Puppycow
Penultimate Amazing
This article explains why, if John McCain gets his way, a whole lot of sick folks are going to find it harder than ever to afford or even qualify for health insurance.
In other words, insurance companies would have greater freedom to choose their customers, and discriminate between them. Healthy people would be offered cheaper plans, while those with pre-existing conditions would pay more, or be denied coverage in some cases.
McCain argues that different states' regulations "prevent the best companies, with the best plans and lowest prices, from making their product available to any American who wants it." Although he hasn't given details, his supporters say that he favors an approach, endorsed by President Bush and championed by McCain's Arizona colleague John Shadegg, that would allow insurers to choose the state laws under which they are regulated. (I e-mailed the campaign about the specifics of McCain's approach and didn't hear back.) An insurance company that chose to be regulated under Arizona law could sell policies in New York without following New York rules. Arizona, like most states, lets companies charge what they want to people who are sick—or simply deny them coverage altogether. Under Shadegg's bill, insurers wouldn't even need to pick up and move their operations; it would be enough to file some paperwork with a state insurance commissioner and pay that state's relevant taxes.
If enacted, this proposal would cause a shift along the lines seen in the credit-card industry. Like the Citibank of old, New York insurers would have little incentive to continue doing business under New York's laws. Insurance companies can make bigger profits by offering different policies to different people based on separate assessments of risk rather than charging everyone the same, as a state like New York requires. An insurer operating under Arizona law would be able to offer healthy New Yorkers a cheaper policy than an insurer working under New York law that has to price policies the same for everyone.
In other words, insurance companies would have greater freedom to choose their customers, and discriminate between them. Healthy people would be offered cheaper plans, while those with pre-existing conditions would pay more, or be denied coverage in some cases.
And, perversely, it would drive up total health care costs for the nation as more people would forego cost-effective preventive care only to end up at emergency rooms later.With the individual market for health care, the libertarian argument fails on its own terms: Sick people can't get coverage they can afford. It's as though the rafts are reserved for people who already have life preservers. Americans with pre-existing conditions—cancer, asthma, diabetes, and the like—would need to pay even more than they do today. Through no fault of their own, more of them would end up without insurance. Meanwhile, insurers would improve their own profits by offering targeted policies to people with the fewest health expenses. As with the history of credit cards, it's Robin Hood in reverse.
Apart from the obvious injustice, this approach could add to spiraling health costs. The sickest 10 percent of Americans are already responsible for 70 percent of the nation's health expenses. When more such Americans go uninsured, skip checkups, and land in the emergency room, they end up costing taxpayers more.