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Admit it, you believe in animal rights.

Do you believe in animal rights?

  • Yes

    Votes: 81 44.0%
  • No

    Votes: 89 48.4%
  • Undecided

    Votes: 14 7.6%

  • Total voters
    184
Volatile: I've already said it's not that simple, and even gave a real-life anecdote of how it's not. If your world is filled with such two-dimensional motivations or if you honestly believe that the eating of meat is based on such two-dimensional moral considerations, then we're going to be at an impasse yet again. The way you're pushing your so-called dilemma is similar to that old canard "the most devious thing Satan did was convincing the world he doesn't exist"-- it's assuming a basis of reference by its language that already assumes a conclusion, trapping the argument in a recursive loop. No matter what "answer" is given, it will be followed with "Aha! This proves..." followed with the pre-assumed conclusion. Rinse, repeat.

Instead of going around in this circle, I'm just going to do like I mentioned earlier and find the post I meant to complete and put it here for you. It's at home, so it'll happen this evening.
 
Volatile: I've already said it's not that simple, and even gave a real-life anecdote of how it's not.

The Heiress Problem is that simple. It's a straight-forward self-contained thought experiment which is essentially your own argument turned back against you, after all. It has consistently been your position that meat-eating was OK as long as harm was minimized. All the Problem does is exchange taste for another, equally flimsy, self-satisfaction. Your anecdote has little or nothing to do with it.

So: we have, hypothetically, improved living standards, removed the pain of death and yet her actions still stick in our collective throats. Why do you think that is?

I suggest that it is because, really, even when harm is eliminated from the raising of animals, killing them for trivial whim plucks a moral chord if the circumstances of death are other than in the context of food. Do you have an alternate explanation?

It's telling, actually, that you reuse to answer this rather straightforward set of questions because you think your answer would represent some sort of moral trump. That should give you pause for thought, actually, because the reticence you have in answering is entirely at the heart of why you're so very wrong on this issue. It seems you've realised the inconsistency, seen it to be unjustifiable and are now, dishonestly, trying to wriggle from the hook you yourself have made with your arguments for reduced harm. That's rather shameful.

If your world is filled with such two-dimensional motivations or if you honestly believe that the eating of meat is based on such two-dimensional moral considerations, then we're going to be at an impasse yet again.
Come on, now. You know my views are not two-dimensional, because I actually give depth, thought, consideration and justification to my actions. You, on the other hand, seem to prefer not to.

If there is a reason for killing for food as compelling as that in your anecdote, let's hear it. You've not given it so far (and, it seems, have gone to great lengths to actually avoid giving it, for some reason).
 
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GreNME said:
No matter what "answer" is given, it will be followed with "Aha! This proves..." followed with the pre-assumed conclusion. Rinse, repeat.
I disagree. I think the use of hypothetical situations, when used in a much broader context (as volatile intends to do), are important for discerning just where we stand on the issue, and to clear out potential problems with any particular stance.

Saying "Aha! That proves X, so therefore, I'm right! Nyah!" is the most likely result is pretty insulting to Volatile, I feel.
 
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I disagree. I think the use of hypothetical situations, when used in a much broader context (as volatile intends to do), are important for discerning just where we stand on the issue, and to clear out potential problems with any particular stance.

Saying "Aha! That proves X, so therefore, I'm right! Nyah!" is the most likely result is pretty insulting to Volatile, I feel.

Thanks for that, Wulfy.

To be fair on him, he is at least partially correct - the experiment was, of course, initially presented (by Cain) as something intended to underscore the veracity of our position. This is, of course, by no means guaranteed, though, and there may well be a response to the dilemma which can reconcile a support for harm reduction with a simultaneous unwilligness to refrain from killing to sate whims. But unless someone, anyone, actually gives such a response, we'll never know.

The only reason Cain presented this in the first place is because our pleas for an explanation on the more direct question went unheeded. Sadly, abstracting it a little seems to have been similarly unsuccessful in eliciting a cogent argument, even though it has rattled some intellectual cages.
 
Note: the earlier post I was working on has been edited to include the posts by Princess from the previous page. I also only found a partial copy of my explanation and quickly filled in some blanks. That may have affected the flow a little bit, but I've been awake for about 36 hours and I'm invoking exhaustion as my excuse for grammar and other minor errors. :)

The main point is that eating meat is neither moral nor immoral, but is instead ethically neutral even though it may be asserted that it is either moral or immoral. Arguments asserting immorality, while obviously sufficient for some, do not and (to date) have not managed to be presented convincingly to lead me to believe that the action of eating meat is in fact immoral. The argument of “moral schizophrenia” quite simply disregards human social framework, as well as ignoring that s similar phenomenon to a more instinctual degree occurs even in other animals. The syllogism presented by Singer leading from pain (or death) does not establish a basis for rights or not eating meat. It attempts to establish a basis for rights, and that attempt is what is typically used to establish not consuming them for meat, but the basis is flawed and relatively arbitrary. Also, one can still be against some parts of the (meat) industry without being against eating meat, so the use of the problems in the industry does not a convincing argument make when there are efforts already in motion and available to try to address those things. This is, in my opinion, a "throw the baby out with the bathwater" type of approach and I don't agree with it.

Gary Francione, who has accused society of “moral schizophrenia,” is incorrect in his accusation because he disregards social framework in humans. The explanation of his "moral schizophrenia" is that while people say they take the interests of animals seriously and even consider pets members of their family, on the whole society treats animals as commodities or as property with little or no value (sound familiar?). It should be no surprise that I take umbrage at this accusation, and not just because it ignores the idea of social network structure in humans (and many animals). Basically, the idea of social network structure in humans is that we have several layers of differing degrees of social networks, each with different degrees of intrinsic and extrinsic value to the individual at the center. While it's possible for someone reading this thread to not have such a collection of social networks, it's highly unlikely and is an exception to an otherwise elementary social (psycological) concept. Of course someone is going to hold those closer to them as having more intrinsic (and possibly extrinsic) value, because that is how our social processes work as human beings [better explanation]. It's not a "moral schizophrenia" that causes humans to have such networks, it's a natural product of humans being social creatures. Given that as being a more established social fact than Francione's assertion, it's also interesting to note the relation of the complexities of these social networks to the focus of the resources to individual survival. With the social networks of prey and herbivore animals, support and resources tend to go to all members and all young despite the parents of the young animals. Predators or carnivores, on the other hand, tend to have more complex social networks where individual adults do not always care for the yound communally, and are in many cases just as likely to kill the competition. The reason this is interesting in relation to human social behavior is that human social behavior falls roughly in the middle of those two sides, with the individual and the group existing in varying degrees to benefit each other. If you want to talk about it ethically you can say it's because humans have developed civilization and ethics to reason, though wolf packs and chimpanzees also have similar behaviors (though less complex) and are hunting species. The difference between human social groups and other animal social groups is not that humans may include other species (and they do) in those circles sharing in the resources, but that humans are the only species who do it with the ability to reason future probabilities due to those shared relationships and work to gain advantage-- and arguably a mutual advantage in the case of some species (though equally arguably not all). That's not a "moral schizophrenia" or hypocrisy, as has been argued. That's how human beings operate as social creatures. Remove the non-human animals and that behavior still remains, both in the humans and to the animals (to a less-complex degree). My opinion on the matter is that you need to do more than apply pointed rhetorical accusations of immorality to make that case that it's indeed immoral before I cease to consider it exactly what it is: social constructs between several species. This applies as much to the dog as a species as it does to the chicken or the cow, all three of which would not exist in the forms they have today (and, at least in the case of dogs, not at all) if it weren't for the existence of the construct I describe. The implication I find most objectionable about Francione's accusation (and to a degree, Cain's rewording) is that it leads logically to the extinction of species based on the supposition of moral superiority. I'm quite sure that neither Francione nor Cain (nor Volatile, Lonewulf, and Princess) see the argument as having that kind of motive behind it, but that's how it goes when it comes to unintended consequences and pavements of good intentions. I don't mean to sound too over-the-top there, but that's precisely the implication I see behind the logic and I don't find the arguments using such logic to be making a strong moral case compared to my own ethics regarding the welfare of animals.

The argument establishing “interests,” namely the avoidance of pain and death, to rights for animals is does not support asserting that eating meat is immoral. I don't have a problem with the explanation Princess gave further expanding on quality of life and how it helps to define our interests (as Singer puts it) and the interests of non-humans. The problem I have is the assertion that it leads inexorably to humans not consuming meat on that basis. Naturally, living things want to continue living and will operate in a manner condusive to their continued existence. However, as RandFan pointed out predation is part of that whole life cycle irrespective of whether humans are involved in the process. Removing humans from the process isn't even going to reduce the amount of predation in that larger cycle of life on the planet by a significant margin, at least not in comparison of the amount of predation by non-humans today to the exploitation of animals by humans for meat. Unless the conclusion is that all predation is a violation of an animal's right-to-life in a more or less equal degree-- which leads to a similar implication to the one in the previous paragraph where I object, in my assessment-- the argument using the argument of pain avoidance or quality of life seems as equally "speciesist" (to borrow the term) in its indictment as the usual targets of that word are accused of being. Sure, the advanced metacognition and sapience that distinguishes humans from pretty much the rest of the animal kingdom can be invoked as a mitigating factor for being more deserving-- namely that our ability to think and consider consequences places us in a more precarious position ethically-- but as I pointed out in this and the previous paragraph these are constructs that might include humans but are not examples of human-intentioned cruelty. I suppose you could posit that there is malign intent that would make it unethical, and depending on the circumstances and the degree I might even agree, but the reality is that kind of thought isn't even on the ethical radar of the vast majority of human beings, so no such motives could be established. So again, the onus falls on the one claiming it is an unethical or immoral behavior to provide a reference and supporting information describing why it's unethical and immoral, not on the individuals for whom the ethical status is almost completely neutral-- though not totally neutral, because I've said that there are valid cases for cruelty in the food-producing industry. As an analogy, one might strive to become a police officer or a soldier in the military because they want an opportunity to kill, but that doesn't necessitate the conclusion that police or military are immoral because such an individual might exist. This is in part what I mean with the "throw the baby out with the bathwater" approach I mentioned earlier.

To use this opportunity to respond to Princess and her (I'm assuming gender, correct me if necessary) posts on page 17, I find the explanation refreshingly honest and I appreciate the addressing of the point I made, but whether I find the explanation "adequate" is going to depend on what you mean by the word. I find it sufficiently believable that you honestly feel that way, and I appreciate the tone in which you present it, but I don't find it convincing, in large part for reasons described above. Plainly put, I disagree that the best thing we can do is leave all animals and their habitats alone, because I believe such a thing is impossible. Humans have spread out and increased numbers exponentially over the course of just a few thousand years, and that growth shows no signs of stopping. The best I believe humans can do-- and this is in both our best interests and the best interests of other species-- is to learn how to exist in a more sustainable and mutually beneficial manner with all of the ecosystems we inhabit (which is practically all of them). A natural outcropping of this is going to involve predation of some sort, just as natural ecosystems have periods of growth and culling in the constant process of trying to achieve homeostasis. The only realistic way human beings could exist without affecting (and being affected by) other species is for human beings to leave the planet post haste. And on a personal level (for me), only rarely have I ever come across a non-human animal that I couldn't appreciate, though I'll point out that for every cane toad or mute swan example of an invasive species destroying the ecology, it's the AR side of the issue who has been arguing to allow it to happen. That is, quite frankly, no better in my opinion than the cruelty those who eat meat get accused of.

That last part of Francione's arguments-- which call for complete abolition of domestic animals and any animal exploitation-- don't seem to be present in the thread, and as far as I can tell accusations of that view toward Cain or Volatile have been denied by them. So are the arguments using the parts of arguments unaware of the implications Francione (or others) might make, or are people picking and choosing pieces from those arguments to make their own to avoid the obvious conclusions in those arguments to begin with? My guess would be neither of those, and that instead the arguments that have been picked up from 'animal rights' ethical arguments are instead more focused on the industries involved in the consumption of meat and how they unarguably have failings when it comes to the humane treatment of animals. In that, however, the main difference seems to be the approach to addressing the problems of the inhumane treatment, to which it seems again to be a matter of degree and not of morality behind the differing approaches. Yes, I understand the moral component used in the arguments for removal of any and all industry using domestic animals or their by-products for food, but that moral component is not necessary to have a problem with those industries and to want change. Thus, while the issue might be a moral one to someone like Cain or Volatile, that does not necessitate it being a moral issue for everyone, even though (I think) the issue is still a valid one to bring up.

Also, the same goes for the consumption of meat, in that while it becomes a moral issue for those who are against it for moral reasons, that does not in itself necessitate it being a moral issue to everyone-- and not even to everyone who eschews consuming meat, since not everyone does for the same reasons. If you, as someone who is vegan or vegetarian, want me to justify it on a moral level, you have to convince me that it's a moral issue on a level larger than your own individual and subjective view, because it does not seem that way to me and I'm not opposed to the vegan or vegetarian choice on their own merits (I just don't share them). To ask me to argue otherwise-- that is, to ask me to argue it as if it were a moral issue when I don't see it as one (or see it as morally neutral)-- is illogical and asking me to presuppose a condition that has not yet been established (at least not outside of the individual's choice to not eat meat). From the position of moral relativity, that kind of choice is perfectly valid for an individual to make, but it doesn't require every individual to make it or to use it as a basis.

Given that the eating of meat is not an issue of morality with me, I choose to eat meat because it is a superior source of the nutrients I need to survive compared to the alternatives, in that it provides a greater amount of those nutrients at one serving than any one of the alternatives, and even more than some of the alternatives combined in several configurations. In essence, it's a matter of practicality. I don't do it for the taste, because there are other things I find more tasty by far (like apples, grapes, and such), so the accusation that I would eat meat because I prefer the taste is a bit useless in my case (even the spices I use to flavor meat are herbs or plant oils). It really does boil down to that. All the rest of this post is explaining how I could possibly have the temerity to consider it morally neutral, when the explanation for why I eat meat can be summed up in a single, short sentence: It meets a need and I have been given no reason to consider it immoral.
 
Re: the heiress question.

I had sincerely wanted to get off of this merry go round but having thought about it, I’m willing to respond to this particular query and perhaps a follow-up or two but not much more than that. Let me also add that I have no illusions that my response will change anyone’s opinion.

You and I see the world in very different ways. I don’t see it in stark black and white terms nor do I think that morality is absolute and/or fixed.
Before I respond, let me give you two hypothetical-moral dilemmas. I’ve already given one of them in this thread but I didn’t ask for a response. Since no one did respond I don’t know if it was even considered by anyone.

Hypothetical #1: There is a bus stranded in a war zone behind enemy lines filled with civilians. It’s known that it is typical for the enemy to kill civilians caught behind enemy lines. There is a crying baby that won’t stop. Should the baby’s life be sacrificed to ensure the life of everyone else?

Researchers tell us that parents are more likely to say no and people who have never had children are more likely to say yes?

Hypothetical #2 a.): A runaway trolley is hurtling down the tracks toward five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. You can save these five people by diverting the trolley onto a different set of tracks, one that has only one person on it, but if you do this that person will be killed. Is it morally permissible to turn the trolley and thus prevent five deaths at the cost of one? Most people say yes.

#2 b.): Once again, the trolley is headed for five people. You are on a footbridge over the tracks next to a large man. The only way to save the five people is to push this man off the bridge and into the path of the trolley. Is that morally permissible? Most people say no.

The problem Volatile is that morality is demonstrably not fixed and absolute even in the same minds. Morality is an evolved set of traits, emotions and neurocognitive calculations. When we come to a moral problem we must rely on our brain, upbringing (environment) and our reason.

You keep stressing over and over that moral truth transcends natural justification but I don’t see it that way. Unless you believe in the supernatural you are left with the fact that morality is the result of our natural brain functioning in response to environmental programming and stimuli (in other words, natural). Given the premises it might very well be fallacy to justify behavior based on our nature but we can’t escape that our morality is the result of nature.

Back to the dilemmas, we know that in the first hypothetical that a person’s response can be strongly influenced by his or her maternal instinct that doesn’t usually kick in until after a person has a child.

In the second hypothetical researchers believe, based on brain imaging, that different areas of the brain are involved in different moral decisions. In other words, it’s possible for us to come to very different moral conclusions even when the outcome is the same simply because we use different areas of the brain to come to those decisions.

My response to the heiress question: I don’t see a stark black and white, good or bad moral conclusion. I have my own personal emotional response to it and find myself morally uncomfortable with her decision. Does that make it immoral? Perhaps to me it does. Obviously, to her, it doesn’t.

Could I be persuaded to find it morally unobjectionable? Yes.
The interesting question is why? Why do I see a difference between the actions of the heiress and eating animals? Well, there are a few different options.
  1. I could have evolved to have a different moral sense as to the propriety of eating animals and the care of pets.
  2. I was indoctrinated to have a different moral sense as to the propriety of eating animals and the care of pets.
  3. Like the trolley hypothetical there could be different regions of my brain at work in calculating the moral propriety of eating animals and the care of pets.
  4. All of the above.
Given that Hindus find the eating of beef objectionable and other societies don’t have the same disinclination of killing and even eating dogs and cats (animals I consider pets) as I do and given what I know about the evolved sense of eating animals and the neurocognitive mechanics of morality I would have to say it is #4, all of the above.

My genetic predisposition as it relates to animals not being killed and eaten by humans is likely not as strong as yours. My upbringing was perhaps different (I was raised on a farm and I slaughtered hundreds of animals). My regions of the brain that perform such calculations may very well be different than yours. Hell, it’s possible that I might be incapable of having a sense that eating animals is wrong (I doubt that BTW).

Morality, it seems, has two important components: A reasoned one and an emotional one. Oddly enough one can first reason a different morality from one’s emotional sense of right and wrong. Further one can later change his or her emotions to align with reason. This happened to me as it relates to gay rights. I at one time had a strong emotional response against granting rights to gays and lesbians. Over time I reasoned that the emotional response was irrational and decided that it was immoral to feel that way. Eventually I came to have a strong emotional response in favor of gay and lesbian rights.

I honestly don’t have an emotional response when it comes to eating animals. It’s something I’ve thought an awful lot about and I’ve never experienced any dissonance or unease. Further I have no good reason to think that my lack of an emotional response is in any way irrational. I know you don’t like that and I’m sorry. It is simply a fact. I’m not justifying why it is right because it is natural. I’m saying that absent a reason to think otherwise my natural sense of right and wrong is simply different than yours.

Finally, I know that animal husbandry can be very beneficial to animals and I honestly think there will come a day when most animals are left only to tooth, claw and the elements. You see that as a good thing. I don’t.
 
Alleged moral neutrality -- eating meat is neither moral nor immoral

Question anyone who claims neutrality on a moral issue.

Just because morality is not a factor for you when it comes to eating meat does not mean you are neutral on the matter, let alone absolve you from responsibility. Morality enters the equation whenever we are dealing with morally significant beings who we are capable of helping or harming. If you were the last living organism in the universe, then you could persuasively argue that your actions are neither moral nor immoral, but given circumstances where you are imposing upon others is another matter. Your other comments here and in this thread betray that basic truth:

"ethical arguments are instead more focused on the industries involved in the consumption of meat and how they unarguably have failings when it comes to the humane treatment of animals."

We can take an amoral system like capitalism. I own a farming operation and I want to maximize profits. I'm morally indifferent with regard to the extent of animal suffering. Maybe overcrowding increases profits, maybe it leads to more disease and an inferior product that does not sell. Let the free market sort out how I treat dairy cows, pigs, veal calves, etc.

Practicality, not Taste

The difference here is cosmetic, and I think "convenience" is probably a more appropriate term than "practicality." In some ways you're actually taking a step backwards: people are passionate about how food tastes, the social environment its experienced in, the memories triggered by similar pleasant meals from the past, and new memories to draw upon in the future. The virtue of laziness is a harder sell.

"Moral schizophrenia" disregards the dynamics of social interaction

This (rather long) discussion fails to account for the is-ought distinction.

It's not a "moral schizophrenia" that causes humans to have such networks, it's a natural product of humans being social creatures.

In addition to claiming human beings are social animals, Aristotle made the observation ("observation") that slavery was a matter of natural law:

"For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave." -- Politics

In any event these social networks are often morally arbitrary, though thankfully fluid. I mentioned this before -- Singer sees an expanding circle.


The Extinction

The implication I find most objectionable about Francione's accusation (and to a degree, Cain's rewording) is that it leads logically to the extinction of species based on the supposition of moral superiority. I'm quite sure that neither Francione nor Cain (nor Volatile, Lonewulf, and Princess) see the argument as having that kind of motive behind it, but that's how it goes when it comes to unintended consequences and pavements of good intentions. I don't mean to sound too over-the-top there, but that's precisely the implication I see behind the logic and I don't find the arguments using such logic to be making a strong moral case compared to my own ethics regarding the welfare of animals.

Even assuming extinction -- of what exactly -- farm animals, pets? -- granting the "supposition of moral superiority" characterization," then what are the unintended consequences and how are they bad?


Moral Agents vs. Nature: A Comparison in Suffering

However, as RandFan pointed out predation is part of that whole life cycle irrespective of whether humans are involved in the process. Removing humans from the process isn't even going to reduce the amount of predation in that larger cycle of life on the planet by a significant margin, at least not in comparison of the amount of predation by non-humans today to the exploitation of animals by humans for meat.

First of all, the "significant margin, at least not in comparison of the amount of predation by non-humans" is faulty reasoning. This is not unlike the economic fallacy people commit when they are willing to drive across town to save five dollars on a CD that normally costs $18, but unwilling to drive across town to save five dollars on a computer that costs $300. Five dollars is five dollars.

Put in terms of discrete lives saved rather than continuous dollar amounts, it's not unlike the old story of the man walking along the beach throwing starfish back into the ocean. A now irritated neighbor who has watched him do this twice a day, everyday finally says: "It's futile; they're still going to keep coming back. What does it matter?" The man picks one off the ground, tosses it into the ocean and says, "It mattered to that one!" (Then under his breath he solemnly repeats the line while a grin creeps across his face, "It mattered to that one." /Hollywood)

Suppose hundreds of years from now we develop the technologies and the will to eliminate all unnecessary suffering for animals "in the wild." Is this stunning accomplishment worthless in light of knowledge that morally significant beings are suffering on another planet in the universe?

Finally, human beings kill billions upon billions of animals for food, so I'm not sure who can call it insignificant. If we take your argument seriously, then why again the concern for "humane" treatment on our farms? That should be a pittance.

Incidentally this type of argument has much more force when it comes to macro-effects -- e.g., going vegetarian for one day in order to reduce greenhouse gases, or for that matter changing any of your personal consumption patterns in an effort to reduce your environmental footprint. In the grand scheme of things these personal lifestyle choices are not going to make a planetary difference, and if they're not obligatory, then it's far more "practical"/convenient/in accordance with one's material "evolutionary nature"/self-interest to consume. The only rationally self-interested reason one might refuse to consume is that by "going Green" a person can signal social concern, and by displaying a moral superiority win the social approval of others as a concerned citizen.

Miscellaneous comments:

Gary Francione -- You spend most of your time rebutting the claims, arguments and language of a person mentioned by no one in this discussion except for yourself. Inasmuch as arguments by resident vegans overlap, and they do seem to overlap quite a bit, I'm sure no one objects. However, at best you're attacking a photo-copy rather than the original.

My opinion on the matter is that you need to do more than apply pointed rhetorical accusations of immorality to make that case that it's indeed immoral before I cease to consider it exactly what it is: social constructs between several species.

We are doing more than making "rhetorical accusations" -- we're constructing moral arguments.

Meandering -

Unless the conclusion is that...

which leads to a similar implication to the one in the previous paragraph where I object....

Sure, the advanced metacognition...

but as I pointed out in this and the previous paragraph...

I suppose you could posit...

but the reality is...

...so no such motives could be established. So again...

because I've said that...

As an analogy...

This is in part what I mean with the "throw the baby out with the bathwater" approach I mentioned earlier.

This is stream of consciousness, inner-dialog, not a clear argument. Worse, there are no marked road signs to help make sense of references to other parts of the post (an indicator of sloppy writing) in part because all of this stuff is smushed together in reader-unfriendly bloc paragraphs.
-------------------
RandFan:

Hypotheticals

I'm not sure what these hypotheticals are supposed to demonstrate. A large part of our moral beliefs are determined by upbringing/nature, which no one disputes. The problem with these is that they tread in uncertainty. Is it possible the baby will stop crying, or that no one will hear it? In the heat of the moment, only action heroes think fast enough when it comes to derailing a trolley. How do we know that pushing the fat man over will not create seven victims (the five originals, the fall guy, and me doing hard time). (I'm also not sure how we're supposed to silence the baby. If it's out of reach, then won't the gun shot signal our position to the enemy? If it's within reach, then why can't we muzzle it? Whatever, I'll assume that someone in our squadron named Billy Mayes spent time in a traveling circus and he happens to be an expert knife thrower.) I think the trolley one appears in Practical Ethics. A better, more appropriate example comes later, with the baby drowning in the fountain, but that's neither here nor there. Presumably these would be brought to bear on other moral scenarios (gay marriage, right) where they would also seem out of place.

Let's also face facts: a lot of people do not bother subjecting their moral beliefs to serious scrutiny. I imagine self-described skeptics will be rather more willing to challenge custom and not take things for granted.

My genetic predisposition as it relates to animals not being killed and eaten by humans is likely not as strong as [Volatile's].

How can you have the faintest idea what your genetic predisposition is "as it relates to animals," let alone compare it to his? Because he refuses to eat animals while you do? Or maybe vegans just have stronger will power. Or maybe you encountered arguments for veganism too late in life and you're now set in your ways Anyway, socialization, as per your own examples, is probably a far more important factor (compare the diet of Hindus versus Americans and I doubt genes play much of a role; compare attitudes toward homosexuality now versus the fifites, or attitudes toward animals shifting over time). How is any of this stuff relevant?

None of this inward speculation really matters because you fail to address the example. More reasoning, less sharing of emotions.

I mean, we could go back in time and kidnap old man Courothers from the fifties.

Cain: Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to marry?
Old Man Courothers: Marry? They should be lined up and shot!
C: But that's crazy, Mr. Courothers. How can you justify that?
OMC: Every time I look around it's in my face.
C: What??
OMC: You have to understand: I'm old.
C: So you can't come up with any reasons?
OMC: I'm basically a moral retard. It's just... who I am.
C: How bizarre.
 
Even assuming extinction -- of what exactly -- farm animals, pets? -- granting the "supposition of moral superiority" characterization," then what are the unintended consequences and how are they bad?

This is just a re-statement, in verbose form, of the rather silly argument that goes something like "If we didn't eat cows, cows would be extinct - and you wouldn't want that, would you?". It's actually only a slightly more thought-out version of "for every animal you don't eat, I'll eat three" taunt, come to think of it.

And we're accused of lacking nuance and depth?
 
My response to the heiress question: I don’t see a stark black and white, good or bad moral conclusion. I have my own personal emotional response to it and find myself morally uncomfortable with her decision. Does that make it immoral? Perhaps to me it does.

Indeed.

So, you find it morally uncomfortable. Do you accept, then, that your reasoning with regard to meat-eating is thus untenable?

I'm interested in the next section of your thoughts:

The interesting question is why? Why do I see a difference between the actions of the heiress and eating animals? Well, there are a few different options.
  1. I could have evolved to have a different moral sense as to the propriety of eating animals and the care of pets.
  2. I was indoctrinated to have a different moral sense as to the propriety of eating animals and the care of pets.
  3. Like the trolley hypothetical there could be different regions of my brain at work in calculating the moral propriety of eating animals and the care of pets.
  4. All of the above.
1 is unlikely given the vast differences in individual human attitudes to animals, and even if it were true, it does not legitimise the behaviour. Is does not imply ought, and you are perfectly capable of changing your behaviours into ines more consistent with what you objectively consider moral.

2 is almost certainly true, but again, this does not legitimise behaviour. On consideration of the issues dispassionately, from a logical and sceptical position and aside from your up-bringing, you are more than capable of changing you behaviour. This is actually the process I went through (as I tried to explain), and it's analagous to my discarding of religion. Diet, like theism, was something I simply hadn't thought about in any depth. When I did think about it, I came to the same conclusions that you have come to above - eating meat simply wasn't rationally compatible with my other moral convictions. The Heiress problem puts that into sharp relief, as I see you've noticed.

3 is also unlikely, given that people can and do change their opinions on whether it is right or wrong to eat meat. There is no evidence whatsoever that this sense is neurologically 'hardwired'.


And so, you've realised, it seems, that your (like most others) moral sense in this area is a little all over the place, just as Cain and I have been telling you for 600 posts. Thank you.

Only you can fix that.
 
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Whilst in the shower,I realise that last post may have come across more sanctimonious than I had intended. So I'd like to, quickly, add an addendum:

What's I'm saying, I guess, is that even if those explanations are true (and as I said, I dispute at least some of them), they do not and should not constitute justifications for behaviour.

There are a number of plausible theories, including by Dawkins himself, that theism, or at least its psychological precursors, confers some evolutionary advantage. But that, in itself, is not enough to justify theism.

We have evolved a number of traits, but chief amongst them is the rational capacity to transcend our biology. We evolved freedom of choice (see: Dennett) and the ability to consider our attitudes, opinions and behaviours, and to change them when appropriate. "That's how I evolved" is not sufficient excuse for an kind of selective behaviour, really - not legally, sociologically or philosophically.

The same is true of indoctrination. The Phelps kids, no doubt, sincerely hold the belief that being mean, spiteful witches is the right thing to do, because that is how they have been brought up. That, however, does not excuse their behaviour. It may be an explanation, but it is hardly a justification, and no doubt they would be more than capable of altering their position given a powerful enough counterargument (as, I understand, at least one of them has done).

And so, RF, you feel no problem with eating meat. But I think you see one, on dispassionate review as above. And you can change, should you have the courage of your rational convictions.
 
Volatile said:
Whilst in the shower,I realise that last post may have come across more sanctimonious than I had intended.
Yeah, I'd have to agree, I was about to respond to you about it...
 
This is just a re-statement, in verbose form, of the rather silly argument that goes something like "If we didn't eat cows, cows would be extinct - and you wouldn't want that, would you?". It's actually only a slightly more thought-out version of "for every animal you don't eat, I'll eat three" taunt, come to think of it.

And we're accused of lacking nuance and depth?

Did you ignore everything else in that post to make your snide remark? This is why I'm already ignoring Cain for the duration of this thread, and also why I said I'm not going to play a part in the picking apart point-counterpoint games. You wanted an explanation, I gave you one. You can either accept it, or explain what you don't like about it. Your post is instead obfuscating the point of the paragraph that mentions what you're talking about.

You see, Volatile, this is what I mean about me getting the impression of lack of good faith on the topic. You're so busy looking for something to be disgusted with that you skipped the whole message in the paragraph to try to make that alleged equation. I'm not arguing that people should eat meat because otherwise the animals we eat would go extinct, and that you're accusing me of such shows just how shallow you're being in evaluating what I said.
 
So, you find it morally uncomfortable. Do you accept, then, that your reasoning with regard to meat-eating is thus untenable?
:)

You are not much different than most people. Just ignore whatever doesn't fit your thesis and then declare a proposition that doesn't follow from any premise.

The Heiress problem puts that into sharp relief, as I see you've noticed.
No, it doesn't at all.

Would you kill the baby?

Would you push the fat man off the foot bridge?

I realize that these dilemmas don't fit comfortably in your view of the world so you simply ignore them. You would rather focus on the dilemma that you think validates your belief that those who disagree with you are immoral. That's fine. I can live with it. I'm not vested in your opinion.

Only you can fix that.
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Sorry I didn't see this post before the last one.

And so, RF, you feel no problem with eating meat. But I think you see one...
  1. What is that problem that you think I see?
  2. Would you kill the baby?
  3. Would you push the fat man off of the foot bridge?
  4. Is morality absolute and can we always come to a consensus as to right and wrong relying on reason alone?
We evolved with ego and bias. We evolved to see our views as right and to defend them passionately. It was the ancient Greeks who realized this and suggested that to find the truth we need to question our held beliefs.

I can question mine. You?
 
If this has been covered I apologise but I have just read all this thread in one go so might have missed it.

To those opposed to eating meat what about this scenario. Is it morally wrong to keep farm animals and only eat them after they have died of ‘natural’ causes?
 
If this has been covered I apologise but I have just read all this thread in one go so might have missed it.

To those opposed to eating meat what about this scenario. Is it morally wrong to keep farm animals and only eat them after they have died of ‘natural’ causes?

It's been mentioned more than once - no-one here thinks that would be morally problematic.
 

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