Idiot Proof Posting for Non Believer
Now NB, this is going to be a rather long post but I'd like you to read it and tell me where you disagree:
1. The principal design loads encountered in a tall building such as WTC are the dead load (the weight of the materials themselves), the live load (occupants and contents), and wind loads.
2. Even comparatively limited wind speeds can produce significant loads, because of the surface area, and it is important to appreciate that they will result in significant strains on the building; deflection is not constant across a face, raising torsional issues, the lee face will be in compression whilst the windward might be in compression, and so on.
3. It would be neither practical or economic to have one element carry all those loads; for example, the external envelope would have to comprise massive sections and cross bracing. The traditional (well, post-Louis Sullivan) approach has been a framed structure with frequent columns across the floor plate braced by large beam sections at floor level. Unfortunately this results in a significant loss of floor space and hence lower rental returns.
4. WTC therefore adopted what might be loosely termed a composite approach, with three principal structural elements acting together. A layman's comparison would be a space frame, which is far lighter and more efficient than a steel beam would be for the same loading.
5. The outer loadbearing facade comprised comparatively slim box sections, with staggered joints. This envelope carried the outer end of the floors (and hence around half the dead/live loads) and also the wind loadings.
6. The inner core comrpised section columns. These were significantly larger than the individual box sections because individually they were carrying greater loads (i.e. same or slightly larger loads, but less columns as available perimeter was less). In addition the core provided resistance to the bending moment caused by wind loads.
7. Of course for this system to work, it is necessary to transmit the loads betwixt the facade and the core. This was the work of the floor trusses, which redistributed wind loads (like a space frame) AND transmitted the dead/live loads to the other two elements.
8. An additional - and rather cute - feature of the design was the use of the so called hat trusses at high level; if you can imagine the bending moment in a high wind, one of the areas of greatest stress is at high level, and these trusses effectively acted as a very much beefed up version of the floors, stiffening the whole upper structure together and redistributing loads.
9. This is what Robertson - and the others - all mean when they say:
Another structural innovation was the outrigger space frame, which structurally linked the outside wall to the services core. This system performed several functions. First, gravity-induced vertical deformations between the columns of the services core and the columns of the outside wall were made equal at the top of the building; at other levels, the differential deformations were ameliorated. Second, wind-induced overturning moments were resisted in part by the columns of the services core, thus providing additional lateral stiffness. Finally, the weight of, and the wind-induced overturning moment from the rooftop antenna (440 feet tall) was distributed to all columns in the building . . . adding additional redundancy and toughness to the design.
11. Now, clearly the floor is supported at both ends and the loads largely distrbuted evenly (saving for allowance for the corners) between the outer facade and inner core. Similarly we know that cantilevering the floors from the core alone would be impractical due to cross-sectional sizes. Hence it is entirely wrong to suggest that the core was designed to take all floor loadings.
12. For a summary of mutch of the design, you might want to start with the FEMA report at
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/fema403_ch2.pdf .
13. On 911, the aircraft impacts caused damage to the cores through both connection (splice) failure and fracturing of the columns themselves. At WTC1 6 columns failed completely and 9 suffered significant damage. At WTC 2, 10 failed completely and 7 were badly damaged.
It is obvious that this would have compromised the ability of the core to carry loads.
14. We similarly know that there was damage to the external frame, compromising its ability to carry load.
15. You have questioned the intensity of the fire and effect on the floors. Now one of our best resources is the extensive NIST fire modelling, but I suspect you're going to claim that the results were fiddled so instead let's have a look Eagar's 2001 article -
http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM...agar-0112.html and his February 2002 presentation -
http://eagar.mit.edu/EagarPresentati...C_TMS_2002.pdf.
One of the first things his article inadvertently does is rubbish suggestions that smoke colour indicated a minor fire.
It is known that the WTC fire was a fuel-rich, diffuse flame as evidenced by the copious black smoke
He then goes on to deal with failure of steel due to "normal" office fires:
It is highly unlikely that the steel at the WTC experienced temperatures above the 750–800°C range. All reports that the steel melted at 1,500°C are using imprecise terminology at best.
and
Temperature of tower fires about the same as typical office fires
which means:
It is known that structural steel begins to soften around 425°C and loses about half of its strength at 650°C
Before coming to the conclusion that:
Even with its strength halved, the steel could still support two to three times the stresses imposed by a 650°C fire...The additional problem was distortion of the steel in the fire. The temperature of the fire was not uniform everywhere, and the temperature on the outside of the box columns was clearly lower than on the side facing the fire. The temperature along the 18 m long joists was certainly not uniform. Given the thermal expansion of steel, a 150°C temperature difference from one location to another will produce yield-level residual stresses. This produced distortions in the slender structural steel, which resulted in buckling failures. Thus, the failure of the steel was due to two factors: loss of strength due to the temperature of the fire, and loss of structural integrity due to distortion of the steel from the non-uniform temperatures in the fire.
16. We know that failure of the lightweight floor trusses led to buckling of the external facade over a significant area, to the point where the affected section could no longer carry any dead/live loads.
17. Some of this load was redistributed to adjacent external panels through the staggered jointing system (think of it as a natural arching structure) and some to the damaged inner core by way of the hat trusses. Neither had sufficient capacity to accept these loads, and failed - thus initiating the collapse.
18. The collapse of the floors and outer envelope would invariably lead to impact damage on the already weakened core. Whilst it is mass that would cause damage, it is nevertheless important to note that large sections of relatively intact debris can be clearly identified in photographs.
19. Similarly it is important to understand that the impact loads would not have been uniformly vertical. We know that parts of the structure tilted and rotated, placing transverse dynamic loads on the structure below. But the core was not built to accept transverse loads in isolation, only as part of the wider composite system. There would be little or no effective bracing.
20. In the same vein, the floors themselves were attached to the core and it would be niaive to believe that when dislodged the joints would neatly shear. Some damage to the core columns would be inevitable.
21. However this is largely academic as the outer envelope and core failed in quick succession as a result of redistributed loads.
Now, NB. Which bits of this do you disagree with, and why? Remember to provide a
detailed response for a change.