Subjectivity and Science

[PixyMisa]

When I said you replied I was saying that people have different opinions. You appear to disagree. QED.

No. I agree that people have different opinions. What I'm pointing out is that the value of these opinions is not equal. Some opinions are just plain wrong.

"Trusted beliefs" - how different is that idea from "metaphysical assumptions"?

Because metaphysical assumptions are neither trusted nor beliefs.

I understand that observations take precedence over current hypotheses.

Okay.

Despite this, science invloves some metaphysical assumptions that are habitually left unchallenged, fixed axioms behind the transient theories or hypotheses.

Yes, I said that.

This is because you can't do science otherwise.

Science is a method for providing natural explanations of natural processes. To do this systematically, you have to make two assumptions.

First, that the natural, material universe is what exists.
Second, that it behaves consistently.

One such is the very question my OP asks. Science assumes materialism.

Yes. Technically, it assumes naturalism, but it's not a significant difference.

It assumes that mind is a function of certain systems of matter.

Nope.

It assumes that spirit is meaningless.

Nope.

It assumes that its own methods are not flawed at a metaphysical level.

Nope.

In fact, 'metaphysics' is made, by choice, arbitrarily, irrelevant, and only 'physics' is allowed.

And nope.

Science doesn't assume that mind is a function of certain systems of matter; that follows from the very first assumption.

Science doesn't assume that spirit is meaningless. Define the term, and we can discuss it.

Science doesn't assume that its own methods are not flawed. It builds its methods logically from the two assumptions I gave.

And finally, science doesn't make metaphysics irrelevant. Science is founded in metaphysics. What makes metaphysics largely irrelevant is the fact that science turns out to work.

It cannot be criticised for that within its own limits, because metaphysics is not the remit of science.

That's true.

The metaphysical assumptions you talk about are not testable, they are assumptions beyond scientific reach.

But that one I won't necessarily grant you.

Let's say that science didn't work. Let's say that we couldn't explain the motions of the planets. Let's say that F=MA except on Tuesdays in October. Let's say that saffron-robed weirdos really could, oh, light fires with their minds.

Science is based on two assumptions. It works if and only if both those assumptions are true. It follows that if it can be shown that science cannot be made to work, at least one of those assumptions is false.

In that sense, science is built on unscientific foundations, untestable axioms.

Precisely. Any formal system is built on untestable axioms.

You believe them, that's all.

No.

No, I don't.

At least, not in the sense you mean. Because it doesn't matter at all what I believe. If you make those assumptions, science works. So even if you don't believe them, as long as you construct your hypotheses and perform your experiments as if you did, it still works. That's called methodological naturalism.

It seems we must either have very different concepts of 'subject' or programming is way ahead of anything I've heard of.

Probably a bit of both.

What computer program has intuited its own existence?

What does that mean? I've written programs that are aware of their own operation, that examine their running state and operating environment and make decisions based on that. This isn't experimental, either, it's common practice. In computer science, this sort of thing is known as reflection.

What computer program has said, "Hey, I think therefore I am!" Do these computer programs ask who created them, by any chance, or haven't they got that sophisticated yet? Please, I'm serious. I'd love to know.

They haven't got that sophisticated yet. But it's quite clearly a difference of degree, and not of essence, the same as we are different only in degree from apes.

It recognises the metaphysical assumptions of the old paradigm as being just that, first of all.

I think this is your single biggest misunderstanding. We know that. We always knew that. We've never lost sight of it. No new perspective is required.

That is how it transcends the old paradigm.

Then it does nothing at all.

It is useful because human beings like to try to understand reality and transcend their delusions.

What delusions? Seriously, what delusions?

You seem to equate utility with technological complexity

Not even remotely. I equate utility in a system designed to produce explanations with its success in producing explanations.

Science works. Mysticism fails.

yet for every beneficence of technology, someone else could point out a terrible consequence.

Technology is beside the point, and the uses to which people put technology even more beside the point.

Science is proud of its value-nutrality (we're only interested in what is true), then, when that truth is questioned, it appeals to its value.

Complete nonsense.

Science isn't interested in what is "true", it's a method for explaining the universe, which it either does, or doesn't. (It does, by the way.) You're conflating morals with explicative power here, which is beyond absurd.

We can love science for giving us modern civilisation, or hate it for it. That is a matter of taste. Is the internal combustion engine a boon or a contributor to the sickness of the ecosystem?

Who cares?

There you go with the 'real world' again. Metaphysical assumption.

It's a metaphysical assumption that can kill you. That's one hell of an assumption.

Quite right. These are metaphysical assumptions too.

No, they're not. They aren't even well-defined or logically coherent concepts.

More assumption and utility and value-judgements (which, no doubt aren't relative either, you're just right and that's and end to it).

Yep, I am.

Science brings us modern medicine. Modern medicine brings us not being dead. Where's the relativity in that?

It might well be that navel-gazing lifted us from conscious proto-humans to self-conscious humans.

Even if that were true, how is it relevant?

It might be that the development of philosophy, pre-science, and with it aesthetics and morals, was the best invention.

You have that backwards. Humans had aesthetics and morals before we had written language.

It might be arguable that had we not gone further we would not now be desperately trying to pull ourselves back from environmental disaster. I hope science is as good at clearing up the mess as it was in causing it.

That's the most ridiculous argument I've heard today. You don't like the outcomes that science is predicting, so science is at fault for providing the understanding to develop the technology that let us build our modern civilisation and is therefore false and we would all have been better off dead in a ditch at 14 of typhoid or pleurisy but happy with our knowledge of morals and aesthetics, not that we ever got to learn anything about them given that we spent the entirety of our short lives in poverty and squalor?

 

[PixyMisa]

What's the argument again? And could you elaborate on the notion of "causally closed"?

A system is causally closed if nothing outside the system can have any effect on what is inside the system.

Let's say I posit the existence of a parallel universe where leprechauns cheerfully hand out pots of gold to every passer by. But that universe and ours are each causally closed; they don't interact with each other in any way.

Does the fairy gold exist? Well, can I touch it? No. Can I see it? No. Can I spend it? No. Does it have any effect on our universe at all? Well, I know about it; it affects my thoughts. But if I was wrong, if the other universe didn't exist, it would affect my thoughts exactly the same way.

So the existence or non-existence of the parallel universe are equivalent states. Therefore it is not meaningful to say it exists.

By reference to what are you concluding that mysticism doesn't "work"? What would it mean for mysticism to work? Because it doesn't seem likely that your examples of flying to the moon or making a phone call via mysticism would constitute instances of its working ("work" arguably implying, in this context something, along the lines of final causation).

Hey, you tell me. People have made claims that they can do that sort of thing via mysticism. No-one has ever made good on such claims, so the only reasonable assumption is that mysticism doesn't work.

If you want to produce some other claim, some entire other category of claims, feel free. We can take it from there.

Science came out of them, in a sense. That's pretty interesting.

Yup.

"Interesting" itself being a concept that arguably involves metaphysical suppositions, of course.

And personal predilections.

Well, whether they are or not (John Freestone's phrase was "best guess theories about a physically measurable universe") would appear depend on what you'd include within the scope of a "guess", which has rather a variable usage. They're not random guesses, certainly, but it's worth bearing in mind that it's not in the nature of science to assert that a particular theory is the only explanation - even the only physical explanation, the only complete explanation, the simplest explanation or the best possible explanation - for a given phenomenon. I daresay this might defensibly fall within some people's usage of "best guesses".

When you look at something like the Theory of Evolution, or of Relativity (either one), or of Quantum Mechanics, you aren't looking at a guess. You are looking at tens or hundreds of thousands of scientific papers. Calling it a "guess" is not defensible; it's a deliberate, calculated, and utterly misguided insult.

Just as an aside, "wholistic" is a perfectly standard variant spelling.

No, it's an error.

How do you justify the suggestion that there's only "one metaphysical system that we've ever found to be of any use"? Indeed, whether something strikes one as "useful" is itself going to depend, again, on suppositions of a metaphysical nature.

Well, point out to me another metaphysical system that is of use.

I'm not expressing disagreement here, but I for one would be very interested in an objective demonstration of the falsity of the Platonic concept of ideals. You should consider publishing it, too, because its novelty will no doubt attract much attention.

This isn't novel at all, but I'd have to look up who first pointed out the problems with Platonic idealism. Basically, what Plato called "ideals" are what we now consider categories, or sets. They overlap in multiple dimensions; they have no existence beyond the conceptual; they have no influence upon the real world; and most importantly, they are arbitrary.

Which is fine for mathematics, but no good at all as a model of the natural world.

 

[Stout]

Now there's a rather intense way to start my morning, reading this thread

I got to admit, most of this conversation is really over my head but one thing in particular has got me really confused.

PixyMisa, you said that there is no assumption that mind is a function of certain systems of matter and I completely and utterly fail to understand that concept.

As far as my non spiritual brain, or mind can tell, my mind and thoughts are made up of several interacting biochemical processes ( dare I throw the word biomechanical in here too? ) that interact to basically make up that which is "me"

Is there some vein of science that refutes this idea, or am i completely misunderstanding the idea?

 

[PixyMisa]

No, you're quite right. My point is more subtle than that.

Science makes two and only two assumptions: That the material universe is what exists, and that it behaves consistently.

The existence of minds is an observation. Granted that the material universe is what exists, and minds also exist, it follows that minds are somehow a product of material processes.

What John was doing was listing assumption after assumption, when these are not assumptions at all, but consequences. That's what I was correcting.

 

[John Freestone]

Basically, what Plato called "ideals" are what we know consider categories, or sets. They overlap in multiple dimensions; they have no existence beyond the conceptual; they have no influence upon the real world; and most importantly, they are arbitrary.

Which is fine for mathematics, but no good at all as a model of the natural world.

But that's what I'm trying to say. It could be that we project our ideas (or 'ideals' or 'concepts' or 'categories' or whateverthehellyouwanttocallthem) onto whatever happens to be REAL and measure those things instead of what is really there! And you have presented mathematics as overcoming the problem of 'words' and 'labels' already, if I understood you, which a) ignores the significant similarity, which is that they are both abstractions, arbitrary mental constructs and b) that you have just stated the problem with them: they are "fine for mathematics, but no good at all as a model of the natural world".

You seem to want to have it both ways: science as nothing at all to do with Reality, AND science as explaining it. Actually, you still miss the point, because mathematics is quite a lot of good as a model of the natural world, it's just that this is all it is.

I think the confusion is because you think that when I say that we might be projecting our ideals onto reality I am saying that, after Plato, that the ideals are the real things. I'm saying almost the opposite. I am actually saying, if you read my words, that science is stuck in a subtle form of Platonism, mostly without even knowing it. Mathematical concepts and symbols might be ever so well defined and not the sloppy things we're using here - words - but that doesn't stop them being constructs of a human mind.

 

[Stout]

Whew!!! Thanks PM

I'm interested in this whole idea of "higher truth" (read woo) moreso in the context of being curious as to why people believe in things like that, and what possible benefits it may bring to their lives. So far IRL I've seen zero evidence of this higher truth interacting with the material world in any way but I strongly suspect it may benefit it's adherents in a "positive thinking" kind of way.

Not that I'm calling scientists ( materialists ) negative, I just suspect that there are others like me who don't need belief to complete their lives and accept the world for what it really is.

 

[ceo_esq]

A system is causally closed if nothing outside the system can have any effect on what is inside the system.

I understand you now. However, now I think your phrase "science is by definition a description of how things behave in our causally-closed universe" is potentially problematic. "Our causally closed universe" is suggestive, to my mind, of the notion that we know from science that our universe is causally closed, which is not the case (although I think one might accurately say that the possibility that our universe is not causally closed is not a question within the scope of scientific inquiry). Perhaps in a more general way we could say that science is concerned with particular kinds of causation, but that final causation, or even non-physical efficient causation, are not among them.

So the existence or non-existence of the parallel universe are equivalent states. Therefore it is not meaningful to say it exists.

If I follow your argument, the reality or nonreality of any metaphysical thing - goodness, justice, even "meaning" itself - are equivalent states and thus statements about their existence (and, presumably, non-existence) are meaningless. Do I have that right?

Hey, you tell me. People have made claims that they can do that sort of thing via mysticism. No-one has ever made good on such claims, so the only reasonable assumption is that mysticism doesn't work.

Taking a line from the Wikipedia article on mysticism (not because I endorse the statement, but just as an example): "In many cases, the purpose of mysticism and mystical disciplines ... is to reach a state of return or re-integration with the Godhead." I'm not sure exactly what that's supposed to entail, but if that's the purpose, I'm pretty sure I can't deduce, from the fact that no one is setting fires or making phone calls that way, that mysticism doesn't "work" (that is, can't achieve its purpose).

Yup.

...

And personal predilections.

Right ... so, what are the repercussions of that for your suggestion that nothing interesting is going to come out of philosophy or metaphysics?

When you look at something like the Theory of Evolution, or of Relativity (either one), or of Quantum Mechanics, you aren't looking at a guess. You are looking at tens or hundreds of thousands of scientific papers. Calling it a "guess" is not defensible; it's a deliberate, calculated, and utterly misguided insult.

The usage of "best guess" (not my term, of course) strikes me as pretty flexible. I think I've heard it applied to a fair chunk of the spectrum that runs between "wild shot in the dark" and "as sure as can be short of a logical proof". But more importantly, while it's no doubt employed sometimes in a derogatory way, only the hyper-inclined-to-take-umbrage would insist that "best guess" necessarily a deliberate insult. For example, I think we can assume that, whatever the merits of his choice of words, this evolutionary biologist was not insulting his colleagues (or himself) when he said "The fact of evolution is that all organisms descended from a common ancestor and that populations change over time. The theory of evolution is the best guess that scientists can make to explain how these populations and organisms change."

No, it's an error.

He was not in error.

Well, point out to me another metaphysical system that is of use.

I don't know. Would you say that no system of normative ethics, for example, is of any use?

This isn't novel at all, but I'd have to look up who first pointed out the problems with Platonic idealism. Basically, what Plato called "ideals" are what we now consider categories, or sets. They overlap in multiple dimensions; they have no existence beyond the conceptual; they have no influence upon the real world; and most importantly, they are arbitrary.

Those objections aren't new to me, but a formal disproof of Platonic idealism would be.

 

[Darat]

I understand you now. However, now I think your phrase "science is by definition a description of how things behave in our causally-closed universe" is potentially problematic. "Our causally closed universe" is suggestive, to my mind, of the notion that we know from science that our universe is causally closed, which is not the case (although I think one might accurately say that the possibility that our universe is not causally closed is not a question within the scope of scientific inquiry). Perhaps in a more general way we could say that science is concerned with particular kinds of causation, but that final causation, or even non-physical efficient causation, are not among them.

...snip...

Your really arguing for the good old "it's turtles all the way down" with a pinch of semantic quibbling thrown in.

It can be successfully argued that the word universe means (in this context) "the entirely of the causally closed system we are part of". So if, for example, we found that our known or even knowable universe is in fact merely a subset of a bigger everything the "closed system" would be refering to the "known universe" and the new uber-universe that our universe exists within.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

This isn't novel at all, but I'd have to look up who first pointed out the problems with Platonic idealism. Basically, what Plato called "ideals" are what we now consider categories, or sets. They overlap in multiple dimensions; they have no existence beyond the conceptual; they have no influence upon the real world; and most importantly, they are arbitrary.

Which is fine for mathematics, but no good at all as a model of the natural world.

I think that would be Aristotle, in The Metaphysics, where he argued against Plato's forms. Actually, he did so in a few other works as well.

I guess the common example now is that Plato would look at a chair and say that the chair is not real but only a pale reflection of the Ideal, while Aristotle would say that we should look at every individual chair to get a better idea what "chairiness" really means -- category as the ultimate reality as opposed to category as the abstract generalization of all possible real-world examples.

 

[John Freestone]

Whew!!! Thanks PM

I'm interested in this whole idea of "higher truth" (read woo) moreso in the context of being curious as to why people believe in things like that, and what possible benefits it may bring to their lives. So far IRL I've seen zero evidence of this higher truth interacting with the material world in any way but I strongly suspect it may benefit it's adherents in a "positive thinking" kind of way.

Not that I'm calling scientists ( materialists ) negative, I just suspect that there are others like me who don't need belief to complete their lives and accept the world for what it really is.

Hi Stout

I think people believe in the 'woo' of higher truth because they think it is in some way 'higher' or more truthful or better, etc. But there is a big problem for such believers: the various ideas they call 'higher truth' can be of evolutionary advantage, or simply persuasive ideas that give people good vibes and thus are maintained as memes. The two categories interact, of course.

I see belief in gods as highly advantageous in evolutionary terms. If we imagine a bunch of tribes fighting each other with no belief in god, then by chance and persuasion, one of them develops a religion, the next time they're fighting they might well have more courage and persistence than the others. If we include the idea of being spiritually indestructible, too, which is a large part of most religions - having an immortal soul or whatever - there will also be occasions when the self-sacrifice of numbers of warriors will allow an overall victory, where self-interest might make those (in the 'front line', say) run off, causing the tribe to disintegrate and be easier to defeat. Winners, of course, go home and multiply, and then teach their children about God who made them victorious in batte. This is a very strong reason to doubt the existence of God.

The same principle works on much less dramatic levels, where the (imagined) support of a beneficient god helps people feel calm and confident (which we now know reduces stress, increasing health and longevity) The believer will be more resilient in many different ways, simply by being confident they know how the world operates and believing that it's on their side because they pray or are in the chosen people. Presumably to some degree this confidence must backfire and be an evolutionary disadvantage, but it's reasonable to assume that on the whole it helped people to pass on their genes and pass on their religious culture.

Whether you consider that process as 'woo' interacting with the material world in some way other than 'positive thinking' is a matter of opinion, but the 'positive thinking' explanation is quite a powerful thing (and thus the subjective world of belief and thought contributes causally to factors in the material world. There are those who see this and have their materialism reaffirmed (because they see placebo as a kind of error - and it is a pest in psychology experiments) and others who see it as affirming the mind-body connection, indeed a mind-over-body connection, and perhaps take this as indication of even greater powers of mind than materialism allows for.

Being able to influence my health by what I think would all be 'woo' to some, and obviously might invite the question "Then why not make a million bucks off JR or in some other way demonstrate your supernatural powers?", except that the mind-body connection (placebo, etc.) have already been assimilated into authodoxy, even though they probably weren't at some earlier time. (Interesting question here isn't there - some things are supernatural until they're 'discovered' by a scientist, and then they're scientific, hence science can go back to saying there's never been anything supernatural and never will! Acupuncture, for instance, has been accepted in many Western countries, when it was all codswallop at one time.)

One thing that relates strongly to my question is what you mean when you say you don't need belief and you accept the world as it is. I have been postulating that a lot of people say this (or that they are a 'skeptic') and don't realise that they are really materialists, and even if they do recognise that, they often don't realise that this is a philosophy, implying belief in something. It is assumed that materialism is absolutely given, obvious, unquestionable, the natural thing to think, so the thoughts, the beliefs behind it go unnoticed. It is the authodoxy of our time. Of course, in 17th Century England, say, someone saying they just take the world as it is would imply other obvious facts, such as the Almighty.

 

[plumjam]

One thing that relates strongly to my question is what you mean when you say you don't need belief and you accept the world as it is. I have been postulating that a lot of people say this (or that they are a 'skeptic') and don't realise that they are really materialists, and even if they do recognise that, they often don't realise that this is a philosophy, implying belief in something. It is assumed that materialism is absolutely given, obvious, unquestionable, the natural thing to think, so the thoughts, the beliefs behind it go unnoticed. It is the authodoxy of our time. Of course, in 17th Century England, say, someone saying they just take the world as it is would imply other obvious facts, such as the Almighty.

This is absolutely spot on. It's a pity so many people seem not to realise it.
Well said, John.

 

[PixyMisa]

I understand you now. However, now I think your phrase "science is by definition a description of how things behave in our causally-closed universe" is potentially problematic. "Our causally closed universe" is suggestive, to my mind, of the notion that we know from science that our universe is causally closed, which is not the case (although I think one might accurately say that the possibility that our universe is not causally closed is not a question within the scope of scientific inquiry). Perhaps in a more general way we could say that science is concerned with particular kinds of causation, but that final causation, or even non-physical efficient causation, are not among them.

The universe is causally closed by definition. If there's something out there that's causally connected with the universe, it's part of the universe.

If I follow your argument, the reality or nonreality of any metaphysical thing - goodness, justice, even "meaning" itself - are equivalent states and thus statements about their existence (and, presumably, non-existence) are meaningless. Do I have that right?

You're talking about concepts. Concepts exist as representations.

If I asked you, does justice exist, we'd have to agree on a different meaning of the word "exist" than if I'd asked you about apple pie.

Taking a line from the Wikipedia article on mysticism (not because I endorse the statement, but just as an example): "In many cases, the purpose of mysticism and mystical disciplines ... is to reach a state of return or re-integration with the Godhead." I'm not sure exactly what that's supposed to entail, but if that's the purpose, I'm pretty sure I can't deduce, from the fact that no one is setting fires or making phone calls that way, that mysticism doesn't "work" (that is, can't achieve its purpose).

You can't deduce much of anything, because the terms aren't defined. Might as well say that the purpose of mysticism is to achieve a pipik of meeple or merpurily with the netlodo.

Right ... so, what are the repercussions of that for your suggestion that nothing interesting is going to come out of philosophy or metaphysics?

Um... None? I'll note that we already have science.

The usage of "best guess" (not my term, of course) strikes me as pretty flexible. I think I've heard it applied to a fair chunk of the spectrum that runs between "wild shot in the dark" and "as sure as can be short of a logical proof". But more importantly, while it's no doubt employed sometimes in a derogatory way, only the hyper-inclined-to-take-umbrage would insist that "best guess" necessarily a deliberate insult. For example, I think we can assume that, whatever the merits of his choice of words, this evolutionary biologist was not insulting his colleagues (or himself) when he said "The fact of evolution is that all organisms descended from a common ancestor and that populations change over time. The theory of evolution is the best guess that scientists can make to explain how these populations and organisms change."

When it's part of a general attack on science, it's safe to assume it's not meant kindly.

He was not in error.

Your dictionary is broken too.

I don't know. Would you say that no system of normative ethics, for example, is of any use?

I dunno. Can it prop up the short leg of my table?

Those objections aren't new to me, but a formal disproof of Platonic idealism would be.

Can't build a formal disproof of something that's not formally defined.

 

[ceo_esq]

Your really arguing for the good old "it's turtles all the way down" with a pinch of semantic quibbling thrown in.

It can be successfully argued that the word universe means (in this context) "the entirely of the causally closed system we are part of". So if, for example, we found that our known or even knowable universe is in fact merely a subset of a bigger everything the "closed system" would be refering to the "known universe" and the new uber-universe that our universe exists within.

Not in in the context of what PM said, which was that "science is by definition a description of how things behave in our causally-closed universe". Let's assume, as you say, that it's actually the case that the physical universe is merely a subset of a bigger reality that includes some kind of metaphysical reality (Heaven, God, or some such thing). Even if "causally-closed system" should then refer to the larger set (physical + metaphysical reality), it doesn't follow that the scope of science or scientific description would likewise expand. Science would still be unconcerned with the metaphysical. So it's not really a matter of "turtles all the way down", I think.

 

[PixyMisa]

I think that would be Aristotle, in The Metaphysics, where he argued against Plato's forms. Actually, he did so in a few other works as well.

I guess the common example now is that Plato would look at a chair and say that the chair is not real but only a pale reflection of the Ideal, while Aristotle would say that we should look at every individual chair to get a better idea what "chairiness" really means -- category as the ultimate reality as opposed to category as the abstract generalization of all possible real-world examples.

Thanks! I was going to say that if people spent more time reading Aristotle and less time reading Plato, we'd all be a great deal better off.

Plato was a great thinker, I don't dispute that at all. But for all that's shiny, he's the starting point, not the end!

 

[PixyMisa]

Not in in the context of what PM said, which was that "science is by definition a description of how things behave in our causally-closed universe". Let's assume, as you say, that it's actually the case that the physical universe is merely a subset of a bigger reality that includes some kind of metaphysical reality (Heaven, God, or some such thing). Even if "causally-closed system" should then refer to the larger set (physical + metaphysical reality), it doesn't follow that the scope of science or scientific description would likewise expand. Science would still be unconcerned with the metaphysical. So it's not really a matter of "turtles all the way down", I think.

Is this "metaphysical reality" causally effective upon the observable universe? Does it actually do anything?

If so, either it's subject to science, or the axioms of the scientific method are false.

If not, it's a matter for literary criticism, not science, because it's no more real than Oz.

 

[lightcreatedlife@hom]

Another question: If consciousness is the fundamental nature of reality, then how did reality manage for such a long time without it?

The same way it survived without "thinking/reasoning" lifeforms. Thinking however, and the consciousness it led to, has to be rooted in the overall "direction/purpose" of the process. Something like how being able to see allows a lifeform to save the energy it would have spent searching for its food in the dark.

 

[ceo_esq]

The universe is causally closed by definition. If there's something out there that's causally connected with the universe, it's part of the universe.

I can accept that (see my response to Darat on the same subject); however, just because (arguendo) there's something out there that's causally connected with the physical universe doesn't mean that science deals with it. As I said, science is not going to address final causes or non-physical efficient causes, for example, whether they exist or not.

You're talking about concepts. Concepts exist as representations.

If I asked you, does justice exist, we'd have to agree on a different meaning of the word "exist" than if I'd asked you about apple pie.

Possibly in part, although in whatever sense "justice" exists, "apple pie" presumably also exists - in addition to any physical instantiation.

You can't deduce much of anything, because the terms aren't defined. Might as well say that the purpose of mysticism is to achieve a pipik of meeple or merpurily with the netlodo.

I think you're overstating your point there. I'd submit that when, say, John of the Cross or whoever asserts that mysticism is a way of achieving communion with God or whatever, it's nonetheless more intelligible than saying it's a way of achieving a pipik of meeble. At any rate, you're the one who apparently deduced that mysticism could not achieve any intended purpose. How did you arrive there?

Um... None? I'll note that we already have science.

Ah. So you think simply that nothing else useful is forthcoming now.

What about the other part of the question, regarding the metaphysical and/or subjective aspect of whether something is interesting?

Your dictionary is broken too.

Possibly all the dictionaries I've been able to find are, coicidentally, broken on this precise point. It's not exactly the way to bet, though, is it?

I dunno. Can it prop up the short leg of my table?

No (unless perhaps when reduced to a thick printed volume). But so what? Whatever utility a normative ethical system may have is clearly not going to consist in such a thing; that is not the purpose of the system.

Can't build a formal disproof of something that's not formally defined.

Can't demonstrate the falsity of something that's not formally defined, either. But if you think the Platonic system of ideals is not defined, one wonders what you intended to signify by asserting that it was actually false.

 

[Roadtoad]

Okay, reading this so far has given me a headache. I'm going to need to read some Terry Pratchett to get my eyes uncrossed.

 

[ceo_esq]

Okay, reading this so far has given me a headache. I'm going to need to read some Terry Pratchett to get my eyes uncrossed.

A capital idea! Enjoy.

 

[Dancing David]

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It is funny that you don't see the relativity of people's views, PixyMisa.
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Hi there some things are not relative in the least, so that is rather a very broad statement.

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I will repeat one point that I think you have failed to contemplate, since your answer seems not to demonstrate an understanding of it: that the scientific method for understanding reality is based on a confidence level and is therefore not able to tell us anything with absolute certainty about reality. You seem to refute this because we can choose a confidence level that suits the needs of our experiment (95% being a common one). That is true; however, my point was, as I said, that this choice is arbitrary (and, as I thought was implied, is less than 100%): hence, if a scientist thinks a result is highly important, s/he can use 99%, if it's less so, 70%...this is the nature of the arbitrariness I was talking about, which makes results of all scientific experiments have some element of doubt).

this is where the rubber meets the road.

So really?

What is the mass of an electron or a proton, are you really saying that is relative?

You are deliberately vague, so why don't you tell us what research you are talking about?

Have you read how Millikin detrmined the mass of the electron?

What level of doubt is there?

You seem to argue that such arbitrariness can be overcome by repeating the same experiment. There are a few problems with this, but one is that the repetitions will use the same method, with the same weakness.

So look up how Millikin measured the mass of an electron.

What room for doubt is there?

What are you talking about, something in mind?

Thus, while it is reasonable to argue that experiments support a hypothesis, and increasing evidence adds further support, the hypothesis is never proven; it always remains, as many many many scientists will agree - a 'best guess'.

As the kids used to say:

No duh.

This is something you would already know to be a known POV for many of us on the baord, it is not a best guess, it is a best approximation.

What does that have to do with the measured mass of an electron?

Now, it seems to me that there are many places we could go from there: we could say that that's ok, we're not bothered, we understand that science gives us best guesses, current hypotheses, and get back to the lab to test some more; we could throw up our hands and exclaim "Well, we've nothing better than that!"; etc.

What I find difficult to concede is that we could ignore that conclusion to the point where we say: You are wrong. You have been told why you are wrong. We can point to research that demonstrates that you are wrong. This is precisely the standpoint that I was criticising, the misconception of 'trusted beliefs' as 'fact'.

More vagueness, you are entitled to your opinion. What does that do to change the mass of an electron.

What research are you talking about.

I understand that getting theoretically closer to possible Truth can be useful. I also understand that the more pure, philosophical or metaphysical questioning that some people have engaged in here (and I am sorry I have got distracted by the scientism rather than engage in it to date) might be pointless and get us going round the same old intangible circles as people have gone round for millennia.

metaphysics is a semantic game.

I do not mean to imply, as someone else has said, that I'm so clever that you won't understand me. That would be as daft as saying that you are so clear in your scientific understanding that any other view is away with the fairies. What I do feel, however, is that some people 'get it' - the question, I mean, ignoring the many answers we might find later - the view that there is something problematic about subjectivity. And they seem to me not to be making a retrogressive step into delusion, but waking up to a new perspective, often transcending and including the earlier paradigm, not dismissing all of it.

So perceptions are malleable and created by a brain, no mystery there.

And it often begins by waking up from the delusion of scientism.

Oh my, what on earth does that mean?

You can not repeal the actions described as 'the force of gravity'.

Because a string of 95%s doesn't make Reality, no matter how far we iterate it. Sometimes it happens by suddenly noticing how bizarre are the theories science has arrived at, that theoretical hidden dimensions, Time 0, Multiverses, or the graviton are hardly any saner concepts than spirits or reincarnation. This leads to a new, mature mystical contemplation and learning, asking questions like mine here, or wondering whether something, or someOne had to have lit the Big Bang.

You lost me there.

Some questions have no answer, isn't that grand?