The "ultimate substance"

[Piggy]

Strongly disagree. Facts are the only real things we have ever found.

Stars are real. Facts are things we know about them, such as how distant they are from us.

You can't put facts under the microscope or point your telescope at them. You can't observe facts. But you can observe matter (aka "stuff").

About what? You keep fighting ghosts, souls, immaterial "stuff", it is ok that you do that, but do it in the appropriate threads

If you're not proposing any of these things -- and I believe you when you say you're not -- then you're not actually challenging the materialist model.

That's all I'm trying (in vain, it appears) to point out to you.

You want to have it both ways. You want to rail against materialism without making any concrete claims that contradict it.

And that's my point there. That's why I keep bringing all that up.

 

[Piggy]

Not at all. The forum is full of claims about that the universe is "made of matter".

It's not the same.

YOU are the one who invented this idea that some "final substance" is implied in that claim.

It's your fantasy, not ours.

 

[godless dave]

Beer is made up of malted barley, alcohol, and hops. What is the "final substance" of beer?

 

[Piggy]

Yes, but one with an history. If skeptics claimed that the world is made of quarks and that this quarks behave in different ways, this is, they can be measured as particles and detected as waves(to put an example) I would have no issues AT ALL.

The mother of all quibbles!

It's like my objecting to people saying "the beach is made of sand" because they don't go on to describe all the properties of sand.

It's just silly.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes, but one with an history. If skeptics claimed that the world is made of quarks and that this quarks behave in different ways, this is, they can be measured as particles and detected as waves(to put an example) I would have no issues AT ALL.

But then again, the forum is full of naive claims about that the universe "is made of matter" and matter, as I have pointed out quoting dictionaries and encyclopedias, is a substance that occupies a space, can be measured, is solid, and etc (without entering in the historical use of the word).

Vox Humana covered it quite well, but in my more simplistic way of saying things.......

It's just a short-cut description. In this case, stated equivalence doesn't necessarily mean absolute equivalence in most people's minds. When asked, I don't think most folks here think they have the slightest idea what 'matter' really *is*. We all treat it as a description of reality, and it is just a word denoting what reality looks like. And science is just a way of describing what we see and explaining it in coherent terms.

I understand what you are trying to do, but I think you've pushed it a bit too far. While it may be true in some cases that folks are naive about it, I'm not so sure that all that many are.

Everyone 'knows' that matter and energy are equivalent. So, what is energy? If it is everything, then there is no basic description for it. Most textbooks treat it as the ability to perform work. What the heck does that mean? Descriptions, descriptions, nor any drop to drink......

I still submit that it is the word's history that causes problems. Not the real concepts.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Beer is made up of malted barley, alcohol, and hops. What is the "final substance" of beer?

Urine.

 

[Piggy]

Which brings us back to those cervezas we were talking about....

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Which brings us back to those cervezas we were talking about....

I'm not sure what will happen if we keep interrupting these trivial discussions for important matters like beer.........

 

[Piggy]

I'm not sure what will happen if we keep interrupting these trivial discussions for important matters like beer.........

Perhaps if we take enough beer breaks we'll start understanding BDZ's logic?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You know, it dawns on me now that there is another way of re-phrasing all of this in terms of 'truth' -- this is all straight from Richard Rorty. You gotta love a man who says, if we haven't figured it out in 2500 years, then who cares anymore?

There is no truth 'out there'. Truth is a language issue, and there is no langauge 'out there' (except in the sense that we are all part of 'out there'). The world exists. We are stuck with descriptions of the world. Truth refers to the validity of a description, its accuracy, if you will, as it relates to 'out there'.

So, to discuss anything as true out there in the world is a bit silly since 'truth' only has meaning in a language community with shared assumptions. Truth does not exist independent of human minds (maybe Heidegger's dasein is better here, since there are likely many non-human minds which also 'create truth').

So, when we use a word like 'matter' to refer to something 'out there', we merely employ our usual ability to describe the world. We can only speak of truth not in knowing 'what is out there', but in our description of what is out there. Since 'matter' is only a word we use to denote our way of describing what is out there, I don't see all that much problem with it -- except for the **** poured on it by philosophers.

Out there is just 'stuff'. Including beer.

Time for a beer break.

 

[Vox Humana]

Out there is just 'stuff'. Including beer.

Time for a beer break.

Caucasian for me, thanks.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Gesundheit!

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Hey Vox Humana, it is nice to discuss this with you. You post arguments, and don't appeal to emotions, commit strawmans or babble at all. I appreciate that.

It can be, just not nearly so succinctly. The idea of material substance is a useful abstraction that:

1. Accurately models the reality we perceive.
2. Allows us to communicate efficiently.

I have issues against 1, "models reality" it works as a map, but only at a perceptual level (as you point out) when we dig beyond what our senses can see or touch or smell, we have to deal with different "things". I believe it is naive to call such "things" as material. As I have said:

For convenience we can say that reality is physical, made of quarks, quantum states, strong and weak forces, and so on. But we must never forget that such concepts are oversimplifications that serve a purpose (they are like anchors that let us to make predictions) but arguably they are not “real entities in themselves”. Particles and waves are ways of describing reality, nothing else, and nothing more.

Yes, it is useful, I agree with your point 2. I have said that it makes us feel comfortable. Still, I believe its utility should be limited to the everyday life. IMO, both science and philosophy certainly don't need it for anything.

In my prior quote, I noted that the two statements:

• X is Y
• X exhibits a set of properties and behaviors

are equivalent if we define Y as the set of properties and behaviors. That's all we're doing here.

They are not equivalent, you are stating this (on the second one) "X exhibits S of P and B", there is not a relation of identity anymore but a description.

I don't think that this is what's happening, though - at least not for me, and I would posit not for most people in general. You've presented two ideas of the nature of substance:

1. Immaterial, or spiritual substance
2. Material, or physical substance
   For grins, I'll add a third:
3. Simulated substance

(Please enlighten me if these ideas have proper names, I'd like to know.)

I'm not indicated to state it, my example was merely to understand why some materialists claim what they claim. I have clearly stated that I have no intentions whatsoever of proposing an "alternate theory" much less any kind of substance.

All three ideas fit the models we've developed and tested for our reality, it's just that the last is the simplest, makes the fewest assumptions and leaves out the extraneous details.

Agreed. Now, it is even simpler to leave out ANY assumption regarding "the ultimate component or nature or whatever" about reality. Uttering the words "it is material" is not valuable, unless it is used for the everyday life, like when we state that "the sun rises every morning".

I argue that the only one adding another element is the one who claims "substance is spiritual". The one who says "substance is physical" is really saying "substance is", nothing more.

I have followed your argument, it might be good, but I don't think it resolves it, we get back to the "X is Y" formula that I claim is not needed. Now, your depition of it SURE WORKS, but the statements naive materialists bring all the time to the discussions, DO NOT.

Is your objection to the material "final substance" that it excludes the possibility of a supernatural reality?

NOT AT ALL!!

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

There is no truth 'out there'. Truth is a language issue, and there is no langauge 'out there' (except in the sense that we are all part of 'out there'). The world exists. We are stuck with descriptions of the world. Truth refers to the validity of a description, its accuracy, if you will, as it relates to 'out there'.

I can't imagine anything more conceited than quoting oneself, but I'm doing so with a purpose, since I think I need to correct one thing above -- or, at least, its possible implications.

Truth, to Rorty, doesn't really refer to the validity of a description in the sense that we can think in terms of the correspondence model of truth. Truth really refers to how successful a description is -- how useful it is for us in navigating the world. And if we want to get down to brass tacks in understanding this stuff from an evolutionary perspective, all that matters in our descriptions is what works, what keeps us from being eaten or turned in to the police or thrown out of the bar before we can get that redhead's phone number.

I am also struck by how this and many other discussions (and I am beginning to see that this is exactly BDZ's point, which is very clever of him) resemble the old fight in philosophy between different camps that have assumed new names as time moves on. The latest incarnation is between those who view science as revelation of the truth of the world and the camp that views science as one more group using a different language game. The first view holds, much like Scully and Mulder, that the truth is out there (but lies are in your head, thank you Terry Pratchett), and that science reveals it. The opposing camp holds that science just invents descriptions of the world and so creates its own truths.

The problem arises in descriptions of these opposing views when we start to think that 'creating truth' means that there is no reality and we only invent it whole-cloth from nothing. Some idealists seem to think this is the case, to which the 'realist' replies, "Then create a new reality after jumping out of a 20 story building.".

The sort of middle ground, which neo-pragmatists like Rorty hold, is the idea that language is our description of the world-as-it-is (with the idea of 'world-as-it-is' being essentially an empty concept since we can't actually get to it) and that different vocabularies allow more useful descriptions. Most of the fights around here consist in clashes between different vocabulary systems -- "What, you meant X when you used the word 'snarflemangus'? Well, that explains it!" If we could take a step back and look at the arguments for what they are, perhaps we wouldn't get so invested in our own vocabulary system. I can certainly understand many folks reluctance to do so, since there are some really wacky language games out there -- just hearing how fundamentalists talk gives me the willies.

 

[Vox Humana]

Hey Vox Humana, it is nice to discuss this with you. You post arguments, and don't appeal to emotions, commit strawmans or babble at all. I appreciate that.

You're welcome! I appreciate the discussion as well.

It can be, just not nearly so succinctly. The idea of material substance is a useful abstraction that:

1. Accurately models the reality we perceive.
2. Allows us to communicate efficiently.

I have issues against 1, "models reality" it works as a map, but only at a perceptual level (as you point out) when we dig beyond what our senses can see or touch or smell, we have to deal with different "things". I believe it is naive to call such "things" as material. As I have said:

For convenience we can say that reality is physical, made of quarks, quantum states, strong and weak forces, and so on. But we must never forget that such concepts are oversimplifications that serve a purpose (they are like anchors that let us to make predictions) but arguably they are not “real entities in themselves”. Particles and waves are ways of describing reality, nothing else, and nothing more.

I don't understand how what you've stated conflicts with my statement (1). To re-state (1), in the context of your quote, I would say:

• 
  Particles and waves accurately model the reality we perceive. (I will allow that the further we go in the subatomic scale, the less robust and accurate our model becomes. I doubt anyone will disagree.)

How is this different from your statement than:

• Particles and waves are ways of describing reality...

Yes, it is useful, I agree with your point 2. I have said that it makes us feel comfortable. Still, I believe its utility should be limited to the everyday life. IMO, both science and philosophy certainly don't need it for anything.

As far a science goes, I think it's useful for keeping the discussion focused. When confronted with a new phenomenon, I believe it is most efficient to presume the phenomenon to be of a material nature, instead of having to entertain the possibility of a non-material origin.

Of its usefulness to philosophy I am not qualified to speak.

In my prior quote, I noted that the two statements:

• X is Y
• X exhibits a set of properties and behaviors

are equivalent if we define Y as the set of properties and behaviors. That's all we're doing here.

They are not equivalent, you are stating this (on the second one) "X exhibits S of P and B", there is not a relation of identity anymore but a description.

Didn't you agree with me earlier?

I think the implication of stating "X is Y", in a discussion such as this, is that Y stands for some set of properties and behaviors that are usefully grouped together, and that all are exhibited by X. In essence, the two statements are equivalent for the purpose of discussion.

Good. And we don't need to resort to any claims about the nature of substances, all we need are a labels for set of properties. Thanks, this is more or less all I claim.

When it is said "X is Y", can't that be interpreted as a statement of classification? "My pet is a dog" is a descriptive statement of the characteristics of my pet, no?

All three ideas fit the models we've developed and tested for our reality, it's just that the last is the simplest, makes the fewest assumptions and leaves out the extraneous details.

Agreed. Now, it is even simpler to leave out ANY assumption regarding "the ultimate component or nature or whatever" about reality. Uttering the words "it is material" is not valuable, unless it is used for the everyday life, like when we state that "the sun rises every morning".

I disagree, I would argue that it is more like stating "the sun rises every morning because of the rotation of the earth." This is not a controversial statement today, but there was a time when people thought it was Apollo and his golden chariot.

I argue that the only one adding another element is the one who claims "substance is spiritual". The one who says "substance is physical" is really saying "substance is", nothing more.

I have followed your argument, it might be good, but I don't think it resolves it, we get back to the "X is Y" formula that I claim is not needed. Now, your depition of it SURE WORKS, but the statements naive materialists bring all the time to the discussions, DO NOT.

It is needed because there are those who argue:

• Mind is not material.
  or
• The physical is not all there is.

Is your objection to the material "final substance" that it excludes the possibility of a supernatural reality?

NOT AT ALL!!

Oops! Sorry!

 

[maatorc]

This thread is a good discussion threatening to become uncivil. Remember to attack the arguments, not each other.

Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic  Posted By: LibraryLady

Do not be too hard on them, or posters like 43 - 46 - 52 - 54 - and 57, just to mention some from this page alone, and hundreds on others, will have nothing to do, and may as well drop from the site: God forbid, how can we possibly do without them!!!

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes, but one with an history. If skeptics claimed that the world is made of quarks and that this quarks behave in different ways, this is, they can be measured as particles and detected as waves(to put an example) I would have no issues AT ALL.

So all you demand is meaningless equivocation?

Quarks are particles. They can't be "measured as particles" - that doesn't even make sense. Likewise, they can't be "detected as waves", another meaningless phrase.

The things to which we attach the label "quarks" are particles, because we observe in them the properties we ascribe to a class of things to which attach the label "particles".

If your entire problem is with the langugage used to describe the materialist position, then first, why didn't you say so earlier, and second, this is your problem; everyone else is able to use these terms meaningfully and without falling into the sort of problems you put forward in your strawman.

But then again, the forum is full of naive claims about that the universe "is made of matter" and matter, as I have pointed out quoting dictionaries and encyclopedias, is a substance that occupies a space, can be measured, is solid, and etc (without entering in the historical use of the word).

Ah, the old "quote an irrelevant source in a debate over terminology" tactic.

BDZ, you are presenting a strawman version of materialism. No-one believes it. No-one has ever believed it. It makes no sense. That you persist in doing so long after this has been pointed out smacks of dishonesty and desperation.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Pixy,

Something to consider in that regard. Did the scientific revolution occur because of a few observations or because there was a fundamental change in the vocabulary of the time compared to the Aristotelian terms used previously?

Kuhn and all that.

Words matter. When we discuss them it often means that vocabularies are changing. It is clear to me that we need desperately to change the vocabulary we use in the 'consciousness debate' -- then we might see some real change and realize that there is no hard problem. There has never been a hard problem, only a misstatement of the issue with an older vocabulary.

It could be that we are headed toward a completely different set of terms for matter/energy, especially if the discoveries we are seeing in particle physics and cosmology pan out.

 

[PixyMisa]

Pixy,

Something to consider in that regard. Did the scientific revolution occur because of a few observations or because there was a fundamental change in the vocabulary of the time compared to the Aristotelian terms used previously?

Neither. As Piggy has been saying, science is ultimately pragmatic. The experimentalists - and Aristotle was arguably among the first of these - won out over the pure philosophers because it worked.

Now, there are interesting philosophical questions about what it means that science works, as discussed by philosophers such as Hume and Popper, but they came after the scientific revolution was already well under way. First we discovered that the method worked, then we examined the implications.

Kuhn and all that.

Kuhn is a fine example of an interesting idea stretched too far. I'll take Popper any day.

Words matter. When we discuss them it often means that vocabularies are changing. It is clear to me that we need desperately to change the vocabulary we use in the 'consciousness debate' -- then we might see some real change and realize that there is no hard problem.

That's exactly my point. We already know there's no hard problem, because we already have definitions that work. Some philosophers disagree, but that's because they are making errors in their own definitions, and not for any other reason.

There has never been a hard problem, only a misstatement of the issue with an older vocabulary.

Older definitions, I'd say, rather than older vocabulary.

BDZ is clinging to a distorted version of a pre-scientific version of materialism when he raises his objections. Words matter, yes, but meanings change with understanding. That he clings to outdated - or simply false - definitions in his argument is not a problem with the terms as they are normally used, it's a problem with his argument.

It could be that we are headed toward a completely different set of terms for matter/energy, especially if the discoveries we are seeing in particle physics and cosmology pan out.

Well, no. Maybe we are, but that will be happenstance; the current terms serve perfectly well. We know what they mean. We simply know better what they mean now than we did fifty or a hundred years ago.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Quarks are particles. They can't be "measured as particles" - that doesn't even make sense. Likewise, they can't be "detected as waves", another meaningless phrase.

Ahh Pixy... you simply cant' cease to amaze me, always with your colorful "I know it all" attitude.

You are dead wrong my dear, and you are one of the self proclaimed authorities of materialism in the forum. Quarks are descriptions of behavior. For convenience, we ascribe them a simple name (from rather a simple concept) this is, we call them "particles".

Let's illustrate this a bit better. "Fundamental" particles, like quarks, are NOT extended in space (one of the key categories for matter that you, and others have eluded). Reason is simple, they are charged, and if they had extension they would exert a repulsive force against each others.

They are viewed more like "geometrical points" than little particles (a very small piece or part of something, by definition). Now, since geometrical points cannot spin (this would mean it has an extension in space) quantum spin cannot be understood as macroscopic spinning. We use mundane concepts and words to illustrate things that are in the verge of our grasping abilities.

At the same time, ALL PARTICLES can be understood as waves instead of localized particles. Waves do have extension, but they have this strange property of being in two (or more) different places at once.

For consistency with the way we do experiments we must think that (whatever they are) we most measure them as waves, or as particles, depending on the context. (the genius Bohr called this Complementarity principle). But they are, arguably, not particles nor waves.

Well, my point. We describe behaviors, we use common terms like "particles" to denote them but that "stuff" is in another league (to use another common expression). Now... it is my belief that we lack the concepts to think about them as other than particles, or matter (extended in space, solid, etc) because our brains are designed to deal with macroscopic objects.