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Postmodernism

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Think of them more like ‘performances’ – you don’t judge a play as really good because you know more about the world than when you went in, but because you’re looking at the world you do know in a different way. Similarly, a good postmodernist text will take some hitherto unexamined assumption in your brain and blow it wide open. It will make you think about the machinery that lies underneath what you are reading, writing and saying
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I must say, as far as I understood it, I enjoyed the thesis of Deleuze's Difference and Repetition in that way, for its inversion of philosophy: instead of the traditional looking for Identity between phemonena to discern a common Idea -- classification, try looking for the Difference that renders some things sui generis and better defined by Repetition (instantiation) than words.

But why it had to be written in such dense obscure language (at least as it was translated)... didn't seem to add anything but bulk and falderal to the novel and valid inquiry he was making into the assumptions underlying classic metaphysics. I prefer recent stuff like say Slavoj Zizek for its conversational prose, even though he's not that original, mostly just reinterpreting Lacan. But at least he's trying to be clear, as opposed to the older postmods, who seemed to embrace a sort of stream-of-conscious logorrhea as the key to subversive epiphany and understanding.
 
But at least he's trying to be clear, as opposed to the older postmods, who seemed to embrace a sort of stream-of-conscious logorrhea as the key to subversive epiphany and understanding.

Well, sometimes it is. I love 'Finnegan's Wake' for precisely that reason - I never understand it in the way I would understand a news article or even the instructions on self-assembly furniture, but I always come out the other side of it feeling as though my language centres have been thoroughly purged. I get the same sort of feeling from 'Anti-Oedipus', which I'm afraid is the only Deleuze and Guattari I've attempted.
 
... but I always come out the other side of it feeling as though my language centres have been thoroughly purged. I get the same sort of feeling from 'Anti-Oedipus', which I'm afraid is the only Deleuze and Guattari I've attempted.


Well maybe; but purging my language centres gives me such a headache!!! ;)
 
Absolutely. Takes forever to get the stains out, as well…

Simonmaal – a brief brush with Gergen seems to indicate that he’s applying his ideas as a psychotherapist. I reckon that’s appropriate. If you’re analysing a traumatised patient, and that patient firmly believes that cranio-sacral therapy has brought them into closer contact with their guardian angel (or similar), then now is probably not the time to give them a short sharp lecture on critical thinking skills. His argument seems to be that postmodernist thinking, with its multiple ‘readings’ of the world, is a good framework within which a therapist can respect (without actually accepting) that sort of thing.

It’s like the point I made earlier about education – the fact that you’re plainly wrong has nothing to do with the validity of your feelings. My primary ethical duty is to avoid hurting people – if that means leaving them to their woo beliefs rather than kicking away one of the pillars that’s holding up their fragile psyche then so be it.
 
Right. So give me something discoved using the pomo mindset.

Or just something that could be discovered using the pomo mindset. Walk us through it. Show us pomo in action, don't just talk about what it is like.

This is not a difficult question to my mind.

You're doing it again: pomo does not discover things per se, it contextualises them. It is perfectly able to embrace the scientific technique, as I showed earlier (I already provided several examples so I won't repeat myself - go back and take a look).
 
<snip>

To the extent I can, I am dubious, in that she seems to remove all aspects of biology from behavior. When we try to get to specifics, the arguments are as hard to catch as a greased pig. I offer this site, which I believe to believe a reputable academic source, as an example.

"In opposition to theatrical or phenomenological models which take the gendered self to be prior to its acts, I will understand constituting acts not only as constituting the identity of the actor, but as constituting that identity as a compelling illusion, an object of belief"

"Because there is neither an 'essence' that gender expresses or externalizes nor an objective ideal to which gender aspires; because gender is not a fact, the various acts of gender creates the idea of gender, and without those acts, there would be no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals its genesis"

That clears it right up for me :D

Somewhat more seriously, substitute happiness for gender in the above. The sentences still say the same thing, and we can agree or not. But there is a biological basis for happiness, it's not just an act.

And that's my problem with pomo. I've never seen any that tries to ground itself in facts, instead it gets lost in supposition. There is no 'thing' called happiness, nor can we exactly define it; that does not render it a fiction or a construction. <snip>

And this is where the two of us agree. Pomo can be cause for concern: it can lead up a relativised dark alley where biological factors and personal autonomy and responsibility are subordinated to "the social". And they do often use flowery euphemisms to disguise their highly subjective, incohesive (and often circular) arguments; untestable notions such as a dynamic subconscious or institutional racism being annoying examples of this at work.

But once again, this does not mean that the pomo (i do like that abbreviation) is inherently woo, just that it can be misapplied.
 
<snip>Can you compile a similar list for postmodernism? "The experimental technique, led by a skeptical mindset, discoverd these things: [INSERT LIST HERE]."

Now, try this. "The [INSERT ADJECTIVE HERE] technique, led by a postmodern mindset, discovered these things : [INSERT LIST HERE].</snip>"

Your question suggests that you have misunderstood my argument, and I consequently feel we are starting to go circular here. But I will humour you ;). Post-modernism is capable of using precisely the same results from that list and placing them in what Gergen described as a "democracy of ideas." I will use homeopathy (the first item in the list) to make the point. So we would need to modify the statement you have asked to say:

The experimental/hermeneutic/social constructionist/existential approaches, when interpreted through a postmodern mindset, can be used to show that homeopathy does not work but that, for its day, it had a moral advantage over such baleful practices as blood-letting and leeching in that, although equally ineffective, it did not directly harm the patient. Homeopathy therefore complies with Hippocrates request: "[SIZE=-1]As to diseases, make a habit of two things -- to help, or at least to do no harm"; the barbaric practices of the orthodox medicine of the day did not. However, in time, technological advances and social change allowed effective medication to replace homeopathy, with the last American homeopathic school closing down in the early 20th century.

However, homeopathic medicine has enjoyed a resurgence in recent times, perhaps due to two factors. Firstly, there is a growing mistrust of science and primary care doctors, who are often seen as the marketing arm of the drug companies. Secondly, we now live in a consumerist society where freedom of choice has replaced the blind following of expert advice. The social changes of the mid twentieth century have led to a world where anything goes. Perhaps future research can examine the role of perceived autonomy on healthcare choices...(etc, etc)


I have taken other factors (social, technological, financial) and placed them alongside the "cold hard facts" of science. Now, the above piece was hastily written but it illustrates how this type of thinking can be useful in some situations. But, as I keep saying (and as people keep ovelooking), the pomo mindset is open to abuse and can allow anything to be relativised.

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Similarly, some of the more hysterical wing-nuts in postmodernism have suggested that special "ways of knowing" should produce new insights unavailable except through "feminist science" (or some such gibberish). I've never seen a convincing list of such insights; I've rarely seen a list at all (convincing or not).
Well you won't find me arguing against the dangers of unchecked relativism and pseudo science. For example, I do not like being incorrectly labelled a racist simply because I am white and I therefore "have internalised racial power inequalities to the extent that I an unaware of my racism; only a person from an ethnic minority is able to observe the full extent of white supremacy" and other such untestable poppycock.

The Third Reich used this kind of approach...
 
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But aren't we disagreeing here?

In comparison, I'm asserting that there are theory free observations, or at least theory invariant observations. This idea is very important in science as it allows us to quantitatively evaluate different theories.

Ok then, given that you arguing for theory-free observations, I'll concede that we are disagreeing ;) By its very nature, science has a reciprocal relationship with theory. Now, however objective we try to be, there are always different ways to interpret the same piece of research and theory. If there were not, then we would have lapsed into dogma and ceased to be scientists. We always need to accept that our theories can be modified or abrogated. To use our example, the Babylonians were looking at the same sky and stars as we do today (well, our night skies may differ by a tiny amount, but that is a moot point here). The important thing is the way they observed, measured and predicted the movement of the stars was affected by their beliefs, knowledge and technology. But the layout of the sky was still the same. We can replace their theory but the sky does not change; we are interpreting the same piece of evidence in very different ways.

For example, we can make the objective assertion that: General Relativity is more accurate than Newtonian mechanics, which is at least as accurate and has greater predictive power* than those of the Babylonians.

*I don't know how good the Babylonians were but as they only worked out what was going on by counting, Newtonian mechanics almost certainly gives greater accuracy, and allows you to predict the movement of previously unobserved bodies.

Yes indeed, and this is why I brought ontology and epistemology into the discussion.
 
You're doing it again: pomo does not discover things per se, it contextualises them. It is perfectly able to embrace the scientific technique, as I showed earlier (I already provided several examples so I won't repeat myself - go back and take a look).
Then allow me to reword my request, especially in light of your last two posts.

I think I showed through example what New Criticism does in a previous post: you could say it contextualizes a poem in reference to itself. What does it "discover"? Certainly not that 2+2=4, E=mc^2, or anything like that. But it can illuminate such things as use of meter and rhyme to establish a mood. Say I didn't notice that Stevens was using a lot of silibants in a poem to mimic the sound of the wind. A New Criticism analysis points this out, and I go "ahh! I can hear that". I have a new viewpoint on the poem that has value for me. That's all I really mean in terms of a "discovery".

I would assume pomo provides value also (beyond making a way to publish 'original' material for a struggling academic) , otherwise why do it? I'm asking for someone to actually give an example of that. So, you say Pomo contextualizes. That's terribly vague to me. I'm asking for an example.

I think examples of sort have been given; I remain nonplused. We can go back to Tristam Shandy, Don Quixote, the greeks, etc., for similar examples. In short, I don't believe the linguistic gymanstics that the pomos play actually has any value. It's a one trick pony. Show that we can create ambiguity in language. Go from there to showing that this undermines what we are claiming. etc. I get it. It's a neat trick, worthy of a graduate lit paper or two.

Why should I plow through Judith Butler as she deconstructs 'gender' to ultimately conclude that gender is an act? We have very successfully talked about gender without recourse to that labored language, and extraordinarily dubious conclusions. I really haven't seen any insight that she has provided that either 1) presents new ways of looking of something that is actually of value to me and 2) I actually agree with. To be fair, my knowledge of her is only google based, but she was the example presented, so I'm trying to go with her.

Every time we try to press for some actual idea, we get told there isn't any. Fine, I'll stipulate that. Then, why "contextualize" something in this way? Why is this being done? Why are careers being based on it? Why are universities charging a heck of a lot of money to teach it to students? Why are students going into debt to the tune of 100K or so to learn it? I honestly don't get it.

If it has value, show us. If it doesn't, fine, but then don't be surprised when we pronounce pomo research as worthless :)

(Note my complaint is how pomo is written and communicated, not with a few of the basic underlying ideas that yes, language is incomplete. That's a useful idea that we can deal with in much more productive ways than pomo).
 
YSo we would need to modify the statement you have asked to say:

The experimental/hermeneutic/social constructionist/existential approaches, when interpreted through a postmodern mindset, can be used to show that homeopathy does not work but that, for its day, it had a moral advantage over such baleful practices as blood-letting and leeching in that, although equally ineffective, it did not directly harm the patient.


Or, alternatively, we could apply standard (non-social constructionist) historicism and arrive at exactly the same conclusion, but written clearly and using approximately 20% as many words.

In fact, it did. Historians of science were dissing homeopathy since long before postmodernism.

So what you're saying is that postmodernism can do something that conventional scholarship can, but less effectively and with substantially increased likelihood of error.

I agree entirely.

I have taken other factors (social, technological, financial) and placed them alongside the "cold hard facts" of science. Now, the above piece was hastily written but it illustrates how this type of thinking can be useful in some situations.

No, it doesn't. You're doing bad history-of-science unde the guise of postmodernism.

But, as I keep saying (and as people keep ovelooking), the pomo mindset is open to abuse and can allow anything to be relativised.

Again, I agree.

The problem is that the pomo mindset, while open to abuse, is effectively not open to use. It not only can allow anything to be relativised --- in fact, it can't prevent it.
 
So what you're saying is that postmodernism can do something that conventional scholarship can, but less effectively and with substantially increased likelihood of error.

I agree entirely.
I LOL on this one. :D
 
Ok then, given that you arguing for theory-free observations, I'll concede that we are disagreeing ;) By its very nature, science has a reciprocal relationship with theory. Now, however objective we try to be, there are always different ways to interpret the same piece of research and theory. If there were not, then we would have lapsed into dogma and ceased to be scientists. We always need to accept that our theories can be modified or abrogated. To use our example, the Babylonians were looking at the same sky and stars as we do today (well, our night skies may differ by a tiny amount, but that is a moot point here). The important thing is the way they observed, measured and predicted the movement of the stars was affected by their beliefs, knowledge and technology. But the layout of the sky was still the same. We can replace their theory but the sky does not change; we are interpreting the same piece of evidence in very different ways.

I agree with everything you've written, our choice of what observation to make and the inference we can draw from it is highly influenced by our choice of theory.
Still I don't think this undermines my claim of theory invarient observation. Einstein , Newton, and even Galilao who predates both Newtonian physics and General Relativity would agree that g is about equal to 10 ms^-2.
We could get proponents of each school to agree on the value of g to arbitary precision simply by locking them in a lab together with good enough equiptment (and sufficently competent lab technicians).
 
I think we have run out of steam on this one, fun though it was to discuss.

If you browse back through all of my posts, you will find that I have been playing devil's advocate, offering up examples both supporting and criticising the post-modernist mindset. I think this is where there have been several misunderstandings between other posters and myself; there were people reading one of my posts where I was illustrating one side of the argument, and who then latched onto it as if I were taking a side in the debate, which I was not. When placed in context with each other, we can see that I was almost arguing with myself on this one!

However, I think we have now reached a point where we are finding some common ground (although not necessarily agreeing), and I also think there isn't really anything worthwhile that I can add to what has already been said. This therefore seems like a good time to sign off from this extremely entertaining discussion.

So to quickly sum up, the original question was: should post-modernism be a subject for skeptics? I think the answer to that question is a definite yes, but that yes is nevertheless a conditional one.

Thanks for the debate :)
 
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Not wanting to appear rude, but do any of you actually know what post-modernism IS? Have you ever read any? Or are you just going by what you've heard?

It's perfectly compatible with scepticism, and indeed can be a tool of a sceptical approach. Post-modern approaches to gender, race and sexuality have informed liberalism for most of the second half of this century. Believe me, you all engage in post-modern thought whether you'd care to admit it or not. The type of thought and communication the internet has facilitated is extremely post-modern, as are the founding principles of things like Open Source Software and Wikipedia.

It's true that post-modernism has had its embarrassments - the Sokal affair being maybe the most well known - but considering a comparable occurrence concerning the Journal of Reproductive Medicine recently, I don't think that's reason enough to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

Postmodernism, despite Dawkin's mischaracterisation, does not posit "everything is true", despite what you've heard.

Sorry, I am committing the forum sin of jumping in before reading the entire thread, but nonetheless...


"Greek science was never exact, precisely because, in keeping with its essence, it could not be exact and did not need to be exact. Hence it makes no sense whatever to suppose that modern science is more exact than that of antiquity. Neither can we say that the Galilean doctrine of freely falling bodies is true and that Aristotle's teaching, that light bodies strive upwards is false."

"It is still more impossible to say that the modern understanding of whatever is, is more correct than that of the Greeks. Therefore, if we want to grasp the essence of modern science, we must first free ourselves from the habit of comparing the new science with the old solely in terms of degree, from the point of view of progress."

Heidegger, The Age of the World Picture


So, according to the father of post-modernism, we can't say that modern scientific knowledge is any more true than ancient Greek speculation. It's all a question of perspective and the "enframing" of understanding in the age in question. Calling the sun a god is just as true and just as false as calling it a nuclear reaction of hydrogen and helium.

There is no progress, only perspective. We are not increasing our ability to make true statements about external reality, we are stuck in a mode of perceiving that "destines" us to impose our categories of understanding on reality. Not only is our understanding conditional, it is conditioned - and no particular conditioned understanding is any more valid or "true" than any other.



What a bunch of horsepuckey. Post-modernism is garbage.
 
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Where, exactly, have you heard Martin Heidegger referred to as 'the father of Postmodernism'? I mean, philosophy doesn't really live in those categories but even so, with his belief in an approachable and 'authentic' sense of 'Being' I would put him very definitely in the Modernist category.

Even so, your paraphrase is way off. He is not saying that 'no science can be accurate because the Greeks weren't accurate'. He appears to be saying that it isn't terribly useful for modern scientists to think of themselves as further along some arbitrary line marked 'progress' than their earlier counterparts.

Which they shouldn't. All good scientists should be willing to accept the idea that they are completely wrong about everything as soon as the data points that way. That's not postmodernism, it's just good research practice.
 
Where, exactly, have you heard Martin Heidegger referred to as 'the father of Postmodernism'? I mean, philosophy doesn't really live in those categories but even so, with his belief in an approachable and 'authentic' sense of 'Being' I would put him very definitely in the Modernist category.

Heidegger set the foundation for Derrida, Focault et al. He is in no way a modern. You could argue that he is in fact pre-modern - i.e., pre-Socratic. He is anti-rational, anti-enlightenment and anti-liberal. Martin Heidegger hates the City.

Even so, your paraphrase is way off. He is not saying that 'no science can be accurate because the Greeks weren't accurate'. He appears to be saying that it isn't terribly useful for modern scientists to think of themselves as further along some arbitrary line marked 'progress' than their earlier counterparts.
My paraphrase is not way off - and your paraphrase of my paraphrase is inaccurate. Have you read the piece that I am quoting from? He is saying that modern science is no more true than ancient science. He is denying the possibility of progress entirely. He is claiming that all truth is relative to the Age in which it occurs and no such truth can be said to be more "true" than any other. This is fundamental premise of the Age of the World Picture, and it is wrong.

Which they shouldn't. All good scientists should be willing to accept the idea that they are completely wrong about everything as soon as the data points that way. That's not postmodernism, it's just good research practice.
Scientists do accept that. Heidegger does not. Heidegger says that no scientific understanding of truth is any better than any other. He privileges an aesthetic, poetic, pre-rational approach to truth that is contextual only.
 
--snip--

Postmodernism is just a perspective, a way of looking, a set of metaphors and methods of illustrating how relationships function. It doesn't make testable truth claims, but nor should it be criticised for it.

--snip--

Yes it should. If it makes no testable truth claims, it has no defensible value (aside from the example described below). It is also thereby disqualified from validly criticizing modes of enquiry that do make testable truth claims - i.e,. empirical science. Can you not see that putting PM above such criticism negates its value as a tool of criticism?

As with all entirely theoretical abstract constructions of philosophy, PM can and should answer one question: Does it contribute to human flourishing, and if so, how? If it can't satisfactorily answer this question, we are justified in tossing PM into the theoretical waste-bin of "making crap up".
 
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Heidegger set the foundation for Derrida, Focault et al. He is in no way a modern. You could argue that he is in fact pre-modern - i.e., pre-Socratic. He is anti-rational, anti-enlightenment and anti-liberal. Martin Heidegger hates the City.

Please unpack what you mean by 'set the foundation for'. Derrida's metaphysics could be argued to be completely oppositional to Heidegger's. Foucault was a historian and cultural theorist - I've read 'Discipline and Punish' and bits of the History of Sexuality and I'm at a loss to see the influence of Heidegger in either.

I said 'Modernist' not 'modern'. Different ballgame. Modernism was mystical, in that it believed that there was a kind of 'underlying truth of being' that you could approach with sufficient mental effort.

My paraphrase is not way off - and your paraphrase of my paraphrase is inaccurate. Have you read the piece that I am quoting from?

No. Is it online? I'll have a peek and get back to you, but I'll bet a pound to a penny that nothing in it is suggesting anything more controversial than 'different cultures view the world differently, and should not be considered as inferior for doing so.' Which seems a pretty good way to look at things to me.

However, I fail to see what makes your argument so devastating. Heidegger had all sorts of wacky ideas, including the one that it was a jolly good thing to be a Nazi. He was a deist, of a sort, and had this vaguely naturalistic thing going. He came from a long tradition of German philospher-mystic types who felt a desparate need to contemplate the deep mysteries of existence. A lot of what he said, particularly in later life, was rather silly. That doesn't discredit an entire discipline.

As with all entirely theoretical abstract constructions of philosophy, PM can and should answer one question: Does it contribute to human flourishing, and if so, how?

Well, earlier threads have pointed out that there's lots of stuff comes under the heading 'Postmodern'. So to name but a few:

It was postmodern architects who first railed against the dispiriting 'projects' for housing the urban poor - pointing out that responding to the desired experience of the people actually living there, regardless of how 'irrational' it might be, would do more good than imposing 'scientific' solutions from above.

Since Fanon, postcolonial theory has been massively liberating for many third world thinkers.

And biggest of all - I'd argue that it contributes to human flourishing by merely existing, in the same way that any work of artistic and intellectual effort contributes to human flourishing. When I read Derrida I feel excited, bewildered, challenged, unsettled from my comfortable view of language and the world, ready to reconsider my assumptions. Don't know about you, but that sounds like flourishing to me.
 
Please unpack what you mean by 'set the foundation for'. Derrida's metaphysics could be argued to be completely oppositional to Heidegger's. Foucault was a historian and cultural theorist - I've read 'Discipline and Punish' and bits of the History of Sexuality and I'm at a loss to see the influence of Heidegger in either.

Simple: Reality is open to contextual interpretation. This is a tenet of PoMo is it not? The first place I have encountered this notion is in Heidegger.

Also, "In Derrida's view, deconstruction is a tradition inherited via Heidegger." Wikipedia...so take it for what it's worth.

I said 'Modernist' not 'modern'. Different ballgame. Modernism was mystical, in that it believed that there was a kind of 'underlying truth of being' that you could approach with sufficient mental effort.
The modern project is to undercover the underlying truth of Being through reason, not mysticism, Hegel not-withstanding. Don't mistake an axiom (that there is such a thing as an objective reality about which we are capable of making true statements) for mysticism.



No. Is it online? I'll have a peek and get back to you, but I'll bet a pound to a penny that nothing in it is suggesting anything more controversial than 'different cultures view the world differently, and should not be considered as inferior for doing so.' Which seems a pretty good way to look at things to me.
The merits of cultural relativism aside (of which I think there are few - it is perfectly reasonable to judge other cultures. Taliban anyone?), I'll take that bet. Unfortunately, I don't think his work is public domain, so you may not be able to get a legit copy online.

However, I fail to see what makes your argument so devastating. Heidegger had all sorts of wacky ideas, including the one that it was a jolly good thing to be a Nazi. He was a deist, of a sort, and had this vaguely naturalistic thing going. He came from a long tradition of German philospher-mystic types who felt a desparate need to contemplate the deep mysteries of existence. A lot of what he said, particularly in later life, was rather silly. That doesn't discredit an entire discipline.
His silliness (including Nazism) comes from his elevation of Poesis over Reason and the Enlightenment. If Heidegger is the foundation of PoMo, then discrediting Heidegger does indeed undermine the entire discipline. Thus, I assume, your rejection of the assertion that Heidegger is the PoMo Moses.



Well, earlier threads have pointed out that there's lots of stuff comes under the heading 'Postmodern'. So to name but a few:

It was postmodern architects who first railed against the dispiriting 'projects' for housing the urban poor - pointing out that responding to the desired experience of the people actually living there, regardless of how 'irrational' it might be, would do more good than imposing 'scientific' solutions from above.

Since Fanon, postcolonial theory has been massively liberating for many third world thinkers.

And biggest of all - I'd argue that it contributes to human flourishing by merely existing, in the same way that any work of artistic and intellectual effort contributes to human flourishing. When I read Derrida I feel excited, bewildered, challenged, unsettled from my comfortable view of language and the world, ready to reconsider my assumptions. Don't know about you, but that sounds like flourishing to me.
It is perfectly reasonable to disagree on the degree to which PoMo contributes to human flourishing. But not everything is an assumption open to deconstruction - particularly the conclusions, conditional though they may be, of empirical science. PoMo is more dangerous in misuse than beneficial in its limited range of legitimate use.

In addition, I would humbly advise you to avoid mis-interpreting your intellectual delight as an indication of validity.
 
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