It seems to me you are, in regards to using the word soul, in effect saying it's sweet because of sweet stuff in it.
Largely. But that's not as meaningless as you seem to think. See below.
The soul remains undefined in any meaningful way.
Not at all. Tradition has given us an extensive, if somewhat vague, definition of the "soul"; for example, we "know" that it is immaterial and therefore that it will not be found via anatomical dissection. We "know" that it is eternal and therefore does not develop as part of childhood. And so forth.
But beyond that, we "know" that the soul is a substance, or at least a kind of "stuff." Saying that a drink tastes sweet "because of sweet stuff in it" is actually more useful than you think; it suggests that the reasons for the sweet taste should be found, for example, in the composition of the drink, and not in the circumstances under which it is drunk. If
the reason for the sweetness is in the ingredients, then drinking it out of a different container should not change the essential sweetness.
A drink is sweet because it has sweet stuff in it. But a girl isn't sexy because she has "sexy stuff in her." A child isn't smart because he has "smart stuff" in him. An elephant isn't big because it has "big stuff" in it. If RecoveringYuppy is correct, and consciousness is merely a function of computation, then any suitably-configured collection of molecules could become conscious -- and consciousness could be produced or destroyed by messing with the configuration. But if consciousness is caused by the presence of an immaterial soul, merely rearranging the components will not create consciousness.
The soul-hypothesis suggests that consciousness is a property of composition, not of arrangement, behavior, or quantity. That's hardly "meaningless" -- and in fact, directly contradicts much of what has been written about computation-as-consciousness (which is a behavioral criterion).
Actually -- at the risk of beating a dead horse -- RY is somewhat self-contradictory in his arguments. He talks on the one hand about "emulating intelligence" as a criterion, which of course is behavioral. But he
also talks about "a computer with connections similar to the brain" as being sufficient for consciousness -- and that, of course, is a criterion of arrangement. This is just the hardware/software distinction, of course. Would brain-like
hardware automatically be conscious, or is there some special
software that the hardware would need to run to achieve consciousness? (The answer, of course, is currently "we don't know," with a very real possibility that this is completely the wrong line of inquiry to begin with.)
So we have at least three different and incompatible theories as to how consciousness arises. It's the hardware, or it's the software, or it's the soul independent of the hardware
and software. It's hardly meaningless or empty to suggest that the third possibility is the uniquely true one.