My theoretical framework

[AkuManiMani]

If you wish to say that "spirit" is whatever consciousness is, regardless of what that turns out to be, I feel you are doing violence to the term.

Yea, I'm just that brutal.

Wait...

Do you mean you aren't sure what consciousness is?

And the plot thickens

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm not so sure. Look back at his arguments with my contentions. I have pointed out more or less exactly what you have, and he has disputed it.




As I said, I have made this point in every post I've made. He has contested it each time, so I certainly don't think he agrees at all.

Well, one of the reasons he might contest it is an emphasis issue, but the other reason is probably much deeper than that. Ultimately, from one way of looking at it, there is nothing there because there is nothing at all.

Stay with me for a second. He is approaching this from a Buddhist (I think) perspective, so while we perceive things that are out there, ultimately there isn't anything out there because it is all illusion. But that includes us too. And consciousness itself.

Now obviously we are here and spoons are out there. So, the idea is more along the lines of Parminides version of Being or the idea of the universe merely being a bubble of equally counterpoising forces that add up to one big zero (all the positives equal all the negatives, etc.).

But, I think he is mostly trying to push the idea that what we see out there isn't properly speaking what is out there. So, if he keeps saying that there is no spoon, it is not because there is nothing that begins the perceptual process out there, but just that it's 'real nature' (which we can never know, so who really cares what its 'real nature' is anyway) is not 'spoon' but whatever noumenal substance (I think he is using Kant's word here) that comprises it.

That's my best guess, at least.

I think everyone is making a mountain out of a molehill. For the most part I think everyone in this argument basically agrees, but we're all stuck on particular ways of using words.

 

[Piggy]

Yea, I'm just that brutal.

Wait...

Do you mean you aren't sure what consciousness is?

And the plot thickens

You've totally lost me here. I have no idea what you're trying to say.

But most likely, a continuing conversation between us on this topic is a waste of time. You appear to be a definition-fetishist, and discussions with DF's are nothing but endless rabbit holes.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

But, I think he is mostly trying to push the idea that what we see out there isn't properly speaking what is out there. So, if he keeps saying that there is no spoon, it is not because there is nothing that begins the perceptual process out there, but just that it's 'real nature' (which we can never know, so who really cares what its 'real nature' is anyway) is not 'spoon' but whatever noumenal substance (I think he is using Kant's word here) that comprises it.

Exactly right. I reckon that my wording might not be suitable all the time, I believe this is the case because English is not my first language (actually it is my third). I would like to express myself as clearly as you can (express myself this is)

I think everyone is making a mountain out of a molehill. For the most part I think everyone in this argument basically agrees, but we're all stuck on particular ways of using words.

I believe you are right. One of the BIG limitations of online arguing is that everyone have their own meanings for the words we all share in.

Still, that doesn't give ANYONE the right to begin to take it at a personal level and insult their interlocutor. As for myself, I'm here to talk, to discuss ideas, to argue, to learn from others and even maybe to make some friends.

 

[Robin]

For the most part I think everyone in this argument basically agrees, but we're all stuck on particular ways of using words.

This is a sentence that accurately characterises most philosophical debate throughout the centuries.

 

[D'rok]

I didn't understood what you want. I hope this is useful:

1) All we have are beliefs, in the sense of "knowledge open to improvements" instead of "real" knowledge (the whole and only truth, the last word, absolute knowledge, whatever you like to call it).

2) Beliefs are based on theoretical frameworks (world views, cosmo-visions, cognitive stances). You can't have a clear belief unless its based on one. Lets draw a mini picture of two theoretical frameworks (note that they are just an oversimplified models); a) materialists believe that everything in the universe is material, nothing immaterial exists. b) spiritualists believe that what animates a body is a immaterial soul, that lives independently of the organism (a material body).

3) Our theoretical frameworks are always unfinished. they are like vast nets with holes on it (we might be unaware of some). When confronted by something that can't be explained by it we first try to repair it, as it is difficult to change it (its changing ourself, in a way).

4) Beliefs can (and should) be contrasted with facts. What constitutes "a fact" depends on the theoretical frame of reference, but still it can be defined as "that what is beyond opinions" (oversimplification again, I have noted that some of the posters like to take sentences by the letter, unable to understand contexts).

5) Contrasting, correlating beliefs with facts its how we get confidence in our theoretical framework (or makes us doubt it and think in changing it). And its a difficult, often slow process.

________________________

Now, lets see this in more detail.

a) All we have are beliefs (both skeptics or woos)

b) Still... Not every belief weights the same

c) We can differentiate among them because of their relative fidelity to facts, or by their being better correlated with facts (Newton's vs Einsteins for example) (another example would be souls as the center of personality or brains serving the same purpose)

d) Skeptics and woo are equivalent IN THE SENSE THAT we all share beliefs, NOT IN THE SENSE THAT what they believe have the same relative weight (or correctness)

e) Now the tricky part (one that was implied in my previous posts but not openly said) Some beliefs are based on world-views that explain a lot more stuff than others, their validity resides on that. Let's think on world-views as concentric circles. A small one can explain just a few of the facts around, a bigger circle catches more facts, and so on.

Currently, the wider circle we have is based on the knowledge (beliefs) that we can get using scientific methods. We can explain a lot of stuff if we assume certain world-view. To my knowledge, some forms of physicalism (not to be confused with naive materialism*) have accommodated a great amount of facts under the same explicative rules, still, there are still lots of stuff outside its explicative power, so, the best we can do is remain skeptics and not embrace any world-view as final and definitive.

* For me, "matter" is a way to describe things, not a "thing in itself". Not a thing that its there, as we see it, when we are not seeing it.

Good grief. Why couldn't you have started with this as your OP? It would have saved a lot of pointless squabbling. There's at least enough common ground here for an actual discussion to happen. Why the initial troll?

 

[PixyMisa]

It's wrong, in exactly the same ways the initial post was wrong, but at least it's coherent.

 

[AkuManiMani]

You've totally lost me here. I have no idea what you're trying to say.

From your earlier statements I was under the impression that you believed consciousness was something that was described strictly by neural processes.

 

[D'rok]

It's wrong, in exactly the same ways the initial post was wrong, but at least it's coherent.

I agree. However, coherence is still a virtue and is definitely preferable to sophistry.

 

[Piggy]

From your earlier statements I was under the impression that you believed consciousness was something that was described strictly by neural processes.

I wouldn't put it that way. "Described by" is troublesome. It implies that if we know what's happening at the strictly neural level, we know what's happening with conscious experience. But we also have to take into account the larger-scale structure of the brain.

I would say that consciousness is entirely the result of neural processes. In other words, it is an activity of the physical brain, and that alone.

 

[schlitt]

Thanks for the video, yes, Im pretty familiar with the work of Ramachandran That said, No, I do not believe that consciousness is anything else but the result of what are called physical interactions.

So knowing that conciousness is nothing more than the result of physical interactions of matter which exists independently of the concious result. What is your explanation, other than materialism?

As for materialism, it is not my intent to disprove it. I merely want some "naive materialists" to recognize first, that it is nothing but an assumption, and secondly, that it is a fairly good view but not "final" nor "perfect" nor "the ultimate truth". Materialism have changed A LOT in the last couple of centuries, yet some posters in this very forum are still holding what materialists from hundreds of years claimed.

I agree with you that no one can know for certain. But there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that phenomena can exist, without having a material existence/cause. Surely the burden of proof lies with those who dispute materialism.

Naive materialism states that the world is made of objects, spoons, tables, etc. Modern philosophical views of materialism hold that quarks are "real"*, and appearances are a byproduct of the brain (which is my stance BTW).

Whether our terms of perception of these things differs or not, does not detract from the reality of these things themselves. The systems involved in producing a conciousness are subject to resulting inevitable inherent differences contrasted with comparable systems, due to the nature of structural difference. The resulting subjectiveness has no bearing on the reality of the material make-up.

I used the " " for real because, it is forgotten that REAL is a word that have some utility inside certain contexts, but outside them it is irrelevant. Facts are beyond opinions, as it is the noumena.

Problem is, we get caught up in the seeming ability for concious reflection, as if it is somehow seperate from what it is comprised of. It is not. Conciousness is no more special as a process than the result of any physical system and its interactions. This can be shown factually, by disrupting the physical systems.

 

[Phaedrus74]

It's wrong, in exactly the same ways the initial post was wrong, but at least it's coherent.

Why is it wrong?
I understand that you disagree, but why is it wrong?

 

[volatile]

FIRST OF ALL. STOP RIGHT THERE.

If you are unable to expose your thinking without resorting to this I'm done with you. So far we have been arguing ideas, yes, heat is up but nothing happens, we might reach different conclusions and we are here to expose the how and why about them. Nothing more. I will not allow this personal insults.

You started with the rolly-eyed and giggling smilies, talk of crayons an the like. If you can't take it, don't dish it out.

I don't know whether there's been a language issue here, but you seem to be agreeing with Wasp and disagreeing with me even though we are saying exactly the same thing.

So now I'm confused as to what your position is. Do you agree that there is an object-in-the-world that begins the perceptual process? Prior to any consciousness, is there a real, extant, material object in the world? In Wasp's words, do you agree that "obviously we are here and spoons are out there"?

If you do agree, what comprises this object-in-the-world if not matter? And if you agree, would you retract your claim that "there are no objects"?

I'm just trying to clarify exactly what you're trying to claim, because you're contradicting yourself when you disagree with my claim that the world is luminous, disagree with Schlitt who is restating that same argument, but then agree with Wasp when he said "So, if he keeps saying that there is no spoon, it is not because there is nothing that begins the perceptual process out there".

That's what I've been trying to pin you down on, especially with the question you still haven't answered. Why can multiple subjects perceive the same object if the object itself is not prior to their individual conscious processes? This is important; it lies at the heart of your argument and I wish you'd make a coherent attempt at answering it so I can figure out exactly what it is you're arguing.

Your characterisation of materialism seems like a strawman to me. You're trying to claim that materialists accept that the subjective interpretation and perception of reality is the same thing as reality itself. No-one is arguing that. What we are arguing is that, even if it is essentially indescribable, reality is material. Material reality is necessarily prior to any conscious process. That is not to say that the conscious process perfectly experiences every nuance of reality (we are, after all, in Dawkins' 'Middle World', with bodies and minds attuned to a particular frame of reference), just that reality is there to be experienced in the first place.

 

[Piggy]

So now I'm confused as to what your position is. Do you agree that there is an object-in-the-world that begins the perceptual process? Prior to any consciousness, is there a real, extant, material object in the world? In Wasp's words, do you agree that "obviously we are here and spoons are out there"?

If you do agree, what comprises this object-in-the-world if not matter? And if you agree, would you retract your claim that "there are no objects"?

BDZ can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think he's saying (sorry if you're not a he, B) that there is a something-in-the-world that begins the perceptual process, but that it's wrong to call it an "object" like a "spoon" because essentially these things which our brains turn into perceptual objects don't have any of the qualities we attribute to them, being in essence a mere aggregate illusion of an underlying quantum reality which cannot be said to be "material" when you get right down to it.

 

[volatile]

BDZ can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think he's saying (sorry if you're not a he, B) that there is a something-in-the-world that begins the perceptual process, but that it's wrong to call it an "object" like a "spoon" because essentially these things which our brains turn into perceptual objects don't have any of the qualities we attribute to them, being in essence a mere aggregate illusion of an underlying quantum reality which cannot be said to be "material" when you get right down to it.

That's not a challenge to materialism, that's semantics. Materialism does not rely on the ability of subjects to be able to perceive the material, for starters. Of course the object-in-the-world and our perception of it are not identical, but that does not negate materialism. That reality is (might be?) quantum in nature is also not a problem, because quantum particles are material.

This "framework" also negates the fundamental problem of what the apparatus that produces consciousness is. Consciousness itself arises out of a material process, so to give it some privileged position outside of or beyond the material world is silly.

 

[Phaedrus74]

That's not a challenge to materialism, that's semantics. Materialism does not rely on the ability of subjects to be able to perceive the material, for starters. Of course the object-in-the-world and our perception of it are not identical, but that does not negate materialism. That reality is (might be?) quantum in nature is also not a problem, because quantum particles are material.

Sorry to butt in guys, but permit me...

I think that BDZ does not seek to challenge materialism so much as he is trying to challenge the (perceived) uncritical acceptance of the notions that 1) the universe is essentially (meaning in it's very essense) material and
2) that we can uncover (in the Heideggerian sense) the ultimate truth about the world

I think you (volatile) and I have encoutered in an other thread some people that do seem to take these notions for granted and consider them unproblematic. Unfortunately BDZ, in his OP, formulates his challenge that ontological claims like these are meaningless in terms of an ontological claim (that it is a fact that noumena are non-material). Had he formulated it as an epistmological claim (that we cannot know (for sure) that what we hold to be true is the ultimate truth) it would not have been so problematic.

In the end I still believe his (ontological) position to be similar (if not the same) as Kant's transcendental idealism. From this follow (quite understandably) his epistemological anti-realism (in the sense that there maybe a shared objective reality but that this reality is essentially inaccessible for conscious inspection) and his instrumentalist philosophy of science (in the sense that science can aspire to no more than successfully predicting what will be perceived under given (perceived) circumstances).

This "framework" also negates the fundamental problem of what the apparatus that produces consciousness is. Consciousness itself arises out of a material process, so to give it some privileged position outside of or beyond the material world is silly.

I don't see how this follows exactly but I'm interested, could you elaborate? (Don't worry about referring to philosophical works, it's been a while since I graduated but I think I can manage)

 

[AkuManiMani]

This "framework" also negates the fundamental problem of what the apparatus that produces consciousness is. Consciousness itself arises out of a material process, so to give it some privileged position outside of or beyond the material world is silly.

Even if one wanted to consider the mind as "separate" from the physical the fact that the mind can sense and interact with the "material" is proof enough that it is based upon the same fundamental rules. There is no duality of mind and body but a spectrum.

I think that BDZ does not seek to challenge materialism so much as he is trying to challenge the (perceived) uncritical acceptance of the notions that

1) the universe is essentially (meaning in it's very essense) material and
2) we can uncover (in the Heideggerian sense) the ultimate truth about the world

I agree. I think that the assumption of many physicists that they will find a "Theory of Everything" is a bit misguided and based upon intellectual greed. The most we can come up with is a "Theory of Everything we can observe/extrapolate ATM". The search for the ToE is equivalent to the search for God -- they're seeking an ultimate that isn't there.

 

[volatile]

I think that BDZ does not seek to challenge materialism so much as he is trying to challenge the (perceived) uncritical acceptance of the notions that 1) the universe is essentially (meaning in it's very essense) material and
2) that we can uncover (in the Heideggerian sense) the ultimate truth about the world

If he meant that, he certainly didn't say it very coherently. I don't agree with 1) as I think the universe is essentially material, even though I do agree with 2). It's the contention with 1), and the conclusions BDZ has drawn from it, that I fundamentally disagree with (and which I think are undermined by even the most cursory of observations).

The universe is material, but the limits of our perceptual systems means we will (may?) never exactly the precise nature of that materiality. This is uncontentious, I think, but BDZ seems to disagree, particularly with the first clause.

He's overstating his case. He's saying that because our perceptual system (and the very nature of subjectivity) necessarily distances us somewhat from the material fabric of reality, that means that the material fabric isn't there. There are obvious challenges to this, not least the fact that multiple subjects can perceive the same object in broadly similar ways, even prior to language in some respects. I think our perception of reality is a pretty decent approximation of it; BDZ seems to be less sure.

I think you (volatile) and I have encoutered in an other thread some people that do seem to take these notions for granted and consider them unproblematic. Unfortunately BDZ, in his OP, formulates his challenge that ontological claims like these are meaningless in terms of an ontological claim (that it is a fact that noumena are non-material). Had he formulated it as an epistmological claim (that we cannot know (for sure) that what we hold to be true is the ultimate truth) it would not have been so problematic.

I agree, but I don't think you've totally seen the forcefulness with which he makes his ontological arguments. He has argued, consistently, that "there are no objects", and has contended my claim that material objects are prior to their noumenal construction. Essentially, I think you're giving him too much credit. Your re-statement of what you think he's arguing makes sense (in the same way Wasp's restatement did). His actual argument is far less cogent, because it's far more emphatic in denying a material reality prior to conciousness.

I don't see how this follows exactly but I'm interested, could you elaborate? (Don't worry about referring to philosophical works, it's been a while since I graduated but I think I can manage)

Consciousness arises in the brain. The brain is material.

 

[volatile]

Even if one wanted to consider the mind as "separate" from the physical the fact that the mind can sense and interact with the "material" is proof enough that it is based upon the same fundamental rules.

Exactly. That's Dennett's argument in "Consciousness Explained", actually. If BDZ is denying the materiality of the real world, he also needs to deny the materiality that generates consciousness in the first place.

There is no duality of mind and body but a spectrum.

Well, I'd even state there's not even a spectrum. They're the same thing.

 

[volatile]

I agree. I think that the assumption of many physicists that they will find a "Theory of Everything" is a bit misguided and based upon intellectual greed. The most we can come up with is a "Theory of Everything we can observe/extrapolate ATM". The search for the ToE is equivalent to the search for God -- they're seeking an ultimate that isn't there.

I don't think you know what the theoretical ToE is, do you? It certainly isn't a search for God, just a search for a theory that will "unify all the fundamental interactions of nature, which are usually considered to be four in number: gravity, the strong nuclear force, the weak nuclear force, and the electromagnetic force" (Source.

It's just mathematically working out the interactions between particles. Nothing unachievable there.