False dichotomy, and false.
First, I did not make any sort of logical argument with that statement, it was a simple statement of identification, so a fallacy of any stripe does not apply.
Second, I did not, nor did I imply, nor did I seek to state or imply that the world of reference books was limited to only encyclopedias and dictionaries, and never the twain shall meet. I have an encyclopedic dictionary, I've seen dictionaries of encyclopedias. There are also atlases, thesauruses, almanacs, indexes, and a plethora of others.
Third, and I realise this is only a grotty old "general dictionary" sort of definition:
en·cy·clo·pe·di·a
n. A comprehensive reference work containing articles on a wide range of subjects or on numerous aspects of a particular field, usually arranged alphabetically.
Are we next going to go six rounds about whether or not "comprehensive" and "in depth" are equivalent because you have special meanings for those words, to?
Fourth, the title of the work you referenced is the "Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy". It says it is an encyclopedia, and that's my basis for saying "Tsk. You provided an encyclopedia".
Hee hee, you cherry-picked there; you didn't give the rest of it. You really need to to do it properly.
That's why I put in all this bit here:
But, unfortunately, "In general, the term ‘relativism’ refers to many different ideas."
There is also:
"in moral philosophy ‘relativism’ is usually taken to suggest an empirical, a metaethical, or a normative position. The empirical position is usually:
Descriptive Moral Relativism (DMR). As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be."
It goes on, setting up another definition that seems to mirror our "general" defenition:
"Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons."
However: "It is important to note several distinctions that may be made in formulating different metaethical relativist positions."
"First, it is sometimes said that the truth or justification of moral judgments may be relative to an individual person as well as a group of persons."
"Second, that to which truth or justification is relative may be the persons making the moral judgments or the persons about whom the judgments are made."
"Finally, MMR may be offered as the best explanation of what people already believe, or it may be put forward as a position people ought to accept regardless of what they now believe."
Nope, still the conflation between subjectivism and relativism
That statement ("moral relativism, the view that moral truth or justification is relative to a culture or society." ) does not reference subjectivism at all, so how does it possibly "conflate" the two?
Hammegk clearly means something else than you do; therein lies the confusion.
That's possible. Hammy often means something other than what the face value of his statements seem to mean. That's why I was asking him clarifying questions.
Why don't you share what you think Hammy meant?
Tsk. Read it. Subjectism is the recognition of epistemological problems owing to individual perception.
Right... and that invalidates or differs from "the only valid standard of judgment is that of the individual" exactly how?
Wrong. The recognition of the epistemological problems leads directly to recognising moral statements have no truth values.
That does not follow, and your linked article even says the opposite:
"Cognitivism is the denial of non-cognitivism. Thus it holds that moral statements do express beliefs and that they are apt for truth and falsity."
" This variety [cognative] of subjectivism agrees with one of the positive non-cognitivist theses (that moral utterances conventionally express non-cognitive attitudes), but it does not agree with either of the essential negative non-cognitivist claims (that the judgements don't express beliefs and/or that they are not truth-apt). According to this subjectivist theory, the moral utterance expressed the speaker's belief that she approves of the action and this has truth conditions which are also the truth conditions of the sentence uttered. "
I don't think it is me that is confused.
Yet this does not make all moral statements of equal worth, since "worth" is a value judgment itself; relativism is properly used for the self-defeating stance that all morals are of equal worth.
See?
Subjectivism = recognition that moral statements have no truth values and eventually result from individual perception and cognition.
Relativism = the self-defeating stance that all morals are of equal worth.
I do not find that in your linked articles. Would you point out where it says that?
ETA: In any case, As I am not a "specialist", and as I was using the "general dictionary" definitions with which my posts agreed fully, and neither the Atheist not Hammy has expressed the need for a "special" vocabulary in this discussion, I do not see how I've "conflated" the two in this context.
I apologise for those "specialists" out there I may have thusly offended.
Indeed.
____________
But what do you have to say about nannies? Subjectively, of course.
I think it would be lovely to have a proper English nanny spank me and take me to bed. I'm very naughty.
And bring me a nice spot of tea after.
I loathed Fran Drescher though.