Liquid Bomb plot

[ZouPrime]

I disagree... for example... the restriction on liquids was in direct response to the Atlantic Bombing Plot.

In the same way, the Bojinka Plot (in which Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Yousef planned to detonate bombs in multiple airliners) resulted in airline security measures changing so that luggage would only be put on an aircraft if the owner of that luggage was on board.

Meanwhile the events on FedEx Flight 705 resulted in changes to rules governing jumpseat passengers.

The history of aviation is full of examples of threats to aviation resulting in changes to security measures.

You are right.

Still, the whole strategy of implementing controls tailored to specific security incident is wrong and ultimately useless, if only for an economic standpoint.

 

[Par]

[M]aybe the airlines should save themselves a lot of time and inconvenience by stripping security back to a bare minimum, as the chances of any individual passenger dying due to a terrorist action is highly remote.

You sure showed that straw man.

Fair enough. But then:

The ban isn't to stop people making TATP onboard planes, it's to stop them making ANYTHING dangerous on board planes. There are far more things, and things far more deadly than TATP that could be smuggled onboard in innocent looking packaging. Consider if you will the situation where a terrorist smuggled the precursors for Sarin onboard an A-340 or 474-800... Not a happy thought.

Oh my God, any liquid could be Sarin! Oh my God, any solid could be plastic explosive! Or anthrax! Oh my God, any gas could be Sarin too! I think we need to ban matter on aeroplanes. It's the only way to be sure.

That’s just not cricket, old boy.

 

[Par]

I can see why you’ve mentioned it, but of course none of that is actually pertinent to the question of whether or not the method is in any way feasible. That is, it might not have been practical in this specific case, but it doesn’t follow from that that it’s an impractical method per se.

So far, nobody has provided any evidence that this method is practical even for a talented gang of terrorists.

Well, that’s a different issue entirely. I merely wished to point out that your argument above is a non sequitur.

 

[Par]

So far, nobody has provided any evidence that this method is practical even for a talented gang of terrorists.

Now, as to that issue: The notions that liquid explosives represent a threat to aircraft and that the security measures in question serve a useful purpose are reflected in the current paradigm. If you wish to affect a change in that paradigm, then it would seem that the burden of proof would fall upon you.

 

[PhantomWolf]

To the best of my knowledge many places besides the USA have planes. Glad I could help you out with that.

Now I assume your implicit claim was something like "other nations have planes too, their security measures are just like those of the USA, their security measures are entirely at the discretion of the airline companies, and so I was right all along that the financial interests of the airline companies drive security measures". Because you hid behind a rhetorical question rather than coming out with a claim you might have to defend I don't know for sure that's what you meant but it seems a reasonable guess.

Was that what you were trying to say?

No it wasn't. What I was pointing out is that the TSA had nothing to do with the ban in the first place and certainly didn't force everyone else on the planet to do it too. The intial ban was placed by the British Department of Transport and the the EU Commission brought in the 100ml ruling. Remember that this plot was based in England? They were they ones that banned liquids first, on all planes into and out of Britian, followed by the US (who actually lightened up the restrictions first as well.) The idea that it is all some plot by Homeland security to scare USAers falls apart when the fact is that it wasn't the USA that come up with it or put it in place!

As to airlines being sued, airlines weren't responsible for security pre-9/11 either so I guess that is why no one is suing them over it.... oh, that's right... oops. That's the resaon that airports and airlines outside of Europe are complying with what was made into an International Standard, because if they don't they can be sued.

 

[PhantomWolf]

In the same way, the Bojinka Plot (in which Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Yousef planned to detonate bombs in multiple airliners) resulted in airline security measures changing so that luggage would only be put on an aircraft if the owner of that luggage was on board

Wasn't it Pam Am 103 that caused that? (In fact even before 103 it was the FAA rule I see, but it was often breached, as was in the case of 103 as well, at least twice.) The Bojinka plot was barely noticed and since it involved a bomb left in the cabin, the security measures you list would have been ineffective against it.

Oh, and BTW, for those naysayers who have been naysaying, Yousef smuggled the Nitrogylcerine onboard Philippine Airlines Flight 434 in.... a contact lense solution bottle, the very sort of thing now banned. DOH! And just for good measure, the detonator was his wristwatch and the batteries were in... The soles of his shoes! And you wonder why these sort of things are now targeted for extra security

 

[Magenta]

Does any country outside the US still x-ray shoes? I'm not qualified to judge whether the LAGs rule is effective or not, but in my experience it's a minor inconvenience compared with the rigours of long-haul flights. Increased security measures don't make me either fearful or complacent about flying. Presumably, if people are "cowering in fear" they're not flying and that means more room for me. (I'm more mindful of other aviation-related safety issues - things that I have some control over, eg choice of airline.)

In the same way, the Bojinka Plot (in which Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Yousef planned to detonate bombs in multiple airliners) resulted in airline security measures changing so that luggage would only be put on an aircraft if the owner of that luggage was on board.

Actually, that changed well before Bojinka. (PhantomWolf beat me to it.)

Another example of changes in security measures is how check-in procedures changed (for a while at least in the UK) after the Hindawi episode.

 

[gumboot]

Wasn't it Pam Am 103 that caused that? (In fact even before 103 it was the FAA rule I see, but it was often breached, as was in the case of 103 as well, at least twice.) The Bojinka plot was barely noticed and since it involved a bomb left in the cabin, the security measures you list would have been ineffective against it.

Yes, you're quite right. Thanks for correcting me.

 

[Kestrel]

Just out of interest, roughly how many people have been prevented from travelling since 2001 due to the more rigorous enforcement of "no fly" lists? Not disputing, just asking.

Dave

I know a guy who is on the no fly list. His first name is David and he has a rather common Anglo Saxon surname. There are probably 2 or 3 thousand guys that have than name in the US. David is a frequent flyer and now carries special paperwork so TSA knows he is not the David they are looking for.

The screwy part is that there are no known cases where an actual terrorist was turned away at the airport because his name was on the no fly list.

 

[uk_dave]

Does any country outside the US still x-ray shoes?

Yes. At Heathrow they do it after the main security check (hand luggage, metal detector etc) and before you enter the 'secure area' where the duty free shops are. At least in Terminal 3 last time I went through.

 

[Par]

[Y]ou can argue that the panic is media-driven and the US TSA is just responding to the media in CYA fashion. Or you can argue that the US government, particularly the TSA, is deliberately creating stupid panics and the media goes along with it for ratings. What you can't argue is that any factor relevant to airline security changed with the discovery of the Lucozade plot. If liquid bombs were a threat they were a threat known long before, and the plot that was discovered was no threat to anybody.

I believe that I understand the point that you’re trying to make. However, I don’t find it particularly compelling.

Firstly, let’s suppose for a moment that your more nuanced version of Kestrel’s theory is correct and these measures have indeed been cynically introduced by various governments either to placate purely media-generated alarm or so that they can be exploited in order to foster widespread fear for some nefarious reason or another. Secondly, let’s also temporarily assume that these particular plotters were somewhat unlikely to have ever managed to bring their plans to fruition. Thirdly, let’s take into account that, as you say, if liquid bombs represent a threat, then it is a threat that has been known about for some time.

Now, the problem is that none of these three factors have any bearing on the question of whether or not liquid explosives (or hazardous liquids in general) actually represent a threat to aircraft. Nor do they have any bearing on the subsequent question of whether the security measures in question serve a genuinely useful purpose.

 

[Kage]

There are two problems with the way the TSA tries to secure our airports and flights. The first is that the programs and policies that are put into place are purely reactionary. They are designed to prevent plots that have been foiled. This means that the TSA is dammed to be flying outside terrorism. They just can't run their OODA loops fast enough to turn inside AQ. It might be the case that even with think tanks and red cell test groups they still would be behind AQ as far as planning attacks. I would still feel a lot better if that was how things were being run. At the moment they can't even check the wiring.

The second issue is how the TSA is utterly incompetent at reacting to previously foiled plots. The no-fly list and the shoes being taken off and everything is so utterly bass-ackward that it is a wonder AQ doesn't fly loops around the TSA.

My theory, the TSA is just slightly less incompetent than AQ.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I believe that I understand the point that you’re trying to make. However, I don’t find it particularly compelling.

Firstly, let’s suppose for a moment that your more nuanced version of Kestrel’s theory is correct and these measures have indeed been cynically introduced by various governments either to placate purely media-generated alarm or so that they can be exploited in order to foster widespread fear for some nefarious reason or another. Secondly, let’s also temporarily assume that these particular plotters were somewhat unlikely to have ever managed to bring their plans to fruition. Thirdly, let’s take into account that, as you say, if liquid bombs represent a threat, then it is a threat that has been known about for some time.

Now, the problem is that none of these three factors have any bearing on the question of whether or not liquid explosives (or hazardous liquids in general) actually represent a threat to aircraft. Nor do they have any bearing on the subsequent question of whether the security measures in question serve a genuinely useful purpose.

While that is true so far as it goes, those three factors to prove (I think) that the current airline security regime cannot be based on a rational and informed assessment of the real dangers.

If it was based on a rational and informed assessment of the real dangers then either liquids would have been restricted on flights a long time ago, or they would never have been restricted at all. It's not as if the principles of chemistry have changed recently, or as if it's a totally novel idea that terrorists might want to use bombs to destroy planes.

So if the current security regime is a sensible one it's because they/we got lucky, not because they are proceeding on rational bases.

This is also why the claim made earlier that the burden of proof is on anyone who thinks the current airline security system is imperfect is mendacious. We've proven it's not based on rationality and evidence, so there's no grounds to assume that it's perfect until shown otherwise. If anything the burden of proof should be on bodies like the TSA to justify absurdities like the liquids restrictions, which they have refused to do when directly questioned.

 

[gtc]

If it was based on a rational and informed assessment of the real dangers then either liquids would have been restricted on flights a long time ago, or they would never have been restricted at all. It's not as if the principles of chemistry have changed recently, or as if it's a totally novel idea that terrorists might want to use bombs to destroy planes.

I agree that we can rule out a change in technology or science (or more correctly the assessment of the science made by the security people) that would have suddenly made such bombs possible.

However, can we rule out the possibility that the security people now feel that the probability that such an attempt would be made has increased? Don't forget that the standard approach to hijackings was to assume that the hijackers did not want to crash the plane with themselves on it. Were there any suicide bombings or attempted suicide bombings on aeroplanes prior to 9/11?

I don't think you have ruled out this possibilty as might just means that there has always been a non-zero probability.

If anything the burden of proof should be on bodies like the TSA to justify absurdities like the liquids restrictions, which they have refused to do when directly questioned.

Does it matter either way? The airlines are privately run; if they want to restrict liquids they can, irrespective of whether its justified or not.

 

[PhantomWolf]

While that is true so far as it goes, those three factors to prove (I think) that the current airline security regime cannot be based on a rational and informed assessment of the real dangers.

And the ability to carry unknown and unchecked liquids onto a plane is not a threat? Tell that to the family of Haruki Ikegami.

If it was based on a rational and informed assessment of the real dangers then either liquids would have been restricted on flights a long time ago, or they would never have been restricted at all. It's not as if the principles of chemistry have changed recently, or as if it's a totally novel idea that terrorists might want to use bombs to destroy planes.

However the question is, was it a novel idea for terrorists to attempt to smuggle the bombs onboard as innocent liquids. While true the answer is no, it had been done previously, the TAPA Plot was larger and gained far more public attention and thus more action than the Bojinka Plot did.

So if the current security regime is a sensible one it's because they/we got lucky, not because they are proceeding on rational bases.

We did get lucky. If not for an accident the Bojinka Plot could have downed multiple Airplanes back in the 90's.

This is also why the claim made earlier that the burden of proof is on anyone who thinks the current airline security system is imperfect is mendacious. We've proven it's not based on rationality and evidence, so there's no grounds to assume that it's perfect until shown otherwise.

Why should a security system be shown to be perfect before being used? Do you lock your front door even though it can be broken down by a determined burglar? What's the point of using deadlocks on all your doors and windows when they can come in through the roof? All security systems are reactive, they work at defeating the known ways of attacking. Attempting to out think and defeat unknown ways of attacking is pointless because you never know what will be tried, you simply cover your bases and hope that you'll pick up on anything new. As to proving that this measure was based on neither rationality and evidence, I disagree, it was totally rational and the evidence is that terrorists have attempted and have in fact smuggled explosives onto planes disgused as innocent liquids. One of those attempts cost a man his life and could have cost a lot more people if it had been brought to fruition.

If anything the burden of proof should be on bodies like the TSA to justify absurdities like the liquids restrictions, which they have refused to do when directly questioned.

Again why do you focus on the TSA? It seems to me that you have a hate for them because you continue to blame them for things they didn't do. The British Department of Transportation created the ban in the UK for planes travelling in and out of the UK before the US adopted it. The US simply followed the UK because the attacks had been aimed at them.

 

[damien pastaume]

Agreed. Further, the whole “religious sensitivities” thing is simply massive in the United Kingdom at the moment, resulting in people (including male terrorists) wearing burqas when flying so as to avoid having even their faces checked against their passports.

All I can say is it worked for me. I am now wanted in 24 countries. They'll never take me alive!

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

And the ability to carry unknown and unchecked liquids onto a plane is not a threat? Tell that to the family of Haruki Ikegami.

Try to keep up. Nobody is saying the threat is nonexistent. I'm saying the threat is not worth worrying about. Yes, even if one person did die once.

However the question is, was it a novel idea for terrorists to attempt to smuggle the bombs onboard as innocent liquids. While true the answer is no, it had been done previously, the TAPA Plot was larger and gained far more public attention and thus more action than the Bojinka Plot did.

So you agree that it's based on media attention, not the real degree of danger?

Why should a security system be shown to be perfect before being used? Do you lock your front door even though it can be broken down by a determined burglar? What's the point of using deadlocks on all your doors and windows when they can come in through the roof? All security systems are reactive, they work at defeating the known ways of attacking. Attempting to out think and defeat unknown ways of attacking is pointless because you never know what will be tried, you simply cover your bases and hope that you'll pick up on anything new. As to proving that this measure was based on neither rationality and evidence, I disagree, it was totally rational and the evidence is that terrorists have attempted and have in fact smuggled explosives onto planes disgused as innocent liquids. One of those attempts cost a man his life and could have cost a lot more people if it had been brought to fruition.

No.

Again why do you focus on the TSA? It seems to me that you have a hate for them because you continue to blame them for things they didn't do. The British Department of Transportation created the ban in the UK for planes travelling in and out of the UK before the US adopted it. The US simply followed the UK because the attacks had been aimed at them.

So your argument is that the TSA just copies whatever the UK does? If not, how is this a response?

I agree that we can rule out a change in technology or science (or more correctly the assessment of the science made by the security people) that would have suddenly made such bombs possible.

However, can we rule out the possibility that the security people now feel that the probability that such an attempt would be made has increased? Don't forget that the standard approach to hijackings was to assume that the hijackers did not want to crash the plane with themselves on it. Were there any suicide bombings or attempted suicide bombings on aeroplanes prior to 9/11?

If suicide bombing became a threat as of 9/11 and liquid bombs are a feasible threat, liquids should have been restricted from 9/12 onwards. They weren't.

Does it matter either way? The airlines are privately run; if they want to restrict liquids they can, irrespective of whether its justified or not.

I keep hearing about these airlines whose security is totally a matter of their own discretion, but as far as I'm aware in the USA and Australia airline security is either conducted directly by the government (USA) or largely governed by state and federal law (Australia, to the best of my knowledge).

Which airlines do their own security?

 

[PhantomWolf]

Try to keep up. Nobody is saying the threat is nonexistent. I'm saying the threat is not worth worrying about. Yes, even if one person did die once.

So how many people need to die in your opinion before security measures are put in place to prevent more? 10? 20? 50? 100? 500? 1000? 3000? How many human lives do you price a bottle of water in your hand luguage at?

So you agree that it's based on media attention, not the real degree of danger?

No it's based on the effect and public knowledge. Few people know of Bojinka, and was no outcry about people's safety. Lots of people learned of the TAPA Plot and wanted their planes safe. Publicity plays a part in people's awareness of a danger. If people are ignorant to a threat, why would they increase security over it?

No.

No what? You don't lock your house? Good luck keeping hold of your computer.

So your argument is that the TSA just copies whatever the UK does? If not, how is this a response?

No my argument is that the TSA doesn't make the rules, and especially the one that you seem to have your knickers in a twist over.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

So how many people need to die in your opinion before security measures are put in place to prevent more? 10? 20? 50? 100? 500? 1000? 3000? How many human lives do you price a bottle of water in your hand luguage at?

A human life is worth a few million dollars, or that's the price we're willing as a society to pay to avoid the loss of a mostly-randomly selected one. Add up the total cost of the screening tomfoolery in terms both of paying airline security people to confiscate your mouthwash, and of the valuable time passengers waste on said tomfoolery, divide by 3 or 4 million and you have the rough figure.

Before you go down that road, no, just because you find a sheep or three to say "I don't mind waiting in line while they x-ray people's sandals if it keeps the big bad wolf away", that doesn't mean that society wouldn't be better off if they were doing something useful with that time.

No it's based on the effect and public knowledge. Few people know of Bojinka, and was no outcry about people's safety. Lots of people learned of the TAPA Plot and wanted their planes safe. Publicity plays a part in people's awareness of a danger. If people are ignorant to a threat, why would they increase security over it?

I'm really not sure where you think that distinction gets you. You're still admitting that airline security practise is dictated by concerns other than actually preventing attacks, and then defending said practises.

No my argument is that the TSA doesn't make the rules, and especially the one that you seem to have your knickers in a twist over.

That'd be news to the TSA I think, I'd be surprised if they knew they took directions from the government of the UK.

 

[gtc]

If suicide bombing became a threat as of 9/11 and liquid bombs are a feasible threat, liquids should have been restricted from 9/12 onwards. They weren't.

Again, you are making assumptions. Why do you believe that the authorities have not altered there perception of the probability that such an attack might occur.

I keep hearing about these airlines whose security is totally a matter of their own discretion.

From whom? Not from me you haven't.

but as far as I'm aware in the USA and Australia airline security is either conducted directly by the government (USA) or largely governed by state and federal law (Australia, to the best of my knowledge).

Which airlines do their own security?

All of them have the final say. There is nothing stopping them from banning liquids irrespective of whether the government has justified their restrictions to your satisfaction or not.