I'm not sure what you mean by the last sentence. Can you give an example of what you mean by a belief that has evolved from a particular culture?
I wasn't trying to suggest that was your criteria, I was just trying to clarify what question I was asking. To answer your question, I'm talking about the difference between the Hindu creation myth and the Christian creation myth - is one more reasonable to believe than the other using your criteria? From your following answer, I'd say 'no', which is good.
A belief with evidence to support it is reasonable. A belief held by a large number of people is reasonable. I don't like to use the word 'should' with those descriptions because I don't think that 'reasonable' means it must have those qualities. but rather if it does have those qualities, I would consider it reasonable.
The first two sentences I understand, but I don't understand what you mean in the last two sentences where you discuss "should".
I agree with your first point, but I disagree with your second point - there are many examples where a belief held by a large number of people has been shown to be irrational, which would make it unreasonable to believe. In the present day, Christian creationism is a widely held belief that is also completely irrational to hold.
I've answered this several times. That you don't find testimonial evidence and personal experience to be convincing evidence does not mean it isn't evidence. I'm sorry, but I"m not going to answer this question from you again.
Ah, I think I see the problem here - Beth, the issue isn't that we don't find testimonial evidence and personal experience to be convincing, it's that testimonial evidence and personal experience are notably unreliable forms of evidence, to the point of being useless.
It isn't that we
a priori reject the idea of such evidence being useful. It's that such forms of evidence have been established to be unreliable - human memory is falliable, the mind plays tricks on us every day, and we are genetically wired to see patterns where no pattern necesarily exists. Perfectly sane and competent adults can be led to 'remember' events that never occurred. And 'common sense' answers are often completely incorrect, with counter-intuitive and complex science required to understand some of the most basic components of our universe.
That is why anecdotal evidence (as this is what you are talking about when you discuss testimony and personal experience) is useless. If you wish to claim that anecdotal evidence has merit you will have to justify that belief - which I'm more than happy to accept if you can.
Aside from the obvious question: "what empirical evidence do you have for that belief?" (which you're more than welcome to have at go at answering, but I'm not really asking) where I'm not sure if I agree with your argument (or maybe your definition of rational) is in the question of subjective evidence. I'll try an example to explain.
Before I deal with your example, I'll answer the question that you're not really asking.
The answer, unsurprisingly, is 'none'. Does that invalidate the belief? No.
My answer to your original question was, "When discussing the objective existence of an object, yes." When we discuss 'belief in god', we are discussing whether or not god
exists. God is an object that is claimed to exist in reality (i.e. In an objectively observable universe.)
My statement previously is not discussing the objective existence of an object - it is instead discussing an artificial human construct (scientific skepticism) that is used to describe the universe. Certainly there are other artificial human constructs, but the reason I currently adhere to a skeptical viewpoint is that it
accurately describes the universe. It produces results, and can make predictions that are lacking in some of the other models ('blind faith' could be an example of an unsuccessful construct).
Similarly, one cannot produce empirical evidence for the existence of 'justice', because it too is an artificial human construct. It cannot be said to tangibly exist in a world where there are no sentient beings to create it.
Onto part two of your post...
A particular skeptic is strolling along the side of Loch Ness, when he very clearly sees a monster swimming in the water. He's aware that people have been known to hallucinate, but has no particular reason to doubt his eyes any more than at any other time, except for having the knowledge that nobody has produced empirical evidence for what he's just seen, even though they've tried.
Speaking to a couple of very trusted, sane friends, he finds out that both of them have also seen this monster on separate occasions, and they describe the monster pretty much as he saw it.
At this point, our skeptic has nothing but subjective personal experience and a small amount of testimonial evidence. Would he (1) therefore be irrational to believe that there is a monster in the loch and (2) not be able to claim the label "skeptic" any more if he did, because of the lack of any empirical evidence?
BTW I'm not trying to trap you here, I'm just trying to define what various posters here consider a skeptic is and how they should be expected to act and come to conclusions and still be called a skeptic - and of course what is and isn't irrational.
The answer is simple - if the person is to be truly skeptical, they must weigh the evidence for with the evidence against. In this case, the evidence against is far stronger - there has been no addition empirical evidence, only three pieces of anecdotal evidence. While three separate, identical hallucinations would be strange, it would not be unheard of. And that doesn't rule out one of the most likely scenarios - that the 'monster' seen by all three was a very real and elaborate tourist hoax.
In short, it would still be unreasonable for the skeptic to believe in the Loch Ness Monster.
However - and this is important - anecdotal evidence can provide the starting point for a proper investigation. If three people claim to have seen the monster, the best thing to do would be to further investigate. Upon further investigation, strong empirical evidence for the existence of the monster may come to light - at that point it
would become reasonable to believe in the existence of the monster.
Keep in mind that believing in the existence of the monster prior to the discovery of some kind of empirical evidence is irrational, regardless of whether the monster is found to be real in the end. That your claim has
become justified does not mean it was
retrospectively justified.
. I'll come back to these later when I can give them the time they deserve.
