The hard problem of consciousness

[JoeEllison]

No kidding. Its like trying to debate with a politician.

We have provided solid answers to all their questions. They ignore these answers then make more posts with the same questions. Its like they think if they just ignore us then we will magically be wrong. How does that work?

When people throw their hands up and walk away from the discussion in disgust, they count it as a victory? We've covered a multitude of angles on the topic, from conceptual and logical reasons why we don't accept the "HPC", to links to research on consciousness that serves to explain aspects of experience. Their response is to pretend that we didn't post anything, and say the same stupid things over and over again. Repetition doesn't create reality, no matter how much they want it to be so.

 

[westprog]

Penrose is a very good mathematician, but that doesn't necessarily mean that he knows more about consciousness than specialists in more relevant fields such as philosophy, computing and neuroscience.

Leon

If we are dealing with real phenomena, then it's physics. Penrose clearly knows an enormous amount of physics. To assume that computing is a relevant discipline is to beg the question.

When dealing with matters of how real things work, I wouldn't expect a philosopher to have any more insight than anyone else. And Penrose is well capable of keeping up with the developments in neuroscience.

That doesn't mean that Penrose is right, of course, but the assumption that this field isn't suitable for physicists is a good indicator of the level of waffle involved.

 

[leon_heller]

If we are dealing with real phenomena, then it's physics. Penrose clearly knows an enormous amount of physics. To assume that computing is a relevant discipline is to beg the question.

When dealing with matters of how real things work, I wouldn't expect a philosopher to have any more insight than anyone else. And Penrose is well capable of keeping up with the developments in neuroscience.

That doesn't mean that Penrose is right, of course, but the assumption that this field isn't suitable for physicists is a good indicator of the level of waffle involved.

I didn't say the fields I mentioned were the only relevant ones. I don't think I even mentioned physicists.

His physics is clearly wrong, as I mentioned.

Leon

 

[westprog]

I was talking about consciousness being entirely materialistic. I want to be sure we're avoiding any soul-talk, here.

For some reason, when I say "we don't know how it works" that gets translated into "there must be some mystical, non-materialistic explanation". When I say "we don't know" that's what I mean.

To insist that the explanation for consciousness must be along some particular lines would be merely to state my own philosophical preferences. I suspect that there is a purely physical explanation, and I don't expect it to be found for a very long time.

 

[westprog]

But his physics is clearly wrong, as I mentioned.

Leon

It might be, but I wouldn't rely on programmers, philosophers or neuroscientists to check his work.

He's had an interesting debate with Hawking on the subject. Hawking has different views, naturally.

 

[leon_heller]

It might be, but I wouldn't rely on programmers, philosophers or neuroscientists to check his work.

He's had an interesting debate with Hawking on the subject. Hawking has different views, naturally.

Where did I mention programmers?

Which physicists agree with him?

Leon

 

[Dancing David]

I know what my internal state is, corresponding to enjoyment. I don't discover it by observing my own behaviour. I experience it.

This may be far back, do you have children?

How does a child learn that it enjoys something?

Fuzzy language is no excuse for not trying to explore what you are talking about.

When you say "I experience it. ", what exactly does that mean?

Do you have a physical sensation that you label as 'enjoy'? Is it a set of thoughts that you experience when you are 'joyous'? Doi they match the memories of when you felt 'joy' in the past?

What is this 'experience', try and describe it, that is what mindfulness training is about.

BTW , another cadge from the alleged historical buddha:

Will you see better if you pluck out your eye?

 

[Dancing David]

A computational device can do only on thing and thats compute, make calculation. what makes you believe a giant calculator can draw some experience from a math formula. Do transistor enjoy math?

Do neurons only compute?

base cell: receieves potentiation and attenuation from presynaptic cells

base cell: the probability of attenuation and potentiation can increase and decrease from the presynatic signal

base cell: has a probability of firing the probaility is based on the conditioned response of attenuation and potentiation and the input that it receives


In other words it does not 'just compute', it learns an associative response to the inputs, which is plastic.

This has great implications.

 

[Belz...]

Is the brain a physical system? If it is, it can be modelled by a "computational device". If it isn't, what are the non-physical components?

"Non-physical" ?

 

[Dancing David]

Yes, and they disagree about almost everything. Note how Penrose - one of the smartest people in the world - was dismissed out of hand upthread.

And when you dismiss the actual research done into this area and just dismiss it out of hand, what does that mean?

have you read up on sensation and perception yet?

 

[leon_heller]

If we are dealing with real phenomena, then it's physics. Penrose clearly knows an enormous amount of physics. To assume that computing is a relevant discipline is to beg the question.

When dealing with matters of how real things work, I wouldn't expect a philosopher to have any more insight than anyone else. And Penrose is well capable of keeping up with the developments in neuroscience.

That doesn't mean that Penrose is right, of course, but the assumption that this field isn't suitable for physicists is a good indicator of the level of waffle involved.

Here is what Susan Blackmore has to say about Penrose's theories:

"Concerning the physics, Grush and Churchland argue that microtubules cannot provide the conditions of purity and isolation required by Penrose’s theory, nor could effects be transmitted from one microtubule to another as is required for explaining the unity of consciousness in the way Penrose requires. In addition the theory provides no explanation of how the quantum effects could interact with effects at the level of neurons, neurotransmitters and neuromodulators, when the microtubules are supposed to be isolated from their environment."

"Grush and Churchland (1995) conclude that “... the argument consists of merest possibility piled upon merest possibility teetering upon a tippy foundation of ‘might-be-for-all-we-know’s... we judge it to be completely unconvincing and probably false.” (Grush & Churchland 1995 p 12). Churchland puts it even more strongly: “Quantum coherence in the microtubules is about as explanatorily powerful as pixie dust in the synapses.” (Churchland 1998, p 121)."

"They also ask why such a flimsy theory has proved so popular. Perhaps, they suggest, it is because some people find the idea of explaining consciousness by neuronal activity somehow degrading or scary, whereas “explaining” it by quantum effects retains some of the mystery."

Leon

 

[Dancing David]

If we are dealing with real phenomena, then it's physics. Penrose clearly knows an enormous amount of physics. To assume that computing is a relevant discipline is to beg the question.

To assume a physicist who doesn't study it can disect astrphysics of planetary shells prior to a supernove, means what?

When dealing with matters of how real things work, I wouldn't expect a philosopher to have any more insight than anyone else. And Penrose is well capable of keeping up with the developments in neuroscience.

But did he?

unbased and unsupported assertion?

That doesn't mean that Penrose is right, of course, but the assumption that this field isn't suitable for physicists is a good indicator of the level of waffle involved.

Nice spin Westprog and totaly unrelated to the issue at hand, backwards argument from authority much? You threw straw, Penrose read up on all the modern biology of perceptual pathways did he?



Did Penrose talk to the people who study perception?

 

[leon_heller]

I've just dug out my copy of Penrose's Shadows of the Mind. He doesn't mention any branches of neuroscience such as perception.

Leon

 

[westprog]

And when you dismiss the actual research done into this area and just dismiss it out of hand, what does that mean?

I haven't dismissed any research. Some of it is undoubtedly valuable. I dismissed some conclusions drawn from the research.

have you read up on sensation and perception yet?

I've done a lot of reading, but expect to do a lot more. I find it a useful antidote to certainity.

 

[Mercutio]

How is unconsciousness relevant? I thought we were discussing consciousness.

Leon

We were, and that is why it is.

 

[Mercutio]

We don't, of course. But I have an internal state which I refer to as enjoyment. I observe that somebody else behaves in a similar way to me when I'm enjoying something, and I assume - without knowing - that his internal state corresponds to mine.

Thank you for illustrating my point. What you are forgetting (it has been a while, after all) is that the same assumption about that other person's internal state was also made about yours, by the people in your life who taught you to label your internal state. There is, of course, no way to know if your internal state and mine are at all similar (it is, as you say, an assumption). But we can and do know that the publicly available referents that taught you and them are the same. These are the behaviors that correspond to your and the others' presumed internal state.

I know what my internal state is, corresponding to enjoyment. I don't discover it by observing my own behaviour. I experience it.

But you do label it, with words taught you by people who did not experience it. You cannot--simply cannot--know if what you feel as "love" is what any other person on the planet feels. The "qualia" is not and cannot be the bedrock of what is known.

I'm interested in an explanation of my internal state. The fact that language is fuzzy, and that the phenomenon is inherently subjective is not sufficient grounds for dismissing something that I know to be real.

You can substitute "assume" or "infer" for "know" in that sentence, and it would be much more accurate.

But again, thank you for illustrating my point.

 

[Nick227]

Is it possible there are things that cannot be rationally defined but can only be experienced directly?

For sure there are. Can you rationally define an emotion? Can you rationally define "I?"

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Except, of course, that what you just posted isn't really true. There's plenty of explanation, you just reject all of it out of hand by twisting language to insist on their being a problem without explaining why there's a problem. Interesting how after so many pages in just this thread, the best you "HPC" supporters can come up with is sticking your fingers in your ear and saying "uh-uh, no it isn't, it can't be!" towards any non-woo explanations.

Personally I think the issue is more that people who are obsessively rational don't feel many emotions and so can't understand what the HPC is all about.

Nick

 

[Mercutio]

Personally I think the issue is more that people who are obsessively rational don't feel many emotions and so can't understand what the HPC is all about.

Nick

You'd be wrong about that, too.

 

[JoeEllison]

Personally I think the issue is more that people who are obsessively rational don't feel many emotions and so can't understand what the HPC is all about.

Nick

Mercutio beat me too it, but you ARE wrong. We feel plenty of emotion, we just don't think there's something non-physical about it. There's no reason to think that emotions come from anywhere except our body, especially since emotion is very much a physical thing.

The HPC seems to come from the same sort of false assumptions that people rely on when they talk about people as being somehow separate from the rest of the animal kingdom. Needing to define human existence or thought as divided from the rest of the universe seems to be a primitive and immature drive that a lot of people are saddled with.