Two days after we launched our cruise missile attacks in response to the Kenya-Tanzania bombings, a Taliban representative called the State department to complain. He even put his reclusive leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, on the line. This conversation led to a dialogue spread over more than two years during which we repeatedly pressed the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden. Taliban officials replied not by saying no directly but rather by offering a menu of excuses. They said that surrendering bin Laden would violate the Pushtun cultural tradition of courtesy to guests. They said that bin Laden was a hero to Afghans because of his role in ousting the Soviets and that the Taliban would be overthrown if they “betrayed” him in response to American pressure. And they said that they did not believe bin Laden was responsible for the embassy attacks because they had asked him and he had told them he was innocent. For a time, we thought the Taliban might be persuadable.
Notwithstanding their excuses, Taliban officials admitted that their “guest” had become a big problem. They told us that perhaps he would leave “voluntarily.”
At one point, they told us he had already gone. There were rumors that he was ill and had slipped away to find medical treatment. In any case, Taliban leaders assured us that bin Laden was under house arrest and would be prevented from contacting his followers or the press. We didn’t buy these pledges, since the terrorist continued to show up in the media vowing to kill Americans.
Early in 1999, Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Sheehan--the State Department’s director of Counter-terrorism--proposed a comprehensive diplomatic approach entitled “A New Strategy to Get Bin Laden.” After inter-agency deliberations, the strategy was approved in May. The plan basically was to go to each of the countries that we thought had influence and urge them to tell Taliban leaders that they must hand over bin Laden or else face the loss of diplomatic contacts and a prohibition on international flights by Afghan airlines. Meanwhile, we would make clear to Taliban officials directly our intention to propose UN sanctions if they didn’t come around.
In succeeding weeks, we implemented this strategy according to plan, but the plan did not work. Officials from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates agreed to deliver the right message. The Saudis sent one of their princes to confront the Taliban directly. He came back and told us the Taliban were idiots and liars. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah visited the Pakistanis for the purpose of putting pressure on them. When the Taliban failed to cooperate, the Saudis did downgrade their diplomatic ties, cut off official assistance and denied visas to Afghans traveling for nonreligious reasons. The UAE took similar actions.
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Rick Inderfurth and Mike Sheehan met directly with Taliban leaders. They hinted that cooperation would result in the only thing the Taliban desperately wanted: international recognition (although drug and human rights issues remained obstacles). We told the Taliban that if they did not come through they could expect nothing more than the barest kind of humanitarian aid from the international community. They could forget about economic assistance or loans. And we warned Taliban leaders clearly and repeatedly that they would be held responsible for any future attacks traceable to bin Laden, and that we reserved the right to use military force.
Faced with Taliban intransigence, we made good on our threat to impose sanctions. On July 5, 1999, the president issued an order freezing the Taliban’s U.S. assets and prohibiting trade. This was followed by UN sanctions imposed in 1999 and toughened in 2000. Those UN Security Council resolutions were approved under chapter 7 of the UN Charter signifying a threat to international peace and security. They demanded that the Taliban turn over bin Laden and close all terror training camps. The 2000 resolution imposed an arms embargo, urged the closing of any overseas Taliban offices, and barred the Afghan airline from most international flights.
During this period, we continued to meet with the Taliban occasionally, although the dialogue—never productive—had become completely sterile. In repeating our warnings, Mike Sheehan was explicit, “If bin Laden or any of the organizations affiliated with him attacks the United States or United States interests, we will hold you personally accountable. Do you understand? This is from the highest levels of our government.” In May 2000, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tom Pickering reinforced this message yet again in a meeting in Pakistan with Mullah Jalil, “deputy foreign minister” and a close associate of Mullah Omar.
The Taliban was a national, not an international movement. It did not exhibit the same malevolently grandiose ambitions that al-Qaeda did in carrying out acts of terror abroad. Further, bin Laden had already relocated to Afghanistan when the Taliban seized power, so there was no pre-existing connection between them. Nevertheless, a symbiotic relationship developed between the Taliban and bin Laden. The Taliban needed money and muscle that bin Laden provided. Bin Laden needed space for his operatives to live and train.
By mid-1998, bin Laden’s influence was reflected in the increasingly pan-Islamist statements of Taliban leaders. Mullah Omar must have concluded that without bin Laden his power in Afghanistan would be threatened. In retrospect, it is clear the Taliban never had any intention of giving bin Laden up or of forcing him to leave.
.....oh that's right, BECAUSE IT DIDN'T HAPPEN....
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