The whole conversation was about attraction/repulsion.
Which are forms of movement.
In fact, there is only one form of movement. We conceptually apply this notion of attraction/repulsion on top of the movement. Yet there is nothing observable to us about movement which indicates that it is attraction or repulsion. Logically, it is just movement, that's all.
It only becomes either attraction or repulsion when we decide to define it as such.
Yeah, in the penicillin example you can't tell whether the particular molecular/cellular movements which take place, and kill the bacteria, are either attractions or repulsions. Your belief that they have to be described in a particular way is purely due to you having been educated in that particular convention. They are just movements.
You can't weasel out of this in such a way, by reformulating my example into attraction/repulsion. The penicillin example shows the inanity of your response.
You said that we cannot tell the difference between repulsion of a magnet and attraction of not-magnet when you see movement in magnets placed in close proximity. You did not define 'not-magnet'. Perhaps you would like to do so now. The only logical choice I can see is that 'not-magnet' comprises 'the-rest-of-the-universe'.
We are left with two choices -- (1) magnets carry some form of 'energy' within them and affect other magnets or objects because of this 'energy' or (2) 'the-rest-of-the-universe' acts on the second magnet or other object but in some completely peculiar way that depends on the presence of the magnet.
Let's look at the evidence. I place a magnet on a table. I place another magnet on the table. I move magnet 2 close to magnet 1 and notice that magnet 1 moves away from magnet 2, twirls on its central axis, then moves toward magnet 2 -- but only when magnet 2 is very close to magnet 1. I move magnet 2 further away from magnet 1 and nothing happens. I replace magnet 2 with a stronger magnet and magnet 1 does the same thing, but magnet 2 doesn't have to be so close. Then I do the same thing with coils of wire and run a current through them, changing the number of coils and the amount of current and see different results with magnet 1.
Hmmm. According to you, we could view this as an effect of magnet 2 on magnet 1
or an effect of not-the-magnet (the-rest-of-the-universe) on magnet 1. Of course we could view it that way, that is not the point; if we wanted to be completely idiotic about it, we could certainly call into question the entire project of inductive reasoning. The point is that view does not consider the actual evidence -- that the only action we see depends critically on the presence of magnet 2, the proximity of magnet 2, and the strength of magnet 2. The-rest-of-the-universe is held constant. It would be daft to conclude that the magnet's behavior was a consequence of the-rest-of-the-universe -- which was held constant -- and not magnet 2.
The same is true for the penicillin example. The-rest-of-the-universe is held constant when the sick person is given penicillin. But if we take two people with meningitis and give one penicillin and not the other (aside from the ensuing jail time and angry mob with pitchforks) it will become immediately clear that one is alive and the other dead. Does it make any sense to describe what happens as the-rest-of-the-universe changes in relation to the person given penicillin but not the person not given penicillin? Attraction/repulsion -- those terms don't apply to the penicillin example.
Since changes in the second magnet (or penicillin) produce different results, we use language that reflects that reality. We use language that encodes the evidence. It is not a simple matter of 'you only see movement' -- we see different movement by changing one of the actors, so we speak of that actor as being the agent of change. While one could certainly speak of the universe as the agent of change, that would provide no useful information. I could just as easily speak of the FSM as the agent of change -- all things in relation to the FSM, or invisible pink monkeys act differently in the presence of stronger magnets -- innumerable frames are possible. But those conventions simply ignore the evidence or needlessly compound a simple phenomenon. That is why Blobru railed at Herr Baba's second-rate semi-Empedoclean whitewash and why he mentioned Ockham. Baba's account ignores the evidence and frames the issue in a totally useless and misleading way.
What you seem to be doing is committing the worst of post-modern abuses -- completely ignoring the game that Derrida played and introducing the idea that all frames are precisely equal. Whatever English departments in the U.S. decide to do with deconstruction (and from what I have seen of a few of them, they don't seem to understand it very well), it is not the case that all interpretations are equal.
Is white lack of black? Or is black lack of white?
Your choice.
One culture could choose the former as the convention. Another culture could choose the latter as the convention.
That is a different situation from the magnet or penicillin use. To draw a parallel is to misunderstand the fundamental nature of how language is used. Black, white, positive, negative -- of course they are labelled according to convention. They can be defined in several ways. And all of those differences are equal, since there is no further information contained within such conventions. Who cares if the word we use is 'black' or 'bawana' or if it is defined as the presence of 'black' or the absence of 'white'? That is mere convention. That is not the case with physical phenomena.
But the situation with the magnet and with penicillin is not
merely an issue with naming conventions. At heart is the whole issue of inductive logic -- where is the locus of action to produce change. To suggest that the-rest-of-the-universe acting on magnet 1 is identical to magnet 2 acting on magnet 1 even though the locus of change depends on changes in magnet 2 (or penicillin) -- the rest of the universe does not change -- would involve the destruction of inductive logic.
What happens is just what happens. How it is described, and how we discuss it is convention.
No, it is not
just convention, if by that (as you seem to) that the possible conventions are equally probable or useful. Whether or not we want to describe the process as contained within magnet 2 or penicillin or within the-rest-of-the-universe, the cause of change clearly depends on the presence of magnet 2 or the penicillin. The convention adopted is -- use the easiest explanation. That is the point behind using Ockham's razor. The fact that we can adopt two potential frameworks to describe a phenomenon does not mean that both frameworks are equally plausible or equally useful. One of those frameworks -- the 'active agent' is in magnet 2 and penicillin is useful (actually it's an interaction issue with magnets and with penicillin, but to explain in detail would needlessly complicate the situation). The other is a waste of time, which is why we jettison it.
We could adopt any number of increasingly bizarre frameworks to describe such phenomena. But they are not equally useful. Language is a utility-driven device. It carries with it many different uses, though.
That we use these conventions in the way we do does not mean that we accept the nature of reality as the way we use our language. Why you seem to think people do so, especially when many of us have specifically said otherwise elsewhere, is totally beyond me.
Please explain in more detail.
I'm not participating in the discussion of what love
is. It is far too complicated and important for any simple, trite explanation. My answer would depend on large swathes of the Western canon.