gumboot tell me what, I think it's great that they abandoned protocol and called NEADS directly, but why didn't the protocol in place work as it should? It shouldn't take 30 min to contact the hijacker coordinator.
It gets a little complex for AA77.
An important thing to remember is that Indianapolis Centre did not know about events in New York at the time. It was no until 0931 that Herndon told the ARTCCs that absolutely any unusual activity was to be reported to them immediately.
Anyway, back to AA77. As you know it disappeared off the radar in a primary radar black spot. The handler began searching along its projected flight path, as did two supervisors, but they didn't look back east. As such no one picked up when an unknown primary contact reappeared at 0905.
By now American Airlines had been told about the flight, and were beginning lock down procedures.
Now here's where a major SNAFU occurred, and one I didn't know about. At 0908 American Airlines came to the conclusion that AA77 had been the second aircraft to hit the WTC.
At about the same time Indianapolis Centre notified the USAF Search and Rescue at Langley AFB that AA77 was believed crashed.
An 0916 American Airlines talked with Herndon, and revealed they thought AA11 had hit the WTC, and then that the second one might have been AA77 (although the AA specialist didn't understand how that was possible). At this point Herndon had no information about the identity of the two aircraft that hit the WTC, but they said they had a different report for AA77 so it might not be the second one to hit the WTC.
By 0920 Indianapolis Centre knew that two airliners had hit the WTC, and other aircraft were hijacked. They began to question their assumption that AA77 had crashed. Note, this significantly changes the timeline for AA77, as it means it was only suspected as a hijack 17 minutes before it crashed.
From now until AA77 crashed, Herndon began notifying ARTCCs and TRACONs to be on the look out for a primary radar return.
FAA headquarters were notified that AA77 was missing at 0925.
At 0932, after being on the look out for a wayward airliner, Dulles TRACON picked up an unknown radar contact moving at high speed. They didn't know, but this was AA77.
0934 - AA77 begins its turn. At the same time, NEADS put a call through to Washington Centre to get an update on AA11, which they had been told was heading for Washington DC. During the call Washington Centre offhandedly notify NEADS that they are also looking for another possibly hijacked flight - AA77.
At this time American Airlines is still saying it was AA11 and AA77 that hit the WTC.
0937 - Regan airport controllers direct a C-130H to follow the unknown radar contact. At the same time Boston Centre overhears reports about the unknown contact via a conference call, and notifies NEADS. NEADS immediately direct the Langley fighters to intercept. Less than 60 seconds later AA77 hits the Pentagon.
Obviously this new information changes things. I had incorrectly identified the 0856 communication between Indianapolis Centre and Herndon as a hijack notification. It wasn't. In fact no one suspected that AA77 had been hijacked until 0920.
From what I skimmed through that 9/11 commission board, it looks like there were come communication problems? The Command Center wasn't listening to the lines they had set-up for situations like this... and if that's true then that's something they were incompetent of - tell me if I got this right...
You seem obsessed with finding someone
anyone to label as incompetent. Why? Why is it you cannot just accept that the hijackers beat the system? Why not accuse the airport security staff who let the hijackers on the aircraft of incompetence? Heck, at least one of them committed suicide they felt so guilty. Why not lay baseless accusations against them? Maybe they were an Al Qaeda insider?
It is now clear that in the case of all flights that hit their targets, there simply was not enough time between knowledge of hijacking and their crash to do anything. The only flight where any grounds for failure due to slow communication is possible is UA93. This was the last flight hijacked, and it was hijacked in the middle of utter chaos - with dozens of suspected hijackings, a nationwide ground stop, and a huge information overload.
This easily explains the UA93 situation.
Also, there's a good argument that UA93 and Delta 1989 were initially mixed up as they were both in the same airspace and had the same profiles. The reason I say this might have been relevant is because Boston Centre notified NEADS that Delta 1989 was hijacked at 0940 - about the same time that reports started arriving at Herndon that UA93 was hijacked.
What's important here is once again it's Boston. They're listening to the conference call between FAA centres, and relaying this info to NEADS. No one else is talking directly to NEADS.
It may be that this Delta 1989 alert that Boston overheard was actually UA93, in which case this might explain the long delay before a military response to UA93.
At 0936 Cleveland Centre specifically asked Herndon if anyone had asked for military assistance, and offered to call a local airbase. Herndon told them (correctly) that others above them in the chain of command had to make that decision. Note that at this point Cleveland were not sure UA93 was hijacked.
It's worth noting the contrast between this and Boston. At Boston, once they had notified Herndon, they immediately made multiple attempts to contact military bases, eventually getting hold of NEADS. Ultimately, Boston became the primary source of information for NEADS.
At 0949, as UA93 closed on Washington DC, Herndon suggested to FAA HQ that someone should make a decision about military assistance. It is worth noting no one had made a decision at this point.
At 0953 FAA HQ told Herndon that the Deputy Director for ATC was talking to the FAA Deputy Administrator about scrambling aircraft.
Nine minutes later UA93 crashed, and no intercept request had been issued to the military.
At 1007 Cleveland Centre - who had originally managed UA93 - decided to go straight to the military, and notified NEADS about the flight. By this time they were no longer handling U93. and thus did not know it had crashed.
At 1010 the Langley fighters arrived over Washington DC and NEADS told them to look for UA93.
At 1017 they rang Washington Centre for an update on UA93, and found out it had crashed.
In the timeline for UA93 I see two critical delays. The first was Herndon's delay in telling FAA HQ they needed to make a decision on military intercept. Arguably, it is not Herndon's job to tell HQ to do anything - their job is to pass on information. Also consider they had a lot of things to deal with at once.
The second delay - and the only real legitimate concern, was how long it took FAA HQ to make a decision on requesting an intercept.
If we look at the timeline, by 0934 there was suspicion of a hijacking, at by 0939 it was almost certain. Thus it took 14 minutes for Head Quarters to begin making the decision about involving the military.
On its own, that's probably not a huge delay, but given that by this time 3 airliners had crashed into buildings, a decision probably could have been made sooner.
Of course that's not taking into account all of the other things the FAA were having to deal with - UA93 was not the only event in front of them. Understandably, the FAA gave priority to the other 4000+ airliners that had not been hijacked.
It is telling that records show it was two
deputies making the decision about military involvement with UA93. This suggests their superiors were busy with other matters.
Hey gumboot, I've read somewhere that the Director of Civil Aviation Security from the FAA was in frigging Puerto Rico at 9/11. Is he the hijacker manager for what you know, or did he designate someone else? Is that true? Well I gotta read some more.
I don't know. The role of hijack coordinator is not a person, it's a position. There's no reason to think it was not filled that day.
Arkan, the Sliney guy looks confused so we can't take his words as fact, because he says the command center is required to inform NORAD but then says they had "no process" to notify any military division. I dunno he just waves around, I posted the whole piece because I usually either quote a big part of the whole or I don't quote at all, it's just the way I like to quote.
Can I make a suggestion? If you are going to post enormous chunks of writing, could you bold the pieces you consider most important? Otherwise it can be difficult to identify what you want us to pay attention to.
I used the term "second-hand evidence" as the report from people that we're not at the spot, but hearsay witnesses, such as FAA managers, directors, and whatnot, in relation to what specific ATCs have or have not done. The only ones who have first hand evidence for the specific radar readings are those who had their eyes on it, or any record that they might have saved from that day (do they record radar info?)
Yes, they do record radar info. It was used extensively by the NTSB in constructing their flight path summaries. ATC communications are also recorded, and transcripts of the moments when each flight got hijacked are available.
It's important to note that the actual ATC controller has no duties regarding hijacking, other than to tell their supervisor what is happening. Information regarding what was happening quickly travelled up the chain of command to FAA HQ in the case of all four flights.
Yes funny enough, my case is built on lack of primary evidence available to us. Hence the thread topic title...
Primary evidence is next to useless for us. Would you know what a radar data read out meant? Would you be able to interpret a FDR report? Would you understand ATC transcripts without an accompanying report?
These are highly specialist areas and the primary resources are highly technical. Unfortunately we have to rely on official reports of this information to understand what was going on.
As a skeptic, it is important to look for any inconsistencies or gaps in the official summaries. When we find these, we have to go looking for explanations.
However, skepticism does not mean refusing to believe the official summaries at all, simply because they are official. This is irrational behaviour.
I've looked through all of the official summaries. I've found many holes, and sought documents to fill those holes. I've found military standing orders, FAA directives, US laws, FAA Regulations, tape recordings, studied maps, and so forth. I've tried as best I can to follow the highly technical threads here about FDRs and CVRs. I've dug up news articles and interviews with fighter pilots who were involved on 9/11. And so forth. I've filled all of those gaps. I find one or two here and there, but nothing that directly affects the speed of the military response to 9/11.
As it happens, once all of these gaps have been filled, the timeline I have still reflects those official summaries. That's just how it is.
-Gumboot