Idealists: What does 'physical' mean to you?

[Frozenwolf150]

But then this leads to an obvious question: from whence came God? Is God just something else that pops into existence simply because Berkeley perceives it to be so? Wouldn't this then make Berkeley, or whomever is perceiving the notion of God, the ultimate perceiver? But if that's the case, we're back to the whole tree question...

Sounds like circular logic to me.

They just don't want to admit that God would go "POOF" without anyone to think about him. I'm just saying, given all the gods that people have invented throughout human history, you know, the contingency is more likely to run that way.

 

[Frozenwolf150]

I pretty much agreed w/ almost all of your post, w/ the exception of the bolded statement. In the case of this Matrix-like scenario you have two 'universes' w/ the only exception being one is natural [i.e. 'real'] and the other is "intelligently" designed by some agency to emulate the other. It stands to reason that either:

(a) the Matrix universe was built within the natural/'real' universe. In this case, no matter how flawless the simulation architecture of the matrix is, a disruption to it in the 'real' universe it exists within will have a direct effect on it's performance. One would also have to specify whether or not a conscious human being needs to be pluged-in to it or can be "uploaded" into it w/o the necessity of their organic bodies.

or

(b) the architect is advanced enough to pinch off a separate space-time in which to construct this matrix -- in which case one would fall into the extremely speculative territory of multiverses. Even assuming that The Architect could pinch off another bubble universe to constrict his matrix, it doesn't completely rule out the possibility that they could interact in some way.

In both scenarios there is still, in principle, some way for those in either universe to interact.

Actually, when I said that the illusion was flawless, the assumption was that no interaction or disruption could or would take place at all. Were it to take place, the illusion would no longer be flawless, and we'd be back at scenario 1, which of course I'd already covered. My point had to do with a zero interaction reality, which would be necessary in order for the illusion to be flawless, since that's what the argument was addressing.

Well, regardless of what universe you're in, science would be the most reliable method of figuring out how things work in it. Given enough time it might even advance enough to have something meaningful to day about possible 'outside' universes

Yup.

 

[MattusMaximus]

They just don't want to admit that God would go "POOF" without anyone to think about him. I'm just saying, given all the gods that people have invented throughout human history, you know, the contingency is more likely to run that way.

That's my point. The argument is not only circular, it is also self-contradictory.

If they say God does it, but then they go with idealism and they are the ones perceiving God into existence, then how can God be the thing that perceives stuff when they're not around? (The tree example, for instance)

Are they calling themselves God? That's the only way I see around the contradiction, unless I'm missing something, and I guess it would be consistent with what I understand of solipsism. I very well might have missed something, as I haven't followed the thread for a couple of days.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Except you could turn it around and say materialists assume a second layer of reality by positing the existence of physical objects. An idealist could argue that reality is simply thoughts and minds and the interaction between them. A materialist adds another (unecessary) layer of substance and interaction: thoughts, minds, and physical objects.

The idealist could also argue that we know for certain that thought and mind exist (in the Cartesian sense), so why muddy the waters by positing the existence of physical objects, which there is no evidence for?

Actually we don't know that for certain at all. In descending order of certainty:

1. I know I have a mind and thoughts.
2. I'm pretty sure there is an external universe doing its thing regardless of the content of my mind and thoughts.
3. I'm nearly as certain that some of the things in that external universe are humans with minds of their own.

However I'm less sure that you have a mind and thoughts, than I am that you exist as brute matter, because it's conceivable that you are some kind of automaton with no mind or thoughts.

You can't jump from 1 to 3 without acknowledging 2, unless you think you have some kind of telepathic means of verifying other minds' existence without recourse to the external, physical world.

 

[Malerin]

I raised these points in the other recent topic.

Regardless of whether we live in a Matrix-like world, the conclusion that we cannot truly know anything meaningful about reality does not follow. Let's assume the world is an illusion and see where the possibilities lead.

First, suppose the world is an imperfect Matrix, just like in the movies. It begs the question, how does one identify the glitches in the system? The simple answer is that any violation of the laws of physics would be a glitch in the system. In the films, the people who realized that the world was an illusion were partly freed from its restrictions and were able to bend the normal laws. However this is all dependent on knowing what those physical laws are and understanding how they work in the first place. It is meaningless to say that Neo can defy gravity if we don't know what gravity is and how it's supposed to work. In this scenario, scientific knowledge would be extremely useful because it would allow us to distinguish between normal and abnormal behavior in our world.

Now suppose the illusion or simulation were perfect. There are no glitches to speak of. What this implies is that the Matrix world and the real world would actually have no effect on each other in any way, shape, or form. Those trapped inside the illusion could never get out, and those outside, such as the pilots of Zion, could not hack into the Matrix to get inside. In other words, the two realities would in effect be mutually exclusive. What we learn and discover within this world would be meaningless in the outside world, and vice versa. In this scenario, scientific knowledge would be even more important, because it logically follows that this is the only world such knowledge could ever apply to, Matrix illusion or not. When objects are dropped, they fall to the ground, and if they fall from a great enough height, they get smashed into pieces. Neo would end up as a red smudge on the street for ignoring the laws of physics.

The third possibility is that the world is as real as we perceive it to be. In this scenario, science remains the most reliable means we possess of coming to as close an approximation of reality as possible, and conclusions based on speculation would not tell us anything useful about the world.

Remember that Neo wasn't just asked to believe in a ridiculous proposition without evidence. He had reasons to doubt based on what he and others saw happening around him, and was shown the real world for what it was.

There's another way to look at the Matrix:

Neo never left the Matrix. He merely moved to a Matrix within a Matrix that the computers devised as an outlet for the rebellious humans who resisted the normal program. Morpheus and all the rest were plugged in the whole time.

It's a similar thought that someone had when they started a thread about a skeptic in heaven- if you get to heaven, can you still be skeptical about where you're really at (maybe you'[re dying in the OR and having a vivid NDE where time has really slowed down).

 

[Malerin]

But then this leads to an obvious question: from whence came God? Is God just something else that pops into existence simply because Berkeley perceives it to be so? Wouldn't this then make Berkeley, or whomever is perceiving the notion of God, the ultimate perceiver? But if that's the case, we're back to the whole tree question...

Sounds like circular logic to me.

From whence came the universe? The big bang? Why was there a big bang in the first place? Why something instead of nothing? Berkely would say that God is eternal and causeless. Some cosmoslogists say that "What caused the big bang?" is a meaningless question, like "What is North of the North Pole?" (though you can still ask "Why was there one in the first place?" Sort of like asking "Forget about North, why is there a North Pole at all?").

Any theory of reality is going to invite questions of the "Where did it all come from?" variety.

 

[Malerin]

Actually we don't know that for certain at all. In descending order of certainty:

1. I know I have a mind and thoughts.
2. I'm pretty sure there is an external universe doing its thing regardless of the content of my mind and thoughts.
3. I'm nearly as certain that some of the things in that external universe are humans with minds of their own.

However I'm less sure that you have a mind and thoughts, than I am that you exist as brute matter, because it's conceivable that you are some kind of automaton with no mind or thoughts.

You can't jump from 1 to 3 without acknowledging 2, unless you think you have some kind of telepathic means of verifying other minds' existence without recourse to the external, physical world.

You're right. I should have said "I" instead of "we".

But where is the justification for (2)? I'm not sure about that at all. I have no evidence that there's anything external to me (in the physical sense).

 

[Malerin]

That's my point. The argument is not only circular, it is also self-contradictory.

If they say God does it, but then they go with idealism and they are the ones perceiving God into existence, then how can God be the thing that perceives stuff when they're not around? (The tree example, for instance)

Who says this? I'm not aware of anyone claiming that God's existence is contingent on something perceving It.

 

[MattusMaximus]

From whence came the universe? The big bang? Why was there a big bang in the first place? Why something instead of nothing? Berkely would say that God is eternal and causeless. Some cosmoslogists say that "What caused the big bang?" is a meaningless question, like "What is North of the North Pole?" (though you can still ask "Why was there one in the first place?" Sort of like asking "Forget about North, why is there a North Pole at all?").

Any theory of reality is going to invite questions of the "Where did it all come from?" variety.

Yes, but we can all acknowledge the reality of the universe, so why layer something extra and unnecessary atop it, such as God?

As for the "what caused the big bang?" question being meaningless, I beg to differ. Just today I had an old student come back for a visit - he is currently working on his PhD in theoretical physics with Leonard Susskind at Stanford. The subject of his PhD thesis is to be to work out the theoretical details of eternal inflation, which is a theory of "what caused the big bang". We had a nice chat about it, in fact - fascinating stuff.

Oh yeah, and nowhere in his thesis will he be mentioning God, just in case you were curious.

 

[athon]

Physical doesn't refer to concepts in God's mind. The Berkeley-type reality I described would not have anything "physical" in it. If God is the ultimate perceiver, then the transfer of information (from "Chair as projection of God's mind" to "Chair being perceived by us") would follow whatever rules God thinks are appropriate.

Fine. But here's the thing I think you keep missing - that 'Chair as projecttion of God's mind' or whatever you want to call it appears to subscribe to a set of rules. THAT is physical. Call it whatever you will - matter is what we refer to when we observe rules interacting.

Yes, there would be a system in place to keep the idealistic reality orderly and internally consistent. For example, we'd all have to agree what a "tree" looks like, and that it loses it's leaves in the Fall.

Then those rules describe matter, as such. That is physical reality - the rules which describe what we see. We're in no position to describe anything beyond that. If you want to call it 'God's dream', go for it. I won't go further than simply contemplate the nature of the rules which appear to govern it.

Well, the laws don't give rise to observations. Minds do that. You can have a materialistic universe with no minds, with plenty of laws of nature, and you would never have any observations going on.

Ok, now this is plain silly. In either case, you wouldn't have observations. Even materialists admit that to observe, you need an observer. Yes, matter would exist without anybody observing it, however it is itself ultimately a moot point focusses on why things appear to change when we're not looking. Materialists rely on parsimony to say they change because the rules that govern it continue to operate on that system, regardless of observation. Idealists add a layer of compexity that says the rules are only in place in the mind's perception of it. In the end, one simply has infinitely more complex rules to say 'the ball fell from the table'.

I also think you're making a big leap from observation to reality. Just because we observe something doesn't mean reality is physical or immaterial or theistic. The most we can say is that we are experiencing (or observing) such-and-such.

Oh, I fully agree. I think you'll find most people here also agree.

The bottom line is, we have no idea whether the growing tree in my yard grows according to a set of laws external to my perception, or is part of some great computer program. However, in the absence of any reason to believe it is more complicated, assuming that these laws are external to my perception of it is simpler. In other words, what benefit does the added complication of idealism provide?

Except you could turn it around and say materialists assume a second layer of reality by positing the existence of physical objects. An idealist could argue that reality is simply thoughts and minds and the interaction between them. A materialist adds another (unecessary) layer of substance and interaction: thoughts, minds, and physical objects.

Except that's not quite true. Others have argued it well before me - we observe the laws that seem to govern our observations. That's it! That's materialism! We don't need to complicate it with gods or rules embedded in our own minds that create meaningless illusions of other people existing. It's fruitless navel-gazing at best. Science says we observe and we try to logically tie them together into relationships that we can attempt to make predictions with.

The idealist could also argue that we know for certain that thought and mind exist (in the Cartesian sense), so why muddy the waters by positing the existence of physical objects, which there is no evidence for?

Because something must govern those thoughts and minds. There appear to be laws and rules that give rise to observations. And so far, we've managed to do quite well in finding relationships between them.

The thing is, the universe appears to operate beyond our perceptions of it. If that's an illusion, you'd need to point out why it appears that way.

Athon

 

[MattusMaximus]

Who says this? I'm not aware of anyone claiming that God's existence is contingent on something perceving It.

But if you're an idealist, and you believe that you create it all in your own mind, then you must acknowledge that you are also creating the concept of God within your own mind. Otherwise, you aren't an idealist.

 

[AkuManiMani]

From whence came the universe? The big bang? Why was there a big bang in the first place? Why something instead of nothing? Berkely would say that God is eternal and causeless. Some cosmoslogists say that "What caused the big bang?" is a meaningless question, like "What is North of the North Pole?" (though you can still ask "Why was there one in the first place?" Sort of like asking "Forget about North, why is there a North Pole at all?").

Any theory of reality is going to invite questions of the "Where did it all come from?" variety.

Well, what ever one wants to call the source of "where it call came from" one can assume one can assume that its eternal and/or ex nihilo.

If you wanna take the whole Idealist position of "well its all in the mind and the mind is the mind of God" then there is no distinction between god and the universe and you're just stating pantheism in another way. Either way, you're pretty much back to where you started.

 

[Malerin]

But if you're an idealist, and you believe that you create it all in your own mind, then you must acknowledge that you are also creating the concept of God within your own mind. Otherwise, you aren't an idealist.

Ah, I see what you're asking. Some idealists do believe that we're all God, and we've forgotten what we were and created this illusion we call reality. But even those wouldn't say that God would disappear if it wasn't being perceived, because God (us) is the thing doing the perceiving. It's what the Course in Miracles people think and it doesn't make a lot of sense to me.

 

[MattusMaximus]

Ah, I see what you're asking. Some idealists do believe that we're all God, and we've forgotten what we were and created this illusion we call reality. But even those wouldn't say that God would disappear if it wasn't being perceived, because God (us) is the thing doing the perceiving. It's what the Course in Miracles people think and it doesn't make a lot of sense to me.

Okay, so it is as I suspected in one of my earlier posts. Some idealists actually believe they are God. Wow.

Why don't you think this makes sense? What is to distinguish the validity of your view from this view? How do you come to the conclusion that your view of idealism is correct? At least the Course in Miracles view addresses the contradiction I spoke of earlier.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

You're right. I should have said "I" instead of "we".

But where is the justification for (2)? I'm not sure about that at all. I have no evidence that there's anything external to me (in the physical sense).

I think you have to create a very creative definition of evidence to say that you have no evidence there is anything external to you. Have you ever found an object which you had forgotten you had lost, like a coin under a seat cushion that you had never missed? Either that coin had an existence independent of your mind, or you have an unconscious mind that performs exactly the same function as an independently-existing physical world.

Have you ever done a science experiment, and then looked up what the result was supposed to be afterwards? Amazingly, if you do the experiment properly, the results you get will be exactly the ones science predicts, even though you had no idea at the time what that result was meant to be. That's how scientists at opposite ends of the world can productively work on the same problems at the same time and share their results.

Perhaps you meant to say that you have no irrefutable proof that there is anything external to you. That would be a correct but meaningless statement. Saying that you have no evidence that there is anything external to you is daft.

So where does this get us? Well, if you accept step one (that you have a mind) but not step two, all you've got is solipsism, not an idealist universe with multiple entities coexisting. If you accept step two you've got physicalism plus at least one mind (your own). If you accept step three you've got a physicalist universe with other thinking entities in it.

But how do you manage to embrace steps one and three, without embracing step two? Idealism requires accepting that you have a mind and so do other entities, but if you don't think there's any evidence of physical stuff external to you, how on Earth can you think there is evidence of minds external to you?

 

[Malerin]

Well, what ever one wants to call the source of "where it call came from" one can assume one can assume that its eternal and/or ex nihilo.

Can you do what with a purely physical thing like the universe? What is it about the universe that makes it eternal and/or causeless? Scientists have no problem contemplating ways the universe will end (Heat Death, Big Crunch, Big Rip). With God, though, it gets a bit trickier, because you can say that to BE God is to be eternal and God IS the First Cause.

If you wanna take the whole Idealist position of "well its all in the mind and the mind is the mind of God" then there is no distinction between god and the universe and you're just stating pantheism in another way. Either way, you're pretty much back to where you started.

An idealist doesn't have to take that position. They can claim that there is God, our own minds, and the things that are projections of God's mind (which we perceive), and that these are all seperate things. Or you can be a solipsist and eliminate the whole pantheon altogether.

 

[Malerin]

Okay, so it is as I suspected in one of my earlier posts. Some idealists actually believe they are God. Wow.

Why don't you think this makes sense? What is to distinguish the validity of your view from this view? How do you come to the conclusion that your view of idealism is correct? At least the Course in Miracles view addresses the contradiction I spoke of earlier.

Here's a sample conversation with my wife (who believes in Course in Miracles):

"OK, so if we're all God, why don't we pull the plug on this whole illusion so we can get back to our Godly state? This world sucks."

"There is no illusion. It never happened."

"Then what is all this?" ::sweeping arm gesture::

"An illusion."

"But you just said it didn't exist!"

"It doesn't. You can't talk about non-duality with dualistic language."

That's the gist of most of our metaphysical conversations.

 

[Skeptic]

Russell said it best: those who think material is an illusion should get into a car and drive it into a brick wall, in a speed proportional to their degree of belief the wall isn't real.

 

[Malerin]

I think you have to create a very creative definition of evidence to say that you have no evidence there is anything external to you. Have you ever found an object which you had forgotten you had lost, like a coin under a seat cushion that you had never missed? Either that coin had an existence independent of your mind, or you have an unconscious mind that performs exactly the same function as an independently-existing physical world.

The missing coin is consistent with idealism and materialism. It's not evidence for either of them.

Have you ever done a science experiment, and then looked up what the result was supposed to be afterwards? Amazingly, if you do the experiment properly, the results you get will be exactly the ones science predicts, even though you had no idea at the time what that result was meant to be. That's how scientists at opposite ends of the world can productively work on the same problems at the same time and share their results.

Again, that can happen under idealism as well as it can under materialism.

Perhaps you meant to say that you have no irrefutable proof that there is anything external to you. That would be a correct but meaningless statement. Saying that you have no evidence that there is anything external to you is daft.

It's not daft at all. If the evidence (and I assume you're referring to what we perceive with our senses) is consistent with both idealism and materialism, then how can it be evidence for one or the other? Suppose I tap on my desk. I hear sounds and feel a hard surface (sensory evidence (or sense-data)). But why should I suppose those sensations can only occur with a material object? I'm certain you've had dreams that seemed very real to you and you weren't aware you were dreaming. Your senses seemed to work in these dreams, right? It's equally possible that the sensations I'm getting when I tap on a desk are the result of a very vivid dream.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

The missing coin is consistent with idealism and materialism. It's not evidence for either of them.

How do you explain the coin's behaviour from an idealistic perspective? It's not a mind, so it wasn't perceiving itself. You weren't perceiving it or remembering it. If all that exists are minds and mental events then that coin didn't exist while it was lost, yet it's behaviour is exactly like that of a physical object with its own existence.

Again, that can happen under idealism as well as it can under materialism.

How do you explain the consistency of physical laws from an idealistic perspective? Physical laws aren't minds either, and there was a time when no mind comprehended those laws. So why are these laws consistent, even for minds which have never interacted with each other?

In both cases you've got a problem. You can solve it by pulling God out of a hat, or pulling an unconscious mind or telepathic network out of a hat that is effectively God-like in its perfect recall and perfect understanding of how the universe behaves, but you can't just handwave it away.

It's not daft at all. If the evidence (and I assume you're referring to what we perceive with our senses) is consistent with both idealism and materialism, then how can it be evidence for one or the other? Suppose I tap on my desk. I hear sounds and feel a hard surface (sensory evidence (or sense-data)). But why should I suppose those sensations can only occur with a material object? I'm certain you've had dreams that seemed very real to you and you weren't aware you were dreaming. Your senses seemed to work in these dreams, right? It's equally possible that the sensations I'm getting when I tap on a desk are the result of a very vivid dream.

I'd like to focus on the question which I think you avoided answering. Do you think that there are minds other than your own?

If you do, why do you think there are minds other than your own? What counts as evidence for this hypothesis, by the definition of evidence you personally use?