cooper1958nc
Student
- Joined
- Aug 18, 2007
- Messages
- 49
As a hardcore atheist committed to scientific materialism, and I admit not very skeptical about it, I am on occasion reminded that my worldview may be too narrow. For instance, I cannot fathom quantum indeterminacy or action at a distance, or parallel universes, or any of that. I prefer a billiard ball universe, I guess.
However, closer to home lurks the central problem of philosophy, and I admit I cannot solve it very well.
People believe they have options, i.e. a choices of what to do or not to do. The legal system, and the definition of a "meaningful" human action, assume such. The phenomenological conclusion from inspecting the "contents of consciousness" appear to agree, in that it "feels" most of the time that one can choose actions. In the macroscopic world where quantum effects are not apparent, objects in nature appear to have no such choices. Yet man is fully a natural object.
This statement of the fundamental problem of philosophy, absent the numerous citations it requires to be erudite, bears examination. Solutions to the conundrum have ranged from Cartesian dualism, occasionalism, idealism, and many other isms that in modern parlance seem silly. Roger Penrose suggested that quantum effects in the brain provide a basis for human freedom. Others have invoked the Uncertainty Principle. Personally, I believe the answer is in complexities of neural nets and in emergent properties of complex systems, not in quantum mechanics. However, no one has ever made a neural net that has exercised apparent choices.
Beyond the objective observation of choice lies the ultimately mysterious nature of the "subjective." No neural net seems to have choice, and similarly, does anyone really believe that neural net computer programs have self awareness?
So the problem of consciousness, related in some way to apparent freedom of action, haunts my billiard ball universe. Not enough for me to change.
Perhaps this discussion belongs in another area? None seemed particularly fitting.
However, closer to home lurks the central problem of philosophy, and I admit I cannot solve it very well.
People believe they have options, i.e. a choices of what to do or not to do. The legal system, and the definition of a "meaningful" human action, assume such. The phenomenological conclusion from inspecting the "contents of consciousness" appear to agree, in that it "feels" most of the time that one can choose actions. In the macroscopic world where quantum effects are not apparent, objects in nature appear to have no such choices. Yet man is fully a natural object.
This statement of the fundamental problem of philosophy, absent the numerous citations it requires to be erudite, bears examination. Solutions to the conundrum have ranged from Cartesian dualism, occasionalism, idealism, and many other isms that in modern parlance seem silly. Roger Penrose suggested that quantum effects in the brain provide a basis for human freedom. Others have invoked the Uncertainty Principle. Personally, I believe the answer is in complexities of neural nets and in emergent properties of complex systems, not in quantum mechanics. However, no one has ever made a neural net that has exercised apparent choices.
Beyond the objective observation of choice lies the ultimately mysterious nature of the "subjective." No neural net seems to have choice, and similarly, does anyone really believe that neural net computer programs have self awareness?
So the problem of consciousness, related in some way to apparent freedom of action, haunts my billiard ball universe. Not enough for me to change.
Perhaps this discussion belongs in another area? None seemed particularly fitting.