thinking of mental illness strictly in terms of reducing it to neurological components will continue to yield the same superficial results you've been lamenting."

i was not lamenting, I just nudged PM about a statement.

Cures do not apply to mental health.

Most mental health practitioners are holistic, however it is not a psychiatrist's job to be a spiritual counselor. many consumers of psychiatric services forget that.

I suspect that there are two major philosophical flaws at the heart of whole "drug-as-cure" [DAC] approach in regards to psychology (though they are so interrelated its arguable that they are essentially one and the same):

What Daniel Dennett calls greedy reductionism and determinism.

(Since reductionism necessarily implies determinism, for convenience sake I'll just refer to them collectively as 'reductionism')

The inherent limitations of the reductionist perspective are evident not only in the fields of psychology, but in just about any situation where there is agency involved, namely biology in general. Organisms' ('conscious' or otherwise) are dynamic, coherent wholes; they're systems whose behavior as a whole is not strictly determined by their constituent parts.

Straw man, you have not shown that that is the main focus of mental health or psychology.

Treatment of people as wholes is essential.

You know the biggest obstacle to mental health treatment, substance abuse.
the second biggest, poor life style choices.
the third, destructive relationships.

However people just want the doctor to make it go away. they don't like it when you ask them to stop drinking or using stimulants. Etc...

However the doctor has fiveteen minuets after the initial interview.

Most people avoid counseling, including CBT, to their detriment.

In the context of psychological care, I would argue that the DAC approach is based on greedy reductionism because it sees mental disorders exclusively in terms of "malfunctioning" parts rather than as systemic problems.

Still, neither he not you have shown that to be true.

I think the simplest way to state my position is that an organism is not its constituent parts. Matter and energy are continuously flowing into and out of an organism. Considering this fact, its quite apparent that what an organism essentially is is not, strictly speaking, the atoms and molecules comprising its structure at any given time.

Sure it is , the arrangement and interaction them is part of it, that is a straw argument about reductionism. the EM force pushes on everything within range, you can still measure it.

perhaps you misunderstand science?

An organism is the coherent system that organizes and affects the behavior of said molecules. Its behaviors and properties are emergent and, in the case of sentient organisms like us, they are strongly emergent.

Where do you get data that shows that is not part of psychology?

Theres a pretty workable grasp of a lot of the simpler chemical components in the nervous system, but understanding of the nature of the organizing system of the mind, in a rigorous sense, is very lacking.

No doubt, that does not mean that the mind exists.

A major reason for this is that much of the field of psychology is almost myopically focusing on components to the neglect of the organizational pattern.

Assertion without evidence.

The description of the properties and behaviors of an organism, and especially one with a mind, is not reducible simply to that of its chemical components.

Strawman.

Psychology is not mere branch of biochemistry, but it seems a lot of psychiatric practitioners treat is as such.

False assertion, lack of evidence. Have you or the author talked to a psychiatrist about mental health? they are well aware of humans as systems. And participants of systems.

Strawman.

 

[AkuManiMani]

And I still disagree with that reasoning. I understand the use of 'mind' in common parlace, but as a principle for discussion on a sceptic's bulletin board, no. It is an illusion to my thinking.

Okay, so your objection to the term 'mind' is more of a formality than an absolute statement?

If I say that the body as a whole is something and that i call that 'essensce', what have I really done. I have relabeled the body, as it is as something different.

the same is true of the word, mind. It is another label and I am not sure what reason there would be for using it. I can say 'the body' or I can say 'essence". On has meaning in the definitive debate which occurs on this forum.

Hmm... Well in my thinking one would still be able to define the two terms in a meaningful way. The 'body' (synonymous with 'form') would be the makeup or configuration of the organism at any given time. The 'essence' is the identity and process of the organism that is contiguous thru time, irrespective of a present 'form'. For instance, an individual insect has varying forms (bodies) thru-out its life-cycle (egg, larva, pupa, adult) but maintains the same essence as a living organism.

[This is what I love about a good debate. It helps force me to articulate my thoughts better than when I'm just musing on my own]

Same with the mind I assume that as web of relations is what 'reductionism' will show in the realm of the human experience as exemplified by the processes which we already label ( i refer to the buddha's system here for convenience) body, sensation/perception, thought, emotion and memory. You can then provided further division if you wish, but it is a net or a conglomerate, even in reductionism. You can not move one without it effecting the other. Especially in psychology, there is already an understanding that you are working with a system of systems.

further, where does the mind end?

People who are not in psychology often forget that the CNS (central nervous system) and the PNS (peripheral nervous system) are intertwined, while the sensations and action that are relayed from the PNS by the CNS and processed in the CNS starting with the brain stem, the thing is a whole system. And it is sub systems and connected to other systems, all of them intertwined.

I've actually been giving this question some thought for quite a while now. The tentative conclusion that I eventually came to is this: the mind exists throughout the body. Each bodily system is some degree of unconscious mind; from the endocrine, immune, peripheral, and finally the central nervous system. The conscious mind could be thought of as a highly specialized aspect at the very 'top'; the tip of the metaphorical iceberg that floats above the surface of the unconscious when an animal is awake.

So reductionism is pluralistic and multivariate in psychology. Some people aren't aware of this.

I would say that what you just described is the combination of the reductionist and holist perspectives in conjunction w/ each other. While this may be the case in your practice and personal experience not all mental care providers are as comprehensive -- atleast in the experiences of some friends and acquaintances I know who've had treatment.

So where does the mind extend then, it would have to include the PNS, yes? So again, it is not always explicit if someone referes to brain processes that one is including the PNS. Then there is the whole other set of systems which impact the CNS and PNS, the respiration, transportation, digestions, etc... All impact the PNS and CNS.

So again I am not sure of the utility of the term mind.

I mentioned in a later post that your rationale for considering the 'mind' un-useful as a concept could be extended to atoms, or any other entities. If you merely consider an atom just in terms of its subatomic constituents then, conceptually, the atom "disappears" as an entity and you're left with parts. Shifting perspective to the whole contiguous system of the atom, as an entity in its own right, comes into conceptual view.

I suppose a very rough analogy would be:

The mass of quarks that comprise the nucleus and the electrons which surround it are like the brain/body. The fluctuating system of interacting fields thru-out (that coheres what we call the 'atom') is comparable to the mind.

I call it as I see it, I have been challenged if i have free will as well and have had to concede that it is possibly an illusion, although I don't think so. the buddha teaches that the 'self' is an illusion, which after careful consideration, I agree with. then there is the bugaboo of consciousness, which is also an illusion (I think) and lastly mind, which is most likely illusion.

If one wants to get right down to the nitty-gritty you could extend the line of reasoning you've been employing indefinitely. Everything is just the activity of another underlying process. One could simply go nuts with it and say that everything is, in some sense, an illusion and that the only thing that's real is that fundamental, unreachable, unknowable, indescribable 'essence' of all being. It would be a very profound statement, and probably true, but it wouldn't be very helpful 'up here' in the world of empirical experience where we have to distinguish between relevant "stuffs".

As far as facts go, there's as much categorical weight to justify considering the mind ontologically 'real' as there is to consider an atom real. The only difference is that the latter is rigorously and quantitatively understood. The former is a much higher order complex process that's only roughly and qualitatively understood.

I have many deeply held spiritual and mystical beliefs, i have a wide variety of spiritual experiences, yet here, I discuss the rational science POV, and try to understand them that way.

Utility and clarity in communication are tantamount in science, the practice of creating approximate models to predict reality.

And in that sense, free ill, self, consciousness, mind are very hard to define to the extent that they have utility.

If i was talking to members of a coven or shamanic journey group, i would different terminology with an understanding that allegory is the means of transmission.

Okay, its making a bit more sense to me now. Basically your objections are on the grounds of formal language. You employ distinct systems of language when speaking about the mind/brain depending on the social/professional context.

Is that assessment about right?

Sure it is , the arrangement and interaction them is part of it, that is a straw argument about reductionism. the EM force pushes on everything within range, you can still measure it.

perhaps you misunderstand science?

I didn't mean to suggest that study of the mind is somehow beyond science. What I'm getting at is that our current scientific understanding of it isn't anywhere near as rigorous as our understanding of biochemistry. To use the terminology invoked above: right now science understands the body/form much better than the 'essence'.

 

[Dancing David]

Okay, so your objection to the term 'mind' is more of a formality than an absolute statement?

I am not big on absolutes, so I would give a qualified maybe.

In the formal logical discussion sense, I would say 'no' the mind is a construct of archaic language and the the term 'unconscious' has to be used carefully as it if loaded with the baggage of centuries of magical and informal thinking and language.

In common usage, a 'depends' would be appropriate.

Hmm... Well in my thinking one would still be able to define the two terms in a meaningful way. The 'body' (synonymous with 'form') would be the makeup or configuration of the organism at any given time. The 'essence' is the identity and process of the organism that is contiguous thru time, irrespective of a present 'form'. For instance, an individual insect has varying forms (bodies) thru-out its life-cycle (egg, larva, pupa, adult) but maintains the same essence as a living organism.

But that is only needed to my mind if one considers the universe and the body, to be something that they are not, static. The body is a process, it is in motion, it is transitory and ephemeral.
If it is not in motion then it is usually labeled as 'dead'.

[This is what I love about a good debate. It helps force me to articulate my thoughts better than when I'm just musing on my own]

Me too, Yrreg taught me a whole lot about buddhism.

I've actually been giving this question some thought for quite a while now. The tentative conclusion that I eventually came to is this: the mind exists throughout the body.

Now see that is where I think I just say something like, 'the body exists, the PNS and CNS are part and parcel of the body, despite the Hellenistic, medieval construct of separation of the two' . And that is why also as part of mental health treatment (in the US, you have 'Axis III" , medical factors impacting treatment.

Each bodily system is some degree of unconscious mind; from the endocrine, immune, peripheral, and finally the central nervous system.

That is where then i find greater utility to try to actualy describe the processes rather than using something undefined.
'The state of exhaustion can frequently make someone more vulnerable to the symptoms of anxiety.' or something like that.

The conscious mind could be thought of as a highly specialized aspect at the very 'top'; the tip of the metaphorical iceberg that floats above the surface of the unconscious when an animal is awake.

You can if you wish, i think that is too hiearchial for my taste. i would be more likely to want to discuss the web of interactions that lead to a particular aspect of the state that is presented. Multitrack, multivariate and fuzzy sloppy.
'Jill found that she had responded to the verbal presentation of the concept of hill, she felt anxious and found that her thoughts then tended towards concern about possible negative consequences associated with the climbing of the hills. This then seemed to be generalized to any task that she had some doubt about her ability to preform. She then would associate this anxiety toward Jack, whom she held accountable for the events on the hill.' Although that is very vague and not really a good example of chaining because it is so general and vague. It does not include the specific antecedents to the event, nor a summation of her short term history. Thoughts, emotions, memories and associations.

I would say that what you just described is the combination of the reductionist and holist perspectives in conjunction w/ each other.

I suppose that is true in some abstracted philosophical sense. But the particles of physics are both waves/particles all the time, and they participate in the four forces all the time. Just so humans have long, medium and short term contingent history, they partcipate in netwroks of thoughts memories, emotions and associations, they interact with other humans in a broad variety of settings and situations where all these factors are present all the time.

While this may be the case in your practice and personal experience not all mental care providers are as comprehensive -- atleast in the experiences of some friends and acquaintances I know who've had treatment.

In my experience that is true as well, however i have seen people have very unrealistic expectations as well as to what they are going to receive from various providers in different systems. Due to personal history and expectations I have seen clients assume that a doctor will talk to them about their love life and financial issues. While in an ideal world there would be fifty times the doctors that there are now, and cotors would have time to hand hold and coddle clients through treatment, this is not currently possible.

i have seen this interaction quite frequently, where clients don't want the services to come from the appropriate provider (if available) they will snub the therapist, counselor or case manger just because they aren't the doctor.

And people are people, many doctors are butt heads, I have met them for sure. But then so are many clients, they want to get help with their problems, but don't ask them to stop drinking or using something, or to get more exercise, get enough sleep. etc...

I was in mental health when the 'recovery' movement started which was a good thing, but here is the irony, it was not the system which had robbed the clients of thier individual liberty and accountability, it was their personal choices in many ways. They same people who screamed at us that we shouldn't call them 'clients', were the same ones who screamed to get into the hospital when they had acted stupid and din't need to be there.

The system cuts both ways.

The 'Boston model of psychosocial rehabilitation' was the gold standard when i was in mental health from 1990-2000. It was the ultimate in client choice and functional assesment and intervention, there were other similar models at the time.

So while there are a great number of doctors who have poor social skills and a huge variety of providers with varying levels of professionalism, they are also consumers who have various degrees of personal responsibility and accountability.

The biggest issue in the system is always client choice or lack of service options.

I mentioned in a later post that your rationale for considering the 'mind' un-useful as a concept could be extended to atoms, or any other entities.

Not so, not so.

You haven't said what your approximate model for the mind is , and how it approximates the behavior of reality.

Atoms, which are quanta of energy in particular arrangements have very specific models and very specific predictions.

present what the approximate model of mind is and how it makes predictions.

If you merely consider an atom just in terms of its subatomic constituents then, conceptually, the atom "disappears" as an entity and you're left with parts.

Scale and level of abstraction depends upon teh nature of the model and the behaviors one is trying to predict.

the electron model makes very accurate predictions about the chemical interactions of the atoms.

Shifting perspective to the whole contiguous system of the atom, as an entity in its own right, comes into conceptual view.

I suppose a very rough analogy would be:

The mass of quarks that comprise the nucleus and the electrons which surround it are like the brain/body. The fluctuating system of interacting fields thru-out (that coheres what we call the 'atom') is comparable to the mind.

Only if you say what those fields can do , what approximate model they are involved in and how they interact.

I find it easier to say that 'Thoughts, emotions and memories become associated withe each other and associated with various internal and external states. A person can using webs and chaining models to examine that various components of the interaction where they want to effect a change. Such as a panic attack about a situation at work, then by modifying antecendents such as physical levels of health and sleep patterns, by identifying and changing responses to 'trigger' thoughts/emotions/memories; they can create new patterns of interaction and behavior.'
In an individual person these can be found and the web changed, specific trigger thoughts can be substituted or derailed, behavioral responses to emotions can be modified through physical actions taken by the person in response to the emotional state. Daily patterns can be modified for greater self care and harm reduction. Each one can be specifically monitored, measured and goals set and revised.

If one wants to get right down to the nitty-gritty you could extend the line of reasoning you've been employing indefinitely. Everything is just the activity of another underlying process.

of course, that is why the ontological arguments are so meaningless, all we have at any point is an approximate model. It could be a totaly wrong model ontologicaly.

The utility of a model comes about only by it's ability to predict and model the behavior of the ontological unknowable reality.

One could simply go nuts with it and say that everything is, in some sense, an illusion and that the only thing that's real is that fundamental, unreachable, unknowable, indescribable 'essence' of all being.

I already do;

"All human thoughts are equally false and equally true. Some just have a higher predictive validity than others."

It would be a very profound statement, and probably true, but it wouldn't be very helpful 'up here' in the world of empirical experience where we have to distinguish between relevant "stuffs".

It is very relevant because the only thing that matters is the predictive validity of a thought construct.

As far as facts go, there's as much categorical weight to justify considering the mind ontologically 'real' as there is to consider an atom real.

Show me your model and how it works, then we can talk.

I prefer the language already available.

The only difference is that the latter is rigorously and quantitatively understood. The former is a much higher order complex process that's only roughly and qualitatively understood.

Not so, not so, people like to think of theselves a big ball of mush. But they seem to be a set of systems, frequently they don't want to face that tangled ball of history, association and behavior.

Okay, its making a bit more sense to me now. Basically your objections are on the grounds of formal language. You employ distinct systems of language when speaking about the mind/brain depending on the social/professional context.

Is that assessment about right?

Mostly, I have a reputation for 'galloping scepticism' and have offended many people in many various spheres in my time. I try more to be careful now. I no longer argue with people about racism, because it seems counter productive.

I didn't mean to suggest that study of the mind is somehow beyond science. What I'm getting at is that our current scientific understanding of it isn't anywhere near as rigorous as our understanding of biochemistry. To use the terminology invoked above: right now science understands the body/form much better than the 'essence'.

Well, yes and no, one of the problems is that people don't like it when science confronts their deeply help beliefs.

I have had to not laugh out loud at many a training, a therapist who I respected, because she was an effective one, once stated that sexual content on TV programs was accelerating sexual maturation of young adults. It was a moment of absolute woo in the midst of some great stuff.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I am not big on absolutes, so I would give a qualified maybe.

In the formal logical discussion sense, I would say 'no' the mind is a construct of archaic language and the the term 'unconscious' has to be used carefully as it if loaded with the baggage of centuries of magical and informal thinking and language.

In common usage, a 'depends' would be appropriate.

Gotcha. Terms like 'unconscious' and 'mind' bring with them associations of outdated theories. IYO, using these terms in a modern scientific context is like invoking alchemical language in the context of modern chemistry. It just strikes you as redundant and inappropriate, yes?

While I can really empathize with and respect that position [I used to hold a pretty similar stance myself] I'm of the opinion that the two terms can still be used in a very meaningful sense, sans the 'archaic' baggage one can associate it with.

Hmm... Well in my thinking one would still be able to define the two terms in a meaningful way. The 'body' (synonymous with 'form') would be the makeup or configuration of the organism at any given time. The 'essence' is the identity and process of the organism that is contiguous thru time, irrespective of a present 'form'. For instance, an individual insect has varying forms (bodies) thru-out its life-cycle (egg, larva, pupa, adult) but maintains the same essence as a living organism.

But that is only needed to my mind if one considers the universe and the body, to be something that they are not, static. The body is a process, it is in motion, it is transitory and ephemeral.
If it is not in motion then it is usually labeled as 'dead'.


Now see that is where I think I just say something like, 'the body exists, the PNS and CNS are part and parcel of the body, despite the Hellenistic, medieval construct of separation of the two' . And that is why also as part of mental health treatment (in the US, you have 'Axis III" , medical factors impacting treatment.

That is where then i find greater utility to try to actualy describe the processes rather than using something undefined.
'The state of exhaustion can frequently make someone more vulnerable to the symptoms of anxiety.' or something like that.

A dead body isn't static, either. It also operates within the context of the universe around it. Even so, there are very significant differences between a dead body and a living organism. One difference is that the dead body becomes thermodynamically more and more like its surrounding environment. Instead of developing and evolving it simply decays. Organisms (even single celled organisms) resist this tendency and exhibit behaviors that appear volitional while they're alive; they behave as agencies. When they die they cease being agents. Its apparent that nothing material actually leaves an organism at death. The moment it dies it weighs the same as it did while alive.

What ever process that was involved with the living organization and development of the organism has dissipated. How ever one might model it, the process/system seems informational in nature. Its powered by, and maintains, metabolism. It seems to confine the collective organization and behavior of the atoms and compounds within its area of effect and to a specific range reactions and dynamic behaviors. And above all, regardless of the particular pattern in question, it causes the whole system to behave coherently as a single dynamic entity.

I suspect that what we think of as metal or conscious processes in animals are extreme, specialized, examples of the process of agency inherent to any living organism. IMO, its the natural extension of the same process at work in gene regulation, cellular differentiation, immune memory and response etc., and is contiguous with processes associated with the mental domain like thought and emotion. Its this organizing process (whether its some kind of field or a more general effect) that I think needs some kind of coherent, workable theory.

You can if you wish, i think that is too hiearchial for my taste. i would be more likely to want to discuss the web of interactions that lead to a particular aspect of the state that is presented. Multitrack, multivariate and fuzzy sloppy.
'Jill found that she had responded to the verbal presentation of the concept of hill, she felt anxious and found that her thoughts then tended towards concern about possible negative consequences associated with the climbing of the hills. This then seemed to be generalized to any task that she had some doubt about her ability to preform. She then would associate this anxiety toward Jack, whom she held accountable for the events on the hill.' Although that is very vague and not really a good example of chaining because it is so general and vague. It does not include the specific antecedents to the event, nor a summation of her short term history. Thoughts, emotions, memories and associations.

[...]

You haven't said what your approximate model for the mind is , and how it approximates the behavior of reality.

Atoms, which are quanta of energy in particular arrangements have very specific models and very specific predictions.

present what the approximate model of mind is and how it makes predictions.



[...]


Scale and level of abstraction depends upon teh nature of the model and the behaviors one is trying to predict.

the electron model makes very accurate predictions about the chemical interactions of the atoms.

Only if you say what those fields can do , what approximate model they are involved in and how they interact.

The thing is that right now we have just a hodgepodge of different approximate models that are invoked to aid in different diagnostic scenarios. There isn't a unifying theory or principles yet to make sense of all the disparate data and have some predictive value. I can only speculate at what such a theory would look like.

I remember having a discussion with a highschool friend of mine about a year or so ago. At the time he was still finishing his undergrad studies in biology [Oddly enough, his name is Dave]. We were discussing what a theory of the mind would look like and how it would account for things like Dawkins' hypothetical memes. He eventually proposed the idea that human mental processes can be thought of as operating in what he called "Conceptual space". I was a little surprised by this, as I'm usually the one proposing the wild outlandish ideas.

Anyways, his term "Conceptual space" reminded me of another similar term: probability space which is a concept employed in QM. To be certain, I'm only a layperson in regards to the mathematical details and arcana of QM . But it didn't take much of a leap for me to make the association. Would it be possible to envision a kind of probability space where abstract thoughts and concepts play out, are weighed against each other, and interact all within the theater of an individual's mind? Depending on how these concepts are organized and weighed they could directly or indirectly shape and affect the parameters that govern an individual's volitional and autonomic processes. If one were to actually have such a theoretical system at their disposal they could define a concept like memes in terms of being information elements in "conceptual space". One would have a chance of meaningfully defining them as replicators within this context.

After giving this some further thought, it seems that such a theory would have to fall within more some general 'Theory of Life', with psychology and the mind being a specialized branch. Once there is a unifying theory of biology, and then mental process, it wouldn't be much of a leap to then extend that understanding to the social sciences to figure out the bare-bones interplay of what occurs between the mental worlds of individuals and how cultural evolution works. Such a theory would basically give a deeper scientific understanding of agency and processes associated with it.

Ofcourse, all this is just speculation and such developments would probably require further advances in all related disciplines and probably in technology as well. /shrug

I have had to not laugh out loud at many a training, a therapist who I respected, because she was an effective one, once stated that sexual content on TV programs was accelerating sexual maturation of young adults. It was a moment of absolute woo in the midst of some great stuff.

I remember having something to that effect before. Have their actually been studies that show that early or regular exposure to sexual stimuli could speed the onset of sexual maturity?