This seems like a semantic point that does not affect the argument I make at all. Call it what you like. If, say, Citibank, UBS and Barclays all went down, there would not be a brand new set of banks opening up shop the next day, nor a whole lot of business for them to take on. What are you saying? It does not matter if several institutions fail, eventually new ones will arrive? Well maybe in a couple of decades. . . .
That's just a silly argument, because it ignores the fact that Citibank, UBS, and Barclays aren't the only games in town. One of the things that will inevitably happen is that a competitor who has more stability buys them out-- not unlike the puchase of WaMu by JP Morgan yesterday. Another example is that the failing company is broken up and business units are sold off separately from the company as a whole-- Berkshire Hathoway (to use a large, well-known example) is known for this. Aside from those two (of many) ways, there are also smaller banks with not as much capital as the giants but good enough credit to step in and take over business units or, through mergers, whole companies-- large entities like AIG or Washington Mutual would be like winning a prize to many of these companies, having loads of infrastructure already in place and saving lots of time and investment.
Now, of course this
does mean a likely period of recession as things realign and the market surrounding the acquisitions stabilizes. However, as I've been repeating in other posts, if there are already indications that we're in a recession now or that we're heading to one already, then it makes more sense to prepare the market for the period of instability and slowed investment, not contributing to the instability by purchasing all the toxic securities and hoping they stop plummeting in value.
The asset purchase will fix the symptoms, yes. "The symptoms" are feared (by policymakers) to be severe enough that they will kill the "patients" (the banks) and a whole bunch of innocent bystanders along with them (business and the public). Sometimes you need to treat symptoms. Do you disagree, always, out of some principled doctrinaire persuasion that "bailouts are bad"? Probably not, right?
No, of course not. However, wouldn't you agree that it's still not quite clear that the figurative symptoms are severe enough to kill the patient (patient = economy)? The picture I get currently from the market as a whole is that no one is going to be able to accurately predict what's going to happen, and that conclusive predictions should be looked at skeptically. Are you getting a different picture?
I am aware of this. Do you suggest that those in positions of authority are not? And nobody is saying (certainly not me--read a few other threads here) that the causes need no attention.
Nobody including myself. However, regarding whether I think those in "positions of authority" are aware of the fact that some companies are going to have to go the way of the dodo before things get better, my answer would be a very tentative "probably." My concern isn't whether they're aware of it, but whether they are using sound reasoning for picking and choosing who gets bailed out and who goes under, along with the secondary question of conflicts of interests. Frankly, I
don't think the US Congress, the Fed, or the US Treasury are equipped to decide who stays and who goes, and I get the impression that this proposal is another step in trying to take that authority on themselves. Who is equipped? No one, because no market has (or should have) that kind of certainty to it. Those are casino house rules, and this proposal would be treating the American taxpayer like a gambler.
How deeply have you analysed the situation?
I've been paying close attention to it for a few years now, ever since I took on a vested interest in real estate. However, that question has little to do with the following:
How much working capital can GE borrow and for how long and at what rate as of now? Is it enough to meet payrolls and creditors for the next month? Are you sure that a huge company nothing to do with financial services will not be driven into chapter 11 within weeks because of what is happening in money markets if nothing is done? I think the truth is you have no idea when you say "histrionics". And I don't know either. But you're claiming that you do.
I'm not claiming that I do, I'm questioning the fact that Paulson is claiming that
he does. My entire point is that
no one can be so sure, and to expect the kind of investment his bailout proposal requires pretty much hinges on how sure he claims he is. The fact that he's claiming certainty in an uncertain period is precisely why I'm so critical.
This is my point and see previous post. As things stand, the US public would buy bombed out mortgage-backed securities from UBS and Deutsche. So the Europeans don't need to. Please do not take an observation that a free-rider effect is occurring as anything other than what it is.
Oh baloney. The US is not behaving like some knight in shining armor for the Euro banks. The reason the European governments aren't taking part in this is because they currently see no need to. You're assigning motivations-- continuing to call this "free-riding" on the part of the European governments-- where no proof of such a motivation exists. The major difference between the European systems and the American system is that a few years ago Europe took moves to regulate banking and lending where the US specifically refused to take any such action (see my previous post). Other than that, the only other difference is that the US Fed is now claiming that the only way to "fix" things is to have the US government take all the risk onto itself and not continue letting the ones who bought, sold, and packaged all of this risk together to be accountable for their actions.
And I never said "European governments are doing nothing". In fact I stated what they have done. Hopefully that is clear so that there is no need to allege anything different again.
Aside from your statements about the "free-rider effect" alluding to their activities, exactly why do you posit the European governments are volunteering billions of Euros to assist in the crisis? I am saying that the answer to such a question is important in understanding why I don't think it's a good idea for the US to rush into such a move.
GreNME said:
I think you're not giving enough credit to the European entities who have decided not to offer to pay through their citizens' future wealth to engage in a plan that offers no better odds than a craps table at this point.
You could interpret that way. You could also interpret it the way I outlined. The reality probably involves some of both. Do you reject utterly that there is any view on the part of European governments that "We don't need to tap the public if the US does, and if they don't there's no point in us doing it"? How would you know, actually? I don't know for sure, but I conclude that is part of it.
I don't know for certain that any European government doesn't hold to such reasoning, but like I've already pointed out considering the number of regulatory and accountability measures European governments (and the EU) have taken on since the Parmalat debacle it's pretty safe to assume that they don't feel such action is warranted. If you are saying the reasons for
why the European governments don't think it's warranted is an important factor to examine, then I'd say that I pretty much agree-- let's find out, shall we?
You are correct to dismiss "it's complicated" answers. I think if you perused this sub-forum you would find something very much more helpful than that from many posters here. But it may serve you not to dismiss that out of hand as well.
I don't dismiss "it's complicated" based on anything anyone on this forum has said. I mostly only read (instead of post) in this subforum but I don't get that impression from anyone on this subject. Instead, I
definitely get that impression from the statements coming out of Washington, DC and from many of the pundits on television, as well as the politicization of the problem by the presidential candidates. To the latter, I think one of the worst things to happen in this crisis is to have it come under the influence of presidential campaigning, because political campaigning has a way of skewing facts and distorting the issues until they only barely resemble reality. To the former, I get the impression that the Treasury and Fed wanted this to happen too fast and that the fallout from the inevitable questions to follow isn't being handled well by the White House (who gave a wholly uninformative speech on the subject), the Fed, or the Treasury.
My position: The way this bailout proposal has come to Congress and the requirements therein are too fast and too broad (respectively) with far too little explanation and information as to why and how (respectively) the Fed and the White House (including the POTUS and Treasury Sec.) feels this is the only option for the economy right now. I understand the situation and I know it's bad. It's been that way for months now, despite recent past statements by the very individuals selling this proposal that were to the contrary. Since it's my (as a taxpayer) money and my (as a consumer) confidence that are necessary for this to even go through, then every elected and delegated official involved in this-- namely the POTUS, the Fed Chair, the Treasury Secretary, and the Senate & House Banking Committee (and possibly others)-- need to be a whole heck of a lot more transparent with me as to requiring answers and explanations, particularly on the subject of why the sudden turnaround and why the Fed and Treasury think this is the only (or even the best) answer.
Does that position really sound unreasonable to you? The same as you, I understand the reasoning being put forth by the Fed and Treasury in the proposal. I simply find that reasoning to be faulty and/or insufficient (for reasons partially touched on above).