• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

Is it?

You cannot be sure that you are right, unless you have a way to prove me wrong.
Agreed?

Nope. Not agreed. You are wrong by definition. I am sure I am right when I am saying that you are wrong.

Unless you start giving us some reasons, then "JetLag is wrong" is the only conclusion.
 
Nope. Not agreed. You are wrong by definition. I am sure I am right when I am saying that you are wrong.

Unless you start giving us some reasons, then "JetLag is wrong" is the only conclusion.

If you are an atheist, then almost all the world thinks something else. To know you are right you must prove them wrong somehow. Otherwise you can't, it's relativism, it is a personal point of view, there is no way to decide right or wrong here...

Why don't we agree on this one?
 
JetLeg,

You are confusing knowledge and belief. Look them up. You may believe that this inconsequential being exists and wants us to wear green socks, but you do not know that this being exists, nor that if it does it wants us to wear green socks.

Besides that, even if you did actually know for a fact that there was a being who wanted you to wear green socks, why would you think that would give you the right to force everyone to wear green socks? You know I exist and let's pretend that I actually tell you that I want everyone to wear green socks. Why would my wishes give you the right to put green socks on anyone but yourself?

-Bri
 
Last edited:
If you are an atheist, then almost all the world thinks something else. To know you are right you must prove them wrong somehow. Otherwise you can't, it's relativism, it is a personal point of view, there is no way to decide right or wrong here...

Why don't we agree on this one?

Jet, we agree you have the right to believe whatever you want. What we don't agree is that you have the right do something with that belief that has any impact on me unless you have evidence to back it up. Simple, right?
 
If you are an atheist, then almost all the world thinks something else. To know you are right you must prove them wrong somehow. Otherwise you can't, it's relativism, it is a personal point of view, there is no way to decide right or wrong here...

Why don't we agree on this one?

You are incorrect about the meaning of the term "atheist," which just means "not theist." An atheist simply holds no belief in a god. Indeed some atheists believe that there are no gods, but others simply don't hold a belief one way or the other.

Few atheists feel compelled to prove theists wrong. They don't have to. The burden of proof is on the person making the claim, which in this case is the theist.

-Bri
 
If you are an atheist, then almost all the world thinks something else. To know you are right you must prove them wrong somehow. Otherwise you can't, it's relativism, it is a personal point of view, there is no way to decide right or wrong here...

Why don't we agree on this one?

Most of the world believes in a god that can interact in the real world. The argument with them is whether an observable effect is a direct manipulation from God or a result of natural laws (among other things).

And as an atheist, all I'm saying is I lack a belief in God. I don't have to disprove the infinite number of possible gods to lack that belief. I am absolutely right that I don't have a belief in any gods. I can't prove it to you that I lack those beliefs, so it must be your job to prove that I'm not a Muslim.

What we're disagreeing on is that there is some difference between the imaginary and the non-existent. Your belief in your non-material deity is no different from a belief in leprechauns.

Also, we are disagreeing that the inability to disprove the non-material somehow weakens a skeptical viewpoint.
 
There are always constraints on free will. The freedom is to choose between the options that are available to you at the time, not to choose anything whatsoever.
Understood. I was refering to a situation where the choice you made was negated by god. God altering or setting up a situation that forces you to make a choice that he wants for the greater good of his plan takes away your free will.


Of course that's not how it works. If God were to do something immoral, then he would no longer be omni-benevolent. Christians simply believe that it's against God's nature to do so, and that he never does (which would mean that he's omni-benevolent). And we can't prove or disprove it -- it's unfalsifiable.
But you are employing a rationalization or rather a redifintion of an immoral act by wieghing it against an outcome so that god can comit an immoral act and call it good so that god can remain omni-benevolent.

Good and bad, moral and immoral are by definition diametricaly opposed.

In practice we do bad things or allow bad things to happen so that something good can take place from the result of the act. It does not mean the bad thing is no longer bad. We just chose to do it or allow it to happen.



If having free will to choose between good and evil IS the greater good, then God providing us the free will to choose between good and evil WOULD result in the greater good, don't you think?
Only if having free will alone is the specific greater good that is sought.
But from the Christian perspective God's greater good is to have more people choose him.
Isn't that the reason he gave us free will, so that we could choose him freely and honestly?
Choosing evil would go against that greater good since god decrees that doing evil (and not repenting) will prevent you from being in his good graces.

Wouldn't this kind of defeat this purpose if giving us free will was his only greater good? It's only a means to an end.



The theory is that the freedom to choose evil (regardless of whether we actually choose evil) is such a great good that it would be better for us to have the choice and to always choose evil than for us to never have the choice at all.
But the greater good of having free will does not redefine evil. The evil is still evil. Just a necessary evil.

Also the end result of always choosing evil goes against the Christian theory. Having free will alone does not seem to an end in itself, but rather a means to an end.



I don't know, but if so it is clear that people living there don't have the type of free will described above.
Maybe. But in pratice people seem happy to give up something so that they can have something else. Such as giving up some personal freedoms so that they can have security.



See above. It would still result in a greater good than if we didn't have the freedom to choose.
I don't see how if according to the Christian belief God's plan is to have us repent and follow his teachings and join him in heaven. If we all chose evil then it kind of puts a kink in that plan.



No, in this theory, the forseeable consequences of the action are taken into account when determining whether or not the action is moral or immoral.
Well in the strictest sense, I disagree. An immoral act is by defintion an immoral act reguardless of the outcome. The end result does not mean the immoral act becomes moral. It means that committing the immoral act became necessary so that the end result could be achieved.

I can certainly see where you could say that the "bad" thing became the "right" thing to do in a given situation. But you would be ignoring and glossing over all the other consequences the "bad" thing has associated with it. I mean, there is a reason a "bad" thing is called a bad thing. And the good result is lessen by the bad thing that had to be done to get it.


Note that I agree that the ends don't always justify the means. In this theory, the means are themselves consequences, just as the ends are consequences. All consequences of an action must be weighed before determining whether or not the action is justified. Instead of "the ends don't justify the means" this theory is more like "the ends don't always justify the means."
Well now you are changing the spirit of the saying to suit you.
In practice I would agree with you. The world is not black and white. And you could debate what is actually good and bad. But you do see what the saying is getting at. Any evil or immoral act that arrives at a good end also has an effect on how good that good end is.
I'm sure you've heard of a "Pyrric [sp?] Victory".


If something is immoral, you should refrain from doing it. So, let's say that a man who you know intends to kill his daughter asks you where his daughter is. He knows that you know where his daughter is. You also know that it is immoral to lie. According to "the ends never justify the means" you would have to tell the truth. But would telling the truth be the moral choice given that you can forsee the consequences?
Well the better way out of this in order so that you would not have to lie would be to trying to convince the man not to kill his daughter or to restrain him or call authorities. Or if Ihe had gun pointed at me threating to shoot me If I did not tell him, I could choose to take the higher path and refuse to tell him and sacrifice myself in order save the daughter's life. I hear God pays heavy dividens for sacrificing yourself for the well being of others. And I did not have to lie.



Yes, stealing is evil but letting someone die is more evil. Therefore, if you have to make a choice between the two, stealing would be the moral action and letting them die would be the immoral action. In this case, the ends do justify the means. Sure, it sucks for the person being stolen from, but so be it! It would suck worse for the person dying if you didn't steal.
Your arguing magnitude. One in relation to the other. This still does not redfine the immoral act into a moral one outside of that circumstance.

All it would mean that it is necessary to do the evil or immoral thing so that the person will not die. What if stealing the thing caused the person your stealing from to die? Like stealing medicine or oxygen they needed to live so the other could live. I just slid the moral magnitude back the other way.

There is a reason why an immoral act is called an immoral act. And it remains so dispite what the end result of committing that act is. It was just necessary so that the outcome could be achieved.



Well, true, to a point. We don't know what rules of ethics a god might be using, so if we're talking about the Christian God we would look to Christianity to tell us whether or not their God could be behaving in a moral way or not. In that regard, "the ends don't justify the means" is only relevant if Christians believe it applies both to human beings and to God. It is unclear whether they believe it applies to human beings, but I'm fairly certain that it cannot apply to Christian belief about God since the Christian God knows ALL consequences of his actions and therefore MUST look at the full consequences of an action in order to act morally.
Well then certainly God is using a different set of ethics than the one he is imposing upon us. The old testament clearly states that "Thou shalt not kill". It does not say "I shall not kill".

But the saying "The ends do not justify the means" does imply that the all the consequences of actions are known. It says "the ends" not "some ends".
It also implies the moral value of the actions taken are not affected by the ends. That means an immoral act taken to achieve a good end does change the immoral act into a moral one.
Of course there is nothing to say that god has to be bound by this. But then it also means that god does use a different set of ethics for himself.



"Benefit" is not always good, quite true. And yes the means do have to be taken into account since they are also consequences of actions (I never meant to imply that they didn't).
Then it sort of means that the bad thing committed still has the bad aspect to it. It was not changed into a good thing.


Yes, I can see how it might apply, but I would also argue that it cannot apply to the Christian God, nor do Christians expect it to apply to their God.
Well then that is being a bit arbitrary to ignore something that has some truth value to it because it does not allow you to attribute a characteristic to your god.



So that things are better for everyone (including those suffering). I can see how it might be a greater good to suffer and have free will than to never suffer at all, yes.
I don't see how the ones suffering so that we all have free will is any better for the suffering than the ones who get free will and do not suffer. Thier sufferning is a necessary bad thing so that every one can benefit from free will. It does not make it any less bad.



That's another question entirely. Certainly if the same good can be achieved through other means, it would be better. The argument here is that the same good cannot be achieved through other means.
But this still does not redefine the theft as a good thing. Just that it was necessary for it be done.



No, it doesn't. Not to any Christian anyway, and we're talking about the Christian God here. If you would like to posit another god that cannot do anything that we might consider "wrong" then I'll agree that your god cannot exist and is a logical absurdity. But like it or not, the Christian God could possibly exist.
You are right. I got the meaning a bit skewed. Omni benevolence can mean that you choose not to do wrong. But then that implies that you are capable of doing wrong. Which would mean that at any point you do something wrong or bad you loose that characteristic.



Yes, hence the example I gave you of stealing to save a life (action) or not stealing and allowing the person to die (non-action).
-Bri
But this still does not redefine a bad or immoral action into a good or moral action.
 
Understood. I was refering to a situation where the choice you made was negated by god.

Agreed, in that instance he is taking away your free will. But that is not to say that he is taking away your free will entirely.

But you are employing a rationalization or rather a redifintion of an immoral act by wieghing it against an outcome so that god can comit an immoral act and call it good so that god can remain omni-benevolent.

I disagree. We are asking whether a particular act is the right or wrong choice in a given situation. In the case of stealing to save a life, it is the right choice to steal and the wrong choice to let the person die. You may feel compelled to insist that stealing is always immoral, but in my book "moral" means "right" and "immoral" means "wrong." In no way can you say that it would be the "right" or "moral" choice to allow someone to die in this situation.

Good and bad, moral and immoral are by definition diametricaly opposed.

Moral and immoral may be two ends of a spectrum, implying that some actions are better or worse (more moral or less moral) than others. If you have a limited number of choices, we can say that the "right" action is the most moral choice, and the "wrong" action is the least moral.

Certainly smiting someone has some negative consequence, but Christians don't expect that their God only performs acts that have no negative consequences whatsoever; rather, they expect that their God chooses the most moral act in a given circumstance -- that is, the choice that is necessary for the greater good.

In practice we do bad things or allow bad things to happen so that something good can take place from the result of the act. It does not mean the bad thing is no longer bad. We just chose to do it or allow it to happen.

The sentence I have placed in bold means precisely that in practice the ends DO sometimes justify the means! Thank you!

Sure, something bad will happen in either case, but in this case the right (or more moral) act is the one that would lead to the best overall result (the person lives even though some property is stolen) and the wrong (or less moral) act is the one that would lead to the worst overall result (the person dies but no property is stolen).

Only if having free will alone is the specific greater good that is sought.

And it very well could be. That's my point.

But from the Christian perspective God's greater good is to have more people choose him.
Isn't that the reason he gave us free will, so that we could choose him freely and honestly?
Choosing evil would go against that greater good since god decrees that doing evil (and not repenting) will prevent you from being in his good graces.

Wouldn't this kind of defeat this purpose if giving us free will was his only greater good? It's only a means to an end.

If God wants us to freely choose him, then yes free will would be the only means to that end. Therefore, even if we all chose evil, it might still be a greater good than having no possibility to meet the goal at all.

If the goal is for us to freely choose God, I'm not certain how we could have any possibility of meeting that goal unless we also had the ability to fail to meet the goal (to not choose God). So I would argue that having the possibility of meeting the goal is better than having no possibility whatsoever of meeting the ultimate goal.

But the greater good of having free will does not redefine evil. The evil is still evil. Just a necessary evil.

But a lesser evil than having no free will (and no possibility whatsoever to meet the goal).

Also the end result of always choosing evil goes against the Christian theory. Having free will alone does not seem to an end in itself, but rather a means to an end.

Let's try to illustrate by showing how much "goodness" may be introduced into or removed from the world from various events taking place:

  • having free will: +500
  • not having free will: -500
  • doing a good deed: +1
  • doing a bad deed: -1
  • reaching the goal (choosing God): +1000
  • not reaching the goal (not choosing God): -1000

Free will is good, so it is worth 500 "goodness" points, but no free will is bad, so we have to subtract 500 goodness points. Each good deed we do adds a point of "goodness" to the world, each bad deed takes one away (let's say that there are 100 deeds that we can do total). Reaching the ultimate goal of choosing God means 1000 points of "goodness" added to the world, whereas if we don't choose God it takes away 1000 points of "goodness" from the world.

If God gave us no free will, we would have -1500 points: we would have no free will (-500 points), we could do no good deeds (0 points) or bad deeds (0 points) since those require free will, and we couldn't freely choose God (-1000 points).

Let's say we are given free will, but we fail miserably and do 100 bad deeds: We get +500 for having free will, but -100 for doing the bad deeds and -1000 for not reaching the goal, so our score is -600.

As you can see, having free will is better (in this case a lesser evil) even if we fail miserably. Of course, if we succeed it's better still.

I don't see how if according to the Christian belief God's plan is to have us repent and follow his teachings and join him in heaven. If we all chose evil then it kind of puts a kink in that plan.

According to you, God's plan is for us to follow his teachings of our own free will. Unfortunately, that goal has exactly zero chance of being reached unless there is the possibility of us choosing evil instead. However, even if we chose evil, it is still better (or in this case a lesser evil) than if we didn't have free will at all (see above).

I can certainly see where you could say that the "bad" thing became the "right" thing to do in a given situation.

Bingo!

But you would be ignoring and glossing over all the other consequences the "bad" thing has associated with it. I mean, there is a reason a "bad" thing is called a bad thing. And the good result is lessen by the bad thing that had to be done to get it.

In the case of stealing to save a life: there are two evils, one of them is the lesser of the two evils and is the right choice (more moral or less immoral depending on how you want to look at it).

I'm sure you've heard of a "Pyrric [sp?] Victory".

Pyrrhic. Yes, that simply means that the means are too costly to justify the ends. It is true that the ends don't always justify the means (but sometimes they do!) In my view, you have to weight ALL of the consequences (both the means and the ends) in order to decide which choice is the right (more moral) one.

Well the better way out of this in order so that you would not have to lie would be to trying to convince the man not to kill his daughter or to restrain him or call authorities.

Of course if there was a better third option that would lead to better overall consequences then you would take that, but that's not part of this hypothetical.

In this hypothetical, no other options are possible (please don't make me complicate the story by adding reasons why no other options are possible, just accept it). You have to answer him either by telling the truth (forseeably leading to the girl's death) or by lying to him (saving her life).

Your arguing magnitude. One in relation to the other. This still does not redfine the immoral act into a moral one outside of that circumstance.

Semantics. The question is whether or not the act of lying in and of itself is wrong so that in order to do the "right" thing you would have to tell the man the truth. If the ends don't justify the means in this case, then you would have to tell the truth and allow the girl to die.

Well then certainly God is using a different set of ethics than the one he is imposing upon us. The old testament clearly states that "Thou shalt not kill". It does not say "I shall not kill".

First of all, a more accurate translation is "thou shalt not murder." The Bible goes on to specify under what circumstances you are allowed to kill.

Second of all, nobody said that God had to operate under the same rules as people. Clearly he can't operate under the same rules and make moral decisions, given that he can forsee all of the consequences of his actions and we cannot.

I don't see how the ones suffering so that we all have free will is any better for the suffering than the ones who get free will and do not suffer.

I never said that those who suffer have it better than those who don't suffer. I said that everyone -- including the sufferer -- benefits from suffering.

Thier sufferning is a necessary bad thing so that every one can benefit from free will. It does not make it any less bad.

Semantics. It is right (more moral) if suffering is for the greater good.

But this still does not redefine the theft as a good thing. Just that it was necessary for it be done.

Semantics. It is right (more moral) if the theft is for the greater good.

You are right. I got the meaning a bit skewed. Omni benevolence can mean that you choose not to do wrong. But then that implies that you are capable of doing wrong. Which would mean that at any point you do something wrong or bad you loose that characteristic.

Correct. My point is that the Christian God may be omni-benevolent as long as what he does is for the greater good, according to how Christians define omni-benevolence. Now, you may want to define the word differently in order to preclude the Christian God from being omni-benevolent, but in order to have an honest discussion about whether the Christian God can logically exist, we need to use the definition that Christians use to describe their God.

But this still does not redefine a bad or immoral action into a good or moral action.

Again, semantics.

-Bri
 
Last edited:
Jet, we agree you have the right to believe whatever you want. What we don't agree is that you have the right do something with that belief that has any impact on me unless you have evidence to back it up. Simple, right?

But that is not to the point. My point was that you cannot know that you are right since you cannot disprove me, so you are not "more right" than I am. How can you know your position is the right one without disproving the positions of others?
 
You are incorrect about the meaning of the term "atheist," which just means "not theist." An atheist simply holds no belief in a god. Indeed some atheists believe that there are no gods, but others simply don't hold a belief one way or the other.

Few atheists feel compelled to prove theists wrong. They don't have to. The burden of proof is on the person making the claim, which in this case is the theist.

-Bri

But I am not sure about the burden of proof. You need to disprove the positions of all others to know that you are right somehow, aren't you?
 
But that is not to the point. My point was that you cannot know that you are right since you cannot disprove me, so you are not "more right" than I am. How can you know your position is the right one without disproving the positions of others?

E-V-I-D-E-N-C-E

It is possible for evidence to show that nobody had the right position.
 
Agreed, in that instance he is taking away your free will. But that is not to say that he is taking away your free will entirely.
Then free will is not truly free. Only when god wants it to be free.



I disagree. We are asking whether a particular act is the right or wrong choice in a given situation. In the case of stealing to save a life, it is the right choice to steal and the wrong choice to let the person die. You may feel compelled to insist that stealing is always immoral, but in my book "moral" means "right" and "immoral" means "wrong." In no way can you say that it would be the "right" or "moral" choice to allow someone to die in this situation.
I am talking about the moral value of the act itself. A "bad act" may be the "right" choice in to achieve a specific end. But the moral value of the end does not change the moral value of the "bad" act. It is still a bad act that leads to a good end.


Moral and immoral may be two ends of a spectrum, implying that some actions are better or worse (more moral or less moral) than others. If you have a limited number of choices, we can say that the "right" action is the most moral choice, and the "wrong" action is the least moral.
The fact that you are limited to just making bad acts inorder to achieve a good end still does not change the fact that those acts are still immoral or bad

Certainly smiting someone has some negative consequence, but Christians don't expect that their God only performs acts that have no negative consequences whatsoever; rather, they expect that their God chooses the most moral act in a given circumstance -- that is, the choice that is necessary for the greater good.
So then you're saying God can commit immoral and bad acts just so long as the outcome is good because the better the outcome the less immoral the act is. But wait! the act is still immoral, Just considered "less" immoral.
What does that say about omni-benevolence?


The sentence I have placed in bold means precisely that in practice the ends DO sometimes justify the means! Thank you!
Nope. I just said that we just allow it. We just accept that a bad thing had to be done and ignore the other consequences of the act .

Sure, something bad will happen in either case, but in this case the right (or more moral) act is the one that would lead to the best overall result (the person lives even though some property is stolen) and the wrong (or less moral) act is the one that would lead to the worst overall result (the person dies but no property is stolen).
but my point is that actions that are still bad and immoral. Bad things that have to be done so that good things can result. That would nean that god would have to do bad things so that good things happen. Which would mean that God is not omni-benevolent.



And it very well could be. That's my point.
I believe the bible says a different greater good is god's goal rather than just free will alone. You even say that its possible that god temporarily suspends free will so that his plan can proceed. If giving us free will is good what is taking free will away?



If God wants us to freely choose him, then yes free will would be the only means to that end. Therefore, even if we all chose evil, it might still be a greater good than having no possibility to meet the goal at all.


I
f the goal is for us to freely choose God, I'm not certain how we could have any possibility of meeting that goal unless we also had the ability to fail to meet the goal (to not choose God). So I would argue that having the possibility of meeting the goal is better than having no possibility whatsoever of meeting the ultimate goal.
But at this point the choice itself is not inherently good or evil, and evil still has to be around so that the choice can be made.
So that means that god allows evil to exist for his plan to work. But is'nt allowing evil or bad things to happen also a bad thing? Yes but it is a necessary evil so that god's greater plan can exists. But those evil things are still evil.


But a lesser evil than having no free will (and no possibility whatsoever to meet the goal).
But it is still evil.



Let's try to illustrate by showing how much "goodness" may be introduced or removed into the world from various events taking place:

  • having free will: +500
  • not having free will: -500
  • doing a good deed: +1
  • doing a bad deed: -1
  • reaching the goal (everyone chooses to believe in God): +1000
  • not reaching the goal (not everybody chooses to believe in God): -1000

Free will is good, so it is worth 500 "goodness" points, but no free will is bad, so we have to subtract 500 goodness points. Each good deed we do adds a point of "goodness" to the world, each bad deed takes one away (let's say that there are 100 deeds that we can do total). Reaching the ultimate goal of choosing to believe in God means 1000 points of "goodness" added to the world, whereas if we don't believe in God it takes away 1000 points of "goodness" from the world.

If God gave us no free will, we would have -1500 points: we would have no free will (-500 points), we could do no good deeds (0 points) or bad deeds (0 points) since those require free will, and we couldn't freely choose to believe in God (-1000 points).

Let's say we are given free will, but we fail miserably and do 100 bad deeds: We get +500 for having free will, but -100 for doing the bad deeds and -1000 for not reaching the goal, so our score is -600.

As you can see, having free will is better (in this case a lesser evil) even if we fail miserably. Of course, if we succeed it's better still.
Assigning arbitray numbers to show an offset of some sort still does not change that fact the bad and evil things are still have a level of evil assigned to it.
God still as to do or allow bad and evil things to happen so that his plan will work.



According to you, God's plan is for us to follow his teachings of our own free will. Unfortunately, that goal has exactly zero chance of being reached unless there is the possibility of us choosing evil instead. However, even if we chose evil, it is still better (or in this case a lesser evil) than if we didn't have free will at all (see above).
I believe that is Christianities view. isn't it? And this still does not change the fact that God still has to do or allow evil or bad things. wether it it less evil or not makes no difference, the act is still an evil act.



But the bad thing is still a bad thing. What does that say about omni-benevolence?



In the case of stealing to save a life: there are two evils, one of them is the lesser of the two evils and is the right choice (more moral or less immoral depending on how you want to look at it).
Again lesser or more does not matter. It is still evil.



Pyrrhic. Yes, that simply means that the means are too costly to justify the ends. It is true that the ends don't always justify the means (but sometimes they do!) In my view, you have to weight ALL of the consequences (both the means and the ends) in order to decide which choice is the right (more moral) one.
In my view there is no justification. Just what consequences you are willing to deal with. The good thing does not cancell out the bad thing. It's a matter of what you are willing to overlook.

Of course if there was a better third option that would lead to better overall consequences then you would take that, but that's not part of this hypothetical.

In this hypothetical, no other options are possible (please don't make me complicate the story by adding reasons why no other options are possible, just accept it). You have to answer him either by lying (forseeably leading to the girl's death) or by telling him the truth (saving her life).
Well now that I am unrealistcaly constrained into a forced choice (sounds familiar?) I would say that I would choose to lie to save the girl. (remember my other choices were taken away from me) Because I have no other choice to take. I am forced to make an immoral choice because that is the only choice available to me that will lead to the desired outcome.
(Is god also constrained in what he has to do to achieve his goal? Are his decisions also similarly constrained? What does that say about omni-potence?)

It's kind of like the choice god give us. God says we are free to choose to follow him or not.
If I choose to follow him I am rewarded by going to heaven. If I don't choose him I am consigned to hell. Sure I can freely choose either one but what kind of a choice is that?

Free will, yea but how free is that will when the choices we have have that kind of a consequence?

Semantics. The question is whether or not the act of lying in and of itself is wrong so that in order to do the "right" thing you would have to tell the man the truth. If the ends don't justify the means in this case, then you would have to tell the truth.
It's a question of what you are willing to do to achieve a desired outcome. It's also semantics to say "that a bad thing is the right thing to do", you're playing with words.
It is more accurate to say "that this act was necessary to achieve this goal." The act was a "bad" act but it was necessary to achieve a "good" goal.


First of all, a more accurate translation is "thou shalt not murder." The Bible goes on to specify under what circumstances you are allowed to kill.
Sorry, I guess I refered to the layman's version. You know, Cecil B Demile.

Second of all, nobody said that God had to operate under the same rules as people. Clearly he can't operate under the same rules and make moral decisions, given that he can forsee all of the consequences of his actions and we cannot.
Well then god does operate under a different set of moral codes than we do. But Than what does "in his image" mean?



I never said that those who suffer have it better than those who don't suffer. I said that everyone -- including the sufferer -- benefits from suffering.
By having free will? The suffering guy may be willing to give up his free will if the suffering would stop.

May be you could answer this for me. Do we still have free will in heaven?
Is suffering still a price we have to pay for free will in heaven?



Semantics. It is right (more moral) if suffering is for the greater good.

So suffering is good? To who? The ones who suffer or the ones who benefits from the suffering? Is the greater good still so great if suffering is required for it's existance. Would not the greater good be even greater if there were no suffering to achieve it? As your numbers put it, one subtracts from the other. Greater good without the suffering would be greater than the greater good with the suffering.

Semantics. It is right (more moral) if the theft is for the greater good.
It's still a bad thing for the one who was stolen from. But we choose to overlook his loss for the greater good. Still greater good without the theft is greater than the greater good with the theft.
The subtraction caused by the theft taints the greater good.


Correct. My point is that the Christian God may be omni-benevolent as long as what he does is for the greater good, according to how Christians define omni-benevolence. Now, you may want to define the word differently in order to preclude the Christian God from being omni-benevolent, but in order to have an honest discussion about whether the Christian God can logically exist, we need to use the definition that Christians use to describe their God.
But that's redefining the meaning of the word to suite a desired characteristic. It's omni-benevolence, but not really. Its a christian interpretation of omni-benevolence.
That kind of defeats the purpose of having a dictionary. The word has an accepted definition and you have to see if your description of god fits that definition, other wise it's something else.



Again, semantics.

-Bri
But no less true.
 
And how do you prove the need for evidence? What do you prove that with?

Um. This question is meaningless, I'm afraid.

Don't think of it as "evidence." Think of it as "reasons to accept one version of reality over the infinite number of others."

Think of the things you don't believe -- there must be something. And think of why you don't believe them but do believe something else.

That's how I feel about all the assertions you've made. You are not giving me no reasons to accept anything you're saying over the much simpler explanations (look up Occam's Razor sometime) I currently hold.
 
But I am not sure about the burden of proof. You need to disprove the positions of all others to know that you are right somehow, aren't you?

Right about what?

I have no belief either for or against the existence of leprechauns. No, I don't have to prove or disprove leprechauns in order to not have a belief about them.

However, if you want to convince me that leprechauns are real, the burden of proof is on you to provide evidence.

-Bri
 
uruk,

I feel like in some cases I'm answering the same questions over and over again, so this keeps getting longer and longer. Feel free to prune out redundant questions because the answer won't change!

Then free will is not truly free. Only when god wants it to be free.

Yup. You can't fly, so it's not truly free.

I am talking about the moral value of the act itself.

There is only one act you can perform. That act is one of the following:

  1. stealing (and thereby saving a life)
  2. not stealing (and thereby letting someone die)

One of those choices is more moral than the other. That choice is the right act to perform given those two possible choices.

A "bad act" may be the "right" choice in to achieve a specific end.

In other words, the end DOES justify the means in this case, in contradiction with "the ends don't justify the means" as you've said previously.

The act itself is one of the two choices above. If you choose stealing, then it IS the right and most moral choice, so how can it be a "bad act?" The act that involves not stealing is the wrong and most immoral choice, so how could it be the "good act?"

But the moral value of the end does not change the moral value of the "bad" act. It is still a bad act that leads to a good end.

I disagree that acts without context have moral values. In this case, it is obvious that the act of stealing is the most moral act possible in that circumstance. More to the point, if you lived your life according to "the ends don't justify the means," you would morally have to let the person die. Therefore, it is much more apt to say "the ends don't always justify the means."

The fact that you are limited to just making bad acts inorder to achieve a good end still does not change the fact that those acts are still immoral or bad

If you choose a "bad act" to achieve a good end, then you are admitting that the end DOES justify the means.

We are talking about which course of action would be the most moral course of action to take. You cannot say "both courses of action are immoral" because that doesn't help you to decide which action is the correct one. You have to make a judgment concerning which is less immoral or more moral. In order to do that you have to consider the consequences of both choices. If you assert that the ends don't justify the means, you would have to do nothing, which means letting the person die, which is decidedly the less moral (more immoral) of the two choices.

So then you're saying God can commit immoral and bad acts just so long as the outcome is good because the better the outcome the less immoral the act is. But wait! the act is still immoral, Just considered "less" immoral.
What does that say about omni-benevolence?

To say that act A is "less immoral" than act B is equivalent to saying that act A is "more moral" than act B. To say that act A is "more immoral" than act B is equivalent to saying that act A is "less moral" than act B. God is omni-benevolent as long as his choices achieve the greatest good possible.

There are no absolute "immoral" or "moral" acts, but rather a continuum based on the context of circumstance. This is clear from the mental gymnastics you have to go through to state that "A 'bad act' may be the 'right' choice in to achieve a specific end," and then pretend that it's not in direct contradiction with your premise that "the ends don't justify the means."

Nope. I just said that we just allow it. We just accept that a bad thing had to be done and ignore the other consequences of the act .

Pray tell, what do you think "the ends don't justify the means" means?

Why do we allow it? Because it would be utterly absurd to let the person die so that you don't steal, that's why. The ends, in fact, DO justify the means under those circumstances.

but my point is that actions that are still bad and immoral. Bad things that have to be done so that good things can result.

Again, you are just restating that the ends DO justify the means.

That would nean that god would have to do bad things so that good things happen. Which would mean that God is not omni-benevolent.

By your definition of omni-benevolence, perhaps. But your definition is not one that many other people, including Christians, hold.

In order for you to hold that definition, you have to keep contradicting yourself, so it's no surprise that the definition would lead to a contradiction! But you might consider using a definition that Christians actually use if you intend to disprove the Christian God. Otherwise, you've only managed to disprove some other god that you've made up.

Assigning arbitray numbers to show an offset of some sort still does not change that fact the bad and evil things are still have a level of evil assigned to it.

The illustration shows that it is possible that in order to maximize the goodness in the world, we MUST have free will even if having free will results in us always doing evil. Not having free will results in less goodness than having free will, regardless of how many good or evil deeds we do because of it.

Well now that I am unrealistcaly constrained into a forced choice (sounds familiar?) I would say that I would choose to lie to save the girl. (remember my other choices were taken away from me) Because I have no other choice to take. I am forced to make an immoral choice because that is the only choice available to me that will lead to the desired outcome.

So once again, the end DOES justify the means.

(Is god also constrained in what he has to do to achieve his goal? Are his decisions also similarly constrained? What does that say about omni-potence?)

Possibly. It says that it is possible that the most good can only be achieved if there is also the possibility of evil.

It's a question of what you are willing to do to achieve a desired outcome.

The ends justify the means!

It's also semantics to say "that a bad thing is the right thing to do", you're playing with words.

Except that I never said that. I said that whether an act is "bad" or not depends on its context. In the context where stealing something saves someone's life, it's not bad at all -- it's good.

It is more accurate to say "that this act was necessary to achieve this goal." The act was a "bad" act but it was necessary to achieve a "good" goal.

Both mean the same thing as "the ends justify the means."

Well then god does operate under a different set of moral codes than we do. But Than what does "in his image" mean?

God operates under a different set of moral codes only insofar as God must act to achieve the greatest good possible, whereas we act to achieve the greatest good that we can given our limitations.

By having free will? The suffering guy may be willing to give up his free will if the suffering would stop.

You may be willing to spend your entire life locked in a steel box in order to avoid the possibility of being hit by a truck, but that doesn't mean it would lead to the greatest good.

May be you could answer this for me. Do we still have free will in heaven?
Is suffering still a price we have to pay for free will in heaven?

I don't know. You'd have to ask a Christian. My guess is that from the descriptions I've heard of heaven, the choices are limited there, but there is no suffering either.

So suffering is good?

Yes, assuming the freedom to choose good in the face of temptation to choose evil is a greater good.

To who? The ones who suffer or the ones who benefits from the suffering?

We all benefit if we all have the freedom to choose between good and evil.

Is the greater good still so great if suffering is required for it's existance. Would not the greater good be even greater if there were no suffering to achieve it?

That is assuming that the greatest good can be achieved without suffering, and the presumption here is that it can't by its very nature. Can you prove that it can?

As your numbers put it, one subtracts from the other. Greater good without the suffering would be greater than the greater good with the suffering.

Do the math, and show me a scenario using the numbers in my illustration how a greater good can be achieved without free will than with it. Looking at the BEST scenario without free will and the WORST scenario with free will, it is clear that the greater good is always achieved with free will than without it.

It's still a bad thing for the one who was stolen from. But we choose to overlook his loss for the greater good.

The ends justify the means.

Still greater good without the theft is greater than the greater good with the theft.

Better than that would be saving the person without the theft and also finding a million dollars. But that's not a possibility in the scenario I presented.

The subtraction caused by the theft taints the greater good.

And yet it's still the greatest good possible in the scenario I described, and therefore theft is the most moral choice.

But that's redefining the meaning of the word to suite a desired characteristic.

No, it's the common meaning of the word. You are redefining it in order to prove the impossibility of an "omni-benevolent god". But you're not disproving the Christian God at all.

I can disprove the possibility of an omni-benevolent god also by re-defining "omni-benevolent" to mean "mortal," in which case I can claim that "mortal god" is a contradiction and therefore the existence of an omni-benevolent god is impossible!

Of course, if I want to disprove the Christian God (rather than my own "mortal god") then I have to use terms in the way Christians use it.

It's omni-benevolence, but not really. Its a christian interpretation of omni-benevolence.

If you say so. I won't quibble except to say that it's the common definition of the word and the one you're using is not. Regardless, you have to use theirs if you want to disprove a God that contains the characteristics they believe their God to possess.

-Bri
 
Last edited:
So you say that if a person has no evidence, you do not need to disprove his position?

The lack of evidence severly weakens that persons position. If his position does not conform to logic, his position is weakened even more. So you get to a point where his position becomes improbable. It practicaly disproves itself.
 

Back
Top Bottom