Better the illusions that exalt us ......

[Robin]

I do not think I am attacking a strawman, Robin. This seems to be a contradiction within Mill's thought whereby he parts company with utilitarianism. The utilitarian says the the criterion by which an action is judged as moral is based on the outcome of maximising happiness. Mill does not abandon that. And as I have read he is particularly concerned with the level of the the family/group/society. That seems to imply he is concerned with the aggregate. So it follows that if he values everyone's happiness as much as he values his own then the overall utility is what counts. The situation in Omelas does just that and therefore it must be moral. The child only gets one vote, the same as everybody else.

If, on the other hand, you argue that the child is in some way special, then it follows that sometimes the moral course is to diminish aggregate happiness: and that is entirely at odds with the system. How do you reconcile these?

You say you are not attacking a straw man. So when you say "The utilitarian says ..." you should state which utilitarian said this and where he or she said it. I have clearly stated which brands of Utilitarianism I am referring to and have directly quoted.

But see the part I have underlined to see that the contradiction is in your logic, not mine. You say "it follows" but this does not follow at all.

If I am to regard another person's happiness as equal to my own and another person is unhappy, then it follows that I must also be unhappy.

So if you set up a situation where my happiness depends upon the unhappiness of another then you have described a situation where happiness is an unreachable destination.

How, therefore, do you claim that a situation whereby happiness is not even acheivable in principle is equivalent to a situation where happiness is maximised?

How do you reconcile these?

I don't think so. It is true that the utilitarian will base on this where the utility cannot be known: this is because it is really hard for human beings to foresee the real consequences of their actions often. However in this case we know the outcomes for all the concerned parties and there is no need to guess. For a utilitarian real outcomes are trumps and it is their position that is it is right to break the normally accepted moral rules if utility is increased thereby. Mill also mentioned that while wider groups can be considered it is normally sufficient to look at outcomes for family and perhaps friends. We are not able to investigate effects on the whole world and utilitarianism does not require this of us.

No, Mill says that there are very few times that we can consider the wider group because we do not have the information to go on. This in no way implies that we are justified in ignoring sources of information we do have.

And again I must point out the flaw in your logic. If someone is considering a future action there are no real outcomes, only foreseeable consequences. So for the nurse contemplating a course of action his own foreseeable happiness cannot trump the foreseeable unhappiness it would cause.

So I do not think it is legitimate to do as you suggest to get to the conclusion you prefer. Once again I get the impression that your moral intuition came first and was not derived from utilitarianism.

Don't forget that your position still entirely depends upon the premise that tolerating the rape of a comatose woman could be considered as an instance of maximising happiness.

And you still have not even tried to defend it.

I am suggesting that one individual selfishly pursuing his own pleasure at the expense of the happiness of all around him cannot possibly be an example of maximising happiness. You are telling me it is illegitimate to suggest this. I am telling you that your arithmetic is wrong.

I am suggesting that if you valued another person's happiness as much as your own, then an act that would make them unhappy would also make you unhappy, whether or not you disclosed the act. You are saying that it is illegitimate for me to suggest this. I am telilng your that x can never be not x.

So that impression is wrong and you are consistent in your position.

I don't understand what you are saying here

My own morality is quite inchoate, but it is best summarised as "you must not steal another person's choice". This works for me in quite a lot of situations. It may be this approach has a name in moral philosophy but I do not know it. It gives me a working rule of thumb in lots of different cases, however and so I think it is quite a useful principle. It works in this case because it does not matter how many people think it is ok to rape the comatose patient: the nurse is stealing her choice and for me that is morally wrong by definition.

That would pretty much describe my own moral intuition. I would only add "don't steal another person's choice so long as their choice follows the same rule". So I would steal the choice of the male nurse in the example.

But of course I would also steal the choice of a man about to hurl himself off a cliff, so it doesn't always work.

So I think that it is unpractical not to take into account the net happiness or suffering that may be consequent upon an action.

I think the people who said "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" got it just about right even though some of the guys who said it were hypocrites.

 

[blauregen]

I am pretty certain that most people would not agree that you can have respect without honesty.

I am pretty certain that most people would agree with this phrasing. I am pretty sure too that most people would differ between honesty and frankness if being frank and honest would express disregard of the validity of a persons worldview.

He has already given an unsolicited value judgement of their religious belief, just not to their face.

He is rather specific that the things he finds ridiculous are the same things he is intending to conduct "respectful" conversations about. Whether or not he completely agrees with Dennet and Dawkins is beside the point we are currently debating.

It isn't. If he had agreed with Dennet or Dawkins, you could derive what beliefs he might find ridiculous by comparing with their utterances. As it is he neither stated the ridiculousness of specific beliefs, nor that the beliefs of a specific person are ridiculous. He only implied that there are beliefs he finds ridiculous but nevertheless wishes to be able to have respectful conversation about.

But if a two people are willingly engaged in a conversation about a subject I don't think you can meaningfully call any opinion expressed there as "unsolicited".

Yes, and similarly you can't call an opinion expressed in a mass media to the general public call 'unsolicited' in a meaningful way. Otherwise nearly every writer on the net or columnist for a paper would be guilty.

And if you are going to translate "I find your belief ridiculous" as "Your belief is ridiculous" then you must be consistent and translate "I don't share your belief" to "Your belief is wrong" and so it is a value judgement in any case.

Let's face it, if someone says "I believe in God" and I say "I don't believe in God", we are asserting the superiority of our respective beliefs and it is useless to pretend otherwise.

No. Up to this point you only talked about your respective beliefs. Even if you had stated 'I don't believe in God because there is no sufficient evidence' or 'I don't believe in God because the idea leads to contradictions.' the other person could still have subjectively equally valid reasons to believe in God. Stating 'Your belief is ridiculous.' discards the other persons belief as invalid.

How is it condescending to treat someone as an intellectual equal?

Which is the point where you stop to treat someone as equal. Flaty discarding someones core beliefs implies that you don't deem those beliefs worthy of consideration, and because those beliefs form the base of their worldview, in extension that you discard their complete worldview. I imagine that most people would rather refrain from frankly stating their honest opinion, if it would mean to state this. You can avoid this if you have asserted that you respect their worldview as equally valid otherwise. This often isn't the case with mere aquaintances.

It is asserted in a number of ways. In this case our respect is asserted by the fact that we can make honest statements about our attitude to our respective beliefs.

But if he pretended simply not to share my opinion and later found out that he found it ridiculous, but had not told me, then I should have held that as a mark of disrespect.

Which is a different social dynamic. You established that you deem your brother's worldview worthy of consideration in other ways. So you can make this statement without being condescending.

Can you give an example of Dawkins or Dennett offering unsolicited debate in a neutral setting? I am not sure what you mean. I am pretty sure that they don't stop strangers in the street or knock on their doors and say "God doesn't exist".

Hardly . It was hypothetical. I wanted to assert that I view atheism and/or naturalism as equally valid worldviews in respect to your entitlement to spread them, as any other ideological or religious worldview and that I would judge it equally. I don't expect atheists to show more consideration than proponents of any other ideology.

 

[articulett]

atheism is not an ideology... it's a lack of belief in divine entities. If one thought it was an "equally valid viewpoint", one would choose it. Just because believers believe it is a valid viewpoint, does not mean that I'm required to pretend I think it is. Do you think Scientology is a valid viewpoint? Astrology. We're not talking ice cream preferences, you know. We're talking about belief in an invisible, immeasurable divine something or other that a person feels guided buy or special to.

It might be common... but "equally valid"-- not to me.

 

[Sceptic Realist]

atheism is not an ideology... it's a lack of belief in divine entities.

I think it can go either way, and that there are people who both consider it an ideology and do not. The official definition from Merriam-Webster:

1. Disbelief in or denial of the existence of God or gods.
2. The doctrine that there is no God or gods.

If one thought it was an "equally valid viewpoint", one would choose it.

Wait, what? Are you saying you can't choose to be an Atheist? I don't really understand the sentence here.

Just because believers believe it is a valid viewpoint, does not mean that I'm required to pretend I think it is.

I suppose not.

Do you think Scientology is a valid viewpoint? Astrology.

Depends on the definition of "Valid" that you're using.

We're not talking ice cream preferences, you know. We're talking about belief in an invisible, immeasurable divine something or other that a person feels guided buy or special to.

So what?

It might be common... but "equally valid"-- not to me.

Again, clarification of the definition of valid you are using would help everyone, I'm sure.

 

[articulett]

Preferences have equal validity... there's no accounting for taste, afterall.

But beliefs about reality are not equally valid. Some are more likely to be TRUE... oh, I know... you apologists have trouble with that word and prefer your 10,000 illusions and all.

Other beliefs are more likely to be delusional. Say, let's just go for the first definition of valid per google: "well grounded in logic or truth". A naturalistic world view is more "valid" than a belief in invisible entities that alter physics on the petitioners behalf.

Communication is easy when you use words the same way as every body else... when in doubt, try a dictionary!

You are welcome for the clarification... but lets be honest... it's unlikely to help an apologist... and the rest already are using words the same way.

 

[Robin]

I am pretty certain that most people would agree with this phrasing. I am pretty sure too that most people would differ between honesty and frankness if being frank and honest would express disregard of the validity of a persons worldview.

Well if you think that most people would regard it respectful to call a belief ridiculous behind their backs but not say it to their face as respectful, then we will have to agree to disagree.

It isn't. If he had agreed with Dennet or Dawkins, you could derive what beliefs he might find ridiculous by comparing with their utterances. As it is he neither stated the ridiculousness of specific beliefs, nor that the beliefs of a specific person are ridiculous. He only implied that there are beliefs he finds ridiculous but nevertheless wishes to be able to have respectful conversation about.

You are missing the point - it makes no difference which beliefs he is talking about, only that they are the same beliefs about which he intends to converse.

He has explicitly stated that the conversations he intends to hold are about things he considers ridiculous.

I am not aware that Dennett has ever called a belief ridiculous, although I may have missed it

Yes, and similarly you can't call an opinion expressed in a mass media to the general public call 'unsolicited' in a meaningful way. Otherwise nearly every writer on the net or columnist for a paper would be guilty.

So we are agreed, then, that his opinion would not be unsolicited?

No. Up to this point you only talked about your respective beliefs. Even if you had stated 'I don't believe in God because there is no sufficient evidence' or 'I don't believe in God because the idea leads to contradictions.' the other person could still have subjectively equally valid reasons to believe in God. Stating 'Your belief is ridiculous.' discards the other persons belief as invalid.

By the same measure if I stated "I find your belief ridiculous" then the other person could still have subjectively equally valid reasons to not find his belief ridiculous or to find my belief ridiculous.

Again, if you insist on translating "I find your belief ridiculous" as "Your belief is ridiculous" then why are you not being consistent in translating "I don't believe in God" as "There is no God", or "I believe in God" as "There is a God".

Which is the point where you stop to treat someone as equal. Flaty discarding someones core beliefs implies that you don't deem those beliefs worthy of consideration, and because those beliefs form the base of their worldview, in extension that you discard their complete worldview.

How do you get all this nonsense from "I find your belief ridiculous"?

The very fact that you are discussing the belief in question demonstrates that, by definition, you deem the belief worthy of consideration.

I imagine that most people would rather refrain from frankly stating their honest opinion, if it would mean to state this. You can avoid this if you have asserted that you respect their worldview as equally valid otherwise. This often isn't the case with mere aquaintances.

If you don't know the person well enough, talk about the weather. If you are discussing religion with somebody then you have an implicit agreement that you know each other well enough to discuss religion. What you are saying is that there are people with whom you can discuss religion, but with whom you cannot honestly discuss religion.

Which is a different social dynamic. You established that you deem your brother's worldview worthy of consideration in other ways. So you can make this statement without being condescending.

Being honest with him is the way I establish that I deem his world view worthy of consideration, there are no other ways.

I have established my brother's world view worthy of consideration by the act of discussing it with him. I have established that I respect my brothers beliefs by frankly stating my own opinion of them.

Were I to hold back my opinion I would be establishing that they were not worthy of consideration and that I did not respect my brother or his beliefs. That is what is condescending.

Just for example, I have a relative who is always talking God this and Jesus that. I nod, smile politely and say "really, that is interesting". I do so because I don't consider this particular part of his world view worthy of consideration and, even though I respect him in many other ways, I don't respect this particular belief.

Hardly . It was hypothetical. I wanted to assert that I view atheism and/or naturalism as equally valid worldviews in respect to your entitlement to spread them, as any other ideological or religious worldview and that I would judge it equally. I don't expect atheists to show more consideration than proponents of any other ideology.

Well why didn't you just say so?

I would hope that everyone, irrespective of their world view, irrespective of whether they wanted to spread their worldview or to simply state their own particular ideas, would show consideration and respect.

 

[Robin]

Here is an example.

Say some people come to my door and tell me that my world view is not only ridiculous, but so evil that it condemns me to an eternity of the worst punishment possible.

Now there is not the slightest shard or fragment in my mind of suspicion that this view has any credence whatsoever.

On the other hand I recognise that if someone really does believe that another human being is headed for eternal torment then the polite thing to do is to tell them.

So they will be invited into the house and offered refreshments and the chance to express their view fully.

I do not think that when they leave they will feel disrespected or offended in any way. But neither will they leave in ignorance of my opinion that their warning is ridiculous.

Because after all I cannot respect others by disrespecting myself.

 

[Beth]

Well if you think that most people would regard it respectful to call a belief ridiculous behind their backs but not say it to their face as respectful, then we will have to agree to disagree.

I don't think he said that. Seems a miscontruing of his argument to me.

Being honest with him is the way I establish that I deem his world view worthy of consideration, there are no other ways.

I have established my brother's world view worthy of consideration by the act of discussing it with him. I have established that I respect my brothers beliefs by frankly stating my own opinion of them.

Were I to hold back my opinion I would be establishing that they were not worthy of consideration and that I did not respect my brother or his beliefs. That is what is condescending.

Just for example, I have a relative who is always talking God this and Jesus that. I nod, smile politely and say "really, that is interesting". I do so because I don't consider this particular part of his world view worthy of consideration and, even though I respect him in many other ways, I don't respect this particular belief.

Here is an example.

Say some people come to my door and tell me that my world view is not only ridiculous, but so evil that it condemns me to an eternity of the worst punishment possible.

Now there is not the slightest shard or fragment in my mind of suspicion that this view has any credence whatsoever.

I do not think that when they leave they will feel disrespected or offended in any way. But neither will they leave in ignorance of my opinion that their warning is ridiculous.

Because after all I cannot respect others by disrespecting myself.

So you feel you treat your brother and JW's with respect and honesty, but not your cousin? That's how what you've written has come across to me.

I agree with you about being honest with people, but I think the writer of that article would too. I don't think that anyone here has advocated being dishonest. But then, I don't think you've been disrespectful to your cousin or his belief.

 

[blauregen]

Well if you think that most people would regard it respectful to call a belief ridiculous behind their backs but not say it to their face as respectful, then we will have to agree to disagree.

I don't believe so, but in the article this did not happen because as I read it .......

You are missing the point - it makes no difference which beliefs he is talking about, only that they are the same beliefs about which he intends to converse.

He has explicitly stated that the conversations he intends to hold are about things he considers ridiculous.

....the statement does not express an equivalence ( A wishes to hold respectful conversation about a belief <=> A finds the belief ridiculous ) but an implication ( A finds the belief ridiculous =>A wishes to hold respectful conversations about the belief )

From this The set of beliefs A finds ridiculous is not identical to the set of beliefs A wishes to have respectful conversations about, but a subset of them. More, A did not specify which beliefs he finds ridiculous, nor which persons hold beliefs he finds ridiculous.

This means that for each pair (p,b), p in 'persons to have respectful conversations with', b in 'beliefs to converse about' it cannot be determined whether the author finds p's belief b ridiculous.

This allows p to assume that A respects the belief b as valid. Respecting a belief as valid -as I read it- does not mean that A shares it, but that A respects it as an interpretation of p's experience of equal value to A's interpretation of A's experience (or at least allows p to assume this respect).

As soon as A tells person p that A finds the specific belief b ridiculous, p's assumption that the author respects the belief as valid is contradicted.

Again, if you insist on translating "I find your belief ridiculous" as "Your belief is ridiculous" then why are you not being consistent in translating "I don't believe in God" as "There is no God", or "I believe in God" as "There is a God".

Because 'I don't believe in God' is a statement about your beliefs regarding God and as such does not contradict the assumption explained above. 'I find your belief ridiculous' is a statement about your belief regarding the person's beliefs, which does.

Well why didn't you just say so?

I thought I did.

I would hope that everyone, irrespective of their world view, irrespective of whether they wanted to spread their worldview or to simply state their own particular ideas, would show consideration and respect.

This I agree with.

 

[blauregen]

Here is an example.

Say some people come to my door and tell me that my world view is not only ridiculous, but so evil that it condemns me to an eternity of the worst punishment possible.

Now there is not the slightest shard or fragment in my mind of suspicion that this view has any credence whatsoever.

On the other hand I recognise that if someone really does believe that another human being is headed for eternal torment then the polite thing to do is to tell them.

So they will be invited into the house and offered refreshments and the chance to express their view fully.

I do not think that when they leave they will feel disrespected or offended in any way. But neither will they leave in ignorance of my opinion that their warning is ridiculous.

Because after all I cannot respect others by disrespecting myself.

No, and in the above case you would not even have a reason to be respectful towards their beliefs. If they called your belief ridiculous and evil, they defined the level of mutual respect regarding beliefs. And i find it very nice that you would respect them as persons and treat them courteously despite their disrespect of your beliefs

 

[Sceptic Realist]

Preferences have equal validity... there's no accounting for taste, afterall. But beliefs about reality are not equally valid. Some are more likely to be TRUE...

Where does probability come into this mix?

oh, I know... you apologists have trouble with that word and prefer your 10,000 illusions and all.

Other beliefs are more likely to be delusional. Say, let's just go for the first definition of valid per google: "well grounded in logic or truth". A naturalistic world view is more "valid" than a belief in invisible entities that alter physics on the petitioners behalf.

Agreed somewhat. Of course they're not grounded in logic, as there is no evidence to support these theories/beliefs. However, truth may or may not include God/Aliens/whatever, so I'd be uncomfortable making that statement until I knew for sure if there was or wasn't such a thing as (insert God, Aliens, other wierd s*** here).

Communication is easy when you use words the same way as every body else...

No need to get your clusters in an uproar. You'd be suprised how many times an entire conversation has been affected beacuse someone's idea of a particular word is slightly different than someone else's. I've seen it happen on this very forum. It's happened in my own conversations with people, as well, and it can come from either end. It never hurts to ask for clarification from the one who uttered the words, and that's all I did. Thank you for providing that, by the way.

when in doubt, try a dictionary!

I always do. The problem is stated above, in that it is always good to know exactly how they are using the word if there is any posibility of confusion. It is good practice for an argument.

You are welcome for the clarification... but lets be honest... it's unlikely to help an apologist...

Well, as long as we're being honest, this post is unlikely to help an automated label gun that oversimplifies every issue discussed and flips the ignore switch on whenever someone challenges their views.

and the rest already are using words the same way.

So glad you're avoiding that smugness.

 

[articulett]

it's not people who challenge my views that I ignore... as many who challenge my views would tell you should you ever be interested in evidence. It's the straw man tossers who don't even seem to know what a straw man is. They imagine themselves as communicating something, though no-one gives them feedback that they are successfully engaging in communication or dialogue and all attempts at correcting errors are met with... imagined expertise.

I do take them off ignore... but most, sadly, go right back on. I have no problem with them communicating with those who can make sense of them. I'm big that way. I prefer dialogue with those whom I understand and who understand me... those who can tell the difference between a fact and an opinion... those I like-- an oddly enough, I like tons of people who don't share all my beliefs, lack of beliefs, or views. Just not the self important straw man tossers who imagine they have something to teach me while being utterly clueless as to their basic social failures.

Congratulations sceptic realist... you are the first person back on my ignore list... and the only one for now. I'm sure you'll find plenty more who find you worth engaging. My standards are a wee bit higher.

 

[Fiona]

You say you are not attacking a straw man. So when you say "The utilitarian says ..." you should state which utilitarian said this and where he or she said it. I have clearly stated which brands of Utilitarianism I am referring to and have directly quoted.

You have made some quotes from Mill it is true. And I am sure you think you have been clear and perhaps for those who have made a formal study of philosophy you have been. But you are not clear to me. I have been reading a bit around the subject and I cannot recognise what "brand" of utilitarianism you are proposing. Throughout I have been trying to respond to what you say. I also tried to derive your position by including some of what Rocketdodger said, since you were both apparently using utilitarianism. But I now think your positions are very different, so I am trying to separate them and understand where they diverge. I should have done this earlier.

But see the part I have underlined to see that the contradiction is in your logic, not mine. You say "it follows" but this does not follow at all.

If I am to regard another person's happiness as equal to my own and another person is unhappy, then it follows that I must also be unhappy.

So if you set up a situation where my happiness depends upon the unhappiness of another then you have described a situation where happiness is an unreachable destination.
How, therefore, do you claim that a situation whereby happiness is not even acheivable in principle is equivalent to a situation where happiness is maximised?

How do you reconcile these?

I do not reconcile them within a utilitarian system because I do not understand how they are part of that system. It seems to me that the essence of utilitarianism is outcome based. It does not matter if it is pursued through rules or through individual decisions about the maximisation of utility in every instance of choice to be made. The measure of worth is happiness and in principle the best course can be discovered through counting. The point of this is to make morality objective. If Mill says we "should" value another's happiness as much as our own he has left utilitarianism behind. There is no reason at all to suppose that we do: and in fact it is at odds with actual outcomes in many cases. It seems to me he has therefore moved away from any version of utilitarian thought and is now standing on something like the golden rule. I don't think that is a bad thing, but it certainly does not have the objective quality of utilitarianism. It is a different kind of prescription altogether.

And again I must point out the flaw in your logic. If someone is considering a future action there are no real outcomes, only foreseeable consequences. So for the nurse contemplating a course of action his own foreseeable happiness cannot trump the foreseeable unhappiness it would cause.

Don't forget that your position still entirely depends upon the premise that tolerating the rape of a comatose woman could be considered as an instance of maximising happiness.

And you still have not even tried to defend it.

Not only have I given instances where that would be the case; you have agreed that in those instances there is no moral objection to the action within the terms of utilitarianism. At least that is what I took from it when you asked your question at the end of this quote.

If the nurse checks with his employer and his co-worker and ensures that the woman's friends and family are on board with his little plan and everybody agreed that it was morally OK for the nurse to do what he did and the patient herself said, "that's fine, I wasn't using my body anyway", then on what basis was the nurse's action wrong?

I have clearly misunderstood your intent and so can you now please answer that question in your own terms?

I am suggesting that one individual selfishly pursuing his own pleasure at the expense of the happiness of all around him cannot possibly be an example of maximising happiness. You are telling me it is illegitimate to suggest this. I am telling you that your arithmetic is wrong.

No. I am saying that however you do the arithmetic there are instances where maximising happiness results in an outcome which I personally consider to be wrong. You may say those instances are implausible, but since you are currently founding on the idea that people are incapable of being happy if that happiness is founded on another's misery, plausibility does not seem to come into it. A system must be able to deal with hypotheticals which we can easily conceive and this is a perfectly legitimte way to explore the content and limitations of any system where we cannot do experiments either for reasons of practicality or ethics.

I am suggesting that if you valued another person's happiness as much as your own, then an act that would make them unhappy would also make you unhappy, whether or not you disclosed the act. You are saying that it is illegitimate for me to suggest this. I am telilng your that x can never be not x.

And I am saying that is perfectly correct. But it is not a utilitarian position, since it happens that some acts which make other people unhappy do not make the actor unhappy. Since the basis of untilitarianism is about maximising actual happiness it has no defence against this fact. Utilitarianism is concerned with outcomes not with oughts. Where you bring in an "ought" you leave the system.

 

[Robin]

You have made some quotes from Mill it is true. And I am sure you think you have been clear and perhaps for those who have made a formal study of philosophy you have been. But you are not clear to me. I have been reading a bit around the subject and I cannot recognise what "brand" of utilitarianism you are proposing.

Well I have cited Bentham and Mills, so I thought it would be clear that I am relying on them.

I don't know of the others that you are reading, so as I asked before, can you cite your own sources?

If Mill says we "should" value another's happiness as much as our own he has left utilitarianism behind.

Again, please cite your source or state whiat brand of Utilitarianism you are talking about that J.S Mill has left behind.

There is no reason at all to suppose that we do: and in fact it is at odds with actual outcomes in many cases. It seems to me he has therefore moved away from any version of utilitarian thought and is now standing on something like the golden rule. I don't think that is a bad thing, but it certainly does not have the objective quality of utilitarianism. It is a different kind of prescription altogether.

As I have pointed out before, Utilitarianism depends, ultimately, on subjective measures, utility as individuals would regard it - Bentham's shopkeeper.

I am unaware of this objective Utilitarianism you are talking about.

Not only have I given instances where that would be the case; you have agreed that in those instances there is no moral objection to the action within the terms of utilitarianism. At least that is what I took from it when you asked your question at the end of this quote.

...

I have clearly misunderstood your intent and so can you now please answer that question in your own terms?

I am not quite sure why you regarded my question as agreement to your absurd hypothetical of everybody being delighted at the rape of a comatose woman. It certainly was not. It was a question.

No, you are talking of another species, you are talking of a bizarre alternate universe. No, Utilitarianism would not work for this alternate universe or alternate species.

Here, in this universe, on planet Earth, with the human species it is utterly nonsensical to say that everybody concerned would be made happy by the act. Sexual abuse does not make people happy. Not even the abusers.

So, no, sexual abuse of a comatose woman could in no way be considered an instance of maximising happiness. If you have invent such a surreal example for the drawbacks of Utilitarianism then this is a sign that Utilitarianism must be a pretty good system.

No. I am saying that however you do the arithmetic there are instances where maximising happiness results in an outcome which I personally consider to be wrong. You may say those instances are implausible, but since you are currently founding on the idea that people are incapable of being happy if that happiness is founded on another's misery, plausibility does not seem to come into it.

Again, please feel completely free to quote the part where I said that. Seriously.

I did say that it was one of the rules Mill proposed for Utilitarianism, that we should regard anothers happiness as equal to our own. I do not recall ever saying that people are incapabable of happiness founded on another misery. And I can't seem to find it.

A system must be able to deal with hypotheticals which we can easily conceive and this is a perfectly legitimte way to explore the content and limitations of any system where we cannot do experiments either for reasons of practicality or ethics.

No, a system does not have to deal with impossible hypotheticals, that is just silly.

I already asked you to show how Kantian ethics would cope with this situation. I don't think you replied to this one.

And I am saying that is perfectly correct. But it is not a utilitarian position, since it happens that some acts which make other people unhappy do not make the actor unhappy. Since the basis of untilitarianism is about maximising actual happiness it has no defence against this fact. Utilitarianism is concerned with outcomes not with oughts. Where you bring in an "ought" you leave the system.

Again, I will have to ask you to cite where you are getting this stuff from. You are talking about a version of Utilitarianism that I have not heard of. I have said which version I am talking about from the beginning.

It is unfair of you not to tell me which version of Utilitarianism you are talking about so that I can read up on it.

 

[Sceptic Realist]

Congratulations sceptic realist... you are the first person back on my ignore list... and the only one for now.

OMG really?! F****** awsome.

 

[articulett]

Robin, I think she's talking about the brand of utilitarianism where supporters are more immoral than her and all those who rely on "illusions" for their morality--the one that supports her view that the OP is meaningful and there are these "strident" skeptics who dare to say the Emperor is naked --and those nicer ones like herself who think it's good to indulge the fantasies of others no matter how untrue or potentially hurtful.

These sorts of rambling straw men posts all sound like the courtier's reply... http://richarddawkins.net/article,463,The-Courtiers-Reply,PZ-Myers. They believe that delusions and illusions are good for people and see themselves as diplomats rather than those promoting a stereotype and aiming to shut up those who point out that the emperor is naked, and it's really not condusive to a functioning society to indulge the deluded or claim otherwise nor shame those who would share the truth.

To me, the truth trumps happiness... and people ought to at least be given the consideration as to whether they want the truth if it conflicts with their belief. Most don't know there is the option even. Their faith makes them scared or blind to alternate viewpoints.

The apologetic viewpoint just seems to transparent to me. It's like ever post is an attempt to prove the "mean skeptic" stereotype to themselves in their head so they can feel morally superior without having to provide actual evidence of anything at all.

 

[Sceptic Realist]

These sorts of rambling straw men posts all sound like the courtier's reply... http://richarddawkins.net/article,463,The-Courtiers-Reply,PZ-Myers. They believe that delusions and illusions are good for people and see themselves as diplomats rather than those promoting a stereotype and aiming to shut up those who point out that the emperor is naked, and it's really not condusive to a functioning society to indulge the deluded or claim otherwise nor shame those who would share the truth.

To me, the truth trumps happiness... and people ought to at least be given the consideration as to whether they want the truth if it conflicts with their belief. Most don't know there is the option even. Their faith makes them scared or blind to alternate viewpoints.

The apologetic viewpoint just seems to transparent to me. It's like ever post is an attempt to prove the "mean skeptic" stereotype to themselves in their head so they can feel morally superior without having to provide actual evidence of anything at all.

Aw, damn. I should have placed bets that you would start discussing me immidiately after I was ignored. Ah, well. You live and learn, right?

 

[Herzblut]

Aw, damn. I should have placed bets that you would start discussing me immidiately after I was ignored.

Who would have bet against it?

 

[Fiona]

@Robin. I am not trying to be difficult. I am trying to understand. So here goes with my understanding of the system

Mill was raised in the tradition of Philosophical Radicalism, made famous by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John Austin (1790-1859), and his father James Mill (1773-1836), which applied utilitarian principles in a self-conscious and systematic way to issues of institutional design and social reform. Utilitarianism assesses actions and institutions in terms of their effects on human happiness and enjoins us to perform actions and design institutions so that they promote — in one formulation, maximize — human happiness. Utilitarianism was a progressive doctrine historically, principally because of its universal scope — its insistence that everyone's happiness matters — and its egalitarian conception of impartiality — its insistence that everyone's happiness matters equally.

This seems to say that utilitarianism, as conceived by Bentham and his cohort, was an attempt to make the assessment of morality a matter of objective effect on human happiness, and that this must be impartial. To that extent everyone's happiness matters, but it matters equally. this is clear in Bentham's work because he maintains that we are governed only by pleasure and pain. Your suggestion that the pleasure of the other is as important in determining the moral course does not seem to be supported here because:

Bentham allows that we may be moved by the pleasures and pains of others. But he appears to think that these other-regarding pleasures can move us only insofar as we take pleasure in the pleasure of others (V 32). This suggests that Bentham endorses a version of the principle of psychological egoism, which claims that the agent's own happiness is and can be the only ultimate object of his desires

and

By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question

Bentham then explains that the happiness which matters is that of the community (the group or aggregate, as I have been calling it). And this leads to a problem. If each individual can only pursue his own happiness it is difficult to see how he can simultaneously pursue the happiness of the community. These will be at odds at least some of the time. Bentham and Mill seem to try to reconcile this by a version of "enlightened self interest" But how can we make a person who is only able to pursue his own happiness take your view that another's happiness is equally important. Bentham specifically denies that. So this is part of the problem I have in understanding what you are arguing for. It truly is not self evident, though you are probably more steeped in this and have perhaps forgotten the tensions one meets when coming to this at first.

Because the utilitarian asks us to maximize value, he has to be able to make sense of quantities or magnitudes of value associated with different options, where he assigns value to pleasure and disvalue to pain. Intensity, duration, and extent would appear to be the most relevant variables here. Each option is associated with various pleasures and pains both within a single life and across lives. For any given option we must find out how many pleasures and pains it produces, whether those occur in a single life or in different lives. For every distinct pleasure and pain, we must calculate its intensity and its duration. That would give us the total amount of (net) pleasure (or pain) associated with each option. Then we must do that option with greatest total. If there are two (or more) options with the greatest total, we are free to select any of these.

So although the actual experience of pleasure or utility is subjective there needs to be some way of measuring this objectively, else there is no guide to action apart from the individual decision. I cannot see how you can get to that without agreeing some normative measure.

Turning to Mill: he appears to move away from Bentham because although he says that happiness is the only thing that is desirable in itself: it is not the only thing that a human being can desire. It is not clear whether he thinks those other desires derive as a part of each person's happiness: but if he does not it is hard to see how this aligns with Bentham's conception that we are motivated by the pursuit of our own self interest. So he has moved away from the individual decision about where his own happiness lies to a conception of the happiness of the group. Which again seems to me to be necessarily normative. And this is why I cannot see how you can be basing on both Bentham and Mill, since I cannot see how they agree. Indeed Mill criticised Bentham on the basis of failure of imagination and narrowness of view.

Mill appears to endorse an objective standpoint in his defense of the intrinsic superiority of the "higher pleasures". This seems to me to be a radical departure from the position of Bentham, because for Bentham pleasure is the only thing with intrinsic value, and the existence and the measure of that value is entirely subjective. Indeed poetry is inferior to a seduko, because the seduko can produce pleasure for more people. Mills talks about the superiority of art based on the sense of human dignity of the competent judge. This means that the value is independent of the pleasure, since those pursuits will be preferred even when they produce less pleasure in the competent judge. Thus the idea that pleasure is itself the indicator of moral worth is not supported here. It may not be an objective thing, but this seems implicit in the notion of the intrinsic superiority of certain kinds of pursuit, surely?

In discussing Liberty Mill says that

It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being

Once again I cannot reconcile this with the idea of a subjective system. So we have to look at what Mill means by happiness. It is clear he does not mean what Bentham means is it not? Bentham means what we usually mean by happiness - a sensation or mental state. Mill does not seem to mean that. Rather he appears to be talking about the exercise of higher mental capacities which we do not share with animals or children. It is as if he defines happiness as "right living" and again I cannot see how that squares with subjectivity since it rests on a conception of man's nature and not on individual difference.

So what should we do? Mill conceives utilitarianism as an ethical system which informs us of our duty as much as any other. He asserts “the doctrine that utility or happiness is the criterion of right and wrong” Thus it provides a standard of action rather than a decision making procedure. That is it tells us what our goal is but not how we should reach it. He then suggests we should reach it by adopting secondary principles where those principles generally produce more happiness AND where we cannot tell in advance that following the principle will produce less happiness than some other decision.

But this does not really explain his ideas about right and wrong when he seems to say that an action is only wrong if we think it should be punished. This is not judging an action by its utility at all. If happiness is the criterion of right and wrong how can it also be true that "We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it — if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience". This has been explained by suggesting that he proposes a sort of "rule utilitarianism" (though not everyone seems to agree) and therefore we seem to be back to some sort of objectivism. Or so I think anyway. However that pans out it seems that he is now very far from Bentham, because we have to consider the law in terms of utility, rather than the actions of the individual in promoting his own happiness. It is no good seeing the law as a subjective matter, because it isn't in any society which is not an absolute monarchy, I think. Mill's conception, if applied to law, would seem to lead to the conclusion that the act itself must be assessed as right or wrong in accord with its outcome in terms of happiness: and then what to do in response to it must be similarly assessed. I cannot see how we can get to equality under the law in such a case, unless we take rules utilitarianism as given. What do we do when in the particular case we maximise happiness by not applying sanctions: but it is argued that this in itself is reducing happiness because of the inequality it entails? How do we decide which level of utility is trumps? The outcome in the particular case or the (far more uncertain) outcome down the line? These are real tensions in judicial thought, surely?

So these are some of the reasons I am having a bit of trouble to tell what it is you are arguing when you say you found on both Bentham and Mill.

 

[rocketdodger]

If it matters, I have thus far not been discussing this type of "commonly understood" utilitarianism. To me "utilitarianism" is simply a morality based only on utility -- the extra conditions mentioned above are unimportant and only serve to obscure the point, in my opinion.