The hard problem of consciousness

[JoeEllison]

Why is the question stupid? I don't see why we would conclude that conciousness should exist if we didn't already know that it does.

Take computers, for instance. No one that I know really thinks that as they are now they are conscious beings. At what point could data processing move on to experiencing?
We are just matter, reacting to physical laws. Why should this lead to the experience of the taste of a peach? I can see that it would lead to beings that act as though they experience a peach, but actually experiencing it? How? Why?

Of course, you could say that experience itself is an illusion. I think that's a possible solution to the problem. I think there may be others that we haven't thought of.

I certainly don't think that dualism is a solution, because it still doesn't answer the question, it just posits a magical entity (the soul) that is "by it's nature" conscious. How and why is the soul conscious? Basically: "It just is". In other words, it offers no solution at all.

But I don't see that the question is stupid. It's just one we don't have an answer to yet, and shouldn't pretend that we do.

Edit: Nice post Randfan.

You're "answer" shows how the question is stupid:

We are just matter, reacting to physical laws. Why should this lead to the experience of the taste of a peach? I can see that it would lead to beings that act as though they experience a peach, but actually experiencing it? How? Why?

What sort of assumption leads you to believe that there's a problem with experience, but no problem with acting like you experience? Why would there be a difference or separation between those two things, and why would there be a "problem" with it?

Why "experience" is a problem for anyone at all is why I find the "problem" invalid... and circular in a way. It seems to me that the "problem" was created not because there IS a problem, but because people have all sorts of "solutions" that they'd like to pretend are valid. It seems not completely unlike the way creationists see "problems" with evolution that don't actually exist, because they start with the assumption of "God" as a solution.

 

[skiba]

I dont see a problem with a machine trying to reason either, no hard problem there. Automated computation, math formulas, information processes, no problem at all. When we add an experiencer we have a problem.

Why? How do you conclude that?

Simply because we have no explanation for the "mechanism of consciousness", if there even exists such a thing.

In other words if you were this highly complex electro-chemical computer
in the classical sense you wouldn't be experiencing anything, there wouldn't be anything more than computation.

How do you conclude that?

see above.

Do you believe that this would be achieved by adding more compexity? More transistor, more memory, more data and more sophistacated algorithms . What you get is
more information processes at a faster rate. Does faster computation equal experience/consciousness?

Is there any way we can know, currently?

No, not really, but giving it any validity without proof is another thing.

Sorry bout the rambling, but my point is, there is no conceived way of how a transistors or neurons could achieve more than computation.

The problem is: experience is not a function in the classical sense.


How do you conclude this?

See my first response.

What you are really saying is that we have not currently build a computer that appears to be conscious. That is probably true, but how do you reach from there to the conclusion that we cannot?

I wont deny the possibility that one day we could have these machines. I believe the technology would something very different to what we have today. Something fundementally different.

 

[leon_heller]

Damn. I have occasionally joined threads like this to see if anybody could explain to me what qualia are, in the sense of being anything in particular. So far, even hard-core dualists have failed. That may, of course, be because I'm unusually dense.

Unfortunately, reading this thread so far, I don't think an explanation is forthcoming.

To me the hard problem of consciousness is what the problem is.

Hans

A typical quale is the redness of an apple. Most philosophers have problems conceptualising physical systems that can have qualia. A few, like Dennett, don't believe that they exist.

Leon

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

<snip>

I wont deny the possibility that one day we could have these machines. I believe the technology would something very different to what we have today. Something fundementally different.

I agree. Given that a single neuron can have 10,000 synapses, software and hardware engineers are going to have to learn a lot more about massive parallel processing before 'conscious' machines become a reality. It may even require abandoning the current paradigm of object orientation, particularly data encapsulation / hiding. Come on global variables!

 

[MRC_Hans]

Simply because we have no explanation for the "mechanism of consciousness", if there even exists such a thing.

It goes deeper than that: You lack an explanation of why there needs to exist such a mechanism, as a discrete thing. Consciousness may just be an emergent property of our already known mechanisms, provided sufficient complexity.

No, not really, but giving it any validity without proof is another thing.

But you do give your "machanism for consciousness" and "qualia" validiy without any proof of their existence as any kind of separate entities.

I wont deny the possibility that one day we could have these machines. I believe the technology would something very different to what we have today. Something fundementally different.

I don't think the technology must necessarily be different, but the architecture must; present computers are specifically designed to be deterministic. As long as you have an intrinsically deterministic architecture, there is no particular reason to expect that it well become more conscious with increased complexity.

Hans

 

[JoeEllison]

A typical quale is the redness of an apple. Most philosophers have problems conceptualising physical systems that can have qualia. A few, like Dennett, don't believe that they exist.

Leon

I could go with the "qualia don't exist"... it seems to be a concept created specifically to bolster the existence of a "hard problem."

 

[RandFan]

Self-awareness. I can't see any insurmountable obstacle that would prevent you from building an automaton that is capable of reasoning about itself or its existance. I don't think this is a "hard problem".

Abstract thought. The difficulty is not in building machines that work with such problems, indeed text, music, images, mathematical equations, musical notes, colours, maps, volumes, surfaces, it can all be represented as binary data in current day CPUs if you wish. What current computers and programs lack is the abillity to develop and test these abstract models of the world around them or purely abstract notions in general; but then, that's difficult for humans too. I don't see why this must be a "hard problem" either.

Theory of mind. I don't see why a computational machine could not have a simplified model of itself that helps it survive the very complex world around it without understanding much of its workings or why it cannot extend this model to other actors similar to in construction to itself to better understand their behaviour and better achieve the desired ends in its model of the world. This does not appear to be a "hard problem" either.

I think that there are many interesting problems here and whenever you solve one that which is called consciousness retreats until there is nowhere left to go. I view consciousness as a dualist enspired notion to begin with.

Postulate that there is a computational machine with a theory of mind, a convenient abstraction that evolved for its survival; very useful for regulating its own behaviour and predicting the behaviour of other such machines. Postulate that this abstraction contains notions which are useful for survival but not true. Postulate that this machine surrounds itself with similar machines and that a means of communications evolved to contain the abstract notions in this model, either because it didn't know the model it had of itself was wrong or because these abstract notions are useful short hand for describing the behaviour of others.

Postulate that this machine is capable of formulating and testing abstractions about the world around it, and uses the notion of belief from its theory of mind to describe to other such machines what it is doing when it provisionally accepts something to be true.

I think that consciousness, like so many other preconcieved notions will evaporate away when we finally manage to examine it closely enough.

I don't understand your responses in light of the conversation. I don't claim that there is an insurmountable problem. I've made that quite clear. If we postulate your machine it would be conscious. So, I'm not at al sure what your point is. Consciousness may very well "evaporate" away but we will still have the capacity to wonder why we are here. It might be smoke and mirrors but I still ponder the universe. I still think abstractly.

You are not solving anything or telling us anything. But thanks anyway.

 

[RandFan]

How are these guys modeling feelings? It seems to me, and I willingly confess that I'm not much up on these things, that the issue of emotions will be significant in understanding the aspect of "richness" attributed to inner life. How do you make a machine feel?

Nick

Excellent question. If we assume that feelings are the end result of our brain then the how is not so important.

The Germans didn't understand how microwaves worked when they reverse engineered English radar from a downed plane but they made it work and then they understood it.

It's hoped that by doing with our brains what the Germans did with radar that we will gain insights. I think we will.

If you have a hard time imagining how that will happen (and to be frank I do) then you are like the rest of us, however, if you draw any conclusions from that inability then you are simply engaging in the age old fallacy of arguing from incredulity. Just because we can't imagine how it happens doesn't mean that it doesn't.

 

[RandFan]

I could go with the "qualia don't exist"... it seems to be a concept created specifically to bolster the existence of a "hard problem."

Yes you could but then you could also deny that pain exists. You could also deny that you feel pain and we are all just making it up to bolster a "hard problem". I'm curious, do you feel pain?

 

[Jimbo07]

Yes you could but then you could also deny that pain exists. You could also deny that you feel pain and we are all just making it up to bolster a "hard problem". I'm curious, do you feel pain?

Dogs feel pain. Are dogs conscious? Does their reaction to painful stimuli have a spurious relationship to ours?

If they have a sensation, that leads to the same outward appearance, but is completely different from ours, it calls into question the entire power of observation. To be clear, it might be something else, but then we'd have a second explanatory problem. Why is there a difference, and what mechanism accounts for the difference? It compounds the HPC, because now you need two explanations to explain organisms which share so many physical similarities. HPC seems almost like a wedge issue for the existence of the soul...

Regardless, once we have decided against the power of observation of the physical we are on shaky ground. We can't assume that the floor will be solid when we wake up in the morning.

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

<snip>

I'm curious, do you feel pain?

My brain interprets certain stimuli as noxious, which often results in an emotional response. Sometimes more primitive parts of my nervous system cause my body to react to a noxious stimulus before my brain is aware of it.

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

Dogs feel pain. Are dogs conscious? Does their reaction to painful stimuli have a spurious relationship to ours?

If they have a sensation, that leads to the same outward appearance, but is completely different from ours, it calls into question the entire power of observation. To be clear, it might be something else, but then we'd have a second explanatory problem. Why is there a difference, and what mechanism accounts for the difference? It compounds the HPC, because now you need two explanations to explain organisms which share so many physical similarities. HPC seems almost like a wedge issue for the existence of the soul...

Regardless, once we have decided against the power of observation of the physical we are on shaky ground. We can't assume that the floor will be solid when we wake up in the morning.

Exactly. If it consistently behaves in a way which indicates it is conscious, it is conscious.

So the real problem is to define what we consider conscious behaviour, rather than what consciousness is.

 

[RandFan]

Dogs feel pain. Are dogs conscious? Does their reaction to painful stimuli have a spurious relationship to ours?

If they have a sensation, that leads to the same outward appearance, but is completely different from ours, it calls into question the entire power of observation. To be clear, it might be something else, but then we'd have a second explanatory problem. Why is there a difference, and what mechanism accounts for the difference? It compounds the HPC, because now you need two explanations to explain organisms which share so many physical similarities. HPC seems almost like a wedge issue for the existence of the soul...

To be certain I'm not arguing that consciousness is necessary to experience an emotion, sensation or feeling. I don't know what dog's "feel" or experience. To be frank I don't know what you "feel" or experience. I can only draw conclusions of what you likely "feel" based on observation and inference about the real world.

"Wedge issue"? This would seem to be special pleading or something akin to it? Whether it is a wedge issue or not is not relevant to the point.

Regardless, once we have decided against the power of observation of the physical we are on shaky ground. We can't assume that the floor will be solid when we wake up in the morning.

I think you have me confused with someone else.

 

[RandFan]

My brain interprets certain stimuli as noxious, which often results in an emotional response. Sometimes more primitive parts of my nervous system cause my body to react to a noxious stimulus before my brain is aware of it.

"Emotional"? What is emotion? I'm not trying to be obtuse. I think those who want to avoid dealing with HPC miss the elephant in the room. You can use whatever word you want but it won't really explain what pain is anymore than the word pain. Yes, we understand the evolutionary why of pain but what is pain? What is emotion?

 

[Jimbo07]

To be frank I don't know what you "feel" or experience. I can only draw conclusions of what you likely "feel" based on observation and inference about the real world.

This goes to my point. You seem to be arguing a phenomena/noumena sort of thing, no? That is, your collection of observations about the thing is not the same as the thing itself? I would argue that this is self-evident, but it seems to spiral off into a debate about the nature of reality.

"Wedge issue"? This would seem to be special pleading or something akin to it? Whether it is a wedge issue or not is not relevant to the point.

This was not speaking directly to a point. It was a last line that was tangential on purpose. It was me musing on the HPC in general...

I think you have me confused with someone else.

Again, specific points mixed with general.

 

[RandFan]

Exactly. If it consistently behaves in a way which indicates it is conscious, it is conscious.

So the real problem is to define what we consider conscious behaviour, rather than what consciousness is.

Yes, and prior to understanding aerodynamics scientists could have simply defined the behaviors of flight. Why bother trying to understand it when it is beyond our understanding?

I realize that HPC is used by many of those who believe in the metaphysical but simply ignoring cognitive phenomenon isn't really productive.

 

[skiba]

It goes deeper than that: You lack an explanation of why there needs to exist such a mechanism, as a discrete thing. Consciousness may just be an emergent property of our already known mechanisms, provided sufficient complexity.

Exactly it goes deeper than that. The agrument that sufficient compelixy gives rise to consciousness is a rather shallow and abstract one. As someone already stated here, it's no better than saying "god did it".
Now I'm not claiming to know, but i'm willing to argue that todays scientific explanations give nothing to the HPC.

But you do give your "machanism for consciousness" and "qualia" validiy without any proof of their existence as any kind of separate entities.

I don't think the technology must necessarily be different, but the architecture must; present computers are specifically designed to be deterministic. As long as you have an intrinsically deterministic architecture, there is no particular reason to expect that it well become more conscious with increased complexity.

My only proof is subjective experience but I believe you have the same ability. I experience, and I take that as a undeniable fact. To this day nobody has given this a valid scientific explanation or even plausible machanism. Computation and complexity is the prevailing theory but seems to falls short. Theres alot of suggestion that different kind of computation or architecture would do it, but it's all still computation, automated processes that dont give ANY explanation to experience ONLY HOW IT PROCESSES INFORMATION.

I see computation different from experience. Computation is a process with some logical function or an end result that we can all understand.
A signal is sent from point A to point B and such and such happens.

In the case of computing an experience what would it look like on paper?
What is the end result in a "computation of experience"?

 

[RandFan]

This goes to my point. You seem to be arguing a phenomena/noumena sort of thing, no?

Let me clear. We experience a wide range of cognitive phenomena like pain, sense of well being, joy, anger, disgust, etc. Further, we experience sensations of color, sound and touch. We don't simply know that red is different than blue we experience a difference. We hear the change in pitch from one note to another. I can build a machine that can detect the difference between red and blue but I can't build one that can experience the colors. I can't build one that can experience pain or be moved emotionally by a concerto. At the moment no one can because we don't know what these phenomena are. It's that simple. We are confident (and for good reason) that they are emergent properties of our brain but we don't have a working theory (scientific theory) of them yet. We will.

EDIT: I should add that scientists are trying to build a machine to do all of these things by reverse engineering. This hopefully will help us know what these phenomena are.

 

[JoeEllison]

To this day nobody has given this a valid scientific explanation or even plausible machanism.

Your entire position is the logical fallacy known as "argument from incredulity." You don't buy any of the explanations, therefore they must be invalid?

 

[skiba]

Your entire position is the logical fallacy known as "argument from incredulity." You don't buy any of the explanations, therefore they must be invalid?

Nobody has given any plausible explanation.(not that I'm really expecting one) but its all speculation, and abstract ideas on how it MIGHT work. I give my oppinions why I think they are incorrect. You are free to do the same.