Automatons

[Scazon]

And if it turns out that it is possible to wire two heads together and share experience

The problem is that research increasingly shows that we don't even know what our own experiences are, let alone anyone or anything else's - http://www.boingboing.net/2008/09/11/false-memories-of-tr.html

 

[Nick227]

Where else would you draw the line?

A person can experience. Ok.

What about a retarded person?

What about a really drunk person?

What about a monkey?

A dog?

A chipmunk?

A bird?

A tree?

A worm?

A thermostat?

Another issue arises over what one terms an entity. For living organisms it's pretty straightforward. For inanimate stuff it's more complex. If the inanimate entity itself does not monitor its own boundaries, can we really say it is conscious?

BTW, using the word "experience" really does cloud the issue here imo. A water molecule, for example, has no possible sense of selfhood, as far as I'm aware, let alone an "I." It's conceivable, to my mind, that it could be conscious (though the reasoning I quote above is an issue), that it has an experience cannot imo be so.

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

There’s probably no such thing as ‘pure experience’ anyway. Isn’t it always about experience of something or experiencing something? If we always must insert a relational factor by which we make experience a sort of happening, then conversely, if we strip away those relational attributes, we’re pretty much left with simply ‘being the material system', and nothing else. In this regard there’s not much difference between a water molecule (which doesn’t possess any such attributes to begin with) or a patient under general anaesthesia (in which such attributes have temporarily been blocked).

 

[rocketdodger]

Another issue arises over what one terms an entity. For living organisms it's pretty straightforward. For inanimate stuff it's more complex. If the inanimate entity itself does not monitor its own boundaries, can we really say it is conscious?

But then you get into the argument about "what, exactly, consitutes 'monitoring it's own boundaries'?"

Which just illustrates why discussions like this have very little point other than trying to show zealots that their human soul isn't so magical after all. Which doesn't apply to anyone here (I think).

BTW, using the word "experience" really does cloud the issue here imo. A water molecule, for example, has no possible sense of selfhood, as far as I'm aware, let alone an "I." It's conceivable, to my mind, that it could be conscious (though the reasoning I quote above is an issue), that it has an experience cannot imo be so.

Nick

Well then use that word if you like.

It doesn't really matter, right, because if we agreed upon an actual definition of such a word -- a definition that was not "fuzzy" in any way -- then the HPC would evaporate. Which is what us materialists have been saying for decades.

 

[Nick227]

But then you get into the argument about "what, exactly, consitutes 'monitoring it's own boundaries'?"

Human beings and many animals have a somatosensory cortex, which creates a body-map. This preserves the functional integrity of the organism, and also sets boundaries. Some machines have a function for self-monitoring.

Well then use that word if you like.

It doesn't really matter, right, because if we agreed upon an actual definition of such a word -- a definition that was not "fuzzy" in any way -- then the HPC would evaporate. Which is what us materialists have been saying for decades.

Well, "consciousness" might still be a bit of a fuzzy word, but "experience" is plain and simple dualistic, so I don't see that it's really an option.

Nick

 

[westprog]

There’s probably no such thing as ‘pure experience’ anyway. Isn’t it always about experience of something or experiencing something? If we always must insert a relational factor by which we make experience a sort of happening, then conversely, if we strip away those relational attributes, we’re pretty much left with simply ‘being the material system', and nothing else. In this regard there’s not much difference between a water molecule (which doesn’t possess any such attributes to begin with) or a patient under general anaesthesia (in which such attributes have temporarily been blocked).

I don't think this is necessarily so. It's possible to put someone in an sensory deprivation environment and tell them to think about cheese. They can do so. I think that is a valid type of experience.

It doesn't necessarily affect the main point. Access to memory of cheese is only possible because there is hardware available to store a previous experience of cheese.

 

[westprog]

The problem is that research increasingly shows that we don't even know what our own experiences are, let alone anyone or anything else's - http://www.boingboing.net/2008/09/11/false-memories-of-tr.html

Perception is a strange thing. We don't interact with the world. We interact with a model of the world that lives inside our heads. Occasionally we bump up against inconsistencies between the model and the world.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I don't think this is necessarily so. It's possible to put someone in an sensory deprivation environment and tell them to think about cheese. They can do so. I think that is a valid type of experience.

“…and tell them to think about cheese.” But isn’t that exactly inserting a relational attribute into the system? Thus it becomes an “experience” about cheese plus any other possible process happening as a result of such instruction. The term ‘experience’ would only be a sort of shorthand for the processes of lumping different processes together into a seemingly whole – kind of like ‘money’. You still wouldn’t find ‘pure experience’ any more than you would find the ‘essence of money’.

It doesn't necessarily affect the main point. Access to memory of cheese is only possible because there is hardware available to store a previous experience of cheese.

Yes, I think it’s more than enough that the brain simply processes stimuli/data through its physiological structures, which consequently creates functionality in regards to certain stimulus; mostly in terms of neuronal circuits or patterns. ‘Understanding’ the instruction (thinking about cheese) would in this case simply be the manifestation of a particular physical neuronal pattern, moulded in conjunction with external stimuli over time (seeing, touching, tasting cheese etc.), trough biological predisposition in regards to cellular structures (memories about cheese). Where would the actual “experience” of cheese be? I would say nowhere in particular.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Perception is a strange thing. We don't interact with the world. We interact with a model of the world that lives inside our heads. Occasionally we bump up against inconsistencies between the model and the world.

Although ‘the map is not the territory’ assertion looks good on paper, it’s not necessarily so clear cut. Isn’t the very act of creating a model part of a real world happening? Where exactly would you draw the distinction? From a more holistic point of view, ‘the map certainly seems to be part of the territory’.

 

[westprog]

Although ‘the map is not the territory’ assertion looks good on paper, it’s not necessarily so clear cut. Isn’t the very act of creating a model part of a real world happening? Where exactly would you draw the distinction? From a more holistic point of view, ‘the map certainly seems to be part of the territory’.

The map is usually part of some territory, if you look closely enough. I like to peer through the windows of the model building you see in the lobby of some offices to try to see myself. It's quite clear that even if the map is part of the territory, it's very different to the territory that it models.

 

[westprog]

Penrose's conclusion is simply the result of a fallacy. An error in logic.

If you don't believe me (but I suspect you do) simply google lucas + penrose + fallacy. Hell, if you just google lucas + penrose, something like half the links are to articles criticising the thesis/theory/whatever-one-should-call-it.

http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-23-penrose.html gives some of the chief arguments against Penrose, and his responses.

 

[Scazon]

The internal model, as it has developed over the billion(s) of years of our evolution, has been good enough to allow those who have used that model to reproduce. So it obviously has a correlation with whatever external reality may be there, at least in the areas that have mattered historically. It's also clear that it's not a perfect model, and that details of the model differ, sometimes startlingly, between different people. Some of the difference is due to the memory-supplied but not consciously perceived loadings that are applied by the model to external stimuli, that may be the same thing that the Freudians refer to as the Unconscious, others as the soul, and that some of us would call the memome.

I don't know if any of you winced when Dennett told Dawkins in the recent interview that he was happy to say he had a soul- and that the soul is a process of the mind- I took him as referring to such a system.

 

[Beerina]

Well, at completely non-reproducible molecular (more likely quantum) level, yes. Why is that a problem?

Well, at completely non-reproducible molecular (more likely quantum) level, yes. Why is that a problem?

I'm still waiting for a coherent argument that the magical black box of a "spiritual soul" does things in any manner whatsoever other than a completely deterministic (with possible true random influences) manner.


I'd settle for a problem that a (universal) Turing machine was proven it can't solve, but that a human could. This would be interesting because either:

1. There exists a computational model more powerful than a Turing machine yet still finite.

or

2. There exists a computational model with infinite capabilities and such a thing actually exists.


Either one is a tremendously important development.

 

[westprog]

I'd settle for a problem that a (universal) Turing machine was proven it can't solve, but that a human could./quote]

I suggest a visit to the link above. The arguments against Penrose, and his response - which are both extremely complex - are gone into in depth.

 

[rocketdodger]

I suggest a visit to the link above. The arguments against Penrose, and his response - which are both extremely complex - are gone into in depth.

And... Chalmer's argument against Penrose still stands.

If you read section 3 carefully, you will notice that Penrose backtracks so far in order to wriggle out of Chalmer's argument that his original theory is completely shot.

Penrose's original theory is based on the idea of a "idealized" mathematician that is aware not only of the formal system underlying its own thought processes, but of the soundness of that formal system. Chalmer's counter is that such an entity -- one who fully believes the soundness all of its own beliefs -- is inherently contradictory because, in short, of its ability to generate some version of the Epimenides paradox.

In section 3, Penrose claims that in fact the entity need only believe the soundess of its own beliefs regarding Godel statements rather than all beliefs. But how can such an entity be an "idealized" mathematician if its confidence is so limited? What does the existence of such an entity have to do with the human mathematicians Penrose completely relies upon for his theory? Is it even possible for a "mathematician" (human or otherwise) to be able to deduce the soundness of a Godel statement without being able to deduce the soundness of any others?

There are a great many different ways to show the fallacy of Penrose's argument. Here is a good one: http://www.mth.kcl.ac.uk/~llandau/Homepage/Math/penrose.html

My own take -- which may be wrong because I won't waste my time actually reading his book, based on all I have read about it -- is that his theory requires us to delude ourselves into thinking we are actually as analytical and precise as a strong AI to begin with, and even then his arguments appear to be invalid. Unless all his detractors are simply wrong -- which I doubt, based upon his own responses in the article you linked to.

 

[Miss_Kitt]

Hmmm -- I have to admit I stopped detail reading when the topic moved to about 3 posters arguing the Hard Problem of Consciousness (complete with mysteries terms like chinese rooms and p-zombies). I am interested in Toady's original line of thought, which I interpret as meaning: "If I don't have an immortal soul, then what's the point of anything?" It also seems to imply that not having a "soul" also means not having the ability to value anything--which, as prior posts pointed out, implies a belief in intrinsic value.

As I see it, the content of our minds--including our experience of our lives, and our sense of self-awareness--being something dependent upon the structure and activity of our brains doesn't make us "meat robots" or "just going through the motions." It makes no difference whether my arm moves because nerves are sending signals to muscle fibers, as far as my ability to enjoy throwing the ball to my daughter is concerned. If the Truth behind it is that my mind, situated in my immortal Soul, commands my Astral Body that then controls its physical analog in the Prime Material Plane--or, as suggested above, that neurons are firing in my brain, nerves passing on messages to muscles while receiving and reacting to feedback from sensory systems--it doesn't matter to me.

What I experience is the pleasure of my body doing what I want it to; the pleasure of doing something for my beloved child that she wants; the pride of a mother watching her offspring develop new skills and confidence; the warmth, color, and tantalising aromas of a late summer day; and the bittersweet awareness that my 'baby' is now a well-grown child, with adolescent awkwardness and teenage angst closer to today than her first steps. And I experience this all in a few moments, a second or two at most.

Whatever the process, it is my life, and I enjoy it. It is my daughter's life, and I cherish it. If my experience of Self and Life is an 'emergent quality' of my brain, that doesn't make my experience of it any less real. If it is the result of evolutionary pressure that makes valuing one's offspring a desireable trait, that does not diminish my love for her.

I'm completely at a loss to understand why Toady thinks that somehow those things don't matter if the underlying cause is biologic.

 

[westprog]

our experience of our lives, and our sense of self-awareness--being something dependent upon the structure and activity of our brains doesn't make us "meat robots" or "just going through the motions." It makes no difference whether my arm moves because nerves are sending signals to muscle fibers, as far as my ability to enjoy throwing the ball to my daughter is concerned. If the Truth behind it is that my mind, situated in my immortal Soul, commands my Astral Body that then controls its physical analog in the Prime Material Plane--or, as suggested above, that neurons are firing in my brain, nerves passing on messages to muscles while receiving and reacting to feedback from sensory systems--it doesn't matter to me.

What I experience is the pleasure of my body doing what I want it to; the pleasure of doing something for my beloved child that she wants; the pride of a mother watching her offspring develop new skills and confidence; the warmth, color, and tantalising aromas of a late summer day; and the bittersweet awareness that my 'baby' is now a well-grown child, with adolescent awkwardness and teenage angst closer to today than her first steps. And I experience this all in a few moments, a second or two at most.

Whatever the process, it is my life, and I enjoy it. It is my daughter's life, and I cherish it. If my experience of Self and Life is an 'emergent quality' of my brain, that doesn't make my experience of it any less real. If it is the result of evolutionary pressure that makes valuing one's offspring a desireable trait, that does not diminish my love for her.

I'm completely at a loss to understand why Toady thinks that somehow those things don't matter if the underlying cause is biologic.

I think the fundamental philosophical difference is between people who think that the feeling between Miss Kitt and her Kitt-en is objectively real, and those who think it is a subjective fiction in an essentially meaningless universe.

 

[Toady]

In post #18, after at least a dozen simple, straightforward replies, you were "struggling with the thought of non-existence and non-purpose"

Now that you have had quite a bit of elaboration on those answers, do you still think the word 'grapple' is appropriate?

I don't understand your question. I was merely explaining the reason I started the thread. Yes, "grapple" is appropriate, because I wanted to see how others reacted to these thoughts of physicality, non-existence, and so forth. "Grapple" means, basically, to deal with or overcome.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I think the fundamental philosophical difference is between people who think that the feeling between Miss Kitt and her Kitt-en is objectively real, and those who think it is a subjective fiction in an essentially meaningless universe.

It might seem that way. I however find the distinction fundamentally unsound (as you probably know from my earlier posts already). I.e., the mistake is to create the distinction in the first place.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I was merely explaining the reason I started the thread. Yes, "grapple" is appropriate, because I wanted to see how others reacted to these thoughts of physicality, non-existence, and so forth. "Grapple" means, basically, to deal with or overcome.

Well, for me it wasn’t so much about overcoming anything, more like a release from a ridiculous stranglehold; ‘ridiculous’ because it was a self-caused stranglehold to begin with.

I think Marquis de Carabas said it best (page 1; post #27):

Life, like a Saturday afternoon, finds its ruination in purpose.