Materialism and Logic, mtually exclusive?

[I less than three logic]

If "it; that is Reality" exists, it is not metaphysical. Most here have concluded monism is the only logical intellectual position.

Whether 'everything that exists' is best described as "physical" with all the baggage that term carries, or "not physical; that is, immaterial", an intellectual position which also carries unexplicable implications.

In either case, whether this “stuff” is “physical” or “non-physical”, Stillthinkin still has the same problem. His position still seems dualistic. That there is a fundamental component that humans possess that allows us to “do logic” that nothing else has or can have; a soul, an incorporeal ball of think, or whatever you’d like to call it.

As long as everything is made from the same “stuff”, and this “stuff” is capable of “doing logic” when in the configuration of our as-perceived physical brain, then, at least theoretically, this “stuff” may be capable of “doing logic” in other as-perceived physical configurations. Stillthinkin appears to be denying even the possibility.

Also, I think all monisms are describing the exact same thing, the baggage and confusion only comes into play when attempting to address the unknown/unknowable.

 

[hodgy]

Adding a post here just because its interesting and I want to find it again next weeek. BTW - you're all wrong and I'm right - I'll tell you why next week .

 

[CapelDodger]

Adding a post here just because its interesting and I want to find it again next weeek. BTW - you're all wrong and I'm right - I'll tell you why next week .

And next week, like tomorrow, never comes .

 

[Fifty Thousand Bucks]

Monism Shmonism!

In either case, whether this “stuff” is “physical” or “non-physical”, Stillthinkin still has the same problem. His position still seems dualistic. That there is a fundamental component that humans possess that allows us to “do logic” that nothing else has or can have; a soul, an incorporeal ball of think, or whatever you’d like to call it.

As long as everything is made from the same “stuff”, and this “stuff” is capable of “doing logic” when in the configuration of our as-perceived physical brain, then, at least theoretically, this “stuff” may be capable of “doing logic” in other as-perceived physical configurations. Stillthinkin appears to be denying even the possibility.

Also, I think all monisms are describing the exact same thing, the baggage and confusion only comes into play when attempting to address the unknown/unknowable.

Sir:

The venerable William Ockam and his eponymous "Razor" are often referred to in support of minimalist theoretical commitments/enterprises. Undoubtedly, a theory categorizable as "monist" would be as minimalist as one can get.

However, it has sometimes been remarked (by Bernard Williams, among others) that you require however many explanatory principles you require. Truth be told, Ockham never suggested otherwise. Nor, btw, did Aristotle who was the first recorded person to make the same basic point.

So, arguments in the abstact for and agin monism are, let me put it gently, ********.

At the end of the day, we need howsoever many principles we need. And despite the omnniscience assumed by some, we don't know in advance/a priori, how many we need.

Eagerly, I await your and others' reply.

Cheers,

FTB

 

[Fifty Thousand Bucks]

Where do you ultimately stand?

Problem is, is there really any functional difference between immaterialism and materialism, Ham? Other than allowing for what might exist - since in both cases, everything could exist with some foundation in 'basic stuff' - and if that basic stuff is true either way...

Yeah, what is the difference, functionally, between materialism and immaterialism?

(Obviously, what ST is arguing for is some form of dualism...)

Dear Z-Dragon:

I apologize for taking so long to reply to this. It has been weighing on my mind since I read it but I've been busy (I have to eat and pay the bills) - as I'm sure you have been too. Despite what follows, I want to assure that you have, to my mind, raised a very worthwhile issue. Moreover, several subsequent postings are merely elaborations of your position.

Described at a sufficient level of generality, I agree, there is no difference functionally between materialism and - to use your term - immaterialsim.

However, such a level of abstraction may obscure important considerations.

Let me try to articulate my concern. (I'll count on you to recognize - via the principle of charity of interpretation, if nothing else - that tentativeness is not necessarily an indication that one is not stating what one genuinely believes at any given point in time.)

Suppose, then, our only options are materialim and idealism (= immaterialism, as you put it). Both are, as you say, monist - all is one and all or nothing - theories.

If these are my options, I've no doubt where I would stand. I would stand with materialism.

Let me try to explain my undergirding intuitions.

The thing is, I'm quite convinced that I am a physical/corporeal being. (As a consequence, I've never been impressed by the likes of, say, Descartes who talks about a clear distinct idea of myself as though my idea of myself is not plainly corporeal.)

Hence, any theory that not only doesn't accept that I'm corporeal, but which then tries to "explain it away", is, for me, a non-starter.

I don't mean to say that I couldn't be persuaded otherwise. But what I do mean to say is that such a theory will need to persuade me as a rational being, not try to bully me in Wittgensteinian fashion. In my experience, I've not yet run across any convincing argument concluding that I'm not really a physical/corporeal being.

Functionality is, of course, an equivocal term and relative/contextual.

So, at a less abstract level, I would maintain that idealism and materialism are not functionally equivalent.

If these are my options, that is, materialism or idealism, hey, I'm a materialist.

Paradoxically, after considering their postings, I suspect that RF and ST would say the same.

If you choose, you can remain so aloof theoretically as to avoid such commitments. Personally, I've entertained such possibilities and rejected them. I've rejected them, I suppose, because they've too removed me from my experience, feelings, and fellow human beings. Call it a herd mentality if you wish. I really don't care.

Where do you ultimately stand?

Cheers,

FTB

 

[Z]

Ultimately, in spite of everything, I'm a dualist of sorts. But, logically, I think that materialism is where it's at.

The main problem I see with most idealists, is that they're making the same claims as materialists, but trying to toss in lots of loopholes and dead space that their real pet woos could survive in. If it's all 'stuff', but that stuff is thought, there's room for ghosts and Gods and such.

But that same room exists for materialists, too. The big difference is that it's harder under materialism to believe in something that leaves no evidence behind.

That's my take on it, anyway.

 

[Fifty Thousand Bucks]

Elaboration?

Ultimately, in spite of everything, I'm a dualist of sorts. But, logically, I think that materialism is where it's at.

The main problem I see with most idealists, is that they're making the same claims as materialists, but trying to toss in lots of loopholes and dead space that their real pet woos could survive in. If it's all 'stuff', but that stuff is thought, there's room for ghosts and Gods and such.

But that same room exists for materialists, too. The big difference is that it's harder under materialism to believe in something that leaves no evidence behind.

That's my take on it, anyway.

Dear Z-Dragon:

I'm glad to see that you, like me, are not overly embarrassed by a bit of tentativeness ("That's my take on it, anyway"). I'm not yet sure whether you and I are in the minority on this on this thread. But I'm fairly sure it doesn't matter greatly to either of us.

I would - honestly - like more elaboration of your statment that you are a dualist of sorts but find that logically materialism is where it is at. Of course, you need not answer to my wishes. But, let me assure you, I would like to hear your further thoughts.

Why? Well, if nothing else, my own thoughts have not ceased growing - despite my age, which I shall not reveal. Hence, I might - and, I would add, it is probable that I may - learn something valuable/useful. With luck, we both will.

So, I could simply go at what you've said to argue this or that, and in future probably will , but right now, I'd like to hear more - that is, if you have the time and don't mind.

Cheers,

FTB

 

[I less than three logic]

Sir:

The venerable William Ockam and his eponymous "Razor" are often referred to in support of minimalist theoretical commitments/enterprises. Undoubtedly, a theory categorizable as "monist" would be as minimalist as one can get.

However, it has sometimes been remarked (by Bernard Williams, among others) that you require however many explanatory principles you require. Truth be told, Ockham never suggested otherwise. Nor, btw, did Aristotle who was the first recorded person to make the same basic point.

So, arguments in the abstact for and agin monism are, let me put it gently, ********.

At the end of the day, we need howsoever many principles we need. And despite the omnniscience assumed by some, we don't know in advance/a priori, how many we need.

Eagerly, I await your and others' reply.

Cheers,

FTB

Yes, at the end of the day, we need as many principles as we need. However, you can just go adding unfounded principles simply because you’re uncomfortable with the consequences of not having it.

There is absolutely zero evidence or reason to assume that our ability to experience or to “do logic” is the result of some special incorporeal component we have that everything else lacks. Experience is a funny thing; we have no solid evidence of its existence anywhere but our own. Likewise, we have no evidence against the existence of this phenomenon elsewhere. I simply cannot know if you, or anything else for that matter, experience or not. At best I can take your word on it, and that is where our (humans) difference lies. We have the ability to communicate abstractly, thus providing a means to share our experiences. But to extrapolate that into believing we are the only things capable of such experience, despite the complete lack of evidence supporting this, is simply a product of our delusion of grandeur.

 

[Fifty Thousand Bucks]

Sharing Experiences. Really?

Yes, at the end of the day, we need as many principles as we need. However, you can just go adding unfounded principles simply because you’re uncomfortable with the consequences of not having it.

There is absolutely zero evidence or reason to assume that our ability to experience or to “do logic” is the result of some special incorporeal component we have that everything else lacks. Experience is a funny thing; we have no solid evidence of its existence anywhere but our own. Likewise, we have no evidence against the existence of this phenomenon elsewhere. I simply cannot know if you, or anything else for that matter, experience or not. At best I can take your word on it, and that is where our (humans) difference lies. We have the ability to communicate abstractly, thus providing a means to share our experiences. But to extrapolate that into believing we are the only things capable of such experience, despite the complete lack of evidence supporting this, is simply a product of our delusion of grandeur.

Dear I +:

But your mention of addition misses the point, then, doesn't it. As I et al say, we need however many principles we need - not however many we may add.

"Need" suggests foundedness. Don't you think?

Fine, "need" is contextual. But it still suggests "foundedness."

"Experience is a funny thing." Really" as in, say, odd?

I would think that my experience is the least funny thing in the cosmos. But that's how I find it. You?

And re as your "no evidence" claim, I would ask, "Really?" I would have thought I had lots of evidence. Granted it is inferential, numberless animals around me seem to exhibit experience -despite their inability to communicate it to me in human language. Am I deluded in thinking it quite solid evidence? Does it suggest something else to you? But then I don't require Cartesian certainty - whatever that is - to subscribe to various claims. Do you?

And, btw, aren't you rather teasing contradiction by speaking of "sharing our experiences"? After all, you say that you cannot know if others have experience. If you wish to push the point about believing that only we share experience as a mistake (or as the truth?), a little more care in expression is called for.

I won't even begin to deal with "delusions of granduer". Perhaps a subsequent post.

I'll admit, your post is, if nothing else, "breathtaking".

Cheers,

FTB

 

[Z]

I would - honestly - like more elaboration of your statment that you are a dualist of sorts but find that logically materialism is where it is at. Of course, you need not answer to my wishes. But, let me assure you, I would like to hear your further thoughts.

Well, the fact is I'm of two minds, after a fashion: I am quite comfortable with logic and reason, and embrace the scientific world of 'what is'. I'm quite fine with the idea that all of THIS is matter - whatever matter is - and that it all obeys certain rules. Even the uncomfortable reality that ultimately materialism means magic, the afterlife, and all those wonderful things don't really exist doesn't bother me much, on a logical perspective.

The other mind is more emotional and intuitive. This is the part that tells me there's more to the universe than unfeeling matter. This part tells me that things aren't always what they seem; that things are usually not at all what they seem. This is the part that causes me to believe in some sort of divine reality, some vast intelligence that is responsible for 'all of THIS'.

The only way I ever felt truly comfortable - not that my comfort makes me right or wrong - was to attempt to reconcile what I knew with what I felt. The best way I came up with was to rationalize that reality is dual in nature: on the one hand, that which is real (materialism); on the other hand, that which is unreal (idealism). But by 'unreal' I don't mean 'doesn't exist'; rather, I mean that I feel there are things that aren't a part of reality as such, but exist in a form that still has an effect on reality.

It's not easy for me to put into words. I feel, for example, that spirits exist - that the key to living matter is something unreal, an 'essence' of life that exists in all living things. This isn't quite like a soul, in my opinion; more like an energy of sorts that causes us to live. This energy may carry part of who we are, but when we die, it breaks up and ends up a part of other life later - perhaps scattering among thousands or millions of beings, mingling with life energy from other beings... Much like our cellular matter dies, breaks down, and eventually forms something else.

That doesn't do much for the idea of an afterlife, obviously...

Another example: I think there is a Creator; that some intelligent being made All That Is within herself (or of her own Being). But this Creator, I think, is no more interested in humankind as she is in any other phenomenon. Perhaps she experiences through us, or perhaps we're an interesting glitch to be observed from a distance. Don't know. Don't care.

In spite of learning how to be a skeptic, I also personally hold that things can exist until disproven - as opposed to the usual view that things don't exist unless proven to exist.

I also think ideas - imagination, thought, whatever - have an existence of their own. My logical portions look at it this way: if a human has an idea of a thing - dragons, Gods, faeries - then that idea becomes a part of the motivations and processes of that human. So in a way, every imaginary event in someone's mind influences reality.

And, of course, the more people who carry an idea, the more effect that idea has.

I suppose I'd be seen as a dime-store schizo or something... but these are my beliefs. I don't claim they're based on evidence or reality, and I rarely discuss them here - simply because I'm fully aware of the ephemeral basis for these beliefs, and that they have no place among the skeptics here.

See, I'm fine with people believing something - as long as they're honest about their belief. If they claim to 'know' that God exists, they're wrong. They can believe God exists all they want, but the moment they try to prove God's existence, I become a skeptic.

Look at this topic, for example. ST thinks that materialism is, for some reason, incompatible with logic; but the reason he thinks this is an assumption that the human mind is more than matter! This is, of course, unprovable. He may be right (about the mind), but his belief that minds are more than matter does not constitute a firm basis to deny materialism based on the existence of logic!

Yet if he had said that he believes logic and materialism are mutually exclusive, based on other beliefs he holds - I'd be fine with that.

I hope that helps clarify things a little.

 

[I less than three logic]

Dear I +:

I +?

But your mention of addition misses the point, then, doesn't it. As I et al say, we need however many principles we need - not however many we may add.

"Need" suggests foundedness. Don't you think?

Fine, "need" is contextual. But it still suggests "foundedness."

You’re treading awfully close to equivocation here. Don’t confuse “need” as what is required with human “need” or desire. Some people impose a need for a soul because they’re uncomfortable with the consequences of viewing themselves as entirely materialistic. This is fallacious reasoning and most certainly doesn’t suggest “foundedness”.

And re as your "no evidence" claim, I would ask, "Really?" I would have thought I had lots of evidence. Granted it is inferential, numberless animals around me seem to exhibit experience -despite their inability to communicate it to me in human language. Am I deluded in thinking it quite solid evidence? Does it suggest something else to you? But then I don't require Cartesian certainty - whatever that is - to subscribe to various claims. Do you?

No, I tend to agree with you. However, this response completely dismisses the p-zombie argument. They are able to communicate or exhibit experience just as well as anyone, yet by definition they lack any experience. Therefore, the ability to communicate or exhibit experience is not enough to prove something has experience. I’m not sure if I accept the p-zombie thing either, but it seems able to withstand counter-arguments well.

This response also seems to suggest you haven’t read all of stillthinkin’s posts in this thread. He’s already differentiated humans as containing some fundamental immaterial component that animals and anything else do not.

The fact is, human beings are very enigmatic and bizarre things. We have many similarities with animals, but I think the differences are even greater. I find the dismissal "X is nothing but Y" is resorted to a little too easily, and is often accepted without argument.

The being proposed in P2 which exists and does logical inference is "me". If I can find nothing else besides "me", and things like me (human beings) which can do this, then we have to ask -- what is different about us?

And, btw, aren't you rather teasing contradiction by speaking of "sharing our experiences"? After all, you say that you cannot know if others have experience. If you wish to push the point about believing that only we share experience as a mistake (or as the truth?), a little more care in expression is called for.

Careful with your equivocation again, “share” was in the same sentence as communicate. Try to read things in context. We are able to communicate our experiences with each other, to describe them. However, according to the p-zombie argument, as stated above, this does not provide ample evidence that they are experiencing.

 

[stillthinkin]

And that's a fundamental straw man.

Materialist theories of being have a perfectly good place for concepts such as 'correct', 'mistaken', etc - they are illusory labels, inventions of human thought, used to deal with certain brain processes and social situations. Truth and falsehood don't exist in nature. They are inventions of human thought.

There's no need to abandon them in the materialist metaphysic; rather, the need is to recognize the source of such notions, and the limitations that result. For example, 'good' will only ever be a subjective notion, no matter what group of people want to label things 'good' or 'evil'. What's good for one is evil for another; there's no objective good, no objective evil.

That, I think, is the biggest reason people flock to other metaphysics: they WANT there to be objective moral codes. They WANT some superior authority to tell them what is right, and what is wrong; so that they can assert that authority over others.

But the authority just doesn't exist.

If what you say is true, then nothing of what you say is true. That is why materialism and logic are contradictory. The hypothesis of materialism collapses in self-contradiction. By the way, I like your use of the phrase "perfectly good place", and how it follows from what you say in the next paragraph that it could just as easily be "perfectly evil place". By your way of thinking, the statements "materialism is true" and "materialism is false" are just as meaningful, and just as meaningless.

 

[stillthinkin]

Precisely where I was going - I didnt think we would get here this fast.

Says you on post #309. You call that fast?

Well it sure looked just a few posts back like we still had a long way to go just to get here...

We not only talk about truth and correctness, we are relying on them, fundamentally, in this thread.

So is this thread more than "talk"?

Hey... that is what my wife always asks me... is that you, honey?

If we need to redefine "truth" to be something no one means it to be...

What do you think people mean "truth" to be?

Well, you seemed eager to redefine it in pragmatic "what works" terms, perhaps you can speculate on what definition you think are abandoning? I would say people certainly dont mean "what works".

...we might have a hard time not redefining "logic"? How would a statement be measured against the "what works" definition? If logical inference is a "truth preserver", and truth is now "what works", then what is logic?

Oh dear, we're back to "logic" again. I thought we were getting somewhere.

See thread title? You arent thinking that "logic" is now a dirty word, like "semantics" and "dualism" I hope.

If logical inference is a "truth preserver" then it's completely unproblematic. Logic is just a mechanical procedure. The results of logical inference contain no new information that wasn't contained in the premises. I can infer that my brother's father's brother's son is my cousin. But I haven't discovered any new "truth" in doing this.

We can get very far along, and achieve astonishing and bizarre results, simply by applying logic. We discover very new truths indeed.

Lets try and stick to questions about truth, correctness, error etc. We don't really want to spend another 8 pages arguing over whether computers do logic, do we?

First you want to kill the thread, now you want to drive! Honey, that is you isnt it...?

 

[Z]

If what you say is true, then nothing of what you say is true. That is why materialism and logic are contradictory. The hypothesis of materialism collapses in self-contradiction. By the way, I like your use of the phrase "perfectly good place", and how it follows from what you say in the next paragraph that it could just as easily be "perfectly evil place". By your way of thinking, the statements "materialism is true" and "materialism is false" are just as meaningful, and just as meaningless.

Word play - no substance. There's no contradiction at all.

Yes, phrases like 'materialism is true' and 'materialism is false' is just as meaningful or meaningless. This doesn't cause a contradiction, though, until you apply a paradigm of some sort to the terms. Then it is the paradigm that is to blame, not the statements themselves.

If I say X-3=j and X-4=j, there's no contradiction until we attempt to define X and j (hell, and 3, for that matter). Both statements are equally meaningless until the terms are defined; then one can be shown true, and one false, within the given paradigm.

Or does materialism also contradict mathematics, now?

 

[chriswl]

Well, you seemed eager to redefine it in pragmatic "what works" terms, perhaps you can speculate on what definition you think are abandoning? I would say people certainly dont mean "what works".

I don't think most people have a clear definition to hand of what they mean by "truth". Its one of those "I know it when I see it" kind of things. "What works" as a suggested definition may seem strange to most people but I suspect the alternatives would seem similarly strange or completely empty.

Perhaps naturalism (not just materialism) does kill the notion of a kind of absolute truth. But is this a problem? Was this notion coherent enough to be worth defending anyway?

We can get very far along, and achieve astonishing and bizarre results, simply by applying logic. We discover very new truths indeed.

But those truths were always there, hidden in the premises all along. The process of uncovering them is a straightforward, mechanical process requiring no creativity. This is why machines (and simple ones at that) can do logic but they can't write symphonies or novels. That's why in science fiction stories robots that can only be strictly logical are seen as less than human.

You said yourself, logic is a truth preserver. That's all it does, preserve already established truths. What is often claimed to be a problem is how these truths come into being in the first place in a world of particles and velocities. That is not a problem about logic.

First you want to kill the thread, now you want to drive! Honey, that is you isnt it...?

I'm just trying to separate out what I think are interesting questions from what I think are simple and uninteresting misunderstandings.

 

[stillthinkin]

You got your definition of illusion from wiki -- dont do that, it make some people upset. You should use princeton: "illusion: an erroneous mental representation". I think "illusion" is better term for our purposes here than "hallucination" is. Maybe "delusion" would work too.

Delusion is better.

Let's go with "delusion" then.

Precisely where I was going - I didnt think we would get here this fast. If "correct" and "mistaken" and "true" and "untrue" do not fit in a materialist theory of being - perhaps it is the theory itself that is incomplete? Truth and falsehood seem pretty darn basic. I am not prepared to abandon them. I do not feel rationally compelled to do so - quite the contrary.

I see no conflict between mistakes, true and so on with materialism.

Can you agree with this statement: if materialism is true, then mistakes are impossible, and therefore when we believe we have made one it is a delusion.

 

[stillthinkin]

I don't think most people have a clear definition to hand of what they mean by "truth". Its one of those "I know it when I see it" kind of things. "What works" as a suggested definition may seem strange to most people but I suspect the alternatives would seem similarly strange or completely empty.

I dont think your proposed definition of truth will survive a materialist accounting either. In a materialist world, there is no such thing as something that doesnt work; the idea is just as illusory. (AWPrime - read "delusional")

Perhaps naturalism (not just materialism) does kill the notion of a kind of absolute truth. But is this a problem? Was this notion coherent enough to be worth defending anyway?

Actually the fundamental problem is determinism. No one has pointed it out, but throughout my arguments the issue has been that matter is presumed to be deterministic.
It depends on what you mean by "absolute truth". I find the addition of the word "absolute" somewhat unnecessary. However, I think that you will find most definitions of the word will die the same death under any deterministic scheme.

But those truths were always there, hidden in the premises all along. The process of uncovering them is a straightforward, mechanical process requiring no creativity.

The process of uncovering even a single new result in mathematics (for example) is an amazing and wonderful spectacle, and the dream of mathematicians. There is nothing straightforward, mechanical, or uncreative about it at all. Further, the notion of truths being hidden, known by no one, is, I think, something of an absolutist one.

This is why machines (and simple ones at that) can do logic but they can't write symphonies or novels.

If machines can do logic, but cant make mistakes - what would we mean by a "bug"? And actually, a machine can write a novel - in fact, I doubt you have ever seen a book that was not written by a machine. I am speaking of course of a printing press, which writes a novel as much as a computer, abacus, or marble game does logic.

That's why in science fiction stories robots that can only be strictly logical are seen as less than human.

I have had the sneaking suspicion that a number of people on this thread were avid science fiction fans. The phenomenon of the sadly-merely-logical thinking machine is a product of romanticism, which disparaged reason and rationality... and of course, logic.

You said yourself, logic is a truth preserver. That's all it does, preserve already established truths.

That is not all it does - but it does do that. As you have already pointed out, it can reveal hidden truths heretofore unknown.

What is often claimed to be a problem is how these truths come into being in the first place in a world of particles and velocities. That is not a problem about logic.

It is as much a problem about logic as it is about truth. If truth goes down, so does logic.

I'm just trying to separate out what I think are interesting questions from what I think are simple and uninteresting misunderstandings.

You jumped quite quickly, it seemed to me, from our "matter doesnt make mistakes" discussions right to "the boat of truth is sinking" (my metaphor). Why was that?

 

[stillthinkin]

Word play - no substance. There's no contradiction at all.

Yes, phrases like 'materialism is true' and 'materialism is false' is just as meaningful or meaningless. This doesn't cause a contradiction, though, until you apply a paradigm of some sort to the terms. Then it is the paradigm that is to blame, not the statements themselves.

If I say X-3=j and X-4=j, there's no contradiction until we attempt to define X and j (hell, and 3, for that matter). Both statements are equally meaningless until the terms are defined; then one can be shown true, and one false, within the given paradigm.

Or does materialism also contradict mathematics, now?

It seems to me that you are doing the word play. We already have a paradigm, it is called "the English language". We also have the entire context of this thread, and we have already touched upon the definition of materialism and truth.

In the context of mathematical notation, both your statements are fine. Each defines a straight line on the Xj coordinate system. If you want to say that the statement X-3=j actually means "I like peanut butter", then you are the one playing word games, as with the statements above about materialism.

Obviously if logic is unachieveable in a materialist framework, then so is mathematics.

 

[Z]

....Thereby proving conclusively how clueless you really are, ST.

My suggestion to you: keep thinking. One day, you might get it right.

In the meantime, what has been conclusively proven, for the audience (since we know ST isn't actually reading anything), is that materialism and logic are clearly compatible - indeed, that logic depends on a materialist paradigm. We have conclusively proven that ST is working from a dualist assumption, one he is unwilling to let go of even for hypothetical situations. Further, we have proven that, if ST's point is to be proven, he must demonstrate the existence of ANY single non-material thing which can 'do logic'... for that matter, that he has to demonstrate the existence of any non-material thing... or his entire argument falls flat.

His argument amounts to an assumption that something (the human mind) does logic, and is not material; and a lesser assumption that no material thing, anywhere, any time, can ever do logic. Hence, he demonstrates his inability to think without assumptions, his inability to grasp the basics of materialism, his complete lack of logical capacity, and his lack of imagination - all at once.

Gentle Reader, I ask you... where is the substance of his statement? Where is the beef, as they say?

If materialism is true, then humans are purely material. If humans are purely material, then logic is done by a material thing. This isn't hard to understand. No problems there.

 

[Fifty Thousand Bucks]

I Can Sleep Fitfully Without P-Zombies

Dear ILTTL:

I +?

I'm sorry. The "+" was placed there with playful purpose (given what I immediately went on to say about addition). It was not intended to insult.

You’re treading awfully close to equivocation here. Don’t confuse “need” as what is required with human “need” or desire. Some people impose a need for a soul because they’re uncomfortable with the consequences of viewing themselves as entirely materialistic. This is fallacious reasoning and most certainly doesn’t suggest “foundedness”.

The word "equivocation" has been mentioned a lot in this thread. What are we talking about when we speak of it? The usual account goes like this. I equivocate when I use a word in more than one way. Normally, using a word in more than one way requires that I use the word twice - otherwise we are talking about mere ambiguity.

And what was it I said the led you to say I’m treading close to equivocation? This:

But your mention of addition misses the point, then, doesn't it. As I et al say, we need however many principles we need - not however many we may add.
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"Need" suggests foundedness. Don't you think?
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Fine, "need" is contextual. But it still suggests "foundedness."
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Well, then, what did I write in the foregoing that suggested equivocation to you? I certainly wrote the word “need” all four times with the intention of using it the same way. Even now, I can’t detect any shift in my usage. Again, what suggested equivocation to you?

If your real concern is ambiguity, not equivocation, let me say that you can substitute the word “necessity” and reformulate. But such substitution still won’t settle all. Why? Because the necessity of which we would be speaking is the necessity involved in theory construction – reducible, I suspect, to neither metaphysical nor logical necessity.

In any case, I see nothing in my words which trade on ambiguity. Do you?

I may as well say it here, now. I’m just not impressed by stories of p-zombies and their ilk. Rather than delve into the minutiae of such stories and their purported salutary effects, philosophically speaking, I’ll simply say that I don’t bow my head on hearing Cartesian/Skeptical dicta on what is to count as “knowledge.”

By the way, I usually take “communicate”, “express”, “exhibit”, etc. as success terms. Understood in this way, it is contradictory to hold that something communicates experience but lacks experience. (This doesn’t mean we can’t use the words in other ways. Fine.) We are every bit as much (and to my way of thinking more) entitled to say that the thing isn’t really communicating experience as to say it doesn’t have any experience to communicate.

Sure, I’m dismissive of the p-zombie argument. I'll sleep fitfully without p-zombies.


Cheers,


FTB